Re-visiting the screet-car dilemma

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Unfortunately it is not possible to posit 4 different votes. So use your own words to describe your decisions - and please give reasons for your decisions. .
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It is very simple for me. I have two choices:
  1. Do nothing and kill five people.
  2. Do something and kill one person.
I would choose to kill less people.
 
…Presumably, the saving of 5 lives would be a proportionate reason and there is a grave reason why the one person should be exposed to mortal danger.
I see it not as saving five lives but ending only one. This is not just semantics either.
 
Perhaps there is no difference in flipping the switch and stabbing with a knife, and I’m wrong. I’d argue that there is a difference, however.
In the stipulated street-car scenario, the “stabbing” cannot be an option, not even hypothetically. In a different scenario, it could be. Suppose those people are captured by terrorists, and they are told that they will be executed. Suppose that you are the only one to have the ways and means to rescue them (by killing a guard), then you could invoke the double-effect principle.
Again, Catholicism agrees with you, and again, through the doctrine of double effect.
We are talking about the same thing, using different words. I am saying that the killing is morally justified in the terrorist case, because it is morally superior to save the hostages. If the death of the hostage taker is unavoidable it does not matter if it was intended or just an unfortunate by-product of the necessary action. Observe, I do not say that the end (rescuing the people) justifies the means. I fully agree that the “end can never justify the means”. I am saying that in this case the end and the mans form a justifyable sequence of actions. There is a difference between the two.

The church says somewhat otherwise. You are not supposed admit or accept (internally) that the guard’s death is an integral part of the sequence. You must “distance” yourself, by stipulating that the death was never intended. In my eyes this is simply hypocritical.
 
I’m not the one to decide who lives and dies. I have to leave it in God’s hands.
Unfortunately this is not always a viable option. Sometimes the circumstances force you to act (or refrain from acting) and accept the consequences.
Self defense or defending someone else from a killer are different situation. I would kill a wrong-doer trying to kill an innocent person.
Agreed.
 
Switch the track. Principle of Double Effect applies. I am surprised this question seems to be troubling or confusing people, but Catholic Moral Theology is fairly clear that you are allowed to switch the track.
Agreed.
This scenario does not involve the good effects coming from the death of the one person. If the scenario were re-written such that say for instance, you took one of the passangers off and threw him under the trolly to slow it down before it killed the 5 people, then that would indeed be murder and not permissible.
Would you care to comment on the terrorist scenario?
 
If the scenario were re-written such that say for instance, you took one of the passangers off and threw him under the trolly to slow it down before it killed the 5 people, then that would indeed be murder and not permissible.
Now this is an excellent problem.

In both cases you need to perform an act of volition - switch the track or throw someone onto the track. The end result is the same in both cases: one person dies and 5 lives. In both cases you could invoke the “double effect” - you did not intend to kill the person you threw onto the track, it was just an unfortunate by-product of the action to slow the tram down. What is the reason that one is permissible and the other is now?
 
We are talking about the same thing, using different words. I am saying that the killing is morally justified in the terrorist case, because it is morally superior to save the hostages. If the death of the hostage taker is unavoidable it does not matter if it was intended or just an unfortunate by-product of the necessary action.
I’m sorry, I don’t think I worded myself clearly. If we’re trying to stop the hostage taker from killing somebody by attacking him, then the scenario would be comparable to self-defence.

But I was thinking of there being 7 innocent people in a hostage situation. You are one of them and you have to kill another one of them to prevent the other 5 being killed.

Killing the one innocent person as a means to prevent the death of 5 others is not an act of self-defence, and it would be impermissible under Catholic morality, but may be permissible under some secular theories.
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Katholish:
If the scenario were re-written such that say for instance, you took one of the passangers off and threw him under the trolly to slow it down before it killed the 5 people, then that would indeed be murder and not permissible.
That’s similar to what I had in mind in my poorly worded terrorist scenario, but it is still a slightly different question.

In a terrorist situation where you have to, on order of the hostage-taker, kill an innocent person so that he doesn’t kill the other 5, you are directly killing an innocent person, and only once he is killed, will the terrorist release the other 5. The act of killing one person is the means by which a positive outcome is achieved. This would be impermissible.

In the modified street-car scenario, when you throw one of the passengers underneath to slow it down to prevent it killing the other 5, you are using that person as a means to slowing it down, which is impermissible. How that is different from the original scenario is that your action of throwing a passenger under has one effect which leads to a positive outcome, whereas diverting the tram has two simultaneous effects that occur after your initial action.

Two other interesting questions arise:

Would it be permissible to throw oneself under the street-car to save the other 5 people?

And would it be permissible to throw another passenger under the streetcar if it were impossible for him to do it himself and he asked for your help in order to do it?
 
I’m sorry, I don’t think I worded myself clearly. If we’re trying to stop the hostage taker from killing somebody by attacking him, then the scenario would be comparable to self-defence.

But I was thinking of there being 7 innocent people in a hostage situation. You are one of them and you have to kill another one of them to prevent the other 5 being killed.

Killing the one innocent person as a means to prevent the death of 5 others is not an act of self-defence, and it would be impermissible under Catholic morality, but may be permissible under some secular theories.
Now I think understand, thank you. I wonder if the catholic morality would consider the concept of “self-defence” literally - defending yourself? Or does it also include the defence of others? Maybe the defence of one’s children, or the defence of my neighbor’s children, or maybe even the neighbors themselves? Where does this circle end, if there is a circle at all? Is it permissible by the catholic stance to defend a complete stranger? Can you enlighten me about this?

Nevertheless, I will try to answer. Let me make sure I do understand properly. There are 7 people taken hostages, myself included. The terrorist offers me two options: 1) if I kill one of the other hostages, then all the others will be set free… and 2) if I decline it, then all the others will be killed, muself included. Is that correct? Or is it still imprecise? Maybe I will be let go free even if I decline? The difference seems to be important. If I will also be killed, then the “self-defence” applies. If I will be set free no matter how I choose, then I can use the following principle: "if the circumstances force me to choose between a “bad” and a “worse” options, I would choose the one which is “less bad”. In my eyes to save 5 people is less bad than allowing all the others to die. (By the way, that is not really a “terrorist scenario”, since the “terrorist” does not gain anything in either case. I would consider it a “crazy person scenario”.)
In the modified street-car scenario, when you throw one of the passengers underneath to slow it down to prevent it killing the other 5, you are using that person as a means to slowing it down, which is impermissible.
Why is it impermissible? We always use “others” just like others are always “use” us. Is it impermissible because the “used” person will probably die? Would it be permissible to “use” this person by forcing him to throw big weight on the track to do the slow-down?
Two other interesting questions arise:

Would it be permissible to throw oneself under the street-car to save the other 5 people?
Naturally. That would fall under self-sacrifice or suicide. Funny thing is, if the person would consider it self-sacrifice, the catholic morality would support it. If he simply wanted to end his life, it would be considered “sinful”. So complicated. 🙂 In my world it is his business and that is it.
And would it be permissible to throw another passenger under the streetcar if it were impossible for him to do it himself and he asked for your help in order to do it?
Yes it would. Obviously. This is a modified assisted suicide scenario with an added benevolent twist to it.
 
Now I think understand, thank you. I wonder if the catholic morality would consider the concept of “self-defence” literally - defending yourself? Or does it also include the defence of others? Maybe the defence of one’s children, or the defence of my neighbor’s children, or maybe even the neighbors themselves? Where does this circle end, if there is a circle at all? Is it permissible by the catholic stance to defend a complete stranger? Can you enlighten me about this?
If I understand Catholic teaching correctly, then there is no circle, and yes, it is permissible to use force to defend yourself or anybody else from unjust aggression. The use of force in itself is not immoral, as much as the sport of boxing is not immoral. Should, in the situation of self-defence or the defence of others, death result from the use of that force, it is one of its two effects, the bad effect being the taking of the life of the unjust aggressor, and the good effect being the preservation of the life of the innocent victim.
Nevertheless, I will try to answer. Let me make sure I do understand properly. There are 7 people taken hostages, myself included. The terrorist offers me two options: 1) if I kill one of the other hostages, then all the others will be set free… and 2) if I decline it, then all the others will be killed, muself included. Is that correct? Or is it still imprecise? Maybe I will be let go free even if I decline? The difference seems to be important. If I will also be killed, then the “self-defence” applies. If I will be set free no matter how I choose, then I can use the following principle: "if the circumstances force me to choose between a “bad” and a “worse” options, I would choose the one which is “less bad”. In my eyes to save 5 people is less bad than allowing all the others to die. (By the way, that is not really a “terrorist scenario”, since the “terrorist” does not gain anything in either case. I would consider it a “crazy person scenario”.)
I actually wasn’t that specific in my own mind about it, and you point out several interesting distinctions.

If you were yourself to be killed, I still think it would be impermissible, as the innocent person is not the one who is threatening your life, and so it wouldn’t be self-defence. If you were to attack the hostage-taker to prevent him from taking your life and the lives of others, then that would be self-defence and the defence of others.

The distinction between Catholic morality and what you suggest is that you’re deciding on the permissibility of the action based on the consequences, whereas Catholic morality looks at the action itself to decide if it’s permissible.

So the consequence of the direct killing of an innocent person is the preservation of the lives of 5 (or 6) others, which from your perspective, makes the action less bad than not killing the innocent person.

From the Catholic perspective, the killing of the innocent person is objectively wrong under all circumstances and the consequences are irrelevant. The action doesn’t become less bad if it was a means to save 5 innocent lives. You’ve still killed an innocent person and killing an innocent person can never be right or “less bad” than not killing an innocent person. Your culpability in terms of sin may be reduced by your intentions or the fact you’ve acted under duress but what you’ve done is still gravely wrong because the actual act is the same as if you had killed the innocent person for any other reason.
Why is it impermissible? We always use “others” just like others are always “use” us. Is it impermissible because the “used” person will probably die? Would it be permissible to “use” this person by forcing him to throw big weight on the track to do the slow-down?
It is your very act of killing that person that brings about the good result. It is the direct consequence of his death. It is his death that slows the tram. In the scenario in the original post, it was not the death of that one person that saved the other five. It was merely a side effect of diverting the street-car.
Naturally. That would fall under self-sacrifice or suicide. Funny thing is, if the person would consider it self-sacrifice, the catholic morality would support it. If he simply wanted to end his life, it would be considered “sinful”. So complicated. 🙂 In my world it is his business and that is it.
I think so too, but I’m not entirely sure.
Yes it would. Obviously. This is a modified assisted suicide scenario with an added benevolent twist to it.
That was precisely my point and assisted suicide is exactly what I had in mind, but indeed with the added benevolent twist, so we could call it “assisted self-sacrifice.” I’m inclined to agree with your conclusion too, but I’d be interested to see how that would work out in Catholic philosophy.
 
Now this is an excellent problem.

In both cases you need to perform an act of volition - switch the track or throw someone onto the track. The end result is the same in both cases: one person dies and 5 lives. In both cases you could invoke the “double effect” - you did not intend to kill the person you threw onto the track, it was just an unfortunate by-product of the action to slow the tram down. What is the reason that one is permissible and the other is now?
But your not playing by the rules! Your changing the scenario! :rolleyes:
 
If I understand Catholic teaching correctly, then there is no circle, and yes, it is permissible to use force to defend yourself or anybody else from unjust aggression. The use of force in itself is not immoral, as much as the sport of boxing is not immoral. Should, in the situation of self-defence or the defence of others, death result from the use of that force, it is one of its two effects, the bad effect being the taking of the life of the unjust aggressor, and the good effect being the preservation of the life of the innocent victim.
Agreed. Even though you did not specify here, but the amount of force used should not be excessive. Though just what is “excessive” would be very hard to measure.
The distinction between Catholic morality and what you suggest is that you’re deciding on the permissibility of the action based on the consequences, whereas Catholic morality looks at the action itself to decide if it’s permissible.
Yes, indeed. I am aware of this difference, though I cannot agree with the catholic stance. To view an act in isolation is absurd. How could an act be judged separated from its circumstances? Looking back to one of the previous posts I found this quote:
“1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.”
Let’s look at perjury. Perjury is lying under oath in court. Suppose one is a winess (in the Nazi Germany), under oath, and the prosecution is demanding to testify about the whereabouts some Jews. In such a case “perjury” not just not “immoral”, but it would be the duty of any witness. My point is that it is impossible to separate the act and judge it in and by itself. There are cases where I find myself in agreement with the church, but in this particular case I could not disagree more vehemently.

Let’s consider murder, too. Suppose you have proof positive that a person intends to destroy the whole catholic church (not talking about the buildings here, but the whole schmeer :)) and also has the ways and means to do it, thereby depriving all the future generations of the guidance the church would provide. (Extra ecclesiam nulla salus). Suppose the only way to prevent this act is to kill the person before he could act. Don’t you think that the benefit of saving the church would outweigh the negative aspect of killing one person?
So the consequence of the direct killing of an innocent person is the preservation of the lives of 5 (or 6) others, which from your perspective, makes the action less bad than not killing the innocent person.
I would use a slightly different wording. To have one person kiiled is less bad than to have 6 people killed.
From the Catholic perspective, the killing of the innocent person is objectively wrong under all circumstances and the consequences are irrelevant.
I know, and directly above I gave my reasons for my disagreement.
 
Let’s look at perjury. Perjury is lying under oath in court. Suppose one is a winess (in the Nazi Germany), under oath, and the prosecution is demanding to testify about the whereabouts some Jews. In such a case “perjury” not just not “immoral”, but it would be the duty of any witness. My point is that it is impossible to separate the act and judge it in and by itself. There are cases where I find myself in agreement with the church, but in this particular case I could not disagree more vehemently.
A person or institution that intends on doing evil with some particular piece of information has no right to that piece of information.

It would be the Catholic’s duty not to lie, but to remain silent, even on pain of death. In practice, I imagine many Catholics would lie. It would be a sin, but I’d imagine in this situation, it wouldn’t be a mortal sin, i.e. a sin that would endanger one’s salvation.
Let’s consider murder, too. Suppose you have proof positive that a person intends to destroy the whole catholic church (not talking about the buildings here, but the whole schmeer :)) and also has the ways and means to do it, thereby depriving all the future generations of the guidance the church would provide. (Extra ecclesiam nulla salus). Suppose the only way to prevent this act is to kill the person before he could act. Don’t you think that the benefit of saving the church would outweigh the negative aspect of killing one person?
A quick note, extra ecclesiam nulla salus doesn’t mean that someone outside of the physical institution cannot be saved.

I’d need to know more about the specifics of the situation. I may be permitted to use force to prevent him from carrying out an evil act, as is the case of defence.
 
A person or institution that intends on doing evil with some particular piece of information has no right to that piece of information.
It would have legal right. Let’s not forget that despite all the horrible atrocities they committed, the Nazis were legally elected into power.
It would be the Catholic’s duty not to lie, but to remain silent, even on pain of death. In practice, I imagine many Catholics would lie. It would be a sin, but I’d imagine in this situation, it wouldn’t be a mortal sin, i.e. a sin that would endanger one’s salvation.
Impractical. There are interrogation methods which cannot be withstood (chemicals). A simple lie might even buy time to persecuted ones, where silence might not.
A quick note, extra ecclesiam nulla salus doesn’t mean that someone outside of the physical institution cannot be saved.
I know. But I was talking about the (really farfethced) idea that someone might have the power to eradicate the whole catholic religion. No one would even remember it. No one would remember God, or Jesus, or any of the teachings.
I’d need to know more about the specifics of the situation. I may be permitted to use force to prevent him from carrying out an evil act, as is the case of defence.
I am not talking about a physical extermination of the clergy. A simple brainwashing would do. 🙂 My point is that nothing can be viewed in isolation.
 
It would have legal right. Let’s not forget that despite all the horrible atrocities they committed, the Nazis were legally elected into power.
God’s Law is above man’s law from the Catholic perspective. It would have no right.
Impractical. There are interrogation methods which cannot be withstood (chemicals). A simple lie might even buy time to persecuted ones, where silence might not.
I’m not saying that Catholic teaching would arrive at the same conclusion or that you would agree with that conclusion.

Imagine if the Jew in question had gone to Munich ten years earlier, but is now staying in Dresden.

Although I might be wrong about this, I think about as far as Catholic teaching goes is that it may permit a Catholic, and only with good reason, to say something like “He went to Munich,” because technically, it is true, but he is silent about some information that the other party has no right to know, and if the other party is to interpret this incorrectly and be misled, so be it.
 
I think you are getting into the territory of sins of omission and comission. Failing to do something vs actively doing.
 
God’s Law is above man’s law from the Catholic perspective. It would have no right.
I am sure you know that I cannot follow you there. 🙂
Imagine if the Jew in question had gone to Munich ten years earlier, but is now staying in Dresden.

Although I might be wrong about this, I think about as far as Catholic teaching goes is that it may permit a Catholic, and only with good reason, to say something like “He went to Munich,” because technically, it is true, but he is silent about some information that the other party has no right to know, and if the other party is to interpret this incorrectly and be misled, so be it.
That would be called to “emphasize part of the truth” or a “white lie”. Whether it is “technically” a lie, or simply a misdirection is up to interpretation. However, in the US, the formula is “… to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”, which does not allow such little tricks. (Of course it is improperly worded. You can tell the “truth” only as “fas as you know”.) Nevertheless, in the times of slavery, if a black slave would have escaped, and a someone would be asked (under oath) to reveal the whereabouts of this slave, I would say that to lie about it is a morally proper act.

In a sense this procedure is a “kind” of vigilantism, talking the law into your own hand, and making a decision whether that law is “proper” or not. Good news is that this procedure is valid in the US, it falls under the concept of jury nullification. But that would lead rather far from the topic we are discussing.
 
I think you are getting into the territory of sins of omission and comission. Failing to do something vs actively doing.
Very astute observation. It is an important question to ponder. My view is simple. If someone has knowledge about some “bad” act to be committed, and if one has the power to prevent it, and if one fails to prevent it, that someone is exactly as guilty as the actual perpetrator. I am not sure how the different legal systems handle this problem, but there should be no difference between the one who pulls the trigger, and the one who could have prevented it, but failed to do so. And I am sure you know what the next sentence would be. 🙂
 
I am sure you know that I cannot follow you there. 🙂
Okay, let’s say that moral law is above state law. If we word it that way, then I think you can follow. Catholics are not bound to follow state law if it conflicts with moral law. Therefore, if a law mandating a nation’s citizens to slaughter any blue-eyed child were enacted, the Catholic would be obliged not to follow that law. I hope that you too would put moral law as you understand it above state law in that situation.
That would be called to “emphasize part of the truth” or a “white lie”. Whether it is “technically” a lie, or simply a misdirection is up to interpretation. However, in the US, the formula is “… to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”, which does not allow such little tricks. (Of course it is improperly worded. You can tell the “truth” only as “fas as you know”.) Nevertheless, in the times of slavery, if a black slave would have escaped, and a someone would be asked (under oath) to reveal the whereabouts of this slave, I would say that to lie about it is a morally proper act.
Well, I think it’s called mental reservation in Catholic teaching, and there are two forms, one licit and one illicit, but I don’t fully understand the distinction.

In practice, many faithful Catholics might lie in the situation you describe and then go to the confessional.
In a sense this procedure is a “kind” of vigilantism, talking the law into your own hand, and making a decision whether that law is “proper” or not.
Yes, and Catholics are not only permitted but required to abide by moral law when it contradicts state law.
 
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