Reading Abelard; Logica Ingredientibus

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Does anyone have any idea what he is going on about in this citation; I cannot make sense of it, and I don’t have a commentary either…

“The fact that we assumed the above is true, namely that whatever is in Brunellus other than the advening forms of Brunellus just is Brunellus; is plain because 1) the forms of Brunellus are not Brunellus, since in that case accidents would be substance, and 2) neither are the matter and the forms of Brunellus together Brunellus , since in that case one would have to grant the body and something already a body are body.”

From the First Theory of the (Abelards) glossus on Porphyry.
 
Curious John. It seems to me he is saying “body” exists independent of form in such a way that there could be body without form, but never form without body. Yet this doesn’t seem to make sense because body is just that: the combination of matter and form.

It seems like he trying to draw a distinction between body which is the matter and form combination and then body which is simply body as body. But then he would be using “body” equivocally, and hence his point would not follow, since the parallel would fail.

Dunno though. That’s just my 2 cents. :confused:
 
I would suggest a different translation:
Does anyone have any idea what he is going on about in this citation; I cannot make sense of it, and I don’t have a commentary either…

“The fact that we assumed the above is true, namely that whatever is in Brunellus other than the advening forms of Brunellus just is Brunellus; is plain because 1) the forms of Brunellus are not Brunellus, since in that case accidents would be substance, and 2) neither are the matter and the forms of Brunellus together Brunellus , since in that case one would have to grant that what is already a body combines [in some inexplicable way] with something else already a body so as to constitute a body.”

From the First Theory of the (Abelards) glossus on Porphyry.
Quod uerum sit autem id quod supra adsumpsimus – scilicet “Quicquid est in Brunello aliud a formis Brunelli, est Brunellus” – inde manifestum est quia neque formae Brunelli sunt Brunellus (cum iam accidentia essent substantia), neque materia simul et formae Brunelli sunt Brunellus (cum iam corpus et iam corpus esse corpus necesse esset confiteri).

I’m quite confused, but it seems to say that the B’s matter is body and B’s accidental/material(?) forms are body, so that body would be a composite of two things that are already bodies, if B is a composition of his matter and his material forms.
 
I’m quite confused, but it seems to say that the B’s matter is body and B’s accidental/material(?) forms are body, so that body would be a composite of two things that are already bodies, if B is a composition of his matter and his material forms.
But the composite of matter and form does not invididuate it; or the accident of form itself does not individuate it; then it is just what it is - it follows from this that Abelard seems to be claiming that Brunellus and Socrates are identical… It seems that his whole refutation of the reply to the objection to the first theory of universals is aiming at a real unity between both B and S; which is profound in a secular sense; but undermines a Catholic understanding between the real unity of S which lends S to be substantially distinct from B; in a greater than Formal manner. (Ie; the substance of S is really distinct from that of B; because of the unity of different quanta in S (viz. soul and materials))

It would not be inconceivable for many atheists to agree with Abelard on this point; and potentially undermines his whole Catholic position on universals. It seems Catholocism is then irreconcilable with Abelard.

Unless I am somewhere misunderstanding him…
 
But the composite of matter and form does not invididuate it; or the accident of form itself does not individuate it; then it is just what it is - it follows from this that Abelard seems to be claiming that Brunellus and Socrates are identical… It seems that his whole refutation of the reply to the objection to the first theory of universals is aiming at a real unity between both B and S; which is profound in a secular sense; but undermines a Catholic understanding between the real unity of S which lends S to be substantially distinct from B; in a greater than Formal manner. (Ie; the substance of S is really distinct from that of B; because of the unity of different quanta in S (viz. soul and materials))

It would not be inconceivable for many atheists to agree with Abelard on this point; and potentially undermines his whole Catholic position on universals. It seems Catholocism is then irreconcilable with Abelard.

Unless I am somewhere misunderstanding him…
I actually agree with you, John Damian---------

Abelard was “incompatible” with the Church even before this; Heloise and the whole controversy which led to his castration, anyone?
This has nothing to do with the passage quoted, though----but it does show that there were “irregularities” with Abelard’s Mode Of Thought and Morals even outside of his writings.👍

Not everyone thinks Ableard is the “Big Deal,” anyone------just ask his Archenemy St. Bernard.
 
But the composite of matter and form does not invididuate it; or the accident of form itself does not individuate it; then it is just what it is - it follows from this that Abelard seems to be claiming that Brunellus and Socrates are identical… It seems that his whole refutation of the reply to the objection to the first theory of universals is aiming at a real unity between both B and S; which is profound in a secular sense; but undermines a Catholic understanding between the real unity of S which lends S to be substantially distinct from B; in a greater than Formal manner. (Ie; the substance of S is really distinct from that of B; because of the unity of different quanta in S (viz. soul and materials))

It would not be inconceivable for many atheists to agree with Abelard on this point; and potentially undermines his whole Catholic position on universals. It seems Catholocism is then irreconcilable with Abelard.

Unless I am somewhere misunderstanding him…
I don’t think that is Abelard’s point. I think he wants to emphasize the absurdity of saying that B and S are really one. His position is that we should not say things which seem to imply that they are really one (i.e., saying that they really both possess the same real form).
 
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