Reconstructed discussion whether belief in literal Adam & Eve is warranted

[hecd2]

You write: “But what the Catholic Church defines, dogmatically or otherwise, is of no consequence in this discussion, since the secondary point at issue is whether Church dogma is proper warrant for any belief, and the primary is whether, specifically, the dogma of a literal Adam and Eve is warranted.”

You may chose to forever ignore the evidence of thousands of miracles which document the grounds for belief in the Catholic Church, but they stand as solid proof to countless Catholics and even non-Catholics who have investigated them.

We are going round in circles. I deny the poorly evidenced and anecdotal claims for the existence of miracles. There is not a single shred of evidence that, to the extent that they are neither downright fraud or delusions of the faithful, physical “miracles” occur any more frequently to believers or the prayed for or that they have anything other than purely natural explanations. The pre-mediaevals and mediaevals lived in a world shot through with what to them was the miraculous - today in the light of modern science and modern methods of gathering evidence they have dried up.

That evidence, supporting the veracity of Catholic belief, also becomes indirect evidence for Adam and Eve, since the Church teaches their actual existence.

I don’t know how to say this more plainly - the Church’s teaching is irrelevant as evidence as it is the Church’s teaching that is in question.

As for the First Way of St. Thomas, let us look at it in relevant part:

*The first, however, and more manifest way is which proceeds from motion. It is certain, and can be shown by our senses, that in the world some things are undergoing movement. Now whatever undergoes movement is moved by another, for nothing undergoes movement unless it is in potency to that towards which it is moved; something moves according as it in act. For to move is nothing other than to reduce something from potency to act. But nothing can be reduced from potency to act, except by something in act. Thus something actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and alters it.

    Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at the sane tine in act and in potency, in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simu1taneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously poten*tially cold.

 It is therefore impossible that according to the same and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, that is., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in movement must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must be moved by another and that by another. But this cannot proceed to infinity, be*cause then there would be no first mover, and, consequently no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.  S.T. I, 2, 3.    .

While Aristotle may have been concerned about change of place, eternal motions, and circular motions, St. Thomas makes no mentions of these elements, which you so aptly cite from the Physics. On the contrary, St. Thomas frames the argument primarily in terms of act and potency, properly metaphysical concepts. Thus the Aristotelian concepts which you focus upon are not really essential to St. Thomas’ argument here.

I think you are wrong here for several reasons:

• you are wrong to say that Aquinas is concerned only with metaphysical concepts, actuality and potentiality; his first premise is based on our senses (It is certain, and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion) and the single inductive example that he gives in support of the proposition that only something in actuality can reduce something from potentiality to actuality is a purely physical one (the heating of wood by fire - we’ll leave for the moment the misconception in treating fire as though it were an entity like wood, and the serious errors, even in Aquinas’s own terms, that arise from treating temperature as though it were a binary quality, hot or cold). Indeed if we are to go only by what Aquinas mentions as an example, then we are stuck with the heating of wood; but it is clear that when Aquinas talks about motion, he means it in exactly the same sense as Aristotle - a sense that includes all change including change of location
• you are wrong to claim that Aquinas does not rely on the Aristotlian concepts of motion, potentiality, actuality and so on; indeed the whole of the First Way depends on concepts that Aristotle develops in Physics and Metaphysics. Indeed it must be so if Aquinas is to have an argument worth discussing at all - because the First Way on its own is merely a collection of unsupported assertions - without Aristotle’s definitions and discussions of motion, potentiality, actuality and the properties of a mover, even his development of the argument for a Prime Mover, Aquinas’s argument is laughably thin - it is indefensible without reference to Aristotle.
• Therefore you are wrong to claim that Aristotle’s notions of locomotion and other motion developed in his Physics and Metaphysics (both of which I have quoted from) are irrelevant - not only are they relevant - they are fundamental to the argument.

It is clear that the First Way is an a posteriori argument that depends on the primary evidence of our senses. Aquinas depends on Aristotle for definitions and developments of the concepts he uses (or else his argument is trivially worthless) - Aristotle himself develops the concept of the First Mover in the Metaphysics and he depends on concepts of motion that he sets out in the Physics. It is all one - Aquinas depends completely on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and that in turn depends on Aristotle’s Physics which is the foundation. To the extent that the foundation is flawed, the edifice is unsupported.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Thus the Aristotelian concepts which you focus upon are not really essential to St. Thomas’ argument here.

To reinforce the response I just posted, let me revert to an argument that you have ignored:

…you agree that Aristotlean metaphysics argues from what can be sensed to more universal truths. As this discussion has unfolded you have persistently changed the definition of motion, as I have demonstrated quite clearly. You are now rejecting the idea that the idea of motion that Aquinas uses has anything to do with Aristotlean physics. But it also clear that when Aristotle talks about a First Mover, he is quite clearly referring to his ideas of motion as set out in the Physics - see, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics Lambda in which not only does Aristotle rely on the definitions of motion that he sets out in the Physics, but he uses the argument from change of place (locomotion) over and over again. In Part 2 he reiterates the arguments of the Physics, in Part 3 he defines a Mover, in Parts 4 to 6 he develops his arguments for a First Mover; and in Part 7, he clearly includes change of place - indeed circular motion as being a kind of motion that requires a mover “There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.” and in Part 8, he makes that argument specific for the cosmos: “The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal.” And we clearly see that all of this is itself dependent on arguments in his Physics - particularly Book VIII.

So we see that Aristiotle’s worldview, as we would call it, is self-consistent: he argues from what he observes to rules about what he observes, his Physics, and from thence to his Metaphysics.** If you say that Aquinas does not use Aristotlean physics and metaphysics - you are left with a conundrum. What is the sensible foundation of Thomisitic metaphysics?** Since Aquinas had no physics of his own, is it the case that his entire metaphysics is without foundation, an edifice supported on sky hooks?

Well no - it is obvious that Aquinas depends heavily on Aristotle for his First Way - in fact its statement in the Summa Theologica is purely Aristotlean; to the extent that Aristotle’s argument is undermined by his erroneous physics, so is Aquinas’s.

Alec
evolutionpages,.com

 

[RobbyS]

To reinforce the response I just posted, let me revert to an argument that you have ignored:

…you agree that Aristotlean metaphysics argues from what can be sensed to more universal truths. As this discussion has unfolded you have persistently changed the definition of motion, as I have demonstrated quite clearly. You are now rejecting the idea that the idea of motion that Aquinas uses has anything to do with Aristotlean physics. But it also clear that when Aristotle talks about a First Mover, he is quite clearly referring to his ideas of motion as set out in the Physics - see, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics Lambda in which not only does Aristotle rely on the definitions of motion that he sets out in the Physics, but he uses the argument from change of place (locomotion) over and over again. In Part 2 he reiterates the arguments of the Physics, in Part 3 he defines a Mover, in Parts 4 to 6 he develops his arguments for a First Mover; and in Part 7, he clearly includes change of place - indeed circular motion as being a kind of motion that requires a mover “There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.” and in Part 8, he makes that argument specific for the cosmos: “The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal.” And we clearly see that all of this is itself dependent on arguments in his Physics - particularly Book VIII.

So we see that Aristiotle’s worldview, as we would call it, is self-consistent: he argues from what he observes to rules about what he observes, his Physics, and from thence to his Metaphysics.** If you say that Aquinas does not use Aristotlean physics and metaphysics - you are left with a conundrum. What is the sensible foundation of Thomisitic metaphysics?** Since Aquinas had no physics of his own, is it the case that his entire metaphysics is without foundation, an edifice supported on sky hooks?

Well no - it is obvious that Aquinas depends heavily on Aristotle for his First Way - in fact its statement in the Summa Theologica is purely Aristotlean; to the extent that Aristotle’s argument is undermined by his erroneous physics, so is Aquinas’s.

Alec
evolutionpages,.com

Not quite sure that your argument hangs together because while Thomas owes much to “The Philosopher,” he also owes much to Dionysius, to whom he assigns almost apostolic authority. His exposition on the Book of Causes reflects this.

 

[hecd2]

]The concept of species of living organisms only has substantial meaning in the biological sense today. All essentialist definitions of species have been abandoned for cogent reasons that I won’t repeat. The philosophical concept as you describe it is about as useful as the Aristotlean idea that substance consists of the four elements - ie it is outmoded, outclassed and rightly relinquished."

You still wish to reduce all knowledge to natural science, to biology here.

To be precise, I don’t wish to reduce all knowledge to natural science, I am merely observing the *fact *that essentialist definitions of species have been abandoned - that is the observation of a fact, not a desire on my part.

Beneath your denial of the validity of natural philosophical species is your rejection of the Aristotelian hylemorphic doctrine, which says that things above the atomic level really do exist – and exist as existential, substantial unities – unities which have unified natures specified and determined by substantial forms

Correct. Parts of this idea, particularly with respect to unified natures determined by substantial form, have not been intellectually defensible since 1859.

These forms are distinguished by the distinction of powers (operative potencies) which they exhibit. That is the basis for natural philosophical species.

And that concept which has had to be completely abandoned; for if you are to follow this concept then tetrapods, insects and crustaceans are all one species, excepting platypus and the naked mole rat which form two further different species. It is a practically and intellectually useless concept.

It is proper to biologists to develop their own theories and definitions of species, useful to them in trying to understand the content and relationships between living organisms. But do not expect that all philosophers are going to abandon their own discoveries in the properly philosophical order to biologists. It is interesting that various orders of biological species have various groupings of powers.

Really? Show me. In fact, why don’t you lay out what you believe to be a proper grouping of life on earth according to this concept.

Philosophically, these powers do indicate distinct real types of substances. (I know you will make your normal observation that most philosophers today deny this…)

No, I deny it. Almost every thinker on earth denies it. It is absolute nonsense on a par with the ancient Chinese classification of animals.

If there really are substantially unified beings above the atomic level, then at least discussion of what makes them one in substance, not mere accidental unities, is in order. And the method of classifying them becomes then a proper philosophical problem, one which the natural philosophical species concept is designed to answer.

Well, you must be the only philosopher on earth attempting to answer it, a) because I am not aware of any serious philosopher who is even asking the question in this form (perhaps I’m wrong and you can point me to a few papers in philosophical journals discussing this concept) and b) because attempting to define all tetrapods, insects and crustaceans as one species while excluding naked mole rats and platypi; all bony fish as another species, but excluding cave fish, is grotesquely useless. It is clear to the entire intellectual community that defining species in this way is arbitrary and wrong. Things are not unified by what senses they possess, substantially or accidentally.

Once again, asking to define “rabbitness,” apart from the natural philosophical species in which it appears is fruitless. My point was that in encountering a rabbit, we grasp some of its properties (not all) – so that on encountering these same properties again we already have some knowledge of them.

Well, what are the properties that we grasp on first encounter of a rabbit?

Moreover, any theory of evolution which claims that one level of species can “evolve” into a new and more perfect level of species (having a substantial form exhibiting more perfect powers) invites metaphysical analysis as to whether the material causality entailed in the evolutionary mechanisms alone are adequate unto themselves to explain the new and higher philosophical species which is produced.

Of course there is no such thing as *perfection *as applied to level of species or *perfect *powers. And as for “metaphysical” analysis as you describe it, it is utterly impotent to determine what you suggest it can determine, given the misconceptions, errors, fallacious thinking and plain daftness of the philosophical species concept as you describe it.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Not quite sure that your argument hangs together because while Thomas owes much to “The Philosopher,” he also owes much to Dionysius, to whom he assigns almost apostolic authority. His exposition on the Book of Causes reflects this.

I agree that Aquinas quotes Pseudo-Dionysius frequently, but not in the First Way which is an argument that is entirely Aristotlean. If I am wrong, perhaps you will point me to where Dionysius discusses motion, potentiality, actuality, the properties of a Mover and the Prime Mover?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[SFH]

We observe in the universe that almost all things exist at one point in time and cease to exist at another point in time (e.g., a field is empty, an apple tree is planted in the field, the apple tree dies). This suggests to us that nothing is eternal. But if nothing is eternal, then at some point in time nothing existed (i.e., given an infinite length of time any possibility becomes an actuality, and thus, the possibility that nothing existed must actually occur). But nothing can come from nothing, so if there was a time when nothing existed, then nothing would exist now, which is clearly false. Thus, there must be something that is eternal. That eternal something is not anything we presently have observed since everything we observe has a beginning and end. Thus, we are forced to posit something eternal that accounts for everything. This, we call God.

That’s my modified St. Thomas Aquinas argument, but I’d love to hear other people’s thoughts on it.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To hecd2:

Alec,

Since you deny God’s existence because of allegedly contradictory essential properties, it would appear that you ought also to deny that photons exist, and for the same reason. Instead, in the first case you deny God’s existence, and in the second you deny the validity of a universal first metaphysical principle. Is this selective reasoning?

You affirm that the principle of non-contradiction is not valid in the subatomic order, as in wave-particle duality.

But your affirmation that “the principle of non-contradiction is not valid in the subatomic order” is itself a statement about the real conditions of the subatomic order, just as are your statements about photons being both particles and waves.

If “the principle of non-contradiction is not valid in the subatomic order,” is itself a statement about the real conditions of the subatomic order, then it can violate the principle of non-contradiction just as easily as does wave-particle duality allegedly violate it. In that case, saying that “the principle of non-contradiction is not valid in the subatomic order” can just as well mean that “the principle of non-contradiction is valid in the subatomic order.” So, what exactly did you say?

Consider the statement: “The principle of non-contradiction is false for subatomic entities.” For this statement itself to be true, it must contradict its opposite (that the principle of non-contradiction is true for subatomic entities). But in so doing, it must affirm the duality of truth and falsity about subatomic entities – which is the very thing that the principle of non-contradiction requires.

Or again, when you say that it is a property of protons that the principle of non-contradiction does not apply to them, then you are simultaneously saying that it is a property of protons that the principle of non-contradiction does apply to them. So, again, what exactly did you say?

I am not a physicist, but I understand that there is experimental evidence that there is no way to simultaneously observe both the particle and wave nature of matter or light. The following report from Nature appears to confirm this:

COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE DEMONSTRATED FOR ELECTRONS. When light waves pass through a pair of slits in a screen, an interference pattern will form at a detector further along. If one of the slits is closed, or if one tries to take a peek at which way the light went then the interference pattern starts to go away. Quantum reality is shy; if you look at it, it disappears. Now a group at the Weizmann Institute in Israel have done a sort of double slit experiment with electrons and observed (for the first time with fermions, spin-one-half particles) how the resultant interference pattern dissipates the more you watch the electrons as they go through the slits, thus demonstrating Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle which states that objects can have wave and particle properties, but not both at the same time. In the Weizmann experiment, led by Mordehai Heiblum, the electrons (or electron waves, depending on whether you look or not) slalom through a two-dimensional obstacle course, where they must negotiate a pair of channels, one of which (via a separate circuit called a “quantum point contact,” or QPC) gives a hint as to whether an electron passed that way. Essentially, as a wave the electron passes through both channels; but if it senses that it is being watched, the electron (as a particle) goes through only the one path, diminishing the interference thereby. (E. Buks et al., Nature, 26 Feb. 1998 (See aip.org/enews/physnews/1998/split/pnu362-2.htm.)

Note the relevant point here: “Now a group at the Weizmann Institute in Israel have done a sort of double slit experiment with electrons and observed (for the first time with fermions, spin-one-half particles) how the resultant interference pattern dissipates the more you watch the electrons as they go through the slits, thus demonstrating Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle which states that objects can have wave and particle properties, but not both at the same time.”

BUT NOT BOTH AT THE SAME TIME!

Is not Niels Bohr a physicist? Does he not say that clearly that “objects can have wave and particle properties, but not both at the same time?” Does not “objects” include photons? Does not this Weizmann experiment claim to demonstrate Bohr’s principle? Is it true then that all physicists share your view that the wave-particle duality is simultaneous? If the same photon appears with wave properties at one time and particle properties at another, the principle of non-contradiction is not violated. If, as I have seen it claimed, the particle nature of the photon is not directly observed, but inferred, then judments about simultaneous contradictory properties becomes even more suspect. And if wave properties and particle properties are observed at different times, how do you know they exist in the same objects at the same time? Especially, if the particle properties are an inference?

That wave-particle duality is well-documented, I do not dispute. That it violates the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction, I deny.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To hecd:

Alec,

While I am overwhelmingly impressed with your knowledge of Aristotle’s Physics, it remains the case that the Prima Via is primarily a metaphysical argument, as those in the Thomistic tradition are well aware. I said that St. Thomas’ argument was PRIMARILY metaphysical, not that he used no examples from the physical world. Yes, it does start in sensation, as do all Thomistic arguments.

You are trying to tie St. Thomas’ metaphysical insights to Aristotle’s Physics, and then destroy St. Thomas by attacking Aristotle’s Physics. It does not work because St. Thomas is working in a different dimension. He is an Aristotelian, but he is writing some 15 centuries after Aristotle, and is well aware of all the other philosophers who intervened, including St. Augustine, Plotinus, Maimonides, Avicenna, Bonaventure, and so forth. It is true that his Summa Contra Gentiles arguments to God’s existence use more of Aristotle’s arguments, but the Summa Theologiae is quite different in method and tone. He is writing there for students who already are well versed in philosophy, and the Five Ways are merely quick summaries of arguments well known to them.

And yes, the focus on act and potency, regardless of the examples employed, raises the argument to the strictly metaphysical level, even though it begins in that motion which is evident to the senses. The definition of motion he employs is clearly the one based on act and potency, and that is why he speaks of act and potency throughout. Since act and potency are central insights in his metaphysics, there is no evidence that the Five Ways are dependent essentially on Aristotle’s Physics.

And no, I do not intend to lead this thread way off topic. Most readers believe in God and are quite willing to assume God’s existence when discussing the reality of Adam and Eve.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To hecd2 re post 204:

Alec,

It is clear that you are operating both as a natural scientist and in the positivistic tradition of philosophy, which has tended to dominate most secular universities in North America. That is fine. But you do not appear familiar with the entire Thomistic tradition of philosophy which has flourished in Catholic universities and colleges since the time of Pope Leo XIII, who called for a restoration of the dominance of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The concepts which you find outdated and totally inapplicable to modern biology are well known in Thomistic circles. Truth is not a matter of head-counting. They are simply not biological concepts. That does not make them invalid in their own order of philosophical science.

Your easy rejection of the concept of substantial form alone shows that you have no use for Scholastic philosophy, and that is your right. But please understand that there are many scholars who regularly use such concepts with both respect and effectiveness who publish in such refereed scholarly journals as The New Scholastism, The Review of Metaphysics, the Monist, The Modern Schoolman, Faith & Reason, and other publications that maintain the tradition of the type of philosophy preferred and recommended by the Catholic Church.

You may have noticed that many of the thread participants do take the Magisterium of the Catholic Church seriously. You may not do so, but it may not be entirely prudent to so easily dismiss the presence and teaching of an institution that has seen the rise and fall of many nations in history and survived from the days of Rome to the present. Our Catholic intellectual history is not entirely without merit. And the mere fact that the philosophical and theological tradition of over two thousand years of history is out of favor in many secular circles is not a valid assay of its value and truth.

The miracles you so easily dismiss are not scientific fairy tales as you suggest. Careful study of the Lourdes Medical Commission records would be profitable. The “dancing sun” at Fatima was recorded on the front page of a major secular newspaper the day after it happened. What is easy to reject without careful investigation also has served for the conversion of countless millions who have seen and studied and taken seriously.

There is more to the world than sensation and matter. But I am not sure how much good is served by endlessly trying to test the entire forum of philosophical dispute in a thread primarily aimed as testing whether belief in a literal Adam and Eve is warranted. Note that the thread title refers to “belief” being warranted. It does not demand that we have to “prove” Adam and Eve existed, but merely that it is rational and reasonable to believe in them. Thus, the burden of proof here rests largely on those, like yourself, who would claim that such belief is irrational or utterly incompatible with sound science, or some such arguments. All “believers” must do is show that their belief is not contrary to right reason and that some sound arguments support that belief. I think that such arguments have already been put forth, even though they may not be convincing to all hearers.

 

[hecd2]

So I can say that photons can be seen to have contradictory properties - contradiction need go no further than this and other limited cases in which it is observed. It is correct to say that reality does contain some contradictions, but they do not affect our perception in such a way that it renders us incapable of meaningful testable statements (otherwise existence would be impossible)…

On first reading, I thought perhaps you had something there. According to you, contradictions occur regularly solely in certain limited subatomic cases, and the rest of reality is safe. I recalled what you said in your post #137: “I seriously deny the universal validity of the non-contradiction principle…” So far, so good — from the standpoint of your own consistency. But then, you also said, in that post: “And indeed at the normal scales (size, time and gravitational field) normally experienced by human beings these contradictions rarely occur.” Did I see you say “RARELY?” Further, you added that “…the world is ordinarily non-contradictory at our scale…” “ORDINARILY?” This is beginning to sound like the politician who promises to raise taxes solely on the rich. Is it just possible that the macro world is also at risk to your skepticism about non-contradiction?

I use these expressions “rarely” and ordinarily" because I wish to be precise about the facts of the matter. What Aristotle, Aquinas, you or I observe of the world in our day to day lives is the summed properties of vast numbers of quantum particles. Now it is the case that although small numbers of quantum particles can simultaneously display the contradictory properties of waves and particles (what Bohr proposed about complementarity notwithstanding - I will get to that in due course) the ability to detect this is smeared out in the stochastic summation of larger numbers of quanta which are also decohered from the outset. Since the macro world is made up of vast quantities of quantum events, the probability that we can detect any effect that is contradictory, unless we observe individual events, falls rapidly as the number of particles or events increases, so that although the probability never falls to zero, it rapidly approaches a probability that is so low that it is unlikely ever to occur in the lifetime of the universe - in other words once we have more than a few hundred particles, the probability of observing contradictory effects falls effectively to zero. I use the term “rarely” rather than “never” to reflect the fact that the probability is not identically zero - although you should interpret “rarely” as meaning not likely in the lifetime of the universe. I use the term “ordinarily” for the same reason - to be precise and to account for ensembles of entangled particles which can be prepared but which do not ordinarily appear in nature. So it is indeed the case that contradictions occur regularly solely in certain limited quantum cases, and the rest of reality is safe, but it is safe not as a matter of principle but as a matter of stochastic improbability.

Actually, you have been quite forthcoming. You have said that you hold “that no formal proofs are available for any statement about the macro world…” That would appear to entail that you simply reject a priori any alleged defense of, or proof for, the validity of – much less the transcendental validity of – the principle of non-contradiction.

No - I reject any *formal proof *for the universal validity of non-contradiction in the macro world; I do however accept reasoned defenses of non-contradiction in the macro-world based on inductive reasoning and pragmatic verifacationism.

You reaffirm that your philosophy is one of “pragmatic verificationism.”… there is simply no room for any formal acknowledgement or defence of a universal intellective first principle, such as non-contradiction – not even the initial suggestions I offer in my post #129.

There is room for defense, but no room for formal proof. It is certainly not the case that you suggest, that non-contradiction is immediately evident, otherwise people wouldn’t believe, as they do, six impossible things before breakfast on faith and without evidence…

You conclude, “Since I have already freely abandonded the notion of a reality which has properties amenable to formal proof, your criticism that my statement that contradiction exists in the quantum world undermines the possibility of meaningful statements about it carries no sting.” Of course, it carries “no sting,” once you have abandoned any need for applying the principle of non-contradiction in a logically consistent and genuinely universal fashion.

Still, if you consider the experimental basis for your conclusion about wave-particle duality, it can be argued that it need not violate the non-contradiction principle anyway. One way photons behave when they pass through the slits is as particles. But when they manifest themselves on the screen as interference bands, they reveal themselves as waves. Whether this description is verbally perfect or not, my point is that what we are doing is seeing two different ways the photons behave, and from that inferring that they must possess contradictory properties, since it appears that waves have properties contradictory to particles.

It’s not that your description is verbally imperfect - rather, it is factually erroneous. In a photo counting interference experiment the photons behave as particles at the detection plane (ie we see each individual photon arrive at a single location) and their number density across the detection plane varies as the intensity of classical interference fringes, so they are simultaneously behaving as particles and waves.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[anthony022071]

To Anthony:

Theologian Fr. John A. Hardon, who wrote a favorable review of my book, Origin of the Human Species, addresses the possibility of Adam having primate forebears. He points out that theologians have come to agree that evolution of the first man’s body from lower species is compatible with the faith, providing that (1) the human soul was immediately created by God, and (2) God exercised special providence over the formation of the human body, “so that the first man was not literally generated by a brute beast.” (See John A. Hardon, The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1975, p. 93.

It is not compatible,specifically,with the belief that Adam and Eve were our first parents. We are descended from our ancestors’ bodies (not from their souls),so if the human body has evolved from other species,then Adam and Eve were not our first parents. Moreover,it is not only that the human soul is immediately created by God,but also the physical being with it. Souls are only created as being united with the physical being. In fact,it is the soul,which is an individual spirit that God created of his own spirit,that gives life to the physical material in the first place. So it does not make sense to say that the human soul is immediately created but the human body may have evolved from another species. Human bodies come into being by no other way than by the creation of the human soul.
This is why we can say that personhood begins at conception.

 

[anthony022071]

There is no separation between the act of the human body coming into being and the act of the soul coming into being. Both happen as one and the same act of creation. Both are the same conception of a person. There is no room for evolutionary process in the moment of conception,which is instantaneous. And the reproductive history of a species is a history,or chain,of conceptions.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To hecd2 re post 210:

Alec,

Thank you for your clarification of your usage of the terms “rarely” and “ordinarily” in reference to the macro world and non-contradiction. You have made it clear that the finding of contradictions should occur exclusively in the micro world. Still, you have failed to explain the logical problems your position entails in the micro world, as I lay out in the first half of my post 207. And these are not merely logical problems, but rather a pointing out that if you permit contradictions in the micro world, then your very claim that contradictions can occur is meaningless, since you thereby also implicitly simultaneously affirm that contradictions cannot occur in the micro world.

You write in reference to first principles, such as non-contradiction, “There is room for defense, but no room for formal proof. It is certainly not the case that you suggest, that non-contradiction is immediately evident, otherwise people wouldn’t believe, as they do, six impossible things before breakfast on faith and without evidence.”

People can believe in all sorts of impossible things, because they fail to see that they are self-contradictory. That has nothing to do with the fact that the very intelligibility of any experience whatever presupposes the principle of non-contradiction, as I explain in my post 129.

In your correction of my account of the wave-particle demonstration experiment, you note, in part, “In a photo counting interference experiment the photons behave as particles at the detection plane (ie we see each individual photon arrive at a single location)…”

Perhaps you can help me with the following account I found on a Physics Forum at physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=13768:
A participant named Tom Mattson makes the following comment:

“In order to see the particle nature of light, you have to measure some things that are related to particle behavior. One of those things is trajectory. The bare minimum information one has to obtain to get some idea of the trajectory of a particle is two data points on the position of the particle. But in the case of the double slit experiment (in which there are no detectors at the slits), we do not obtain that information. We only have one point, namely the point at which the photon strikes the detector. We do not know which slit the photon passed through. Indeed, if we were to alter the experiment to obtain that information it would destroy the pattern on the screen. The particle nature of light is not observed in this experiment, it is simply inferred.”

Is this argument valid? If the information needed to assure us that the photon is in particle form when it hits the detector is not immediately given, but is merely inferred, then the claim that it is a particle at that point is not a direct observation, as has been claimed.

I await your comments about Niels Bohr’s Complementarity Principle. You may be able to offer a rebuttal to the Weizmann experiment, but the point is that is was published in 1998, long after Bohr made his claims. It shows that not all professional physicists agree with your claims about “simultaneous” wave-particle duality, and that this disagreement extends over many decades of time

 

[Chrysostom324]

Since Jesus took such liberal interpretation of the Old Testament, I too feel that I may allegorize myself right out of the embarrassing claims made about creation in early Genesis. I am an evolutionist. World’s Age=4.54 billion years

 

[grannymh]

Since Jesus took such liberal interpretation of the Old Testament, I too feel that I may allegorize myself right out of the embarrassing claims made about creation in early Genesis. I am an evolutionist. World’s Age=4.54 billion years

Can another evolutionist (with some reservations) ask at what age do you place Adam & Eve in their fully developed human state with a soul? And are you using a specific source for your answers? Many thanks.

Blessings,
granny

All human life is meant for eternal life.

 

[hecd2]

When one encounters what looks like a contradiction, several options appear: (1) One can deny that the “contradictory” object can exist. (2) One can decide that its nature is not what he initially thought it to be. (3) One can deny that the principle of non-contradiction is is valid in this case. When you have talked about the existence of God, you appear to infer that the problem of evil excludes the possibility that God exists. That is the first option. You might also have concluded that God is unexpectedly evil. That would be option number two. Or, you could, from these seemingly contradictory properties of God (supposedly all good, but doing evil), infer that in His case, the principle of non-contradiction does not apply and a contradiction is acceptable. Question: Why do you apply a different logic to photons than you do to God? Why don’t you follow the same logic here? Since you hold that photons cannot simultaneously exhibit as both waves and particles, therefore photons do not exist – just as you argue that God does not exist because of His allegedly contradictory properties?

These are good questions that deserve thoughtful replies. Nor do I claim that my answers will be neat or final. I am forced to conclude that certain aspects of the quantum world are contradictory by direct and repeatable observations - I wish it were not so because things would be simpler and less disturbing if we could cling to the entirely reasonable and, up until 1910 or thereabouts, the apparently universal principle of non-contradiction. At least it is the case that these contradictions do not appear at the macro-scale, for reasons that I have already touched on, thereby saving reason and intelligibility. It is true is that our senses and our reasoning abilities evolved to reflect the macro world - it is only in the last ninety to a hundred years that we have been able to lift the lid on the bizarre behaviour of the underlying quantum world, but the fact that contradictions appear at the same time and in the same perspective is undeniable.

You challenge me to apply the same reasoning to God and to photons and to select one of the various options for dealing with apparently contradictory phenomena, but you misunderstand my claim about God. I do not say that because of the problem of evil then God does not exist - what I do say is that because of the problem of evil, a God with the specific attribute of being all good is not the cause for the existence of the physical universe (and I conclude that a personal God is unlikely to exist for many other reasons). I make that judgement in your terms (and in terms of things that we can observe, such as evil in the world), although I also hold that to the extent that the concept of God lies beyond observation it is meaningless and unintelligible, so that to talk about contradiction in those attributes of God is equally meaningless. I conclude that light exists, and has the attributes that it has, because I can sense it and determine that it possesses those attributes - the contradiction in the nature of light is manifest. I agree with you that if this possibility of contradiction were to spill over into all judgements then we would be unable to make intelligible statements about anything. As I have pointed out, various systems of contradiction-tolerant and paraconsistent logic have been proposed that allow a limited set of contradictions to occur without entailing the problem of ex contradictione quodlibet. In other words, a non-contradictory universe can result from the stochastic averaging of phenomena that do have contradictory aspects.

You would like to imply that explosion necessarily occurs and that in determining that some contradictions occur at the quantum level, I must reject the possibility of intelligibility altogether - but it isn’t so. I have already explained that I accept the premise that reality (at least in so far as we experience it) is intelligible and not capricious, but I do so as a matter of observation (if the universe were not sensibly intelligible then living in it would be impossible); I do so on the basis of tentative observation (ie, it works) not as a matter of self-evident transcendental truth - it is open to modification in the light of more sophisticated observation - I do not claim that all levels of reality are either intelligible or non-contradictory, and in fact we can see that some contradictions do indeed occur.

The problem that you are having is based on your notion that transcendental non-contradiction is a necessary condition for intelligibility; but as we have seen, that isn’t so - the domain of the physical macro-world does appear to be non-contradictory and is intelligible.

Given your evident skepticism of the most basic principles of thought and reality, it seems a bit curious that you are so apodictically certain that the Human Genome Project findings absolutely exclude any possibility of a single pair of first parents for all mankind, Adam and Eve, during the last six million years.

There is no difficulty in making judgements with high confidence on the basis of evidence. The judgement that we make here is no different in principle from the kind of judgements that we make that gravity operates according to an inverse square law of distance or that it is safe to cross the street. These are judgements that are not defeated or undermined by the contradictions which exist in the quantum domain because they do not explode into this domain.

I am sure that, as an Aristotlean, you will find this unsatisfactory (and to be frank, I am not completely comfortable with it myself), but I am realist enough to accept and attempt to deal with the evidence as it is, not as we wish it to be. At least I avoid the naturalistic fallacy.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

By the way, with respect to whether or not light has contradictory properties in the same sense at the same time:

Whatever we agree or disagree with regard to contradiction, it is rather peripheral to the point in question - I introduced the quantum world into this discussion as a counter to the erroneous ideas inherent in Aristotlean and Thomistic metaphysics with regard to motion, necessity, and, in particular, efficient cause, and we seem to have developed an entire debate around non-contradiction which is not what I originally intended; it has, nevertheless, been entertaining and thought-provoking.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

Good morning delightful posters.

I’m in the poetic realm this AM. Ever notice that sometimes poetry asks questions of ourselves? And sometimes it offers answers? Ever notice that science does those same things? The genius of both poetry and science is being able to rearrange the ordinary.

Could it be that belief in a literal Adam and Eve can be warranted by the results of rearranging the ordinary? Could it be that it is time to, like the flowers, bud again, to be open to sunny possibilities?

Blessings,
granny

All human life needs spring sunshine.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To hecd2 re post 216:

Alec,

Thank you for your elucidation about the way you approach the question of God’s existence as opposed to subatomic particles. Somehow, I suspected that you would find a way out of my challenge to you, and you did not disappoint me. Indeed, you avoided a contradiction in your methodology quite properly by making relevant distinctions!

Once again, you make the general claim that contradictions do not actually occur at the macro level, but can do so at the micro level. I can see the merit in that approach, but I still think it fails to answer the question as to why statements about the micro level which allow the possibility of contradictions do not thereby simultaneously permit the validity of the very principle of non-contradiction which they seek to deny. Perhaps you could claim that statements about the possibility of contradictions at the micro level are themselves incapable of contradiction, whereas statements about the actual particles and waves themselves can be contradicted. But then, how do we interpret such statements as, “This photon is behaving as a particle,” so that we affirm that it is really a particle, and that it is really acting as a particle, not a wave – but without simultaneously excluding that it really is not behaving as a particle, but as a wave. Without observational distinctions, which might then be a basis for not violating non-contradiction, the intelligibility of meaningful statements about observations themselves appears to be destroyed – just the same as they would be at the macro level.

It is well and good to say, “Well, that is just how it happens to be at the quantum level of reality – despite the absurdities it entails.” But then, is this not quite like what the people in the Vienna Circle wound up doing when some noted that the Verification Principle could not pass its own test (that a statement is meaningful only if its terms are somehow sense verifiable, but the VP itself has terms, such as “meaningful” which are not sense verifiable). They then simply proceeded to use the VP anyway, since they could see no other way to make sense of the world save in terms of natural science. This is a faith act – or at best a philosophical assumption, not something itself demonstrable by natural science.

You write, “The problem that you are having is based on your notion that transcendental non-contradiction is a necessary condition for intelligibility; but as we have seen, that isn’t so - the domain of the physical macro-world does appear to be non-contradictory and is intelligible.”

Here we engage our central differences. It seems to me that you view non-contradiction as an empirical observation at the macro level, one that appears
confirmed by nearly unlimited experience at the macro level, but a principle based more on a sort of induction by piling up countless instances in which it appears valid – not one demonstrated by any formal proof or having genuinely guaranteed universality. I see your point, and would not expect you to say otherwise given your sensist epistemology which embraces nominalism. My approach, and that of Thomists in general, would be to insist that this is not merely a sensist observation, but the intellect (a distinct spiritual faculty) understanding in its very first reflective encounter with reality that being is by its very nature universal, that being is and non-being is not – begetting the first metaphysical principles. I am not trying to argue them at this moment, but rather am trying to show the difference in approach. The exact nature of how the mind engages reality so as to give rise to this universal understanding, and the defense of the principles involved (and of their transcendental validity), is best articulated by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., in his God: His Existence and His Nature (B. Herder Book Co., 1934) vol. 1, pp. 111-241. These are a lot of pages to defend “self-evident” principles, but show the incredible rigor of their defense.

The import of these first principles for Thomistic metaphysics lies in the fact that they represent, not a random, isolated collection of principles, but an unfolding of intelligible content found in the first encounter with reality, such that, they reveal themselves as progressively implicit in that first contact with being. Thus, identity and non-contradiction implicitly entail sufficient reason, and then, causality – eventually leading to finality. Moreover, it is these principles which are key to understanding the metaphysical force of the Five Ways of St. Thomas.

I do not offer these points as a mere assertion of authority for them, but to highlight the vast difference in our philosophical worldviews – and to render, perhaps, more understandable why you can more easily countenance the claim of subatomic contradictions than would a Thomistic metaphysician. The initial force of the primary insights into being is far more compelling to those who have studied the complexity and depth of these principles than it would be to someone taking them as mere conventional observations of sensory experience. Again, I am not trying to prove who is right here, but merely hoping to make the basis for our profound disagreement more intelligible.

 

[hecd2]

To return to our main theme: Reconstructed discussion whether belief in literal Adam & Eve is warranted.

At long last the discussion has arrived at the molecular evidence that precludes the possibility that the human population has passed through a bottleneck of two individuals in the last several million years. What follows will necessarily get rather technical, but there is no help for that.

…you have forcefully and repeatedly maintained that natural scientific evidence absolutely excludes the possibility, within the last six million years, of a single pair of mating human beings as the source of mankind today…it may be that it is taken from the type of analysis offered by Francisco J. Ayala and others, and based on the generation of major histocompatibility complex genes which are involved in our immune response:
Francisco J. Ayala, Ananias Escalante, Colm O’hUigin and Jan Klein, “Molecular Genetics of Speciation and Human Origins,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci, USA, 91 p6787-6794, July 1994. Abstract.)

Whatever the case may be, I am not a biologist, nor do I pretend to know the field of molecular biology. But I have professional contacts who do. They tell me that what you say is simply not true, and offer the following citations to prove that a narrow bottleneck – even of just two human beings – is entirely possible in the primate population as recently as the Middle Pleistocene period or later.
Takashi Shiina, et al. (2006) Rapid Evolution of Major Histocompatibility Complex Class I Genes in Primates Generates New Disease Alleles in Humans via Hitchhiking Diversity. Genetics, 173, 1555-1570.

This result not only contradicts Ayala’s, but also demonstrates the radical tentativeness of scientific results.

I am afraid your contact has either misunderstood the paper in question or you have misunderstood what he or she has told you. The Ayala et al paper, plus many others that analyse a wide range of loci in the genome all agree that humans could not have passed through a bottleneck of two individuals. When you say that the Shiina et al paper contradicts Ayala et al, you also have to state in what respect this contradiction is made since Ayala et al claim many things in the paper you referenced and in associated papers. It is neither the case that Shiina et al contradict the finding that multiple allelic lineages (or haplotypes) persist from before the human-chimpanzee divergence, nor is it the case that they can or do reach the conclusion that you or your contact claim - viz, that a narrow bottleneck of two is possible in the human ancestry. The reasons for this are as follows:

1. Shiina et al analyse the Class I region of the MHC whereas Ayala et al focus on the DRB1 locus which is in Class II, and specifically exon 2 of DRB1 - they are not looking at the same loci
2. Shiina et al focus their analysis on SNVs - they are not concerned with tracing the ancestry or deriving a phylogeny of major human allelic lineages (nor are they able to do so given the methodology they adopt); instead they focus on the single nucleotide variation within a small number of haplotypes. They reach the legitimate conclusion that the majority of single nucleotide variation is of recent origin (and note that there are about ten times as many minor variations in the DRB1 locus known now as was known at the date of the Ayala paper), but that does not invalidate the findings regarding the coalescence date and the population size required to maintain the major trans-species haplotypes (see other papers referenced in the continuation post which support the fact that although there is recent variation there are also ancient haplotypes which predate the chimp-human divergence)
3. Shiina et al use a very weak set of data - six humans, two heterozygous chimp lines (four samples) and a single macaque as an outgroup. The human data is also extremely limited, consisting of three Japanese and three Caucasian samples (and not including African data which is the most diverse). With that paucity of data, it is not possible to say anything with certainty about human ancestral demography (nor is it the primary focus of the paper, which is to show hitch-hiking variability in sequences neighbouring hypervariable regions and which they show admirably)
4. The categorisation of their SNV between pre- and post-human/chimp speciation depends on an outgroup represented by a single haplotype in a species that has more intraspecies polymorphism than humans, and the argument for the unambiguous categorisation of what they call hv1 polymorphisms as being recent is weak

to be continued