Reflection on Skeptical Theism

[1AugustSon7]

We can’t speak of events prohibited by God because we know of no such event nor could we short of Divine Revelation, e.g. if God were to reveal a potentialy that by His power He prevented. God is completely and perfectly free and does not suffer nor act under duress; nothing, therefore, could - I think even potentially - cause Him to need to prohibit an event, as there is no event possible that was not always originally known to Him. God is not surprised, though He might affect a surprise as, for example, when we read He approves of certain actions or decisions. He did, of course, foreknow this actuality, and is acting in such situations as Examplar by approving such action for our immitation; likewise, we might read that He abhors this or that act, but again we understand this as His proscribing such behaviour so we might know not to immitate it.

To imagine God as being at the helm of a ship in the midst of a storm with everything going wrong, and grasping to maintain control, is to imagine nothing worthy of the name of God at all. God is neither perturbed nor disturbed. He is immovable - not here in the sense of locomotion but in the sense of changing (e.g. His mind). Prohibited events, therefore, would not be as Perplexlity seems to imagine (i.e. something like reactionary), but precluded as impossible or excluded from the beginning. God is, as the Theologian teaches, pure and perfect Act. To imagine Him, therefore, as being anything like reactionary seems therefore to be completely absurd.

Perplexity at least appears to accept the existence of reality, which is good. However, he appears to be harrangued on the question of God’s secret judgements, as Saint Augustine called them, i.e. why the things that happen, happen. My understanding is that God is actively managing the world and punishing evil when and as it happens according to certain fixed laws and the perfection of His justice, He being aware of all things and perfectly capable of meeting out exactly and perfectly the best and fitting punishment:

[2] It is the glory of God to conceal the word, and the glory of kings to search out the speech. [3] The heaven above, and the earth beneath, and the heart of kings is unsearchable. [4] Take away the rust from silver, and there shall come forth a most pure vessel: [5] Take away wickedness from the face of the king, and his throne shall be established with justice.

The example that I am aware of is that lying is punished by believing lies. His punishments, then, are fitting to the nature of the evil or sin committed.

“God is not mocked.”

 

[Perplexity]

Hmm, well see i’d say that while the skeptical theist might not know the reasons for God allowing something to happen or not, they might well be reasonably certain that an event may or may not occur, due to simple observation and prior experience.

For example if a plane blows up mid air, the ST can be reasonably certain that the passengers on board would die, despite the ST not knowing why God would let that happen.

Ah, but when the theist says X is likely (because of simple observation, prior experience, or whatever), he’s also saying ‘it’s unlikely that God would prevent X.’ I think we all acknowledge that if God existed, he could miraculously intervene to permit or prevent any X (practically any at least).

But, because on ST we can’t say whether God would or wouldn’t have sufficient moral reason to permit X, the theist can no longer say ‘it’s unlikely that God would prevent X.’ It follows then that he can no longer say X is likely.

Ordinarily, prior experience, simple observation (etc.) would probabilify the event in question. This is why I earlier said naturalism fairs quite well here. But, when we have an omni-guy in the picture who could intervene in anything, and we can’t know what he’s gonna do, it’s all up for grabs.

 

[Perplexity]

No, you are assuming that you do not need to make tests to believe your results. Rudolph Carnap proposed a logical/inductive probability in much the same regard as Bayesian probability and, in the same monograph, rejected its use due to the fact that it is meta-scientific at best and the values associated with the hypothesis are vague and very ill-defined–he did, however, suggest that if logical probability could possibly be developed more and unified among every person, then one could use it; however, it is still as poorly developed now as it is then.

Of course I’m assuming I don’t need to test here. I’m not using the kind of probability that requires such things. I’m using the probability almost always employed by philosophers and scientists: Bayesianism. This needn’t be an inter-subjective exercise (though I think it can be). All we want to know is how some piece of evidence should effect our confidence in a hypothesis, and this is exactly what Bayesianism delivers.

You are being fairly obtuse about this point. I have disagreed with your conclusion and I have offered what I think you are trying to state.
Disagreement with conclusion: *You can absolutely know that an event occurred, regardless of whether or not God exists. *
Resolution of what you could possibly state, given your information: What you may not know is why the event occurred.
You even state in the quote below that we cannot be privy to God’s moral justifications for an event. You have been trying to show that if we are not privy to the moral justification of an event, then we are not privy to the actual occurrence of the event. Moral justification and occurrence are very different matters and you have not shown the connection between the two (likely because there is none).

I’ve bolded the above statement for several reasons. This is what you think I’ve been arguing for, but on numerous occasions now, I’ve said this is not what I’m arguing for. The bolded statement has nothing to do with conditional probabilities, and as I’ve explained, I’m only concerned with conditional probabilities. Whether an event actually occurs is totally irrelevant to us here. We’re only interested in whether certain events would occur, if skeptical theism was true.

This is controversial because you have no reason to choose any number outside of 1, 0.5, and 0, and even by choosing one of the three, you are being selective about the numbers. Why is it not possible for the ST to have a P(ST)=0.75? Because you are choosing it to be 0.5? That is not a good reason.

Of course I have reason for choosing the numbers I do. Bayesians have bent over backwards outlining thought experiments and methods for gauging your confidences and how to assign numerical values appropriately. It’s a subjective thing to be sure because the numbers I’m using correspond to my states of confidence, not anyone elses. But to object to this is as absurd as saying we can’t reasonably answer the question: “How much pain do you feel on a scale of 1-10?” Or “How good was the movie? 5 stars being the best, 0 being the worst.” etc. etc. we numerically represent our subjective states all the time without second thought. (Money is just a numerical representation of worth)

As I have explained numerous times now, knowing that an event occurred and knowing why an event occurred are two different things. A ST may not know why God allowed an event to occur, but he certainly would know that an event occurred. Thus, 3 is fallacious.
And you must be trolling to make the statement that a premise cannot be false. Of course you can have a false premise, as can an inference. Since Step 3 is wrong, then the conclusion (4) is wrong.

I know you keep repeating yourself, I think it’s clear you don’t know what conditional probabilities are. If you do, it’s inexplicable why you keep repeating yourself here. All we want to know is whether an event would occur, if a hypothesis were true. That has nothing to do with whether any events actually occur. The fact that you think I’m trolling is quite telling as well. I recommended a book earlier, I’ll recommend it again. It explains conditional probabilities and Bayesianism (as understood by most scientists and philosophers) quite well.

 

[empther]

**WARNING! **

Perplexity will never agree with anything you say.

Because that would end the conversation which is the last thing he wants.

This is why there is no end to his babbling.

**It is also why he’s on catholic.com forums. There’s no other place would engage in his endless nonsense, but here, with enormous numbers of members and a tradition in Catholics to ponder weighty matters, **
he can always find a few people willing to waste all their time quibblling with him.

**Why doesn’t he go on the philosophy website? **
They would laugh at him. :newidea::yeah_me::curtsey::whackadoo::bluelite::egyptian:

 

[Perplexity]

**WARNING! **

Perplexity will never agree with anything you say.

Because that would end the conversation which is the last thing he wants.

This is why there is no end to his babbling.

**It is also why he’s on catholic.com forums. There’s no other place would engage in his endless nonsense, but here, with enormous numbers of members and a tradition in Catholics to ponder weighty matters, **
he can always find a few people willing to waste all their time quibblling with him.

**Why doesn’t he go on the philosophy website? **
They would laugh at him. :newidea::yeah_me::curtsey::whackadoo::bluelite::egyptian:

So, I concede points all the time. I readily admitted that my Atheous argument sunk like a rock. Make a good point and I’ll concede it, I’ve already done that here on this thread with prodigalson iirc. So you’re full of it empther. I do go to other websites btw. The only reason I ended up here was because I was a Catholic apologist for a while. When I started getting into philosophy, I tried this forum out.

Folks, there’s no quibbling here, this is philosophy. I think we’ve had good points all around.

I’d appreciate it if everyone who thinks empther should knock it off would post something about it. If he realizes no one here supports his crazy behavior, maybe he’ll grow up. Otherwise, we’re just kind of enabling this garbage.

 

[someperson555]

I take Skeptical Theism [from now on, ST] to be the hypothesis that theism is true, and we should be skeptical that we can be privy to God’s moral justifications, for any number of reasons, perhaps our cognitive limitations for instance.

Now, on theism, God not only permits or prohibits every single event; but, has sufficient moral justifications for doing so. ST tells us that we shouldn’t think we’re privy to these moral justifications for some reason or other.

Since on theism, whether any event (E) occurs depends on whether God permits it, and ST informs us that we can’t be sure of whether God would or wouldn’t permit it, it follows that on ST, we can’t be sure of whether any given E will occur.

To drive home the absurdity, make E the death of George Washington. Did he die? Well, on ST, this depends on whether God had sufficient moral reasons for permitting his death and we’re not privy to those reasons. So, we can’t say. And so forth for any other event.

Now, from this, using Bayes’ theorem, we could prove that ST’s probability is near 0.0 (i.e., irrational); but, I don’t want to kill dialogue with technicalities.

So, let’s just suppose that the absurdities described above are enough to make you dubious of ST. So what? What does this imply? Well, it means that we can be reasonable in expecting to know what moral justifications God would have for permitting or prohibiting events. As you can imagine, this is quite a weighty implication, especially if we can’t think of anything.

Thoughts?

well, its totally individualized. why God allows certain events to happen/ not happen is based on many factors, so your formula needs to be longer. since God takes into perspective the person’s sinfullness/ holiness, his ability to handle the outcome, the effect the event/ non event would have on other people and the environment, etc, etc. so its more comlicated than a simple formula with three variables.

 

[JDaniel]

Exactly! It depends on whether God would allow it, and skeptical theism says we can’t know if God would allow it or prevent it, so it follows that we can’t know whether any event would occur, given that skeptical theism is true. (Note, this is quite different from saying we wouldn’t know that any events occur)

Perplexed:

On what authority do you assert that God “prevents?”

God bless,
jd

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Of course I’m assuming I don’t need to test here. I’m not using the kind of probability that requires such things. I’m using the probability almost always employed by philosophers and scientists: Bayesianism. This needn’t be an inter-subjective exercise (though I think it can be). All we want to know is how some piece of evidence should effect our confidence in a hypothesis, and this is exactly what Bayesianism delivers.

Bayes’ theorem works when you have testable numbers to (name removed by moderator)ut into the formula. Without testable numbers, it is a vague gauge that has no objective truth to it.

I’ve bolded the above statement for several reasons. This is what you think I’ve been arguing for, but on numerous occasions now, I’ve said this is not what I’m arguing for. The bolded statement has nothing to do with conditional probabilities, and as I’ve explained, I’m only concerned with conditional probabilities. Whether an event actually occurs is totally irrelevant to us here. We’re only interested in whether certain events would occur, if skeptical theism was true.

I agree that you have not been arguing for it, you are just asserting it with no proof. It is an assertion that you are blanketing without discussing the details. You can only offer vague lines, like, “It’s a bit technical…” and “read this book on Bayesianism by professor so and so.” Sorry, if you cannot explain it in your own words, then you probably should not be offering it as proof. In your own words:
Post 1:
To drive home the absurdity, make E the death of George Washington. Did he die? Well, on ST, this depends on whether God had sufficient moral reasons for permitting his death and we’re not privy to those reasons. So, we can’t say. And so forth for any other event.
Post 3:
That is, we’re seeing whether and if so to what degree skeptical theism & k (background knowledge) lead us to expect E
Post 27:
But, on skeptical theism, we can’t be sure whether God would have any moral reasons for preserving Washington or permitting his death. We can’t say it’s unlikely that God would miraculously intervene without affirming God wouldn’t have good moral reasons for doing so

And so on. You are telling us that this is the case and have offered no conclusive proof, just elusive “just trust me” type data. Sorry, that is not good enough results. Any philosopher (or scientist, for that matter) would just ignore you–hence empther’s recent comment.

Of course I have reason for choosing the numbers I do. Bayesians have bent over backwards outlining thought experiments and methods for gauging your confidences and how to assign numerical values appropriately. It’s a subjective thing to be sure because the numbers I’m using correspond to my states of confidence, not anyone elses. But to object to this is as absurd as saying we can’t reasonably answer the question: “How much pain do you feel on a scale of 1-10?” Or “How good was the movie? 5 stars being the best, 0 being the worst.” etc. etc. we numerically represent our subjective states all the time without second thought. (Money is just a numerical representation of worth)

No, you have a somewhat intuitive idea as to what those numerical probabilities entail. But, the real question is: “How sure are you that those numbers you are attributing are factual?” And the answer is: “You do not.” You are making those numbers up with only your feeling–as you explicitly wrote above, “It’s a subjective thing.” Subjective quantifications are absolutely pointless because they do not relate to an objective reality.

I know you keep repeating yourself, I think it’s clear you don’t know what conditional probabilities are. If you do, it’s inexplicable why you keep repeating yourself here. All we want to know is whether an event would occur, if a hypothesis were true. That has nothing to do with whether any events actually occur. The fact that you think I’m trolling is quite telling as well. I recommended a book earlier, I’ll recommend it again. It explains conditional probabilities and Bayesianism (as understood by most scientists and philosophers) quite well.

I keep repeating myself because you keep ignoring the point I am making. You have shown no real, credible evidence that suggests a ST cannot know an event occurred, you have only stated that this is the case.

 

[JDaniel]

So, I concede points all the time. I readily admitted that my Atheous argument sunk like a rock. Make a good point and I’ll concede it, I’ve already done that here on this thread with prodigalson iirc. So you’re full of it empther. I do go to other websites btw. The only reason I ended up here was because I was a Catholic apologist for a while. When I started getting into philosophy, I tried this forum out.

Folks, there’s no quibbling here, this is philosophy. I think we’ve had good points all around.

I’d appreciate it if everyone who thinks empther should knock it off would post something about it. If he realizes no one here supports his crazy behavior, maybe he’ll grow up. Otherwise, we’re just kind of enabling this garbage.

Perplexed:

I’m not sure I like empther’s attacks, so I’ll be one.

But, anyone can become exasperated, sooner or later, with someone who, for some reason, will not notice it when a real flaw is pointed out in his logic. Several posters have pointed out that God does not do “preventative” actions. Nor are such actions absolutely required by ST. Yet, post after post, you continue to bring that up as one of his actions. Soon, one wants to shake you. (I suppose you do this in order that God has a choice. Thus, your preference [for God to choose that which is not “good”] comes to play. That, my friend, betrays your ulterior intentions!)

God creates and causes. He is not coming from a predisposition of imperfection. He comes from a predisposition of perfection. His creational roll-out and his Providence require no negative(s). Therefore, no correction factors. Therefore, no preventions. It is the human condition, faced with our abilities, which allow is to cause and prevent, that seems as though God must also prevent. We are given that propensity precisely because we do not have the ability to perfectly know that our actions will cause, or create, a certain outcome or other.

In our material condition, in order so that our existences are not a mouse in a maze game, we have to be able to prevent when and if needed. That belies an imperfection in us that God does not share.

God bless,
jd

 

[Gorgias]

I’d appreciate it if everyone who thinks empther should knock it off would post something about it. If he realizes no one here supports his crazy behavior, maybe he’ll grow up. Otherwise, we’re just kind of enabling this garbage.

Because ad hominem attacks are the most valid approach to logic, right?

 

[JDaniel]

No, you have a somewhat intuitive idea as to what those numerical probabilities entail. But, the real question is: “How sure are you that those numbers you are attributing are factual?” And the answer is: “You do not.” You are making those numbers up with only your feeling–as you explicitly wrote above, “It’s a subjective thing.” Subjective quantifications are absolutely pointless because they do not relate to an objective reality.

I keep repeating myself because you keep ignoring the point I am making. You have shown no real, credible evidence that suggests a ST cannot know an event occurred, you have only stated that this is the case.

Albert:

Exactly!

Perplexed, take careful note.

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

Perplexed:

On what authority do you assert that God “prevents?”

God bless,
jd

Reason.

 

[Perplexity]

Bayes’ theorem works when you have testable numbers to (name removed by moderator)ut into the formula. Without testable numbers, it is a vague gauge that has no objective truth to it.

I’ve cited someone who’s work on probability I cited has been described as the best work on the topic, that completely disagrees with you. What have you given us to agree with you? Nothing.

“I have claimed that Bayes’s theorem is true, but I had better make clear what I mean by saying this. I mean that, in so far as for various e, h, and k, the probabilities occurring in it can be given a numerical value, it correctly states the numerical relationships that hold between them. In so far as they cannot be given precise numerical values, my claim that Bayes’s theorem is true is simply the claim that all statements of comparative probability that are entailed by the theorem are true. By statements of comparative probability I mean statements about one probability being greater than, or equal to, or less than another probability. Such statements are sometimes all that we can justifiably assert about some probabilities.” - Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. p. 68 (Cf. Swinburne, Bayes’ theorem.)

All you’ve done is assert that Bayes’ theorem requires testable numbers. So, I feel in very good company in disagreeing with you here.

I agree that you have not been arguing for it, you are just asserting it with no proof. It is an assertion that you are blanketing without discussing the details. You can only offer vague lines, like, “It’s a bit technical…” and “read this book on Bayesianism by professor so and so.” Sorry, if you cannot explain it in your own words, then you probably should not be offering it as proof. In your own words:

Post 1:

To drive home the absurdity, make E the death of George Washington. Did he die? Well, on ST, this depends on whether God had sufficient moral reasons for permitting his death and we’re not privy to those reasons. So, we can’t say. And so forth for any other event.

Post 3:

That is, we’re seeing whether and if so to what degree skeptical theism & k (background knowledge) lead us to expect E

Post 27:

But, on skeptical theism, we can’t be sure whether God would have any moral reasons for preserving Washington or permitting his death. We can’t say it’s unlikely that God would miraculously intervene without affirming God wouldn’t have good moral reasons for doing so

Folks, what does the bolded “it” in the first quoted sentence refer to?

“You have been trying to show that if we are not privy to the moral justification of an event, then we are not privy to the actual occurrence of the event.”

‘It’ refers to the above bolded conditional. Can you find any traces of it in the citations of me he’s posted above? No. So, I’m really just baffled that he’s still pushing this.

And so on. You are telling us that this is the case and have offered no conclusive proof, just elusive “just trust me” type data. Sorry, that is not good enough results. Any philosopher (or scientist, for that matter) would just ignore you–hence empther’s recent comment.

I’ve explained exactly why ST entails that the conditional probability ‘anything given ST is either 0.5, or inscrutable’ even going so far as to give a deductive argument for this. Did he say I was vague then? No, he said one of its premises was false. So, I’m not sure how seriously we’re supposed to take his claim that I’m being vague etc.

No, you have a somewhat intuitive idea as to what those numerical probabilities entail. But, the real question is: “How sure are you that those numbers you are attributing are factual?” And the answer is: “You do not.” You are making those numbers up with only your feeling–as you explicitly wrote above, “It’s a subjective thing.” Subjective quantifications are absolutely pointless because they do not relate to an objective reality.

As I’ve explained here and elsewhere, we simply assign numerical values to our degrees of confidence. What he’s doing is doubting our ability to know things through introspection (like how strongly we believe something).

But, we shouldn’t buy this. We don’t have any such skepticism when at the doctors we’re asking how much pain we have on a scale of 1-10. All we’re doing with these probabilities is recognizing that we believe things with different amounts of confidence. This is why we have such things as opinions, and educated guesses. Think of all the things you’d have to throw away if you bought his argument here. I submit, we should stick to what’s natural and maintain what we already know: we have different amounts of confidence in different beliefs.

 

[JDaniel]

Reason.

Perplexed:

OK. Well, in this case, this has been well thought out over the past hundreds of years, such that it requires more than just naked reason.

When it is said that God intervenes, He is not reacting to our exquisite desires. He might be, but only as it suits His purposes - for us. Remember, we are at the minuscule leading edge of our own eternity. Our seventy years, on earth, does not even represent a bacterium on an elephant’s behind, in terms of what is really ahead for us.

Remember, God is not annihilating us upon our deaths. We merely change states. (Of course, this presumes that we don’t believe we’re here by the so-called causal efficacies of pure chance.)

God bless,
jd

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

Perplexed:

I’m not sure I like empther’s attacks, so I’ll be one.

But, anyone can become exasperated, sooner or later, with someone who, for some reason, will not notice it when a real flaw is pointed out in his logic. Several posters have pointed out that God does not do “preventative” actions. Nor are such actions absolutely required by ST. Yet, post after post, you continue to bring that up as one of his actions. Soon, one wants to shake you. (I suppose you do this in order that God has a choice. Thus, your preference [for God to choose that which is not “good”] comes to play. That, my friend, betrays your ulterior intentions!)

God creates and causes. He is not coming from a predisposition of imperfection. He comes from a predisposition of perfection. His creational roll-out and his Providence require no negative(s). Therefore, no correction factors. Therefore, no preventions. It is the human condition, faced with our abilities, which allow is to cause and prevent, that seems as though God must also prevent. We are given that propensity precisely because we do not have the ability to perfectly know that our actions will cause, or create, a certain outcome or other.

In our material condition, in order so that our existences are not a mouse in a maze game, we have to be able to prevent when and if needed. That belies an imperfection in us that God does not share.

God bless,
jd

God prevents all sorts of possible states of affairs and events from actualizing. For instance, God prevents the possibility of all human beings immediately ceasing to exist at this moment from actualizing by choosing to sustain our existence.

God prevented the possible world containing only God as its concrete object from actualizing by creating ex nihilo.

The examples could be multiplied ad infinitum.

I believe the posters who have said God prevents nothing (like empther) aren’t speaking about bare-theism, but rather Christian theism.

As I’ve defined theism, how could we possibly know that God wouldn’t prevent anything? (given the understanding of prevention I’ve utilized) My suspicion seems strengthened by the fact that these same posters also said free-will is entailed by God’s existence; but, that’s clearly false with bare-theism.

 

[prodigalson2011]

All I’ve done is translate that. It’s absurd whether I translate it or not.

Exactly though! Skeptical theism eliminates the possibility of prediction, which is absurd! We can’t say whether anything would happen, given that skeptical theism is true.

Ok. I see where we’ve been banging heads here. The problem is you’re being entirely too reductionist. Skeptical theism, whether true or not, does not eliminate other methods of deduction. Even if skeptical theism is true, we can still use other methods to predict events. Given that we accept that the universe and human beings are allowed an amount of independence, on theism, we can then use anything from psychology, sociology, physics, biology, other natural sciences, etc. to say whether something is likely to happen or not. We can add skeptical theism to these to say that, even though we know certain things are apt to happen, we cannot say exactly how the occurence relates to God.

I think the absurdity lies not in skeptical theism itself, but in your notion of it as a holistic worldview. I would say it’s more like fine print.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I’ve cited someone who’s work on probability I cited has been described as the best work on the topic, that completely disagrees with you. What have you given us to agree with you? Nothing.

Which, fancily enough, is exactly what you have given us to agree with you. It is amazing that you want proof of something without offering any of your own!

“I mean that, in so far as for various e, h, and k, the probabilities occurring in it can be given a numerical value, it correctly states the numerical relationships that hold between them. In so far as they cannot be given precise numerical values, my claim that Bayes’s theorem is true is simply the claim that all statements of comparative probability that are entailed by the theorem are true.” - Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. p. 68 (Cf. Swinburne, Bayes’ theorem.)

All you’ve done is assert that Bayes’ theorem requires testable numbers. So, I feel in very good company in disagreeing with you here.

I edited your post to show the following point: he is saying it is just as subjective as I am. All you can say with Bayesian statistics is that your feeling about the probability can be related to other probabilities to which you are also giving subjective values. This is exactly what Swinburne says there.
Your numbers are completely subjective, by your own admission, and are not necessarily equally compatible (and ought to be comparable) to someone else’s completely subjective values. There is little reason to introduce Bayesian statistics because (a) they are not true statistics, just feelings and (b) you cannot prove your values.

Folks, what does the bolded “it” in the first quoted sentence refer to?

“You have been trying to show that if we are not privy to the moral justification of an event, then we are not privy to the actual occurrence of the event.”

‘It’ refers to the above bolded conditional. Can you find any traces of it in the citations of me he’s posted above? No. So, I’m really just baffled that he’s still pushing this.

Every single one of those posts of yours state the ‘it.’ It is implicit in each one, but it is absolutely there. Without that ‘it,’ those posts of yours make little sense. You need the fact that not knowing the moral justification of an event means that we cannot know that the event occurred. You have stated this as fact in multiple locations in this thread, but have yet to offer evidence that this is the case.

I am baffled by your refusal to admit that your thesis needs it:
Post 40:
This clearly has not been my claim. I’ll formalize this to clarify:

1. If skeptical theism is true, we can’t be sure that God has no morally overriding reason(s) to prevent some event E. (because we’re not privy to any of God’s moral justifications)
2. If we can’t be sure that God has no morally overriding reason(s) to prevent some event E, then we can’t be sure that God wouldn’t prevent E.

** 3. If we can’t be sure that God wouldn’t prevent E, then we can’t be sure that E would occur. (because on theism, no event occurs unless God permits it)**

1. Therefore, if skeptical theism is true, we can’t be sure that E would occur.

You are claiming the ‘it’ right there in these 4 lines. If ST is true, we are not privy to God’s moral justifications. If we are not privy to God’s moral justification, then we cannot be sure that a particular event would occur. Thus, if ST is true, then we cannot be sure a particular event occurred.

QED: I am right, you are wrong here. You have stated it very clearly that with ST, you cannot know an event has occurred. It is your conclusion. That you are ignoring your own conclusion is mind-boggling.

I’ve explained exactly why ST entails that the conditional probability ‘anything given ST is either 0.5, or inscrutable’ even going so far as to give a deductive argument for this. Did he say I was vague then? No, he said one of its premises was false. So, I’m not sure how seriously we’re supposed to take his claim that I’m being vague etc.

As I’ve explained here and elsewhere, we simply assign numerical values to our degrees of confidence. What he’s doing is doubting our ability to know things through introspection (like how strongly we believe something).

It is purely your degree of confidence, not everyone’s degree of confidence. And that is the massive hindrance to not testing a situation: you cannot get the real probability. All you can give is a subjective number about an objective situation, somewhat of a contradiction if you ask me.

But, we shouldn’t buy this. We don’t have any such skepticism when at the doctors we’re asking how much pain we have on a scale of 1-10. All we’re doing with these probabilities is recognizing that we believe things with different amounts of confidence. This is why we have such things as opinions, and educated guesses. Think of all the things you’d have to throw away if you bought his argument here. I submit, we should stick to what’s natural maintain what we already know: we have different amounts of confidence in different beliefs.

I have zero problem accepting different levels of confidence for different beliefs among individuals, I just absolutely disagree with comparing the levels and giving them numeric values. But you said it best: this is why we have such things as opinions and educated guesses. They are not facts and exact answers.

 

[JDaniel]

As I’ve explained here and elsewhere, we simply assign numerical values to our degrees of confidence. What he’s doing is doubting our ability to know things through introspection (like how strongly we believe something).

But, we shouldn’t buy this. We don’t have any such skepticism when at the doctors we’re asking how much pain we have on a scale of 1-10. All we’re doing with these probabilities is recognizing that we believe things with different amounts of confidence. This is why we have such things as opinions, and educated guesses. Think of all the things you’d have to throw away if you bought his argument here. I submit, we should stick to what’s natural and maintain what we already know: we have different amounts of confidence in different beliefs.

Perplexed:

But, what does this have to do with Reality? This means, if taken to its logical conclusion, that the earth has 3.5 billion differing ideas (on a subject) and that all it takes is each person’s degree of belief in each one, to know which one is the correct one. Really?

I have confidence that shortly I shall leave the house and go to work. My chances may be more than 50:50, or less than 50:50 that I will make it to the office. That we each have different amounts of confidence in various propositions, in no way supports any of such propositions. Otherwise, we should all agree with you!

Your proposition arbitrarily imposing numerical values to represent some degree of belief, may itself have a value (also arbitrary) of 0.0000000000000000000001. Don’t you see that? Thus, you have a sort of ‘faith’ in your imposition that may be unwarranted.

God bless,
jd

 

[razredge]

Ah, but when the theist says X is likely (because of simple observation, prior experience, or whatever), he’s also saying ‘it’s unlikely that God would prevent X.’ I think we all acknowledge that if God existed, he could miraculously intervene to permit or prevent any X (practically any at least).

Yes

But, because on ST we can’t say whether God would or wouldn’t have sufficient moral reason to permit X, the theist can no longer say ‘it’s unlikely that God would prevent X.’ It follows then that he can no longer say X is likely.

This doesn’t follow - why can’t the ST simply say that X is likely and he doesn’t know God’s reasons from allow or prevent it from happening.

I think you are equating our uncertainty about God’s reasons for allowing an event to occur to uncertainty over God allowing or preventing that event from occurring.

You can have one without the other.

For example we can be certain that every time someone is shot they will either be injured or killed, despite wondering why God would allow that to happen.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Yes

This doesn’t follow - why can’t the ST simply say that X is likely and he doesn’t know God’s reasons from allow or prevent it from happening.

I think you are equating our uncertainty about God’s reasons for allowing an event to occur to uncertainty over God allowing or preventing that event from occurring.

You can have one without the other.

For example we can be certain that every time someone is shot they will either be injured or killed, despite wondering why God would allow that to happen.

Thank you! Someone else sees what I have been trying to point out for the last 2 days! Perplexity has been dodging this comment by claiming that this is not what he is trying to prove (despite post 40 claiming quite the opposite).