Reflection on Skeptical Theism

[Perplexity]

But even knowing their reasons, we still do not know if the person would or would not perform the action.

I agree. But, we’re asking if they’d be likely to. e.g., how likely is Jones to murder Smith given that Jones has overriding desires to do so?

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I agree. But, we’re asking if they’d be likely to. e.g., how likely is Jones to murder Smith given that Jones has overriding desires to do so?

In which case, whether or not you have the knowledge of their reasoning, you can never be more or less than 50% sure that the event will occur. That is, we know that P(A)=P(B), which means that P(A|B)=P(B|A).

You cannot determine that ST is false in this probabilistic manner.

 

[Perplexity]

In which case, whether or not you have the knowledge of their reasoning, you can never be more or less than 50% sure that the event will occur. That is, we know that P(A)=P(B), which means that P(A|B)=P(B|A).

You cannot determine that ST is false in this probabilistic manner.

Sure we can. All we do is evaluate ST’s posterior for a number of E’s. For example, 5 E’s. ST’s posterior for E1 becomes its prior for E2. Its posterior for E2 becomes its prior for E3. Its posterior for E3 becomes its prior for E4, and so forth.

For every such evaluation, ST’s posterior decreases, and we have so many E’s it’ll eventually approach 0.0. Now you can say that there’s no way to be objective about this but, seriously, just try it. I’ll give an illustration:

Let’s suppose the following probabilities, where E1=George Washington’s death, and ~ST=atheism:

P(ST|K)=0.8 [0.8 represents a confidence far above indifference and slightly weaker than certitude]

P(~ST|K)=0.2 [determined via the probability axiom: P(~H|K)=1-P(H|K)]

P(E1|ST&K)=0.5 [there really shouldn’t be objections here]

P(E1|~ST&K)=0.9 [pretty common sense]

When you plug these numbers into Bayes’ theorem, you get a posterior for ST of .68.

You take that number and make it ST’s prior when evaluating E2 (say, Lincoln’s death), so the only probability that changes here from the last calculation is ST’s prior. This gives us a posterior for ST of 0.51.

As you can see this number will only continue to decrease.

 

[razredge]

In order to make this analogous, we can’t just say we wouldn’t know his reasons for killing them. That implies he would kill them. We need to say we have no idea whether he has morally overriding reasons or obligations to kill them or not. Once you say that, it’s entirely unclear whether he would kill them.

Well, in that case I’d still think we’d be able to say he’d probably kill them based on his past experience.

And anyway we can apply this flawed analogy back to God, we can say that we don’t know God’s reasons for letting X happen however we will know God will most likely let X happen.

I don’t see any issue with that

 

[Perplexity]

Well, in that case I’d still think we’d be able to say he’d probably kill them based on his past experience.

How does knowledge of his past experience change things? We’re still completely ignorant of whether he’d have morally overriding reasons for or against any given event.

 

[empther]

Friends, this entire thread is about Perplexity’s attempt to use Bayes’ theorem

**And what the hell is **Bayes’ theorem?

It’s some crackpot’s theory that,
now sit down before you read this,
the likelihood of a belief being true can be calculated.

Yes, folks, you read that correctly. This Bayes character and his disciple Perplecity
think somebody’s belief can be confirmed or disproved by mathematics.

I know you think I’m lying. Look it up yourself:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayes%27_theorem
plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/

On second thought, don’t look it up. It might drive you nuts.

Perplexity’s ultimate goal is clear. He wants to use this screwball theory to prove the likelihood of belief in God being true is low.

Let us be charitable and draw the curtain of silence on this sad scene.
**　:bighanky::sad_bye:**

 

[Perplexity]

Friends, this entire thread is about Perplexity’s attempt to use Bayes’ theorem

**And what the hell is **Bayes’ theorem?

It’s some crackpot’s theory that,
now sit down before you read this,
the likelihood of a belief being true can be calculated.

Yes, folks, you read that correctly. This Bayes character and his disciple Perplecity
think somebody’s belief can be confirmed or disproved by mathematics.

I know you think I’m lying. Look it up yourself:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayes%27_theorem
plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/

On second thought, don’t look it up. It might drive you nuts.

Perplexity’s ultimate goal is clear. He wants to use this screwball theory to prove the likelihood of belief in God being true is low.

Let us be charitable and draw the curtain of silence on this sad scene.
**　:bighanky::sad_bye:**

Folks, I’ve already explained what Bayes’ theorem is. Empther’s familiarity with it obviously doesn’t extend beyond the articles he linked above, which he must’ve only just read.

Bayesianism as I’ve explained it, is almost universally used by scientists and philosophers. If empther’s world-view can’t hand bayesianism, then so much the worse for it

 

[empther]

The usual nonsense from Perplexity:

Folks, I’ve already explained what Bayes’ theorem is. Empther’s familiarity with it obviously doesn’t extend beyond the articles he linked above, which he must’ve only just read.

Bayesianism as I’ve explained it, is almost universally used by scientists and philosophers. If empther’s world-view can’t hand bayesianism, then so much the worse for it

I took a a course on probability and statistics in college. Even those who didn’t have at least a kernel of an idea of what it’s about.

It’s about calculating the probability of an event, or a “sample” of events, out of a “population” of events.

Simple example: what are the chances of flipping a coin and having it come up heads? You don’t have to flip all the coins in the world until they wear out and no longer exist. That would be the “population”. Instead, all you have to do is flip one coin a hundred times and see the result. That’s the “sample”. Then you can predict the likelihood of flipping heads.

More complicated example: You catch one hundred fish, band them, and throw them back in the lake. What are the chances the next fish you catch will be banded? Actually, there’s no way of knowing that until you catch another 100 fish and see how many are banded. If 10 are banded, you know there are about 1,000 fish in the lake. Now you know the chances of the next fish you catch being banded are about 1 in 10.

There is no “population” with God’s existence. It’s a one time event. He either exists or he doesn’t. You can’t take a “sample” of the “population” to see the chances of his existence.

There is no way to calculate the likelihood of belief in God being true, *or false. *

Of course, Perplexity told you none of this.
Is anybody surprised?

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I had started writing a whole rebuttal to post #123, but then I realized something that I should have realized a long time ago:
Perplexity is asserting that ST means we cannot know that an event could occur (future tense) by referring to a past event. This is dubious because if he were to argue for a future event, he would clearly see that for any belief (ST, T, At, Ag, Pa, Po, M, etc), certainty of a future event is 0.5 and uncertainty is 0.5.

 

[Perplexity]

I had started writing a whole rebuttal to post #123, but then I realized something that I should have realized a long time ago:
Perplexity is asserting that ST means we cannot know that an event could occur (future tense) by referring to a past event. This is dubious because if he were to argue for a future event, he would clearly see that for any belief (ST, T, At, Ag, Pa, Po, M, etc), certainty of a future event is 0.5 and uncertainty is 0.5.

Conditional probabilities don’t deal with tenses. They’re more like counter-factuals. All they’re concerned with is the relationship of ‘implication’ that does, or does not obtain between various propositions. e.g., if proposition P is true, would Q then be true? If so, then P implies Q in the specified way.

 

[empther]

This is dubious because if he were to argue for a future event, he would clearly see that for any belief (ST, T, At, Ag, Pa, Po, M, etc), certainty of a future event is 0.5 and uncertainty is 0.5.

Right!

The probability of a future event can only be determined in two ways:

1. By examining the record, that is, by counting the number of similar events that have already occurred

or

1. By using scientific principles to predict an event. For example: the two sides of a coin are of equal weight and flipping should result in heads 50% of the time.

Neither method is applicable to God’s existence,

{ or for that matter what Harry will do when presented with the opportunity to rob a bank because there are too many factors involved and not enough past events ( and he may have changed anyways ) }

Predicting the truth of a belief is nonsense.
:juggle::curtsey::whackadoo:

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Conditional probabilities don’t deal with tenses. They’re more like counter-factuals. All they’re concerned with is the relationship of ‘implication’ that does, or does not obtain between various propositions. e.g., if proposition P is true, would Q then be true? If so, then P implies Q in the specified way.

Right, and your train of thought that you have been doing this whole time is that you are ignoring P and asking can we imply Q? If you remove ST and replace it with any of the belief systems I wrote, you will find that the answer is: no, you cannot imply Q without P.

 

[Perplexity]

The usual nonsense from Perplexity:

I took a a course on probability and statistics in college. Even those who didn’t have at least a kernel of an idea of what it’s about.

It’s about calculating the probability of an event, or a “sample” of events, out of a “population” of events.

Simple example: what are the chances of flipping a coin and having it come up heads? You don’t have to flip all the coins in the world until they wear out and no longer exist. That would be the “population”. Instead, all you have to do is flip one coin a hundred times and see the result. That’s the “sample”. Then you can predict the likelihood of flipping heads.

More complicated example: You catch one hundred fish, band them, and throw them back in the lake. What are the chances the next fish you catch will be banded? Actually, there’s no way of knowing that until you catch another 100 fish and see how many are banded. If 10 are banded, you know there are about 1,000 fish in the lake. Now you know the chances of the next fish you catch being banded are about 1 in 10.

There is no “population” with God’s existence. It’s a one time event. He either exists or he doesn’t. You can’t take a “sample” of the “population” to see the chances of his existence.

There is no way to calculate the likelihood of belief in God being true, *or false. *

Of course, Perplexity told you none of this.
Is anybody surprised?

Yeah you’re obviously not familiar with the non-frequentist school of probability, which has been dominating probability theory for years now, and is just as old as the frequentist school.

I haven’t heard a rational objection to the majority position yet, and merely describing the frequentist position certainly will not do for an objection empther. C’mon bro.

 

[Perplexity]

Right, and your train of thought that you have been doing this whole time is that you are ignoring P and asking can we imply Q? If you remove ST and replace it with any of the belief systems I wrote, you will find that the answer is: no, you cannot imply Q without P.

I can’t make any sense of this. I’ve been using conditional probabilities this entire time. That’s actually the only kind of probability which Bayes’ theorem utilizes, and I’ve been employing the theorem extensively.

 

[empther]

:extrahappy:

Perplexity’s latest nonsense:

Conditional probabilities don’t deal with tenses. They’re more like counter-factuals.

Reminds me of what MAD Magazine used to do. They’d give you a template with blank spaces and let you fill in the blank space from lists of words.

MAD template:

** space 1 ] don’t deal with space 2 ] . They’re more like space 3 ] . **

Alfred E. Neuman says "Fill in the spaces with a word from the matching lists:

** space 1 ] __ space 2 ]_ space 3 ]**
politicians ___________hookers the dead
doctors dinosaurs vampires
aliens amadilloes ________Elvis
farters ________stock markets Bozo the Clown
terrorists ___________helium balloons _____Perplexity

This system will help you generate 5 X 5 X 5 = 125 statements
to dazzle your friends with your abundant eloquence.

What do they mean? Who cares, man! Them’s great statements!

 

[Perplexity]

:extrahappy:

Perplexity’s latest nonsense:

Reminds me of what MAD Magazine used to do. They’d give you a template with blank spaces and let you fill in the blank space from lists of words.

MAD template:

** space 1** ] don’t deal with space 2 ] . They’re more like space 3 ] .

Alfred E. Neuman says "Fill in the spaces with a word from the matching lists:

** space 1 ]** space 2 ] space 3 ]
politicians hookers the dead
doctors dinosaurs vampires
aliens amadilloes Elvis
farts stock markets Bozo the Clown
terrorists helium balloons Perplexity

Yeah, so I used to interpret empther charitably and assume he was a troll, but now it’s quite evident the man is just ignorant. He literally has no idea what he’s critiquing, please do yourself a favor and don’t listen to him. You’d be far better off researching this yourself.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I can’t make any sense of this. I’ve been using conditional probabilities this entire time. That’s actually the only kind of probability which Bayes’ theorem utilizes, and I’ve been employing the theorem extensively.

Right, and because you were hiding it behind a lot of mush, it took me a while to dig through it all to find the root of it. It is clear to me now, I hope & think, that you are trying to determine if we remove P, can we still infer/imply/expect/whatever Q from the conditional if P, then Q.

All of this stemming from the simple fact that you want us to ignore background information. You are trying to get us to pretend that we do not know P and asking us if we can still expect Q. The answer is no, every time, under any belief system: skeptical theism, nonskeptical theism, atheism, agnosticism, polytheism, pantheism, etc.

 

[empther]

You’d be far better off researching this yourself.

Research what? How to calculate the likelihood of somebody’s religious belief being true or false based on some mathematical formula? How to find God’s “justifications” for “permitting” or “prohibiting” events based on some crackpot theory?

People are too intelligent to waste time on this nonsense. I saw how ridiculous it was in your first post.

 

[razredge]

How does knowledge of his past experience change things? We’re still completely ignorant of whether he’d have morally overriding reasons for or against any given event.

Of course it does, if the agent has acted in consistently in previous scenarios we can assume that it is likely he will do the same in future scenarios - despite the possibility of us being ignorant of his reasons or motive for his actions.

 

[Perplexity]

Of course it does, if the agent has acted in consistently in previous scenarios we can assume that it is likely he will do the same in future scenarios - despite the possibility of us being ignorant of his reasons or motive for his actions.

Remember we’re dealing with conditional probabilities. We’re asking whether skeptical theism’s being true would imply certain events. So, the theist’s background knowledge may very well contain a reservoir of information about what God has already done. But, skeptical theism renders that information useless. It doesn’t allow the theist to justifiably use induction. The skeptical theist cannot be sure God would have overriding reasons to do X, or overriding reasons to not do X, for any given X. If he can, then he’s not a skeptical theist.