Refuting the "Crash Course" Refutation

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Refuting the “Crash Course” Refutation

How does one answer the claims against Aquinas’s cosmological arguments in this video? [starting at 6:45 if you cannot watch the whole 10 minutes]

youtu.be/TgisehuGOyY?t=6m45s

The host flat out dismisses Aquinas as contradicting himself.

He also dismisses the teleological argument in the next episode:

youtu.be/7e9v_fsZB6A
 
I’ll rewatch the videos to try and help you out. But please remember that CC isn’t endorsing the viewpoint. It’s giving a survey level intro to these arguments and giving the various problems with them that philosophers have written about.
 
First rebuttal:. Sure, the Ways don’t prove a Christian type god. But it’s a starting point. It gets a theist and an atheist on the same page that there must be some sort of deity. If there is agreement at least.

Second rebuttal is an ironclad proof that there can be no infinite regress. This is raised as an objection because a lot of Christian arguments take the infinite regress problem as granted.

Third rebuttal - God is outside the “everything must have an X” rule. This isn’t a very strong rebuttal though because it turns on a property of God that is ad hoc to the argument. I’ll think harder on this and do a little research. Admittedly this is where the Ways fall apart for me, too.
 
I’ll rewatch the videos to try and help you out. But please remember that CC isn’t endorsing the viewpoint. It’s giving a survey level intro to these arguments and giving the various problems with them that philosophers have written about.
The main two arguments is that
  1. If an infinite regress is possible then Aquinas is wrong to think that there has to be a starting point or first cause.
  2. Aquinas’s arguments are self deafeters because if every thing needs a cuase then so does God.
These are frustratingly bad objections because they ultimately present a straw-man of Aquinas’ arguments.

As for the first objection. While i think there are good arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress, there really isn’t any need to argue against that possibility. If you really understand the metaphysics of Aquinas one would understand that a first cause has nothing to do with temporal relationships but rather with metaphysical relationships.
  1. Each potential effect receives its actuality not from it’s own potential nature but from that which is already actual. Thus, in other-words, in order for a potential nature to exist something other than itself has to actualize its potential because a potential nature cannot actualize itself. **Potential cannot actualize itself.
    **
Even if an infinite regress of cause and effect exists, every single cause and effect in that regress begins as a potential being. Thus in order to explain the existence of an infinite regress one has to posit the existence of a cause that was not itself a “potential being”.

In other-words no being in the infinite regress is the cause of its “actuality”, every being in the chain receives its actuality, thus the reason for the “existence” of an infinite regress cannot be reduced to the infinite regress itself. Therefore it requires a cause regardless of being infinite.
  1. As for the idea that everything needs a cause therefore God needs a cause. This is a complete misunderstanding of the argument. This has been tirelessly refuted and yet people continue to make the same mistake.
Every “effect” needs a cause. A being that exists because of its own nature does not require a cause.
 
The main two arguments is that
  1. If an infinite regress is possible then Aquinas is wrong to think that there has to be a starting point or first cause.
  2. Aquinas’s arguments are self deafeters because if every thing needs a cuase then so does God.
These are frustratingly bad objections because they ultimately present a straw-man of Aquinas’ arguments.

As for the first objection. While i think there are good arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress, there really isn’t any need to argue against that possibility. If you really understand the metaphysics of Aquinas one would understand that a first cause has nothing to do with temporal relationships but rather with metaphysical relationships.
  1. Each potential effect receives its actuality not from it’s own potential nature but from that which is already actual. Thus, in other-words, in order for a potential nature to exist something other than itself has to actualize its potential because a potential nature cannot actualize itself. **Potential cannot actualize itself.
    **
Even if an infinite regress of cause and effect exists, every single cause and effect in that regress begins as a potential being. Thus in order to explain the existence of an infinite regress one has to posit the existence of a cause that was not itself a “potential being”.

In other-words no being in the infinite regress is the cause of its “actuality”, every being in the chain receives its actuality, thus the reason for the “existence” of an infinite regress cannot be reduced to the infinite regress itself. Therefore it requires a cause regardless of being infinite.
  1. As for the idea that everything needs a cause therefore God needs a cause. This is a complete misunderstanding of the argument. This has been tirelessly refuted and yet people continue to make the same mistake.
Every “effect” needs a cause. A being that exists because of its own nature does not require a cause.
It’s pretty frustrating getting the same tired defenses too. Aquinas’ metaphysics seems so… unnecessary. Unless one needs them to back these arguments. I haven’t encountered a compelling argument for it.

And I think the rebuttal doesn’t hinge on “God needs a cause” though. The real meat of the rebuttal is that if something needs to exist because of its own nature, there isn’t any reason that thing can’t be the universe. Nothing about reality precludes that, and nothing we’ve seen is absolute proof against it being possible.
 
It’s pretty frustrating getting the same tired defenses too. Aquinas’ metaphysics seems so… unnecessary. Unless one needs them to back these arguments. I haven’t encountered a compelling argument for it. .
You’re are certainly free to refute the argument i presented.
And I think the rebuttal doesn’t hinge on “God needs a cause” though. The real meat of the rebuttal is that if something needs to exist because of its own nature, there isn’t any reason that thing can’t be the universe. Nothing about reality precludes that, and nothing we’ve seen is absolute proof against it being possible.
The universe moves from potency to act. It is the fact that the universe is changing, it is the fact that the universe has emergent properties, it is the fact that the universe continuously takes on new forms (its nature changes), this is the reason Aquinas thinks the universe is not the uncaused cause, is not a necessary nature,** is not that which derives its existence from its own nature.** This is the meat of Aquinas’ argument.

If you think that he is wrong, please take the stage dear fellow and explain why.
 
It’s pretty frustrating getting the same tired defenses too. Aquinas’ metaphysics seems so… unnecessary. Unless one needs them to back these arguments. I haven’t encountered a compelling argument for it.

And I think the rebuttal doesn’t hinge on “God needs a cause” though. The real meat of the rebuttal is that if something needs to exist because of its own nature, there isn’t any reason that thing can’t be the universe. Nothing about reality precludes that, and nothing we’ve seen is absolute proof against it being possible.
IWantGod’s response is exactly right. To put it other words, the universe needs an outside explanation is that it is evident by examining it that it does “simply exist in itself”. The universe changes, grows, is different now than it was then, ect. Something that “simply is” wouldn’t suffer change, it would just “be”. Something that “simply is” would be what it is at all times, because that would be the definition of its nature. The universe does not meet this criteria, so it is clear that it does not exist of its own nature.

This doesn’t get us to the knowledge of God as He Is, but it does get us to knowing that there must be a “simply is”, and it’s not the universe. We have other points of information that lead us to know this “I Am That Am”, but this suffices to show us that it must be real, and outside the universe we experience.

Peace and God bless!
 
Something that “simply is” wouldn’t suffer change, it would just “be”. **Something that “simply is” would be what it is at all times, because that would be the definition of its nature. **The universe does not meet this criteria, so it is clear that it does not exist of its own nature.
👍
 
And I think the rebuttal doesn’t hinge on “God needs a cause” though. The real meat of the rebuttal is that if something needs to exist because of its own nature, there isn’t any reason that thing can’t be the universe. Nothing about reality precludes that, and nothing we’ve seen is absolute proof against it being possible.
The mistake is thinking that the declaration that “God does not need a cause” is arbitrary. When we’re talking about the cosmological arguments, we’re not assuming the God of Abraham.

Generally how it works is that you’d have an argument directed at stating there must be a First Cause which itself is not caused. There would be a separate line of argument establishing that properties X, Y, and Z are caused. Then you’d combine these two arguments together and conclude that the First Cause therefore cannot have properties X, Y, and Z. It’s this “First Cause Without X, Y, and Z” that is denoted as God.

So if someone responds with “Well, why can’t this teapot be the First Cause.” The response would be, “because it has property/ies X, Y, and/or Z”. “Well, why can’t the universe be the First Cause?” Again, does the universe have property(ies) X, Y, and/or Z? The theist argues that “yes, the universe does have properties X, Y, and Z and therefore can’t be the First Cause.”

The theist is not making an arbitrary argument here. The theist would say, “Yes, reality does preclude a teapot/“the universe” from being the First Cause.”

Now, do the cosmological arguments work? I believe they do, but it’s not my intent to argue them here. But to object with “Why can’t ____ be the First Cause according to the cosmological arguments?” is to miss a lot about what the cosmological arguments are stating. It would be better to re-examine if the universe* has the properties “X, Y, and Z” as the classical theist claims or to argue that classical theists are wrong when stating that properties “X, Y, and Z” require causes.
  • Granted, is it appropriate to speak of “the universe” as a container or single being in itself? Or should we instead be focusing on the individual elements of the universe? Or the universe as an aggregate of all the elements and not a separate container from the elements? For convenience, I’ve been referring to “the universe” as a thing, though I don’t know if it’s a unified thing in the sense we can talk about it as a being in itself.
 
Objection: These arguments don’t establish the existence of any particular God.

Reply: They’re not intended to. If there’s anything they argue for, it’s theism. It’s not particular to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc . . . [This is not to state that we therefore have no reason to prefer one over the other, or that Aquinas never spoke to those concerns, but that’s beyond the scope of the Five Ways.] Stating “this doesn’t establish Christianity specifically, therefore I’ll remain atheist” is an absurd objection.

Objection: The Five Ways don’t establish a personal God like Christians believe in.

Reply: Again, outside the scope of the Five Ways, which doesn’t mean Aquinas never argued for it elsewhere.

Objection: Aquinas’ arguments don’t rule out polytheism.

Reply: The cursory summaries of the Five Ways in the Summa Theologica only establish that there must be a First Cause, Prime Mover, Necessary Being, etc . . . They really don’t go beyond that, if I remember right. But again, it’s simply outside the scope of the argument, and this is addressed elsewhere by Aquinas.

Objection: Aquinas’ cosmological arguments don’t prove the existence of a sentient God.

Reply: Again, outside the scope of the first three ways, and strongly argued by Aquinas elsewhere.

Observation: Old guys with beards? Egg? Turtle? Block of stone? Okay, this guy is just uninformed and really has no business commenting on the Five Ways.

But now we finally get to something meaty.

Objection: Aquinas was wrong in his insistence that there can’t be an infinite regress of anything.

Reply: This objection get’s Aquinas’ position wrong. Aquinas distinguished between two types of causal series. An accidentally ordered (per accidens) series and an essentially ordered (per se) series. Aquinas had no objections to an infinite regress of the former. He only objected to there being an infinite regress in the latter. Treating Aquinas opinions on series with infinite regresses without distinction makes this a faulty objection. Adding the term “of anything” at the end of the objection is to just flat out lie about Aquinas’ position. And it’s a complete misunderstanding of Aquinas to assume he takes it as a given that there has to be a starting point for everyting, especially because Aquinas specifically designed his arguments to make no assumption about whether the universe had a beginning or not.

ST I:46 : In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se–thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes;

Objection: Self-defeating! If everything must be put in motion by something else . . .

Reply: Let me just stop there, because Aquinas does not argue that “everything must be put in motion by something else” or that “everything must be caused by something else.”

So, in summary, the first four arguments are out of scope for the first three ways. Aquinas does argue for particularity, personality, unity, and sapience elsewhere. The last two objections show that this guy has given no serious effort into understanding Aquinas and has only read the sparknotes. They’re objections to arguments Aquinas never made. His “analysis” has so many gross mischaracterizations and misrepresentations I’m tempted to compare this to the level of “But if we evolved from monkeys, why are there still monkeys!” objection to evolutionary theory.

I’ll try the teleological argument at some point. I already anticipate him completely misunderstanding this and casting it as a form of Paley’s intelligent design argument. EDIT: Yep, called it.
 
The second video is not a refutation of Aquinas’ Fifth Way. It’s a refutation of Paley’s Intelligent Design Argument. I’ve scanned half the video and found no further references to Aquinas beyond the opening (let me know if I missed anything). The Fifth Way is not Paley’s ID argument. I’ve no real interest in the ID argument, not to call it entirely useless, but it’s not my cup of tea and doesn’t establish a whole lot by itself, so I’m not going to really bother going through his objections.
 
The second video is not a refutation of Aquinas’ Fifth Way. It’s a refutation of Paley’s Intelligent Design Argument. I’ve scanned half the video and found no further references to Aquinas beyond the opening (let me know if I missed anything). The Fifth Way is not Paley’s ID argument. I’ve no real interest in the ID argument, not to call it entirely useless, but it’s not my cup of tea and doesn’t establish a whole lot by itself, so I’m not going to really bother going through his objections.
The funny thing is he mentioned the teleological Argument at the end of the video. Naturally one would think he is referring to Aquinas, since the video is about Aquinas’ 5 ways.

I don’t like the argument about irreducible complexity or the watchmaker argument because they treat God as a necessary intermediary cause and i think things just act according to the nature God has given them; so God doesn’t need to interfere. As far as how nature operates is concerned, I don’t think God needs to be considered an intermediary cause. God is simply the creator and sustainer of beings.
 
Ugh, I just started his next video in which he talks about the “omni” God. And he presents his objection to “omnipotence” with the question “Can God create a rock so heavy even he can’t lift it?” And then, after having said that this outline of an “omni-God” was the position of Augustine and Aquinas, doesn’t even bother considering how they would reply to such an objection or what they mean be omnipotence, as if they’d be dumbfounded by such a question. Furthermore, I find it absolutely absurd he doesn’t bother to list Augustine and Aquinas’ position on divine simplicity as an essential attribute outlined by these philosophers, as it is perhaps the most important attribute identified by Aquinas’ natural theology.

I should have figured his talk would be so terrible considering the strawmen he presented earlier, examples being:

  1. *]Aquinas said everything must have a cause.
    *]Aquains said an infinite regress of any thing is impossible.
    *]Aquinas’ Teleological Argument is Paley’s Intelligent Design argument.

    None of which are remotely true, and any self respecting philosopher who’s bothered to research Aquinas should know better than to object to Aquinas’ cosmological arguments with “If everything has a cause, why doesn’t God have a cause?”
 
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