T
The_Exodus
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Daneel,
Perhaps you could respond to my post above? I’m wondering your thoughts on it.
Perhaps you could respond to my post above? I’m wondering your thoughts on it.
Hopefully we shall get there. But we must take this hurdle first. The number of agents and number of moral dilemmas they face in not limited - as I will show it at the end. It can be as large as you wish.I disagree with your statement “of course, to have a small number… number’s game.” For your argument to be a compelling one, you would have to be able to show that your scenario is preferable to a world with more people but with evil. But you wanted to leave that alone for the moment, so we can think about that later.
You are perfectly correct. With open theism this argument does not work. But I base the scenario on the traditional view.In terms of if there is a problem with your scenario, I don’t endorse this, but here is a possibility. Your scenario rests on the view that God sees the future and possible futures. Open theists deny this to be the case. They say God does not know the future. (They reason the future does not exist, so obviously God can’t know it-he remains perfect). If God does not know the future, then your objection does not work. He simply knows that free will may allow the existence of evil.
I don’t endorse that view since I’m not an open theist, my objection to your problem is that the world you propose may be possible, but may not be feasible, but since you are asking if there is any logical problem with the scenario you propose, I mention this. If open theism were true, I think your scenario would not work.
Well, this is the stance of the open theism as danserr pointed it out. However, the traditional view is that God can foresee the future, which has not happened yet.Only the agent can actualize the decision. If the agent does not exist, then there is nothing to foresee. God can’t foresee a future actuality that won’t be actual. It’s a contradiction.
Let me put it this way:
- Free decisions are actualized by the agent.
- The agent must exist in order to have the potential to actualize the decision.
- Without existence, the agent has no potential to actualize the decision, and thus there is no potential for an evil decision.
- Without the potential for an evil decision, there is no evil to foresee.
I don’t argue this point. The purpose of this thread is very narrow: to refute the argument that the existence of free will logically and inevitably must lead to the existence of moral evil. No more, no less.There are many things to say here. I will list them as succinctly as possible.
- It may indeed be possible for God to create a world in which all creatures freely choose good over evil every choice; yet such a world may not be the best of all possible worlds because a) there are greater goods which can be had from a world with free evil, such as the courage of martyrs, and b) such a world would not display the divine nature most perfectly, since there would be no place for the infinite justice of God.
I don’t argue this one either.
- It is manifestly impossible for God to have created this world in which all its creatures always freely choose good. Such a world could possibly exist, but obviously none of us humans would exist in it, since we have all freely done evil. You may object and say that God could have created us free from sin in the first place, removed every inclination for evil, etc. Yet, such creatures would not be us. The law of identity shows that a thing is what it is so long as it has all its properties and none other. Yet these other “us-es” would have properties completely different from ourselves, and thus, in a strictly logical way of speaking, they could not actually *be *us.
Yes, i am aware of the Molinist’s “middle knowledge”. I see one serious problem with it, but that would derail this thread, and it is not really relevant to the topic at hand, so I will not go there.
- Foreknowledge does not imply foreordination, unless God’s foreknowledge is based on his divine decree to create a given possible world, and this is the view Molinists take. Their view is that since God is omniscient, he knows, by his nature before any free choice on his part, all possible things. This includes all the choices any possible free agent could make in any given scenario. By the depth of his intellect, he has true knowledge of counter-factuals. If this happened, then free creature x would freely elicit act y. Such a type of knowledge, Molinists say, is “supercomprehensive.” That is, it is actually true of an actually free agent that it will do x. Because God’s nature infinitely surpasses any created nature, this knowledge is 100% without error, and yet the freedom of the creature is not impinged. How can God have this sort of knowledge? Molina himself says that since God is complete act, he knows, in knowing himself, everything that he is not - this includes any sort of conceivable potentiality. He knows an infinite amount of possible created things which he is not. In other words, God has a knowledge of an infinite number of things which may not ever come to be, though which, if he so willed them to come to be, would certainly exist just as he knew them. The important point stressed here by Molinists is that this knowledge is not based on a pre-determining decree of God’s which makes a given scenario the way it is. Hence Peter’s acceptance of Christ, while it could never happen without God’s grace, is not due to the fact that God decreed it. Rather, God decreed to bring such a world into existence in which he knew first that Peter would freely accept Christ. What follows from this is that in God’s mind there are an infinite amount of possible worlds. Many of them may contain entire creations existing and all of them freely free from sin. Many may contain entire creations freely rejecting God and deserving of eternal punishment. Yet this particular world, Molinists would say, is only different from all others in that it actually exists. It has not been however determined to be how it is. It simply is one possible world, which, in itself, could never be otherwise, or else it would be a different world. God then merely brings it about that this particular idea in his mind comes into being.
That is fine. All I wish to argue is the impossibilty of the “free will defense”.
- All this to say, I lean more toward traditional Thomism, which says that God’s foreknowledge is indeed based off his divine will to determine all things whatsoever, including the free assent of creatures to his grace, and allowing certain creatures to fall away, due to an impediment in themselves.
No, that is not my aim. I don’t accept the “compatibilist” view, only the libertarian one. My aim is simple: to show that the so-called “free will defense” is unteneble. I am using the traditional definitions of omnipotence and omniscience.Hi R_Daneel. I’d like to note that it seems, if I’m understanding correctly, that this argument is going to largely revolve around compatibilism vs. incompatibilism. This debate has been going on for a long time and there is certainly no conclusive agreement amongst philosophers. If that’s the case, I don’t think you’re going to prove anything conclusive at all.
Of course, I may be misunderstanding you.
Okay. Fair enough. So you’re saying it is preferable that God not actualize any world, than that He actualize a world with evil? Am I misunderstanding again? Or is it that God should actualize a world with no evil? If that is a case, I think that is logically impossible.No, that is not my aim. I don’t accept the “compatibilist” view, only the libertarian one. My aim is simple: to show that the so-called “free will defense” is unteneble. I am using the traditional definitions of omnipotence and omniscience.
The preferred way is to actualize a world where the potential of evil exists, but the actuality of evil does not. And, of course with free will. If God could only actualize a world where only evil exists, then it is preferable not to actualize anything at all. Here is the preferred order, from best to worst:Okay. Fair enough. So you’re saying it is preferable that God not actualize any world, than that He actualize a world with evil? Am I misunderstanding again? Or is it that God should actualize a world with no evil? If that is a case, I think that is logically impossible.
Well, I deliberately left the concept of evil vague. Also I only talk about “moral evil”, which is pretty much we all agree upon, like rape, murder, pillage, senseless violence and the like. I left out the “natural evil”, since it is a horrible misnomer, and because it is independent from volitional actions (free will).Hi again. I think that we should first consider the nature of evil. What do you suppose evil to be exactly?
I think that taking the classical theistic point of view, God is that from which all goodness stems, and God is pure goodness. So, if this is the case, it’s hard to see how something, separate from God (i.e. created), could be purely good. This is why I think that choice 1 is impossible. Best.
First off, my heathen friend (Well, I deliberately left the concept of evil vague. Also I only talk about “moral evil”, which is pretty much we all agree upon, like rape, murder, pillage, senseless violence and the like. I left out the “natural evil”, since it is a horrible misnomer, and because it is independent from volitional actions (free will).
Therefore even granting your premise (only for the argument’s sake, I am sure you know) that only God is “pure good” and therefore everything else (the creation) must have some “ungood” in it, the proposed scenario is still possible. The creation can have some “ungood” in it, even if it is not “morally evil”.
Furthermore, consider the OP’s scenario. One agent, one moral dilemma. If that agent cannot make a morally good decision - even in principle - then the agent has no free will.
So I don’t accept your reasoning. (Besides, I would really like to have a purely secular argument. Referring to the traditional view of God has no weight for the abominable heathens - like my poor self.)
I think you are making a “false dilemma”. How is it that God makes a world where one agent has a moral dilemma? If I understand morality correctly it is the “constitution” (so to speak) of actions between moral agents, that is free agents. We don’t talk about a moral dilemma with one agent. One “human” cannot be morally good or evil if there is no more humans. Heck… “one human” can’t even be “human” without more humans (so to speak).Every time the “problem of evil” is considered, someone will come up with the “free will defense”. They say that “free will” makes “love” meaningful, and love is the highest good. They say that “free will” is so valuable that God “must” compromise, because the existence of “free will” leads logically and inevitably to the existence of some form of “moral evil”. Of course they are wrong. The existence of free will only leads to the possibility of moral evil, but does not lead to the actuality of it. I leave the nature of “morally evil” unspecified. You can use whatever definition you like. Free will is simply the concept that the agent is in charge, that the locus of decision is with the agent itself, and that the agent has the freedom to make a different decision if he/she so chooses (principle of alternate possibilities).
There are several ways to refute this defense. I could point out that “love” is used ambiguously, and that agape is not the same as eros (or philia or storge) and there is no need for volition when one considers agape. But I am not concerned about this line of argument in this thread. Let’s leave it alone.
The argument I am going to present will prove that it is possible to have a world with unbridled free will and no instance of moral evil.
Let’s contemplate a simple world. There is one moral agent in this world, and there is one morally significant decision to be made. Therefore, there are only two possible worlds that can be created by God:
Therefore, it is possible for God to make a hypothetical world, in which there is free will, and no morally wrong decisons. Therefore it is proven, that free will does not lead to the actuality of “moral evil”, though the potentiality is there.
- world-A, in which the agent makes the morally right decision, and
- world-B, in which the agent makes the morally incorrect decision. Before God commits to make the act of creation, he can “preview” these two possible worlds, and make a decision, which one to instantiate - if any. God’s foreknowledge has absolutely no impact on the freedom of the decision. God’s action of creation has no bearing on the freedom of the decision either. The agent does, what he does - and he freely chooses to make either the morally right decision (world-A) or the morally incorrect decision (world-B). It could be said, that God does not actually “create” the final outcome, that the agent is a “co-creator”. That distinction has no relevance - though it is certainly a strange way of viewing things. Such a view makes God’s creative act almost irrelevant, makes God a spectator of the events, instead of an actual creator. If God would “foresee” that the agent does not make the morally right decision, he can simply stop and refrain from making the creation at all.
This is it, folks. You cannot “hide” behind the “free will defense” any more.
Now, I am sure, that some of you will say that this world is very different from ours. Some of you might say that “maybe” God could create such a simple world without moral evil, but “maybe” God could not create a sufficiently complicated world, with billions of moral agents and innumerable morally charged decisions - and still ensure that all the decisions will be the “right” ones. I will return to this question later, and will prove that God can always instantiate the “right” world.
But the first point of this thread is the scenario presented. Can you bring up any argument against the proposed scenario?
I have no problem with the classical theism at all. Certainly no “secular God”, for me.First off, my heathen friend (), we are certainly going to have to talk about the God of classical theism in our case. I’m pretty sure nobody here is going to be trying to defend the God of the new and improved theism, or the God of heretical theism. I’m certainly not trying to defend the secular God!
Ok. Evil is: “intentionally causing or allowing unnecessary harm to someone or something that has an ability to perceive that harm (not necessarily consciously)”. For example torturing an animal is considered evil, if done by a human, but not when it is done by another animal. This is why I don’t like to use the term “natual evil”, since there is no intent in an earthquake or a wildfire, or even when a cat “plays” with the mouse.Now, you still did not answer my question about what you think “evil”, without any qualifications, is. Would you say that the term “evil”, as used in the phrases “natural evil” and “moral evil”, is used univocally? This may seem like so much irrelevant questioning, but I do want to know what you think. I think we can do away with moral evil in the same way as natural evil.
I see the reason for the misunderstanding. Looks like I was not clear enough. I used the terms world-A and world-B somewhat ambiguously, which is my fault. Let’s break it down. There is the original world (“world-X”), up until the point of the decision. When the agent makes the morally right decision, we shall call the result world-A. Likewise when the agent makes the morally wrong decision, we shall call it world-B. Once the decision is made, the freedom to change it disappears. There are no more moral dilemmas. So the agent made the decison freely. Is this clear now?As for your original post, I’m not at all sure that, as you claimed, this is not an issue between compatibilism and incompatibilism. In world-A, it is impossible that the agent make the morally wrong decision, yet they (apparently) still make the decision freely. This is what we usually call compatibilism. And if that is what the argument turns to, then I don’t think it is going to be any more compelling than either side of the compatibilism vs incompatibilism debate. I certainly do not think that “this is it”. Best.![]()
I am sure you will reconsider when you think about torturing animals. There is only one moral agent, the human, and an animal, which is not a moral agent. Yet we consider torturing an animal evil. Also, according to Catholicism, masturbation is evil, and there is only one moral agent present. So my example was simple, on purpose. Don’t worry, once we get past the simple problem, I will get to more complicated cases. Besides, there could be as many moral agents in the scenario, the point is that there is only one moral dilemma. This will be the next step. And then it will become even more complicated. But let’s not hurry… there is time.I think you are making a “false dilemma”. How is it that God makes a world where one agent has a moral dilemma? If I understand morality correctly it is the “constitution” (so to speak) of actions between moral agents, that is free agents. We don’t talk about a moral dilemma with one agent. One “human” cannot be morally good or evil if there is no more humans. Heck… “one human” can’t even be “human” without more humans (so to speak).
Aha. So if I happen to see an accident, and stop to help, that is not a “good” action, unless I (or someone else) commit(s) an atrocity? Come on…I’m not saying that God made the Universe as is because he wanted a particular “good” end. He did it the way it is because it was the only possible moral universe. Without “evil” what is “good”?
Your argument doesn’t make sense in how I view what “evil” and “good” is.
No there isn’t… You can’t put a human on a neat little bubble and consider that morality “exists” there just because you want it to. Morality is intrinsic to our universe, to the way we are made, to how we interact to the universe and its consituents (including animals and humans).I am sure you will reconsider when you think about torturing animals. There is only one moral agent, the human, and an animal, which is not a moral agent. Yet we consider torturing an animal evil. Also, according to Catholicism, masturbation is evil, and there is only one moral agent present. So my example was simple, on purpose. Don’t worry, once we get past the simple problem, I will get to more complicated cases. Besides, there could be as many moral agents in the scenario, the point is that there is only one moral dilemma. This will be the next step. And then it will become even more complicated. But let’s not hurry… there is time.
You are missrepresenting what I say! Didn’t the accident hurt the person in need? Wasn’t there a cry for help? Ignoring it would be evil. Actively solving it would be good.Aha. So if I happen to see an accident, and stop to help, that is not a “good” action, unless I (or someone else) commit(s) an atrocity? Come on…![]()
This is just a conjecture. No, morality does not “exist” as an ontological entity, it just exists as a concept. But the nature of morality is not relevant to this discussion.No there isn’t… You can’t put a human on a neat little bubble and consider that morality “exists” there just because you want it to. Morality is intrinsic to our universe, to the way we are made, to how we interact to the universe and its consituents (including animals and humans).
The reason for that is that the rock cannot suffer, since it does not have a nervous system. If we would find a space alien, which is not a biological relative to us, which would have no nervous system like ours, but which exhibits pain, it would be just as immoral to totrure “it”.It is only “immoral” to torture an animal because we are also animals. We relate to them. They relate to us. You can try to “torture” a rock if you like that it won’t be “immoral”.
This is the Catholic view, which I reject. But, again, my rejection is not relevant. I simply brought up masturbation because it is a “single person” endeavor, and yet Catholics consider it immoral. This whole exchange came from the fact that you rejected the simple scenario of the OP, on the ground that morality is contingent upon having more than one “moral agent” involved. Now you changed your mind. We can concentrate on the actual question.Masturbation is immoral because you are egotistically obtaining pleasure at the abuse of your own body and the disrespect to the other gender. It’s just like saying: “I don’t need women to feel good”. (in a sexual sense).
Not necessarily. The accident might not do more than inconvenience him a little. There is no “cry” for help. But again, this has nothing to do with the problem at hand. To use your previous examples, maintaining your health by eating is “good”, even if there is no pain of hunger yet. To be healthy is “good” even if one never experienced “illness”. What the lack of prior suffering means that we would have no concept of “relative” or “comparative” good, we might even lack the word for it. But well-being is “good” even if we never experienced pain.You are missrepresenting what I say! Didn’t the accident hurt the person in need? Wasn’t there a cry for help? Ignoring it would be evil. Actively solving it would be good.
No, it’s not the stance of open theism as I understand it. Open theism says that God does not know the future because he made indeterministic humans who have not made decisions yet, and God is going along with time like the rest of us. I’m saying, as in the traditional view, that God views creation as one big now.Well, this is the stance of the open theism as danserr pointed it out. However, the traditional view is that God can foresee the future, which has not happened yet.
Well, I guess I just fail to see the impact of proving such a point. Of course, free will does not logically and inevitably lead to the existence of evil, but it does lead logically and inevitably to it’s possibility. God then must have chose to make a world in which evil existed from creature’s free will. What is the significance here?I don’t argue this point. The purpose of this thread is very narrow: to refute the argument that the existence of free will logically and inevitably must lead to the existence of moral evil. No more, no less.
It has to be relevant to the argument since you are trying to apply it in a hypothesis…This is just a conjecture. No, morality does not “exist” as an ontological entity, it just exists as a concept. But the nature of morality is not relevant to this discussion.
The problem is that you can’t even conceive of a way to torture a rock. Everything you do to a rock isn’t torture, even if you put the rock in the same situation you put a human being. It just goes to show how your bubble universe would not exist.The reason for that is that the rock cannot suffer, since it does not have a nervous system. If we would find a space alien, which is not a biological relative to us, which would have no nervous system like ours, but which exhibits pain, it would be just as immoral to totrure “it”.
Not at all… masturbation doesn’t affect only the person that practices it, it affects all of humankind because that man/woman is part of humankind… that’s why it is immoral. A human doesn’t exist without the rest… and even more, a single human couldn’t exist at all. Humanity is expressed in 2 genders, male and female.This is the Catholic view, which I reject. But, again, my rejection is not relevant. I simply brought up masturbation because it is a “single person” endeavor, and yet Catholics consider it immoral. This whole exchange came from the fact that you rejected the simple scenario of the OP, on the ground that morality is contingent upon having more than one “moral agent” involved. Now you changed your mind. We can concentrate on the actual question.
If there is no pain of hunger why would you rationalise eating? That’s why gluttony is a sin.Not necessarily. The accident might not do more than inconvenience him a little. There is no “cry” for help. But again, this has nothing to do with the problem at hand. To use your previous examples, maintaining your health by eating is “good”, even if there is no pain of hunger yet. To be healthy is “good” even if one never experienced “illness”. What the lack of prior suffering means that we would have no concept of “relative” or “comparative” good, we might even lack the word for it. But well-being is “good” even if we never experienced pain.
Therefore I reject your concept that “evil” is necessary for “good”.
It is better to never have been ill, rather than to have been ill and recover. It is better to never have been hungry, rather than to starve to half-dead and then be given food.
An excellent post, sir! (I have edited simply for space.) To me, there is something of the essence of difference here: the difference between theory and reality.** A human doesn’t exist without the rest… and even more, a single human couldn’t exist at all. Humanity is expressed in 2 genders, male and female**.
Fine. Now how can you say that someone who is not born YET, already exists? That is beyond me. But for the sake of this thread, I accept it.Thus, when God creates the universe, he knows what the agent does/will do because he created it eternally, but the agent was still the one who actualized the decision. My point is that since the decision belongs to the agent alone, if he doesn’t exist at all then there is nothing to foresee. How can God foresee the decision of a non-existent agent who must exist in order for the decision to be possible? He can’t by the pure logic of it. It’s the same reason why God can’t make square circles.