C
cpayne
Guest
The best-known philosophical atheists for most of my life have been Antony Flew (except I don’t know if he’s still an atheist?), Kai Nielsen (not looking up the last name but I think that’s right), and Bertrand Russell. Nowadays it’s Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and the linguist guy—Pinker? To me it seems evident that Dawkins aspires to be the next Bertrand Russell, except the philosophical candlepower just isn’t quite there.
An atheist friend of mine gave me *Why I Am Not a Christian *by Russell—for Christmas! Twisted sense of humor.
Also, I keep posting this but no one seems to believe me: The variation on the ontological argument by Norman Malcom ends with the conclusion, “Either it is necessary that God exists or it is logically impossible that God exists.” If this argument works (I think it does), this actually DOES switch the burden of proof. To argue against God’s existence, one would have to argue for the logical impossibility of God’s existence. Otherwise, the conclusion would be that God’s existence is necessary.
As for Popper’s falsifiability thesis: Hasn’t that been more or less abandoned by philosophers? As I remember it, it went something like, “If the conditions for the falsifiability of a statement (such as God Exists) cannot be specified, then the statement is meaningless.” But didn’t Quine or someone like him point out that no such conditions can be specified for the thesis itself? In other words, the falsifiability thesis is meaningless by its own criterion of meaning!
Please correct me if I am mis-remembering what this thesis entails.
An atheist friend of mine gave me *Why I Am Not a Christian *by Russell—for Christmas! Twisted sense of humor.
Also, I keep posting this but no one seems to believe me: The variation on the ontological argument by Norman Malcom ends with the conclusion, “Either it is necessary that God exists or it is logically impossible that God exists.” If this argument works (I think it does), this actually DOES switch the burden of proof. To argue against God’s existence, one would have to argue for the logical impossibility of God’s existence. Otherwise, the conclusion would be that God’s existence is necessary.
As for Popper’s falsifiability thesis: Hasn’t that been more or less abandoned by philosophers? As I remember it, it went something like, “If the conditions for the falsifiability of a statement (such as God Exists) cannot be specified, then the statement is meaningless.” But didn’t Quine or someone like him point out that no such conditions can be specified for the thesis itself? In other words, the falsifiability thesis is meaningless by its own criterion of meaning!
Please correct me if I am mis-remembering what this thesis entails.