Huh?
I’m saying that you may believe Kantianism offers no reason to be moral but that doesn’t mean it appears that way to everyone.
Whether they lived their lives to the fullest is largely a matter of whether they were still capable of sensitivity (to
eudaimonia) after doing all these things. Pleasure seems to dull the soul to pleasure; this is why happiness is not found in “the way of all flesh”. The good life is not a function of overt pleasures,
nor is it a function of our own personal opinions about what the good life is. (How’s that for objective?)
I would disagree here. Some people get along just fine living off of those “overt pleasures.” As with Kantianism, you’re disregarding the meaning some people find in their lives simply because you’re unable to see it or experience it.
Possibly the most serious error of the Catholic Church, in my opinion, is the belief that humans are similar enough that they should be held to the same standards, but that they’re different enough to deserve either Heaven or Hell. But as you know, we’re not the same. Some people prefer different lifestyles, and who are you to say that they don’t enjoy those lifestyles?
By the way, if you accuse me of being a consequentialist, I will completely admit that I am – in a strict sense. Anyone who does not consider the consequences of actions, broadly construed, in their moral philosophy is not peddling ethics, but rather dogma.
Accuse you? I applaud you! I’m sure you won’t agree with this entirely, but if the goal of ethical deliberation is to derive disciplines that can be used to improve the experiences of the subjects in this world, then we must look at consequences to achieve this feat. After all, if we disregard consequences, how do we even know what an “improvement” is?
And for those who say that consequences don’t matter and that only pleasing God matters, I have one thing to say: pleasing God is, in a strict sense, still a consequence. But I don’t believe people truly think in these terms anyway.
I fail to see your point.
Again, I only mean that you can’t dismiss something as being worthless, unreasonable, etc., simply because you don’t see the worth or reason involved. Ultimately, the most you can really say about any ethical philosophy’s axiom is “I don’t like it.” I don’t like your “conform to God” axiom and you don’t like the greatest happiness principle. The most we can do is try to persuade each other by pouring out our sentiments over the internet (which isn’t very effective

) or by using outrageous examples of what would happen if our respective philosophies were followed.
True enough. Unlike Kant, I do not assume that all “rational” people will agree with my argument.
I’m glad that you aren’t as presumptuous as Kant on this matter. Now if only we could get rid of the nasty assumption that, if the human race were exposed to God,
everyone would wish to conform to his nature. Is that assumption not at least as large as Kant’s?
Do you mean “If there were no subject, there would be no morality”?
Yes, that is what I mean. Thus, morality doesn’t exist as an object in the same way that my chair exists as an object. Now this discussion is mostly dependent on what you mean by “objective,” since you aren’t using the usual definition.
If Earth did not exist, then the statement “Earth exists” would be false. If “I” did not exist, then the statement “I should not kill humans” would be false. The nonexistence of the subject falsifies the proposition. I fail to see a significant difference.
This is true, but there are other differences. (As an aside, the Earth is not a subject in this sense. A subject is taken to be an entity that has a degree of self-awareness.)
For example, if humans (and yourself) and other somewhat sapient animals still existed, but all have lost their consciousness/awareness (thus, they are no longer sapient or sentient), would morality still exist? No subjectivity=no ethics.
When we have the concept “rational being”, we can discover certain ideas contained within this larger concept. For example, the concept of “freedom” can be analyzed as “lack of restraint” or as “opportunity for multiple actions”. Each of these are equally valid, contained within the concept of freedom itself. For Kant, when you talk about a “rational being”, you are talking about a being that treats itself as an end. He thinks that it is perfectly obvious that every rational being would do so (although it is not perfectly obvious that every human being is rational).
Out of curiosity, what exactly does it mean to treat yourself as an end? I’ve read some of Kant, and he never seems to elaborate on this. For instance, Christians might say that upholding the most selfish lifestyle imaginable still wouldn’t be treating yourself as an end, because you’re abusing your soul. People have different ideas on this matter, it seems.
As to your questions about rationality, Oreo, this is exactly where this subjective/objective distinction comes in. As you know, different people will draw the line of rationality at different places. But it does not follow that there is no line at which rationality can be drawn. “A capacity to make decisions conform to one’s mental judgments, as opposed to one’s animal needs.” That’s my unofficial definition.
That’s a bit of a rough definition (because it is sometimes most rational to act as an animal). Basically your definition amounts to “the capacity to think.” Am I right?
By objective, I mean that the truth value of a true statement does not change when the subject changes.
How do we judge the truth value of an ethic?