What you value and that for which you feel responsible are indeed two different things. But you are saying that you do not value your child any more than any other child. That you would spend all to save her simply because of your ‘responsibility’ to her.
No, that is not what I am saying. This is not an either/or in the sense that you are making it out to be. I didn’t use the words “feel responsible" for, but rather “are” responsible for regardless of feelings.
Other children are, in themselves and in reality, as valuable as my child, but that does not mean I bear equal responsibility for them as I do my own child.
It is possible to “feel” responsible to those whom we value, but our responsibilities do not end when the eventually might come where the “feeling” of responsibility fades. In fact, it might be said that we value and have responsibility for those close to us in a different sense than the way we treat the implicit value that others have. We may still have
some – but not the
same – responsibility towards those not proximate or close to us.
Our sense or “feeling” of value may depend upon our knowing or being familiar with them, but that is not what determines our responsibility for them. We do not forsake our responsibility for those close to us merely when we no longer feel any sense of closeness or responsibility for them. We still ought to value them for their own sake not because of feelings these people engender within us.
YOUR insistence that responsibility is determined by “feeling” responsible for others or having a sense of value for them could be taken to mean that when or if the “feeling” of responsibility dissipates then your responsibility towards that person no longer exists. :nope:
The value we put on others does not determine their real value nor does it demarcate the limits of our responsibility for them. AND, this is the crucial point, their value does not determine the positive responsibility for them, necessarily. The responsibility we have towards anyone is determined also by a variety of factors, such as (most importantly) the fact that we gave them life to begin with.
I am not responsible to feed, clothe, educate and, generally, look after others in the same way as I am responsible for looking after myself. This is called the principle of subsidiarity, by the way, which properly orders responsibility. This does not imply that I am a moral failure if I don’t foist myself into everyone’s daily life or affairs as if I am them or on the supposition that I have some moral duty to inflict myself on others in that way. No, we respect the autonomy of others, including their “right” to make mistakes and learn from them.
This is why morality is, ultimately, a vexing issue. we are not dealing with rocks or pieces of wood whose properties can be quantified or otherwise relatively easily understood in terms of how we might respond to them. No, these are living beings with “value” equal to ours. Working out what that means in terms of our responsibilities to them is not as cut and dried as growing corn or tending hogs.
Tell her that you’ll be seeing a lot less of her in the future. You have just realised that you have a greater responsibility to people in sub Saharan Africa. I mean, what’s time spent with her or money spent on new clothes or an iPhone or braces when there is so much you need to do. Having all that responsibility…
This simply misrepresents my point and I would think you realize that but are quibbling over a point that is nowhere even implied.
In fact, I would argue that a woman who aborts their child operates under the same error as you do above – i.e., that if she doesn’t “feel” or have a sense of responsibility for the child, she bears no responsibility. That is the implication of your view and precisely where it is mistaken. And where Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “violinist argument” ultimately fails.
The value we put on others by our “feelings" about them does not determine their real value, nor ultimately our responsibilities for them.