change God’s unchangeable providence, but rather in order to bring about those effects, which God has ordained to follow from the prayer in question.
We can see from this, then, that the efficacy of petitionary prayer is not opposed to God’s unchangeable providence, but instead is included within it, so to speak. We must recognize that not only do the effects of our prayers fall under the scope of God’s unchangeable providence, but so do our prayers themselves (as well as all of our human acts). As St. Thomas puts it so well, "we pray, not that we may change the divine decree, but that we may impetrate that which God has decreed to be fulfilled by our prayers."11
The objection, which the process philosophers make against Catholic doctrine, fails, then, because it begins with an impoverished view of divine providence, which is anything but the Catholic view. That is, the process philosophers’ objection assumes that God’s unchangeable providence somehow does not extend to the act of petitionary prayer itself, but only to its would-
be effect. This, however, is not the case nor is it in accord with Catholic doctrine. It is from this impoverished view of divine providence, as well as from a desire to retain the reality of the efficacy of petitionary prayer, that the process philosophers are often led to their position which essentially coincides with the third erroneous view of the ancients which St. Thomas describes.
Even after the argument of the process philosophers has been done away with, another question not only remains but also seems naturally to grow out of St. Thomas’s treatment of the relationship of efficacious prayer to God’s unchangeable providence. The question I have in mind is this: If every human act (including but not exclusive to those human acts which involve petitionary prayer) falls within the scope of God’s totally unchangeable providence, then how is it possible for any human act to be genuinely free? This, of course, is a version of the well-known theological question regarding the proper relation between human liberty and God’s unchangeable providence. Although there certainly is an answer to this question, I shall not even attempt to provide it here in any of its fullness. However, it would be fitting, by way of conclusion, to mention a comment made by St. Thomas, which helps to point out part of the true answer to this question, although not in all of its specificity.
In one place where he addresses this question, St. Thomas begins by invoking an important principle of Dionysius the Areopagite, which reads thus, "It does not pertain to divine providence to destroy but rather to preserve the nature of things."12 St. Thomas then explains the meaning of this principle as follows:Whence it * moves all things according to their condition. Thus, from necessary causes, through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity and from contingent causes effects follow contingently. Because, therefore, the will is an active principle which is not determined to one thing, but rather has an indifference towards many things, God moves it in such a way that it is not determined of necessity to one thing, but such that its motion remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.13Here St. Thomas is pointing out that divine providence is so all-comprehensive that it not only extends to those things that come about in the created order, but also to the way or the mode in which they come about. Thus, as regards our human acts, not only the acts themselves, but also the very freedom with which they are done is included under the all-comprehensive scope of God’s unchangeable providence. How mysterious and wonderful this truly is.
Notes
- See Charles Hartshorne’s Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (New York: State University of New York Press, 1984), 1-26. In this work Hartshorne makes it clear that he thinks that the notion of unchangeable providence is incompatible with human freedom. Although in this work Hartshorne doesn’t explicitly formulate the argument, which I am going to attribute to process philosophers in general, nonetheless, one could see from this work of his that he would be quite sympathetic to such an argument. He does though hold to what is the essence of the third erroneous view of prayer, which St. Thomas attributes to the ancients (as will be seen below).
See also Lewis Ford’s “Our Prayers and God’s Passions,” in H. J. Cargas and B. Lee (eds.), Religion, Experience and Process Theology (New York, 1976), 429-430. Here Ford explicitly formulates the argument, which I attribute to process philosophers in general. He sees this argument as being insurmountable for Roman Catholics. Indeed, he holds that only a process account of God is able to overcome the dilemma posed in this argument.
*David Arias lives in Houston, Texas with his wife Jennaya and their two children. David is a graduate student at the Center for Thomistic Studies at the Univesity of St. Thomas. This is his first article for *HPR.
© 2003 Ignatius Press *