Runaway trolley problem

[Rau]

Aquinas differs:

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end.

Can you give precise reference?

 

[Ender]

Subject to the evil not being in the object!!! In the PODE, the act must itself be good - no evil moral object(s).

If PODE recognizes that an act may have an evil consequence - which surely cannot be the moral object - why do you insist that the evil (and completely unwanted) consequence in this case is the moral object? How do you accommodate an evil effect in one case (PODE) but reject it in another? Evil is evil. If you accept PODE it can only be because the evil consequence was not intended regardless of the fact that it was inevitable. In fact, if the evil consequence was not inevitable PODE would not even apply.

 

[Ender]

Can you give precise reference?

It is the same reference o_mlly provided: ST I-II 1 3 ad 3

 

[Rau]

If PODE recognizes that an act may have an evil consequence - which surely cannot be the moral object - why do you insist that the evil (and completely unwanted) consequence in this case is the moral object? How do you accommodate an evil effect in one case (PODE) but reject it in another? Evil is evil. If you accept PODE it can only be because the evil consequence was not intended regardless of the fact that it was inevitable. In fact, if the evil consequence was not inevitable PODE would not even apply.

Intending evil (moral evil) always condemns the act.

Evil in the moral object (moral evil) always condemns the act.

Evils in consequences (physical evils) can be tolerated where outweighed by goods.

 

[Ender]

Both of those are the per se terminus, and the actor’s intentions have no bearing on that. The act chosen is the determining factor - what is inherent to the act?

The act chosen is equally well aimed at killing one as it is at saving four.

I think you have misunderstood the term as Aquinas used it.

Aristotle and his medieval followers steer a middle course. They hold to the objectivity both of substance and of accident, though they recognize the subjective factor in the mode of perception. They use the term accident to designate any contingent (i.e. nonessential) relation between an attribute and its subject. (Catholic Encyclopedia)

It is in this sense that the death of the one is accidental to the intent to save the four.

 

[o_mlly]

“Accidental” does not mean “accidental to the act”, it means “accidental to the intent”, that is, unintended.

No, accidental means those ends that are not foreseen.

Do you claim: “If one intends only the good end then any act is good”?

If so, you argue, as Kant did in error, that a good will is all that is needed to determine a good act.

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end

And there it is. An act is “ordained to but one proximate end.” This confirms what I have been claiming.

No, not so. Thomas is now speaking of intention: “as it proceeds once from the agent.” The primary goal or intention is singular; not so the object of the act.

 

[Ender]

No, accidental means those ends that are not foreseen.

Not to Aquinas.
Aristotle and his medieval followers … hold to the objectivity both of substance and of accident, though they recognize the subjective factor in the mode of perception. They use the term accident to designate any contingent (i.e. nonessential) relation between an attribute and its subject. (Catholic Encyclopedia)

“Accident” as Aquinas used the term meant “contingent”, “nonessential”.

Do you claim: “If one intends only the good end then any act is good”?

Of course not. How many times do I have to answer this?

One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end. (Aquinas) No, not so. Thomas is now speaking of intention: “as it proceeds once from the agent.” The primary goal or intention is singular; not so the object of the act. (o_mlly)

Given that JPII defined the object as the “proximate end” (in Veritatis Splendor), either he didn’t understand what Aquinas was saying…or you don’t. The proximate end refers directly to the object; it has nothing to do with the intent. Since “proximate end” and “object” are essentially synonyms, Aquinas’ statement could be written like this: “One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one object.”

 

[Rau]

I think you have misunderstood the term as Aquinas used it.

Aristotle and his medieval followers steer a middle course. They hold to the objectivity both of substance and of accident, though they recognize the subjective factor in the mode of perception. They use the term accident to designate any contingent (i.e. nonessential) relation between an attribute and its subject. (Catholic Encyclopedia)

It is in this sense that the death of the one is accidental to the intent to save the four.

The question unresolved in my mind [I have oscillated on this point from the start] is whether the death of the one is any less “in essential relationship to the act” than is the saving of the four. The only thing that I can find that distinguishes the two ends is our Intention (motivation) to act - we wanted one of the outcomes and not the other one.

And by the way: if you understand “in essential relationship to the act”, then I think you also understand “is the end in terms of morality to which the act is inherently ordered”.

 

[BlackFriar]

The proximate end refers directly to the object; it has nothing to do with the intent.

I am afraid dedicated Thomists would accuse you of following a decadent form of manualist “Thomism”.
Confer Rhonheimer for example:
" a proper description of the moral object necessarily includes a “basic intention” of the (normally) proximate end, which indicates the aspect under which the intelligible content and material doing are chosen; "

Why don’t you and Rau read and debate something more detailed/recent than the vagaries of the Summa direct? Here is an article by Rhonheimer on exactly the point you two are only superficially debating.
http://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rc...2_Murphy.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3irlEXYMwaAaKSqiSw6NUE

 

[o_mlly]

The proximate end refers directly to the object; it has nothing to do with the intent.

You still confuse the fonts.

I refer you to post #526:

> … the moral object is best described as “the end of a deliberately willed act” or “the end of an act proceeding from a deliberate will.” This distinction more clearly separates the object font from the intention font. In the objective font, it is the act that is willed. In the subjective font, it is the end that is primarily willed.
_> _
> In the trolley exercise, the moral object then can be described as “deliberately throwing the switch foreseeing the killing of an innocent person and the saving of four innocent persons.”
_>

All foreseen events of an act are deliberately willed as ends BY ANY ACTOR. All ends as defined by the act are essential to this act.

But each PARTICULAR ACTOR may will one primary end as their intent.

 

[o_mlly]

The question unresolved in my mind [I have oscillated on this point from the start] is whether the death of the one is any less “in essential relationship to the act” than is the saving of the four.

If the means of the death of the one proceed from, and only from, the act then the death of the one is essential to the act.

To argue in the trolley case that “throwing the switch” is not essential to the act that kills an innocent is to argue that “pulling the trigger” is somehow remote to the bullet that kills an innocent.

 

[BlackFriar]

I am old and must kill my young assailant before I tire. It is the only effective way to defend .
Is his intended death essential or accidental to justly saving my wife?

 

[Ender]

The question unresolved in my mind [I have oscillated on this point from the start] is whether the death of the one is any less “in essential relationship to the act” than is the saving of the four. The only thing that I can find that distinguishes the two ends is our Intention (motivation) to act - we wanted one of the outcomes and not the other one.

Isn’t this precisely the distinction made when double effect is discussed: that one outcome is desired and the other is not. What justifies such an act (among other criteria) is (1) the harmful effect is not intended, and (2) the good effect is at least as good as the bad effect is bad. We know the church accepts acts which have (in addition to the good outcome) harmful results. Why is this one any different?

And by the way: if you understand “in essential relationship to the act”, then I think you also understand “is the end in terms of morality to which the act is inherently ordered”.

Well, I don’t think I accept that the former necessarily implies the latter, but I would challenge you to apply your understanding to PODE acts, which we know are allowable. How do you apply your relationship in such a way that it allows a PODE act but disallows this particular act?

 

[Rau]

Isn’t this precisely the distinction made when double effect is discussed: that one outcome is desired and the other is not. What justifies such an act (among other criteria) is (1) the harmful effect is not intended, and (2) the good effect is at least as good as the bad effect is bad. We know the church accepts acts which have (in addition to the good outcome) harmful results. Why is this one any different?

I feel I have answered this at least a few times before… What seems to distinguish the trolley from a case amenable to a double-effect interpretation is that in the trolley, the act is inherently ordered to the death of an innocent (ie. the death is more than mere consequence, it is in “essential relationship to the act”) and thus the act is itself wrong. PODE does not give a pass to acts wrong in themselves.

Well, I don’t think I accept that the former necessarily implies the latter

Well, if you were to do so, you’d need to reverse your position!

I would challenge you to apply your understanding to PODE acts, which we know are allowable.

I’ve explained why I see PODE as doubtful in the trolley case. In cases where it can be applied, the bad outcome does not satisfy the same test for a wrong act; the bad outcome is not the moral object.

 

[Ender]

Ender: The proximate end refers directly to the object; it has nothing to do with the intent. o_mlly: You still confuse the fonts.

If I am confused it is JPII who confused me since it is his statement I cited.

By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. (Veritatis Splendor)

The ‘proximate end’ is not the intent, which relates to the ultimate end; it is the direct result of the act, not what the act ultimately produces.

All foreseen events of an act are deliberately willed as ends BY ANY ACTOR. All ends as defined by the act are essential to this act.

If this was so then there could never be an acceptable act that had both a positive and a negative effect. Your definition insists that the negative effect is deliberately willed given that it is foreseeable. The church clearly accepts acts with bad consequences (PODE), therefore your definition cannot be true.

 

[Ender]

What seems to distinguish the trolley from a case amenable to a double-effect interpretation is that in the trolley, the act is inherently ordered to the death of an innocent (ie. the death is more than mere consequence, it is in “essential relationship to the act”) and thus the act is itself wrong. PODE does not give a pass to acts wrong in themselves.

If this interpretation was correct it would be equally true that the choice of not throwing the switch is inherently ordered to the death of four innocent lives, and thus that act is itself wrong as well. Both choices - both acts - inevitably lead to someone’s death.

 

[Rau]

If this was so then there could never be an acceptable act that had both a positive and a negative effect. Your definition insists that the negative effect is deliberately willed given that it is foreseeable. The church clearly accepts acts with bad consequences (PODE), therefore your definition cannot be true.

I am unclear what point o_mlly wanted to make. Certainly bad consequences foreseen are accepted; whether we ought say “willed” is unclear. A bad foreseeable consequence is not identical to an evil moral object.

 

[Rau]

If this interpretation was correct it would be equally true that the choice of not throwing the switch is inherently ordered to the death of four innocent lives, and thus that act is itself wrong as well. Both choices - both acts - inevitably lead to someone’s death.

It’s an odd argument that one (innocent) must be killed - as a moral obligation. I disagree that not acting is inherently ordered to the death.

 

[BlackFriar]

I feel I have answered this at least a few times before… What seems to distinguish the trolley from a case amenable to a double-effect interpretation is that in the trolley, the act is inherently ordered to the death of an innocent (ie. the death is more than mere consequence, it is in “essential relationship to the act”) and thus the act is itself wrong. PODE does not give a pass to acts wrong in themselves.

Runaway trolley problem Moral Theology

I am old and must kill my young assailant before I tire. It is the only effective way to defend . Is his intended death essential or accidental to justly saving my wife?

Answer?

Then what if its a 3 year-old with explosives on his back told by mum to run towards checkpoint Charlie and press a button?

 

[BlackFriar]

Why is the one “innocent”?
Can one be an aggressor passively and without personal fault?