Runaway trolley problem

[o_mlly]

To require the one threatened to have no right to oppose (by way of potentially lethal self-defence) until the relevant bomb / bullet / missile is on its way (by which point self-defence is limited to running very fast) seems to require an unusual level of restraint on the one at risk.

I think the instruction that allows the innocent one to a lethal defense is a reasonable fear of an unjust lethal attack. This instruction puts such a fear into the realm of prudence.

As a Catholic, I always have a good pair of running shoes on hand.

 

[o_mlly]

After the bomb has been released, no. I do think they would be justified in trying to take the bomber out before the bomb is dropped though, assuming that they know bombs are about to be dropped.

Homicide is always evil; we are obligated to avoid killing another or the occasion of doing so, if possible.

Are the non-combatants who live next to a munitions factory of an unjust aggressor and within the range of the innocent country’s bombers able to foresee this bombing run and can they avoid injury by vacating? If yes to both then one may argue that those non-combatants have the moral obligation to avoid harm. Is not vacating an act of negligence?

CCC #1737 … For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it.

 

[Elf01]

Vacate if possible, but if taking down the bomber is the only way for them to save their lives I think that they would be justified in trying.

 

[o_mlly]

Vacate if possible, but if taking down the bomber is the only way for them to save their lives I think that they would be justified in trying.

If the non-combatant can but chooses not to vacate and subsequently kills the pilot then is the negligent non-combatant guilty of manslaughter?

May the prisoner wrongly convicted of murder and sentenced to death kill his innocent jailer to escape his execution? Which is more Christ-like: suffering an injustice or committing an injustice?

Probably need a new thread to continue. It seems the notion of an innocent aggressor is perhaps possible but highly unlikely. Our bystander is neither a non-combatant nor a prisoner.

 

[Ender]

are you referring to this act in isolation or is more information assumed in your implied position that it is not murder and thus not intrinsically evil? What does the actor know, for example, in choosing the action?

The actor (like the doctor) is fully aware of the situation and of the consequences of both choices. Either throw the switch and send the trolley at the car with the infant inside - which will lead to his death but will save the life of the mother - or don’t throw the switch, in which case both the mother and the child will die. If it is intrinsically evil to direct the trolley away from the mother because it will then be directed at an innocent person, then you must let both the mother and the child die. If you make that choice, however, I don’t see on what grounds you could accept that the operation that saves the mother’s life is acceptable; I cannot identify a significant difference between the two scenarios.

 

[Ender]

Act: Throwing a switch that one foresees will kill one innocent person with the intention of saving the lives of four innocent persons.

Object: Direct killing an innocent person - murder.
Intention: Save 4 lives.
Circumstances: Premeditated.
Act is immoral. Fails in its object.

Let’s start by noting that what you have defined as the object, even if it properly identified the object, is incorrect. The direct killing of an innocent person is not necessarily murder. We have several examples of this, the most obvious being the civilians that are killed in wars by justifiable bombing raids.

Second, your definition in no way describes the actual object. You make it sound as if saving the four comes directly from the death of the innocent person, which of course it doesn’t. The four are saved whether or not the one dies, which is a criterion of PODE - that the good effect does not come about from the evil effect.

Third, you make way too much of the word “direct”. If I set in motion a series of events that inevitably lead to someone’s death then I am as guilty as if I simply shot him. Shooting a person in a boat is no more an act of murder than sinking the person’s boat and leaving him to drown. It is not the immediacy of the death that matters but its inevitability.

Homicide is always evil; we are obligated to avoid killing another or the occasion of doing so, if possible.

Again, this is not true. Murder is always evil, but homicide is not always murder.

 

[Rau]

The direct killing of an innocent person is not necessarily murder. We have several examples of this, the most obvious being the civilians that are killed in wars by justifiable bombing raids.

Ender, you misuse the word “direct” here. By definition, those innocent civilians casualties of tactical bombing of military targets are “indirect”. Civilians dying in Hiroshima were arguably direct casualties.

You make it sound as if saving the four comes directly from the death of the innocent person, which of course it doesn’t. The four are saved whether or not the one dies, which is a criterion of PODE - that the good effect does not come about from the evil effect.

You are quite right that the saving of the 4 is not connected to the actual death of the 1, but it’s also true that the moral object isn’t reliant on the actual outcome of death. [In many other scenarios, such as chemical injection to treat ectopic pregnancy, the death of the embryo is a required outcome to save mother, though not here. Scraping the embryo from the tube is another alternative treatment - mother’s recovery here is not reliant on death of the child, though that is inherent to the act chosen.] O_mlly does not say that the death of the 1 is the key to saving the 4, but rather that the means is (among other things) inherently oriented to the death of the 1 (innocent) - that is, the means is a knowingly chosen act of murder. Just as we say the sharp-shooter assassin’s knowing choice is an act of murder from the moment he decides to pull the trigger - even if he misses.

If the saving of the 4 relied on the death of the 1, there is no doubt that the act would be evil. I don’t believe we can say however that because the saving of the 4 does not rely on the death of the 1 that the act is good. The expression of the PODE independently requires simply that the act done must not itself be evil (ie. must be good in itself).

Third, you make way too much of the word “direct”. If I set in motion a series of events that inevitably lead to someone’s death then I am as guilty as if I simply shot him.

Yes, exactly correct. “Direct” does not rely on there being a kind of one-step connection from act to end. I’ve seen the characteristic sometimes described as “morally direct”.

Murder is always evil, but homicide is not always murder.

Murder is morally evil. Every homicide entails at least a human death which is a physical evil (in the consequences) and physical evils are to be minimised or accepted only given the presence of counterbalancing goods.

 

[Rau]

If it is intrinsically evil to direct the trolley away from the mother because it will then be directed at an innocent person, then you must let both the mother and the child die.

Long ago, mother and child would die in child-birth because the head of the child was too large to be delivered (cephalo-pelvic disproportion). At some point it became a “practice” to crush the head of the child enabling the (dead) body to be delivered and the mother saved. Is this the moral course? Could we apply double-effect here and argue that the child’s death was an unintended side-effect of reducing the size of his cranium? It seems a stretch. Crushing a skull is fairly inherently ordered to the death of the innocent, even though that end is not required. But putting aside the death issue, there would be no doubt that we have grievously mutilated the child which is also impermissible.

It is distressing (and not a little unsatisfying) to confront the possibility that the only morally acceptable course is the one that sees the maximum physical evil.

 

[o_mlly]

Let’s start by noting that what you have defined as the object, even if it properly identified the object, is incorrect.

A bit confusing. Are you saying, “If you defined the object correctly then you are still wrong”?

The direct killing of an innocent person is not necessarily murder.

All deliberate actions that are the means to directly kill an innocent human being are inherently evil and morally impermissible. The absence of an evil intention does not make good what is inherently evil.

Third, you make way too much of the word “direct”.

Here’s the instruction from the Catechism on the use of the word “direct” as the word relates to the human act of abortion.

2271 Direct abortion, that is to say, abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law:

Substitute “killing” for “abortion” and

Direct killing, that is to say, killing willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law:

I use the word “direct” in the same sense as the Catechism. You cannot deny that “throwing the switch” is the means of the innocent person’s death. And the act of “throwing the switch” is deliberate which is to say that the act is willed.

Again, this is not true.

Yes it is true. Please read VS p. 80. All homicides are inherently evil.

The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts [inherently evil]: "Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia …

 

[Ender]

Ender, you misuse the word “direct” here. By definition, those innocent civilians casualties of tactical bombing of military targets are “indirect”. Civilians dying in Hiroshima were arguably direct casualties.

I have several times asked for terms to be defined. If you’re not willing to do that you can hardly fault me for not using the word the same way you do. In this case it would seem you are using “direct” as a synonym for “intentional”. If you have something else in mind it would be useful if you would explain the meaning.

… the means [of saving the four] is (among other things) inherently oriented to the death of the 1 (innocent) - that is, the means is a knowingly chosen act of murder.

Again, what does “inherently oriented to” mean? Inevitably leads to? In what way is throwing the switch inherently oriented to the death of the one that is not also true of the operation? You have said the operation is directed at saving the mother, which is surely true, but throwing the switch is equally directed at saving the four. In both cases the consequences of the acts lead to life for some and death for someone else.

The death in both cases is an inevitable consequence of the action. The actions in both cases are performed with the intent of saving life. The benefit proceeds from the acts, not the negative consequences. Why is it not justified under the principles of PODE?

 

[o_mlly]

The death in both cases is an inevitable consequence of the action.

Both surgeon and bystander can say, “I did not intend that (the death of the innocent).” But only the surgeon can say, “I did not mean that.” Mean in the sense of directly causing.

 

[Ender]

Both surgeon and bystander can say, “I did not intend that (the death of the innocent).” But only the surgeon can say, “I did not mean that.” Mean in the sense of directly causing.

First, using “mean” to mean something other than is given by its common definition simply adds another layer of confusion. “Mean” does not mean directly causing. Nor do I have a clue as to what you mean by “directly causing.” If the doctor does not operate, the fetus will not immediately die. This sounds like trying to find a distinction between shooting a person, and sinking his boat so he’ll drown. As a direct result of the operation the fetus dies. The operation is the cause of its death.

The reason it’s so difficult to find a meaningful distinction between throwing the switch and operating is that there isn’t one.

 

[o_mlly]

First, using “mean” to mean something other than is given by its common definition simply adds another layer of confusion.

Willfull confusion is like willfull ignorance. Only those who choose to be confused are confused when the sense of a word used immediately follows its use.

The operation is the cause of its death.

Not so. Any morally permissible operation never directly causes death.

 

[Rau]

As a direct result of the operation the fetus dies. The operation is the cause of its death.

You will readily find confirmation that collateral casualties in war are not “directly” killed but “indirectly”. The bomb caused the deaths though - no question about that. So what about the act (not the actor) gives rise to this distinction between direct and indirect?

 

[o_mlly]

The reason it’s so difficult to find a meaningful distinction between throwing the switch and operating is that there isn’t one.

Finding the distinction between throwing the switch and operating was quite easy for most.

More difficult is the question you have admittedly evaded so far:
“What is the meaningful distinction between throwing the switch and pulling the trigger?”

 

[BlackFriar]

Both surgeon and bystander can say, “I did not intend that (the death of the innocent).” But only the surgeon can say, “I did not mean that.” Mean in the sense of directly causing.

I suppose it comes back to the conundrum of whether someone is really mortally malicious to God simply because he voluntarily likes lots of sex with different women and has no conscious intention of hurting God at all.
Traditional theology seems to have answered that question with a clear yes.

And the reason is that its not about what we consciously “mean” at the time. Its about the inner teleology of these grave acts - the very consenting to them means we agree with their inherently destructive inner teleologies even if it is not our conscious teleology/purpose.

The two teleologies/trajectories are incompatible in some acts. Hence we can damn ourselves to hell without a single bad thought against God. It is the actions we choose that damn us and how freely we choose them and how understanding we are of their inherent teleologies.

So it seems the indirection in the “meaning” really needs to be found in the objective behaviour rather than the conscious intent of the actor if we are to play the PODE card.

That seems to be the basis of the recent “means” criterion added to the PODE since Aquinas’s time.
But as I tried to tease out from Rau, distinguishing an accidental evil means from an inherent one at times seems inconsistent.

 

[Ender]

You will readily find confirmation that collateral casualties in war are not “directly” killed but “indirectly”. The bomb caused the deaths though - no question about that. So what about the act (not the actor) gives rise to this distinction between direct and indirect?

Direct: “without intervening factors or intermediaries”
Indirect: “not directly caused by or resulting from something.”

Civilian casualties caused by bombing meet the criteria of direct deaths. You are using those terms to mean something other than the definitions given in dictionaries, and unless you define what you mean when you use them I can’t recognize what distinction you’re trying to make.

 

[Ender]

More difficult is the question you have admittedly evaded so far:

“What is the meaningful distinction between throwing the switch and pulling the trigger?”

That’s a different situation. When Scowler came up with a different situation he wanted to discuss I suggested he take it to a different thread, which he was gracious enough to do. If you’d really like to examine this problem I’ll be happy to do it…in a different thread.

 

[o_mlly]

That’s a different situation. When Scowler came up with a different situation he wanted to discuss I suggested he take it to a different thread, …

This situation is only morally interesting as it relates to disclosing the underlying principle that supports your permit to “throw the switch” in the trolley exercise. When you asked others to come up with different situations (bombers, abortions) to show their consistent moral principles to support “not throw the switch”, they were gracious enough to do so.

If you will not take the position to justify “pull the trigger” then I must conclude your decision to “throw the switch” is emotional, not rational. We ought not be ruled by emotion.

 

[Ender]

This situation is only morally interesting as it relates to disclosing the underlying principle that supports your permit to “throw the switch” in the trolley exercise.

When you asked others to come up with different situations (bombers, abortions) to show their consistent moral principles to support “not throw the switch”, they were gracious enough to do so.

The bombing and the operation are different varieties of the same problem. Yours is a different situation altogether.

If you will not take the position to justify “pull the trigger” then I must conclude your decision to “throw the switch” is emotional, not rational.

However you reached that conclusion, it is incorrect. In your case I would answer no, the point being that if I have opposite responses to two situations it must be because I see them as fundamentally different.