Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

Post #676 is authored by me as I view this thread.

Interesting. Your post that I’m responding to here shows up as 699 as I look at it…but shows as post:703 in the link. In any event I found the post you were referring to.

The terms “direct/indirect” are not referring to physical directness, but to moral directness. Moral directness, not physical directness, is an essential attribute of intrinsically evil acts.

An intrinsically evil act is inherently directed at an evil end: its moral object. This is the sense in which we say all intrinsically evil acts are (morally) direct. Another act may have the same end result, but if that act is not inherently ordered to the same moral object then that act is not intrinsically evil.

The relationship between any act and its moral object is direct because the act itself is inherently ordered toward that moral object. This has nothing to do with physical directness.

“An intrinsically evil act is inherently directed at an evil end: its moral object.” What do you mean by “directed at” here? Do you mean it is intended to produce a particular result, and if so isn’t that the intent of the act? JPII defined the object of an act to be the proximate end, not the final end. The final end is the intent. It seems you are conflating the two fonts. Or do you mean “directed at” to be the inevitable consequence of the act whether or not it was intended?

How is throwing the switch, which inevitably results in the death of the person on the track, morally different than the doctor performing an operation which inevitably results in the death of a fetus? Yes, the doctor’s primary objective is saving the life of the mother, but the intent in the trolley case is to save the lives of the four on the other track, so the intents are essentially identical. Neither the operation nor throwing the switch immediately cause another’s death, but a death is the inevitable result in both cases. In neither case is death intended, but in both cases death is unavoidable.

Define “directed at” in such a way that it means “saving the life of the mother” in the case of the operation, but “killing the one on the other track” in the trolley case. I don’t think this is possible without simply asserting that this is the case. That is, no definition is possible that would lead to such a distinction.

 

[Rau]

An act that leads to an unwanted outcome is morally different than the same act where the outcome is desired.

Yes, but the specifics of the act is of key importance. When you aim and fire a gun (or a trolley) at an innocent, in order to bring about some other good, we might all say we did not desire that death. But we still did the deed.

 

[Ender]

In the first case, the only act was to use your car to go somewhere. In the second scenario, there are likely two acts both voluntarily chosen: the act to go somewhere in your car, and then the act to run over a pedestrian - different acts at different times, both voluntarily chosen.

I see the pedestrian and hit the breaks, but I don’t swerve to avoid him; I hit and kill him. Is this an intrinsically evil act?

 

[Ender]

Yes, but the specifics of the act is of key importance. When you aim and fire a gun (or a trolley) at an innocent, in order to bring about some other good, we might all say we did not desire that death. But we still did the deed.

You compare throwing the switch to aiming a gun; I compare it to operating on an ectopic pregnancy. Both are assertions. What is needed is a definition we can use to determine which assertion is justified. I’ve given you mine - it is JPII’s, and you cited it: the killing must be “direct and voluntary”. That definition would describe aiming the gun as immoral, but it would not apply to either the trolley or pregnancy examples.

 

[Rau]

I see the pedestrian and hit the breaks, but I don’t swerve to avoid him; I hit and kill him. Is this an intrinsically evil act?

Not on the basis of that description.

 

[Rau]

You compare throwing the switch to aiming a gun; I compare it to operating on an ectopic pregnancy.

Were methotrexate injection the treatment of the ectopic pregnancy, I’d agree with you. Such a ‘treatment’ targets the baby.

 

[Rau]

the killing must be “direct and voluntary" (to be evil)

Right, the act causing death must do so directly and be voluntarily chosen. Either an injection, or tube removal, is a voluntarily chosen act. Methotrexate is a direct killing (illicit), tube removal indirect (licit).

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, throwing the switch inevitably leads to the death of an innocent person. (I’ll point out that performing the operation has the same consequence.) That, however, according to JPII, is insufficient to make the act immoral. The killing also has to be voluntary.

the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral.” JP II, VS (57)

This is rather different than the citation from 2258 :"…no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right to destroy directly an innocent human being. "

Both 2258 and the quote from VS 57 are the same in teaching that one must always respect the right to life an innocent person. In throwing the switch, the bystander clearly disrespects the right to life of the innocent person. The surgeon does not (argument to follow).

(Continued.)

 

[o_mlly]

As I’ve said before, I don’t see any moral difference between throwing the switch and operating on the mother, nor is there anything in the definition I’ve used that makes a distinction: if the act of throwing the switch violates 2258, then so does operating on the mother. On the other hand, neither of the acts violates JPII’s definition.

What principle differentiates the bystander’s act from the surgeon’s act? Are both the fetus and the innocent person merely in the wrong place at the wrong time? I do not think so.

Prior to the act of the bystander, the innocent person’s life in not in imminent danger. The bystander deliberately involves the innocent person in something lethal to his life in order to further his purpose. The bystander is the direct agent in bringing about both the imminent danger of and, indeed, the death of the innocent person.

Prior to the act of the surgeon, the innocent fetus’ life is already in danger. So also is the mother’s life. To save the mother’s life, the surgeon excises the mother’s diseased tissue. The surgeon’s act does not introduce a new risk to the vitality of the fetus.

Unlike the act of the bystander, the surgeon’s act does not introduce or materially change the risk to the life of the fetus. (Although one may argue, depending on when the surgeon acts, that the surgeon’s act accelerates an inevitable death.)

Assuming 2258 and JPII are saying the same thing in different ways, which seems a very reasonable conclusion, then how do we reconcile them? I think JPII’s definition is the clearest, but if they mean the same thing then certainly committing an act which leads to an unwanted death hardly meets the criterion of having a right to kill when the death is desired. That is, your sequence fails at step 5. An act that leads to an unwanted outcome is morally different than the same act where the outcome is desired.

Again, as I do not see any contradiction in VS 57 and CCC 2258, I do not see a need to reconcile.

The sequence I offered aims to flesh out the moral object of the act as described in the OP. The moral object does not involve the second font, intent. The moral object does consider foreseeable outcomes but does not rank them in importance. The importance of a particular foreseeable outcome is the consideration in the matter of intent. One may not intend an unforeseen outcome. Likewise, a deliberate (voluntary) act may not ignore or dismiss the moral responsibility for any foreseeable outcomes.

As such Step 5 in the sequence (If the bystander throws the switch then he immorally claims the right to destroy an innocent human being) remains valid as “unwanted” or “desired” do not apply in determining the moral object of an act.

 

[Ender]

Right, the act causing death must do so directly and be voluntarily chosen. Either an injection, or tube removal, is a voluntarily chosen act. Methotrexate is a direct killing (illicit), tube removal indirect (licit).

The act causing the death of the pedestrian was direct and voluntarily chosen, yet no one could reasonably consider it murder or even immoral. Once again, your definitions lead to invalid conclusions. Even your own example of the operation fails your definition: the tubal removal was voluntarily chosen and directly led to the death of the fetus. It is arbitrary to simply assert that it is licit when by your own definition it is not.

 

[o_mlly]

I struggled with the definition of voluntary as well; here’s how I understand it. Suppose I drive my car down a street, don’t see a pedestrian, and run him over and kill him. The act of driving was voluntary, hitting the pedestrian was not. This is a very different situation than if I drive my car, see the pedestrian, and run him over anyway. Externally there is no difference between these two scenarios; a bystander would not be able to distinguish between the two incidents. In the second case I voluntarily killed someone; in the first case I did not, although driving the car was certainly voluntary.

If one foresees an outcome then the act is deliberate or voluntary with respect to that outcome.

Although the two acts may appear to an onlooker to be the same, the acts are different in object. In the former act, the death of the pedestrian is unforeseen. Not so, in the latter act.

 

[Ender]

What principle differentiates the bystander’s act from the surgeon’s act?

Yes, this is the proper question.

Prior to the act of the bystander, the innocent person’s life in not in imminent danger.

This is true, but irrelevant. Nothing in the all the definitions of the moral components of an act raises this as an issue. This is a circumstance, not a moral condition.

The bystander deliberately involves the innocent person in something lethal to his life in order to further his purpose. The bystander is the direct agent in bringing about both the imminent danger of and, indeed, the death of the innocent person.

The doctor deliberately involves an innocent person in something lethal to his life in order to further his purpose. He is the direct agent in bringing about…the death of the innocent person.

Prior to the act of the surgeon, the innocent fetus’ life is already in danger. So also is the mother’s life.

OK, then address the problem I raised with the circular track. If the trolley goes to the right, as the switch is set, both the mother and the child will die. Only if the switch is thrown to direct the trolley at the child will the mother’s life be saved. May we throw the switch in that example?

To save the mother’s life, the surgeon excises the mother’s diseased tissue. The surgeon’s act does not introduce a new risk to the vitality of the fetus.

You are saying the surgeon can kill the child because the child is going to die anyway. This is the argument for euthanasia.

Unlike the act of the bystander, the surgeon’s act does not introduce or materially change the risk to the life of the fetus. (Although one may argue, depending on when the surgeon acts, that the surgeon’s act accelerates an inevitable death.)

Of course it “accelerates” the death of the fetus. It is the direct cause of it. Yes, the fetus would die anyway some time in the future, but that does not justify killing it today.

Again, as I do not see any contradiction in VS 57 and CCC 2258, I do not see a need to reconcile.

If there is no difference between the two then we can use JPII’s definition that the killing must be direct and voluntary to be immoral. Clearly, neither in the case of the trolley or the operation can the death be considered voluntary.

 

[Ender]

Continued…

o_mlly:

The moral object does consider foreseeable outcomes but does not rank them in importance.

JPII says the object involves only the proximate end of the act, other foreseeable consequences are not part of the object.

As such Step 5 in the sequence (If the bystander throws the switch then he immorally claims the right to destroy an innocent human being) remains valid as “unwanted” or “desired” do not apply in determining the moral object of an act.

The bystander’s claim is in no way different from the claim of the surgeon. As a direct consequence of their actions an innocent person will die. Both of them know this, and there is no justification for defining one act as moral and the other immoral.

Let’s see how you deal with with the circular track problem, then I think this situation will be clearer. Do you throw the switch so that only the child dies, or do you not throw the switch and let both the child and the mother die?

 

[Ender]

If one foresees an outcome then the act is deliberate or voluntary with respect to that outcome.

The surgeon knows the fetus will die as a direct result of his operating on the mother. By your definition both the bystander and the surgeon sin by committing an act they know will lead to the death of an innocent person. This suggests your definition is inaccurate since the church does not consider the operation sinful.

 

[Rau]

Once again, your definitions lead to invalid conclusions.

They are not my definitions Ender. Conclusions are the product of reasoning - I believe that is the problem in this case.

 

[Rau]

“An intrinsically evil act is inherently directed at an evil end: its moral object.” What do you mean by “directed at” here? Do you mean it is intended to produce a particular result, and if so isn’t that the intent of the act? JPII defined the object of an act to be the proximate end, not the final end. The final end is the intent. It seems you are conflating the two fonts. Or do you mean “directed at” to be the inevitable consequence of the act whether or not it was intended?

No Ender, I am not conflating the two. And neither of your 2 proposed meanings are right. Do you see how two different treatments for ectopic pregnancy “target” (“are inherently directed to”) different proximate ends, but the same Intention? One (the injection) is inherently directed to the death of the baby (a direct killing) the other (tubal section removal) is inherently directed at the soon to rupture tube of the mother and only indirectly at the death of the baby; the operation is sometimes called an indirect abortion.

The trolley is not exactly comparable to either treatment above. Unlike the ectopic injection case, the death of the innocent on the track is not itself needed for the saving of the 4. But our lever throwing action is directly a killing action, AND directly a saving action. And the act is voluntarily chosen. The injection directly kills and indirectly saves. The surgery (on mum) directly saves and indirectly kills (hastens death).

 

[Elf01]

The trolley is not exactly comparable to either treatment above. Unlike the ectopic injection case, the death of the innocent on the track is not itself needed for the saving of the 4. But our saving action is directly a killing action, AND directly a saving action. And the act is voluntarily chosen. The injection directly kills and indirectly saves. The surgery (on mum) directly saves and indirectly kills (hastens death).

I see your point. It may be comparable to simply removing the baby from the tube, preventing the rupture of the tube, but leading to the death of the baby. My understanding is that that is seen as immoral.

 

[Ender]

They are not my definitions Ender. Conclusions are the product of reasoning - I believe that is the problem in this case.

Your claim was not a conclusion but an assertion.

Methotrexate is a direct killing (illicit), tube removal indirect (licit).

Both acts are directly responsible for the death of the fetus; if neither act was committed the fetus would not immediately die. The difference between them is not the degree of directness, both are direct but only with the methotrexate is the death voluntary.

 

[o_mlly]

This is true, but irrelevant. Nothing in the all the definitions of the moral components of an act raises this as an issue. This is a circumstance, not a moral condition.

A willful act which foresees placing another into mortal danger is most certainly a moral issue.

The doctor deliberately involves an innocent person in something lethal to his life in order to further his purpose. He is the direct agent in bringing about…the death of the innocent person.

No, as explained the doctor’s act of excising the mother’s diseased tissue does not directly cause the death of the fetus. As others have pointed out, only procedures that directly attacks the fetus chemically or physically are prohibited. I know you disagree but Catholic theologians do agree. Catholic hospitals permit this procedure.

In certain cases, such as … an ectopic pregnancy, it is morally licit to remove the threat to the mother’s life by removing … part or all of the Fallopian tube where the child implanted, even though it is foreseeable that the child will die as an indirect and unintended effect of such surgery. http://www.usccb.org/about/pro-life-activities/respect-life-program/life-matters-abortion.cfm

So, to successfully argue from settled Catholic moral theology using the morality of this particular tubal pregnancy procedure as an argument then you must show a direct cause of the innocent person’s death not attributable to the bystander’s act. But because, absent the bystander’s act, the innocent person lives, I do not think you can.

 

[Rau]

Your claim was not a conclusion but an assertion.

Methotrexate is a direct killing (illicit), tube removal indirect (licit).

Both acts are directly responsible for the death of the fetus; if neither act was committed the fetus would not immediately die. The difference between them is not the degree of directness, both are direct but only with the methotrexate is the death voluntary.

The literature will confirm one is a direct abortion, the other is indirect. A view about the meaning of “voluntary” will not feature in that literature.

You misunderstand the sense in which “voluntary” is used. Methotrexate is inherently directed to killing embryos, and if methotrexate is voluntarily chosen, the act is murder. For so long as you hold out on this point, you will be able to exclude undesired outcomes which are the direct end of an act from the object of the act.