Runaway trolley problem

[Rau]

If you know that the performing of a specific action will directly result in the death of another person that would otherwise not die then that action is not a moral action.

Is this your own personal rule? It does not come from the moral theology of the Catholic Church. Were it true, lethal defense would not be permissible. Acts occasioning death to innocents in a just war would not be permissible. Capital punishment would not be permissible. Certain medical treatments of mother with baby would not be permissible. Diverting a crashing jet liner into a lightly populated area to avoid a heavily populated area would not be permissible.

Please examine the alternative analyses presented in this thread and ask questions if you don’t understand or find flaws. The flaws in your proposal have been pointed out a number of times.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

This is important to consider as well for an understanding of how grave any situation that may end a human life is.

"Such strict conditions are placed on efforts of legitimate defense by military force…

…the evaluation of these conditions belong to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good."

These two lines in particular show that the power and ability to make such judgements belong with those who are in a position of responsibility for the common good.

In the trolley situation, you are not in legitimate role of authority or responsibility for the common good where you have the authority to sentence one person to death by trolley for the common good of the four that would be saved.

Similarly in the patient scenario, the surgeon is not in a position of authority for the common good to be able to declare that the value that the one person with the organs contributes to the common good of society is less than the four patients that have the potential to be saved. And despite the declared certainty of success laid out in the scenario, the surgeon’s previous record is only one component contributing to the suitability of the transplant. Rejection of the organs, complications from anesthesia, etc… all combine to ensure that survival of the four patients is not guaranteed.

The only certainty of the situation is the murder of the one patient to harvest their organs.

 

[Rau]

These two lines in particular show that the power and ability to make such judgements belong with those who are in a position of responsibility for the common good.

When the context is a decision to wage war or inflict capital punishment - that’s right.

 

[MonteRCMS]

In real life, you have exactly ONE SECOND to decide.

That is all.

Maybe less.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

I did not insert the word “innocent” in that statement because I thought it was already understood from the given scenarios being discussed. In the trolley scenario and the patient scenario, neither the person tied to the tracks or the patient with the needed organs is listed as an aggressor.

In the case of lethal use of force in self defense or the defense of other innocents, you are performing a specific action against an aggressor. You are meeting a force with appropriate force to stop the threat to life or grievous bodily harm to yourself or other innocents. You are not taking an action to unjustly end the life of an innocent person in an attempt to save the lives of others.

The concept of the “Just War” doctrine is predicate on a legitimate authority who is responsible for the common good making the prudential judgement calls. You could not legitimately declare war on your neighborhood and begin killing people and try to claim your decisions are morally prudent under the concept of “Just War” doctrine.

Decisions regarding capital punishment also belong only to those in positions of legitimate authority.

Medical treatments for a mother that may result in the death of the baby are not similar to the trolley situation, because a baby’s survival is predicate on the mother remaining alive. If the baby is viable and can be delivered prematurely, then all steps must be taken to try to save both the lives of the mother and the child.

If the child is not capable of living outside of the mothers womb, but the mother requires a medical treatments to prevent her impending death that would inadvertently end the life of the child, then the child would also already be in a situation where their death was equally certain.

For example, if a mother was in a life threatening emergency situation and in need of an immediate procedure that would remove damaged tissue, but the removal of said tissue from the mother would almost certainly result in the child being unable to survive, then the actions being taken are not directly against the child. All efforts must still be taken to save the life of the child as well. The child’s inability to survive are not directly due to the actions being taken, but a circumstance of their lack of development. However, medical treatments that are directly oriented towards ending the life of the child in an attempt to lower the risk of death to the mother are not legitimate treatments.
continued…

 

[AveOTheotokos]

When diverting a crashing jet liner, you are not making a decision to divert the plane directly into one specific person or group of persons as opposed to a larger group of persons. You wouldn’t just point the plane away from the highly populated area towards a lightly populated area and then just let go of the controls. Ideally, you would be constantly trying to steer the crashing jet liner to AVOID every obstacle possible. The operational capability of the crashing plane may inhibit your success at attempting to avoid casualties, but as the pilot your goal would ideally be to consistently exert all your efforts to discern and guide the plane out of the path of every potential casualty until reaching the point that your (name removed by moderator)uts on the plane’s controls no longer gave you any ability to determine the path of the plane.

Also, as a licensed pilot, you have been placed in a legitimate position of responsibility over the common good of the passengers of your plane and all who your plane has the potential to harm. It is because of this responsibility that there are licensing requirements and regulations placed upon all those who wish to pilot an aircraft.

The trolley situation is used as a thought experiment specifically because it is “on rails” both figuratively and literally. It is specifically tailored to keep all decisions “on rails” so that the only choices are to do nothing and kill four people or take a deliberate action and knowingly kill one person. The minutiae of other scenarios add much complication to philosophical discussion, which is why a controlled, guided scenario like the trolley situation is such a “classic”.

 

[DignumEtJustum]

This is why I’ve removed myself from the organ transplant list. I won’t let some atheist doctor decide when my time is.

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

Classic mis-use of double effect.

I’m curious about this statement. Is there ANY scenario other than self-defense/soldier in war where you would apply double effect then?

The canonical example is surgery to address an ectopic pregnancy.

@pnewton attempts to divorce “re-directing trolley onto track B” from the physical act which makes it happen. In doing so, s/he feels that it has now become an act which is “morally good or neutral”. It’s the canonical dodge (how’s that? better than “classic mis-use”? ) in trying to take a morally unacceptable act and giving it the veneer of propriety.

I’m sorry, @pnewton, that you feel you need to appeal to “higher authority” in order to justify your case (then again, how do you know you’re not interacting with those who have studied Catholic moral theology? ), but this case is one of the ones that is typically brought up as an example of an immoral act.

 

[pnewton]

But isn’t this the same as the trolley problem?

No. You are pulling the trigger. It would only be the same if you are the one who started the trolled toward the five people.

While all these hypothetical situations are being considered, remember that nothing can be valid that also contradicts the Just War Doctrine.

 

[Gorgias]

Zaccheus:

What happens to their prisoner if you shoot down the bomber is an unavoidable but totally undesired accompaniment to the intended result. What happens to the man on the track if you pull the lever is the intended result.

The intended result is to have the trolley on a track where the least harm is likely.

In other words, utilitarianism: the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Unacceptable, according to Catholic moral theology.

The death of the man is foreseen but not intended. The death of the man on the track upon pulling lever is also totally unavoidable and undesired if 4 lives are to be saved. You have not identified any difference.

Think of it this way:

Let’s leave the five folks on track A out of the equation. In fact, let’s say that they aren’t even there, tied down and waiting to get squished. Is it moral to trigger the lever to position “B” when there’s a guy tied to the tracks on track “B”? Of course it isn’t! If one hides behind the argument “I just pushed the lever; the death was a foreseeable but unintended consequence”, then four out of five dentists surveyed would call him a monster (the fifth is Snidely Whiplash, I suppose).

So, the act itself is morally evil.

But, what about ‘intent’? If track A is loaded down with potential victims, and I intend to save them, doesn’t that count for something?

No, it doesn’t.
CCC 1753:

A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means.

But wait! The circumstances! The circumstances count for something, don’t they? They can make the difference! After all, there are five innocent people about to die!!!

And yet again, the answer is ‘no’:
CCC 1754:

The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

So, taking an action to kill one, while hoping to save five, might diminish responsibility, but it cannot change an evil act into a good one.

One last quote
CCC 1756:

It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. … One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

This one is pretty cut-and-dried. It’s a fun example to debate, even with those who claim to hold to Catholic teachings on morality… but only because some who think they do, are mistaken. Or, at least, are in error and don’t realize it.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

@Gorgias Excellent job breaking this scenario apart and stripping the act to it’s most basic components to demonstrate the moral problem with the act, regardless of other elements of the scenario.

 

[pnewton]

In other words, utilitarianism: the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Unacceptable, according to Catholic moral theology.

If you keep arguing back and forth, you will finally get a phrasing you can jump on. The original posts all clearly state that the intent is to save four people.

Utilitarianism makes the decision easier, but that does not equate to anyone arriving at the same decision is utilitarian. The same problem exists for the Just War Doctrine where one may end up in a position that is utilitarian, without being a utilitarian.

 

[pnewton]

I kept asking for anything authoritative and all I see is people back and forth stuck in the issues. I found this from Stanford University on why the principle of double-effect applies.

It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

In other words, utilitarianism: the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Unacceptable, according to Catholic moral theology.

If you keep arguing back and forth, you will finally get a phrasing you can jump on. The original posts all clearly state that the intent is to save four people.

Fair enough. Catholic moral teaching asserts that a good intent cannot redeem an evil act.

Utilitarianism makes the decision easier, but that does not equate to anyone arriving at the same decision is utilitarian. The same problem exists for the Just War Doctrine where one may end up in a position that is utilitarian, without being a utilitarian.

As someone mentioned upthread, “just war doctrine” is a whole 'nother discussion…

 

[Gorgias]

I kept asking for anything authoritative and all I see is people back and forth stuck in the issues. I found this from Stanford University on why the principle of double-effect applies.

It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.

Two thoughts: first, whereas Stanford University might speak authoritatively on philosophy, it does not speak authoritatively on Catholic moral theology. The fact that somewhere outside the teaching of the Church makes a claim, does not make that claim true. Sorry (but nice try. ).

Second, you misquote the document in a way to make it seem that it is saying that the trolley example is one that demonstrates double effect. That’s misleading. Rather, the article merely states that:

Many morally reflective people have been persuaded that something along the lines of double effect must be correct. No doubt this is because at least some of the examples cited as illustrations of DE have considerable intuitive appeal.

“Many morally reflective people” think that? Hmm… doesn’t sound like it proves your case, nor that it says that this is what the Church teaches.

“At least some of the examples cited”… but not all? You mean that it’s possible to mis-use double effect? Really? C’mon…

The examples “have considerable intuitive appeal”? That’s it? Not even that the author, here, is claiming that they work – just that they have appeal…?!?

To suggest that this quotation demonstrates an ‘authoritative’ position – by Stanford University no less (appeal to authority, much?) – is misleading. I hope that wasn’t your intent…

 

[AveOTheotokos]

The section you quoted does not say in any kind of authoritative way, that the scenario is morally sound because of double-effect , but instead says:

“Many morally reflective people have been persuaded that something along the lines of double effect must be correct. No doubt this is because at least some of the examples cited as illustrations of DE have considerable intuitive appeal:”

I find the section regarding the common misinterpretations of double effect quite interesting, such as this one:

A third common misinterpretation of double effect is to assume that the principle assures agents that they may do this provided that their ultimate aim is a good one that is ordinarily worth pursuing, the proportionality condition is satisfied and the harm is not only regretted but minimized. That is not sufficient: it must also be true that causing the harm is not so implicated as part of an agent’s means to this good end that it must count as something that is instrumentally intended to bring about the good end. Some discussions of double effect wrongly assume that it permits acts that cause certain kinds of harm because those harms were not the agent’s ultimate aim or were regretted rather than welcomed. The principle of double effect is much more specific than that. Harms that were produced regretfully and only for the sake of producing a good end may be prohibited by double effect because they were brought about as part of the agent’s means to realizing the good end. Double effect is silent about cases in which a harm might permissibly be brought about as a means to a good end.

 

[pnewton]

Two thoughts: first, whereas Stanford University might speak authoritatively on philosophy, it does not speak authoritatively on Catholic moral theology.

Right, but do you know the name of the philosopher that defines the term? That would be Thomas Aquinas. Even secular philosophers know what the term means and where it comes from.

As to authority, fine, I will wait for someone to bring something from the Church. Until then, we are merely swapping opinions and ignoring opinions, an exercise in vanity. At least I brought something other than my own opinion.

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

Two thoughts: first, whereas Stanford University might speak authoritatively on philosophy, it does not speak authoritatively on Catholic moral theology.

Right, but do you know the name of the philosopher that defines the term? That would be Thomas Aquinas. Even secular philosophers know what the term means and where it comes from.

Wow. Lots to comment on, here.

First, the article asserts that Aquinas didn’t formulate “double effect”, but rather, was the first to apply this type of thinking to a discussion of moral theology.

Second, Aquinas’ application was purely in terms of the legitimacy of self-defense. It wasn’t broadened into a general principle by him.

Finally, the fact that Aquinas says something doesn’t make it Church teaching, or even make it true. (Have you read the section of the Summa that discusses the theological impact of the biology of conception/‘quickening’??? Oy vey…)

As to authority, fine, I will wait for someone to bring something from the Church. Until then, we are merely swapping opinions and ignoring opinions, an exercise in vanity. At least I brought something other than my own opinion.

Psst… did you see those quotations from the Catechism that I provided? You know… the ones from ‘authority’ and ‘from the Church’? I brought something other than my own opinion, too…

 

[pnewton]

Psst… did you see those quotations from the Catechism that I provided? You know… the ones from ‘authority’ and ‘from the Church’? I brought something other than my own opinion, too…

I read them. Not one of them mentioned this trolley problem or contradict the law of double effect, which takes those principles into account. You and other will continue to say the act of pulling the lever is intrinsically disordered. I will deny it. You and others will say this is the case of the ends justifying the means, which I also will deny. It is the application that I question.

So what does your priest say? Ave, have you asked your priest?

 

[AveOTheotokos]

There have been several quotes from the Catechism, which I would think qualify as authority and not opinion.

For example, CCC 2269, which states:

2269 The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death. The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal danger without grave reason, as well as refusing assistance to a person in danger.

The acceptance by human society of murderous famines, without efforts to remedy them, is a scandalous injustice and a grave offense. Those whose usurious and avaricious dealings lead to the hunger and death of their brethren in the human family indirectly commit homicide, which is imputable to them.71

Unintentional killing is not morally imputable. But one is not exonerated from grave offense if, without proportionate reasons, he has acted in a way that brings about someone’s death, even without the intention to do so.

When you combine this with what is laid out in CCC 1750-1761, it lays out solid information on the Church’s position on the morality of acts.