Runaway trolley problem

[Rau]

This procedure not only directly heals the mother, but does so by directly killing the child. This would be impermissible morally (since the bad effect – the death of the child – is what causes the good effect – the healing of the mother.)

I believe the chemicals don’t directly heal the mother. The chemicals directly kill the child, and consequently, the mother in due course heals. This is direct abortion with no good moral object.

 

[Rau]

Throwing the switch does not directly kill the person tied to the tracks…

Throwing the switch to direct the tram is an act whose inherent end, expressed in terms of morality, is the death of an innocent. That is, it is ordered to that result. This is saying more than simply the death is a consequence of the act (though that too is true). But equally to the other good result - the act is ordered to that good end (and that good end is also a consequence). Hence two moral objects.

 

[Ender]

The bystander does not have a duty to throw the switch. The pilot has a grave duty to defend.

Admit the implication of your position: the pilot has a right to kill innocent people that is denied the individual. That is certainly true of magistrates and guilty people, but I doubt that it applies equally to the innocent. Here’s a problem however: if there is no person on the second track then the bystander clearly has a moral obligation to throw the switch. So how does his obligation to save the five disappear because there is someone on the other track?

 

[Ender]

Throwing the switch to direct the tram is an act whose inherent end, expressed in terms of morality, is the death of an innocent. That it, it is ordered to that result. But equally to the other good result. Hence two moral objects.

I think we’ve gotten tangled up in imprecise terminology. The church defines the second font of a moral action as “the end in view or the intention”, but this does not match up at all with your use of “end”, which implies a consequence rather than the intention.

Nor do I accept your definition of “ordered to”. You cannot accept the validity of double effect while at the same time asserting that the act which leads to both effects is ordered to the bad one. If that was true the principle could not exist.

Finally, I do not believe one act can have two moral objects. One can have multiple objectives (which refers to intent), although one will be primary, and there can be multiple consequences, but this still all arises from a single act.

 

[Rau]

The church defines the second font of a moral action as “the end in view or the intention”, but this does not match up at all with your use of “end”,

The moral object is a kind of “end” (sometimes called proximate end), distinct from “Intention”. This is a common area for confusion.

You cannot accept the validity of double effect while at the same time asserting that the act which leads to both effects is ordered to the bad one. If that was true the principle could not exist.

Where double effect analysis approves of an act, it is always the case that said Act has only good moral object(s). Is the trolley case such an act? Your denial that an act can have two moral objects is pivotal here. This may be something specific you can research.

 

[BlackFriar]

Lets amend the scenario slightly.
What if I do not know there is “the five” tied to the spur track until after I switch tracks?

Do I now have a moral obligation not to throw it back to the prior state (killing the one) according to your analysis because that is intrinsically evil whereas omission is not?

Yet I have interfered with the natural order of fate by objectively wrongly throwing the switch (in ignorance).
Shouldn’t I restore things to how fate intended them by now intending to throw the switch back (and so kill the original one instead of the five which I have stupidly now done?)

 

[Rau]

Did you switch tracks initially knowing about the one you’ve just put in harms way, or are you just playing with switches? The initial state supposed to be 4/5 in danger, 1 innocent on the spur.

 

[BlackFriar]

?

What if I do not know there is “the five” tied to the spur track until after I switch…

 

[Rau]

Please set out the whole scenario you are contemplating, rather than give an incremental change from what you think is the original scenario. I am unsure we have the same picture of the original scenario.

 

[o_mlly]

Admit the implication of your position: the pilot has a right to kill innocent people that is denied the individual.

No direct “right to kill innocent” exists. This notion is your incorrect inference; not my implication. No one, bomber or bystander, has a direct “right to kill innocent people.”
CCC 2258 … no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.

Here’s a problem however: if there is no person on the second track then the bystander clearly has a moral obligation to throw the switch. So how does his obligation to save the five disappear because there is someone on the other track?

Same reason – no one has a right to directly kill the innocent. In the trolley exercise, everyone tied to the track is innocent; only four are at risk of death. So, if the bystander throws the switch he knowingly and directly targets the death of an innocent who otherwise would live. Such an act is immoral. The death of the innocent one is causally the effect of the bystander’s throwing the switch. We may not do evil so that good may come of it.

The bomber’s action directly targets a munitions factory, a non-innocent and legitimate target in a just war. Within the principles of just war, he judges the evil he eliminates is proportionately greater than the non-combatants who will die. His act is moral.

 

[Ender]

The moral object is a kind of “end”, distinct from “Intention”. This is a common area for confusion.

I’ll grant you that (the confusion part). The best description I’ve seen on this topic is in Veritatis Splendor.

78. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will… In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.

Where double effect analysis approves of an act, it is always the case that said Act has only good moral object(s). Is the trolley case such an act?

A single act has a single object: it is the nature of the act. It is the proximate end, of which I believe there is only one. (There can only be one…)

Your denial that an act can have two moral objects is pivotal here. This may be something specific you can research.

Yes, I think this is the crux of our disagreement. Read Veritatis Splendor from section 76 and see what you make of it.

 

[Ender]

Lets amend the scenario slightly.

What if I do not know there is “the five” tied to the spur track until after I switch tracks?

Do I now have a moral obligation not to throw it back to the prior state (killing the one) according to your analysis because that is intrinsically evil whereas omission is not?

Yet I have interfered with the natural order of fate by objectively wrongly throwing the switch (in ignorance).

Shouldn’t I restore things to how fate intended them by now intending to throw the switch back (and so kill the original one instead of the five which I have stupidly now done?)

This occurred to me too, but slightly differently. Suppose I throw the switch away from the five and toward the one, and now Rau convinces me that I have committed an intrinsically evil act. Should I throw the switch back? It would seem that even returning to the original situation leaves me having committed an evil, given that all the arguments against throwing the switch in the first place are still valid against throwing it back again, only this time the outcome is even worse. Surely one option has to be better than the other (morally acceptable), but if the objections to throwing the switch are valid then I cannot help but sin no matter what I do.

 

[Ender]

No direct “right to kill innocent” exists… No one, bomber or bystander, has a direct “right to kill innocent people.”

I agree, which is why there is no distinction between the actions of the bomber and the bystander…except that we know the action of the bomber is morally justifiable, which suggests the action of the bystander is equally justifiable.

CCC 2258 … no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being.

The key word here being “directly”, and the problem you face is explaining why “directly” applies to the bystander but not the bomber. Each of their actions will inevitably lead to the death of innocent people, yet both have elected to commit the act with knowledge of that outcome. I don’t believe their actions are morally distinguishable.

 

[o_mlly]

I agree, which is why there is no distinction between the actions of the bomber and the bystander

The distinction is that the bomber has a legitimate target for lethal action. The bystander does not.

 

[Ender]

The distinction is that the bomber has a legitimate target for lethal action. The bystander does not.

The bomber has a legitimate end: the destruction of an enemy factory. An inevitable consequence of achieving that end will be the death of innocent people. The bystander has a legitimate end: directing the trolley away from five people tied to the tracks. An inevitable consequence of achieving that end will be the death of an innocent person.

The command not to “directly [to] destroy an innocent human being” is absolute and equally applicable; there is no “legitimate end” exception. The end, legitimate or not, does not justify committing an evil act to achieve it. If the bomber’s action is legitimate it is because the act is legitimate, and the same applies to the bystander.

 

[o_mlly]

If the bomber’s action is legitimate it is because the act is legitimate, and the same applies to the bystander.

No, the bomber’s act is morally good act because all three fonts are good.

The bystander’s act is immoral because it is immoral in its object. It is always intrinsically evil to do evil.

Both acts are lethal acts. The bomber directs his lethal act at an unjust aggressor. The bystander directs his lethal act at an innocent.

 

[Ender]

The bomber directs his lethal act at an unjust aggressor. The bystander directs his lethal act at an innocent.

The bystander’s act is directed at saving five lives; it is assuredly not directed at killing anyone despite having that as a consequence. Only if the switch was thrown with the express purpose of killing the one person would it be an immoral act despite the good that comes from it.

Look at it this way: the presence of a person on the other track does not determine the action. The bystander would throw the switch whether or not there was a person on the other track. The act and the motivation behind switching are unquestionably moral if the second track is clear, so why is the same act and motivation suddenly immoral if a person is on the second track given that his presence has no effect on decision? Whatever the act is directed at it cannot be something that does not alter the decision.

 

[o_mlly]

Look at it this way: the presence of a person on the other track does not determine the action.

Such a change – no one gets hurt – would materially alter the morality of the act (and remove all the drama). If the only end in view and actual consequences are good then there’s no point. Of course, the end in view that an innocent person on the track will die determines the moral object of the act.

Many who consider this situation seek to relieve rather than confront the dilemma. But that defeats the exercise, doesn’t it?

CCC #1753 The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

If not a nation then certainly not four.

 

[BlackFriar]

Nevermind, if this the green…

 

[BlackFriar]

The bystander’s act is immoral because it is immoral in its object. It is always intrinsically evil to do evil.

I think you need to explain this as you seem to use evil twice with different meanings.

And how can an object of an act be immoral?
It cannot, only the whole act is ever be called immoral.
The object can be disordered…but choosing something disordered is not always morally evil is it? That is the very amiguity we are trying to solve. Sometimes it is good to do something disordefed (like killing).

So sometimes it is not evil to do evil…why do you say the opposite?