Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

(#832) The weapon of death matters not. Just as choosing an act which kills by electricity (typically causes heart failure), choosing an act which kills by trolley (typically causes decapitation) is immoral. Both acts are direct attacks on innocents (despite desiring no death at all), and both were motivated by the same good intent.

Again, I find your terminology ambiguous, nonetheless I take the distinction to be (my understanding of) what constitutes a direct versus an indirect cause. The electrocution is direct; I don’t seen any other explanation for it. Throwing the trolley switch is indirect. I take the difference here to be identical to the difference between the operation that is allowed (salpingectomy) versus the one that is not (salpingostomy). Although the consequence is identical (the embryo dies, the mother lives) the former cause of death is indirect while in the latter case it is direct. This is why one procedure is acceptable, and it also explains why rerouting the trolley would be acceptable as well.

 

[davidv]

Then you choose the Proportionalist’s model - there is only Intention and consequences.

Not at all. I am trying to understand how you have decomposed the act into its three moral fonts.

 

[Rau]

Like Rau, your assertion that the evil effect was intended here would mean that no action with a double effect could be possible.

I’ve repeatedly noted that the bystander desires that no one dies. But he surely chooses an action that, by its very nature, [pointing a speeding trolley in the direction of a man on a track], kills.

 

[Rau]

Not at all. I am trying to understand how you have decomposed the act into its three moral fonts.

I think I’ve set that out about as well as I can. I contrasted it with your analysis, which - as far as I could tell - omitted moral content from the object font.

 

[Rau]

Again, I find your terminology ambiguous, nonetheless I take the distinction to be (my understanding of) what constitutes a direct versus an indirect cause. The electrocution is direct; I don’t seen any other explanation for it. Throwing the trolley switch is indirect.

This escapes me entirely. A “switch is thrown” in either case! Please explain why directing a trolley involves one kind of moral anlaysis while directing an electric charge is altogether different. The following is what I’ve asked you to consider:

“The entire original problem could have employed electricity instead of trolleys. The pre-existing situation may have been that in 2 mins a fatal electric shock was to be applied to the 4. A switch is available that changes the course of the electricity such that it bypasses the 4 and is directed to the 1. Do I understand you will allow the 4 to die now because causing death by electricity is not something you are prepared to do, but decapitation by trolley is OK? Or will you tell us that the moral object is now not electrocution but “redirect the electricity”, conveniently ignoring the moral content?”

I note that you previously declined to save the 4 if it involved the one dying by electrocution. Surely you are not going to say that electrons following into a body is direct, but the wheels of a trolley across the throat is indirect??

 

[Rau]

As far as the act of “throwing the switch” is concerned, while it is true that the outcome comes through the act itself, it is not in the act itself. That is, if there was not someone on the second track, and the switch was thrown, obviously no one would die. Therefore death is not in the act of throwing the switch.

I go back to this earlier post of yours. You say the death of the one can’t be a moral object, because if you take away the victim, no one dies! I note that if you take away those at risk, no one is saved either, so you can’t view the good of saving lives in the moral object either! So you must hold to the position that the moral object is just the same as on a normal day - shuffling trains from one track to another. Clearly that is a nonsense. Clearly that gives clearance to act so long as our purpose is to save someone, and the nett body count is favourable.

So you are going to have put moral content back into the moral object. And when you put the saving of lives in, you can’t help put the taking of lives in. Because in this problem - by design - they are two sides of the one coin. Can’t have one object without the other.

 

[Rau]

You have compared throwing the switch to shooting someone in the head. You have defined it as an intrinsically evil action.

Please use comparable language - compare apples with apples. I have pulled you up repeatedly on this cheap trick. “Throwing a switch” compares to “squeezing a trigger”. There is a lack of moral content in the description so no morally assessable act is involved. I have compared murder by gun to murder by trolley. Both intrinsically evil. Acts whose “moral meaning” is murder - those acts are intrinsically evil.

… you are prohibited from throwing the switch to save the mother’s life. How can you throw the switch and send the trolley directly at the infant if such an act is intrinsically evil? The fact that the baby is doomed in either case is not an exception because there is no such thing as an exception to the commission of an action that is intrinsically evil.

It is not intrinsically evil to “throw a switch”. It is intrinsically evil to murder an innocent. You are arguing from a physical picture as though the moral content - and who injects it - matters not. The bystander did not hurl the trolley at the baby- it was already hurled (directly at the baby) by another who from that moment is guilty (morally) of murder noting the track leads to the baby. The bystander introduces no evil - he does not decide to end a life. He merely changes the path of the missile, saving mother and (possibly, according to position on track) varying the distance to the baby. That is not murder. There is no analogy here with the original trolley - where throwing the switch itself (alone) and by its nature causes the death of the innocent - the bystander decided the one innocent was to die at this hand.

Ender you rely far to much on the circular trolley. For even if the bystander were forbidden (which he’s not) to reverse the course of the trolley, there is no lessen for the original trolley. The differences are stark.

 

[Rau]

First, there is simply no question that one has freely chosen to kill anyone. That goes to the criteria for double effect: one cannot will the evil consequence, but only accept it as as unwanted, and completely unavoidable. Your approach would nullify the entire concept of PODE by defining it as a given that the evil effect was chosen.

My approach recognises there is no scope for double effect when choosing an act which by its very nature, in and of itself, is directed toward the death of an innocent. This death is not one that can be accepted. I don’t say the bystander desires the death, but he chose an act inherently ordered to that end. Why? We know he was well motivated.

Second, as for the killing being inherent in the act, that seems true, but misleading because it is ambiguous. I’ve said before that the relevant distinction is whether the outcome is “in the act” or only “from the act.” If the death was in the act then it would be immoral, but if it only flows from the act then it may (conditionally) be allowed. Your comment leaves no room for this distinction.

I suggest you’ve misunderstood the definition that @o_mlly offered. The evil outcome is in the act in every relevant way that the saving outcome is in the act. I wonder if you are thinking that switching the track instantly saves [and you equate this to “in the act”], but only kills chronologically later and you think that means it is not “in the act”. If that is your thinking, then I’m afraid this can give no reprieve to our hapless bystander, for it is the “ordering” of the act to the end that determines the act’s moral nature, not the immediate attainment of the end.

Finally, and you have yet to address this, your position creates severe problems for you in the cases of the circular track…

No, it does not, as I have explained at least 3 times.

 

[Rau]

So you’re saying I can direct the trolley at a person if he’s threatening someone else?

You can surely take lethal action again one who unjustly threatens the lives of others. The usual provisos as to appropriate force apply of course.

 

[o_mlly]

The object would be “objective” only if the object was defined solely as a physical act, but we know this is not the case. As I’ve pointed out several times, JPII has said the object includes the physical act as well as the proximate end, and that end will be subjective and dependent on the actor.

Please re-read your post. You write illogically that the moral object can only be objective if it is subjective. “The object would be ‘objective’ only if … the object include … the proximate end, and that end will be subjective …” ?

Beside the obvious logical error in the above is the error of reversing the order of dependency. Contrary to what you have written, the object font does not depend on the intention font. Rather, the intention font is dependent on the object font as no end can be intended that is not foreseen. The misunderstanding that allows intention font to dominate the object font is the same root problem JP II assigns to the ethics of proportionalists and consequentialists in VS.

Of course, you must deny the primacy and independence of the object font otherwise your analysis is incoherent. Like the proportionalist and consequentialists, who limit foreseeable outcomes in the object to only those foreseeable outcomes intended as good, you eliminate the possibility that any act can ever be intrinsically evil. That is not Catholic thinking.

To start with, both the intent and the object would be different …

Let’s also end there. The moral object of the same act remains the same object for all actors. To justify a change in the moral object, one must change the act, not the actor. Please read the catechism: 1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

(Continued.)

 

[o_mlly]

Why is the evil effect part of the object?

Because the OP specifies that all actors who act so foresee that evil effect as an outcome.

It is obviously not the proximate end of the act.

Does the innocent person die if no one acts? No. Therefore, only the act itself (in se) causes the death of the innocent. If the innocent death is only caused by the act then the death is most certainly a proximate end to the act.

Every action with a double effect by definition has both a good and an evil effect. Also, by the criteria specified for such an action to be valid, the evil effect cannot be intended even if its inevitability can be foreseen. Like Rau, your assertion that the evil effect was intended here would mean that no action with a double effect could be possible.

I believe @Rau did not, and I most certainly do not, assert an evil intention. The bystander’s intention has throughout this thread been given as good. I do assert that the act is voluntary, that is deliberate and premeditated.

And, I believe we have been applying the principles of the double effect throughout the thread. Seeing the act as intrinsically evil, @Rau and I could not get past the first principle: the act must (in the concrete) be good.

The in se (indirect) cause of death is throwing the switch; the per se (direct) cause is getting run over by a trolley.

Please rewrite the thought contained in the above sentence. It is a bit confusing to me in two areas.

First, that an act is in se causal would be necessary but not sufficient to indicate a direct relationship to the effect. How do you mean “in se (indirect) cause …”?

Second, the passive voice “getting run over” and relegating the trolley to a preposition “by a trolley” seems rather contrived so as to confuse with unnecessary ambiguity the clear and concise statement of direct cause as given in the OP’s case: If you pull the lever, then that one person will surely die.

(Continued.)

 

[o_mlly]

By what authority does the bystander claim the right to decide who lives and who dies? The lack of this authority separates the mother’s dilemma in tubal pregnancy as comparable. The bystander may offer his own life for the sake of others but he may not offer another’s life.

One does not have to have special authority to act morally, nor does anyone receive special dispensation to act immorally. If the bystander’s action was moral, that is authority enough.

You beg the question.

 

[davidv]

I think I need more help. Please list for me the three fonts of the act in question.
Object: ?
Intent: ?
Circumstances: ?

 

[Elf01]

@Rau and how you reached your conclusion.

 

[Ender]

This escapes me entirely. A “switch is thrown” in either case! Please explain why directing a trolley involves one kind of moral anlaysis while directing an electric charge is altogether different.

What is the cause of death in the two situations? In one it is electrocution; in the other it is massive trolley trauma. Throwing an electrical switch is the direct cause of the electrocution; I’m sure we can agree on that. Throwing a track switch puts a person in a position to get run over, but throwing the switch doesn’t actually kill someone. Again, it’s the difference between shooting someone, and shooting holes in his boat so he drowns. It is the difference between in se (indirect or from the act) and per se (direct or in the act).

“The entire original problem could have employed electricity instead of trolleys. The pre-existing situation may have been that in 2 mins a fatal electric shock was to be applied to the 4. A switch is available that changes the course of the electricity such that it bypasses the 4 and is directed to the 1. Do I understand you will allow the 4 to die now because causing death by electricity is not something you are prepared to do, but decapitation by trolley is OK? Or will you tell us that the moral object is now not electrocution but “redirect the electricity”, conveniently ignoring the moral content?”

In this case I would throw the switch. The reason you’re having trouble with my answers is that you keep subtly changing the conditions. Perhaps the next response will clarify this.

I note that you previously declined to save the 4 if it involved the one dying by electrocution. Surely you are not going to say that electrons following into a body is direct, but the wheels of a trolley across the throat is indirect??

“Dying” is not the issue. The concern is with what constitutes direct killing. If I throw a switch that electrocutes an innocent person, I have committed a grave sin. If, however, I throw the switch and only set the conditions that lead to his electrocution, this might not be sinful. It’s the difference between throwing the switch on the electric chair, and putting the person in the chair to begin with. The first action is the direct cause of death, the latter is an indirect cause.

 

[Ender]

I go back to this earlier post of yours. You say the death of the one can’t be a moral object, because if you take away the victim, no one dies! I note that if you take away those at risk, no one is saved either, so you can’t view the good of saving lives in the moral object either! So you must hold to the position that the moral object is just the same as on a normal day - shuffling trains from one track to another. Clearly that is a nonsense. Clearly that gives clearance to act so long as our purpose is to save someone, and the net body count is favourable.

I object to the way you have stated this, but the net conclusion is accurate. The moral object has two components, the physical act and the proximate end. In the case of throwing the switch the physical act is always the same; the proximate end is either to direct the trolley at something or away from something. That is, do I want to send it down track A or do I not want to send it down track B. The intent behind the actions will vary greatly, but the object, not so much.

So you are going to have put moral content back into the moral object. And when you put the saving of lives in, you can’t help put the taking of lives in. Because in this problem - by design - they are two sides of the one coin. Can’t have one object without the other.

Unless the object is intrinsically evil then the morality of the action is determined by the intention relative to the foreseeable consequences. I have said the object is in fact not intrinsically evil, therefore it is the intention and the principles of PODE that matter.

 

[Rau]

Throwing an electrical switch is the direct cause of the electrocution; I’m sure we can agree on that. Throwing a track switch puts a person in a position to get run over, but throwing the switch doesn’t actually kill someone. Again, it’s the difference between shooting someone, and shooting holes in his boat so he drowns. It is the difference between in se (indirect or from the act) and per se (direct or in the act).

Amazing Ender. The choice of weapon somehow determines the moral meaning of killing an innocent! Your confusion arises from seeing the act as a limited physical thing - again you call it “throwing a switch” - with no moral content anywhere in sight. You misuse (misunderstand) o_mlly’s definition, which has nothing to do with physical indirectness.

In this case I would throw the switch. The reason you’re having trouble with my answers is that you keep subtly changing the conditions. Perhaps the next response will clarify this.

I change the scenario is give focus to the issues you erroneously rely on for your analysis. To be clear: You have stated now that - with no trolleys, tracks or track switching equipment involved, you would electrocute one innocent to prevent four other innocents from being electrocuted by the evil initiator. And you explain this as follows:

If I throw a switch that electrocutes an innocent person, I have committed a grave sin. If, however, I throw the switch and only set the conditions that lead to his electrocution, this might not be sinful.

Whose action causes the death of the innocent? In every case, it is “yours”! So, deciding that the electricity should go into Fred’s body (noting Fred is not threatened at this point) and not the bodies of John and Mary (who are) is merely setting some conditions — and you say it might not be sinful? The bystander who does this is to be praised for saving 2 but not condemned for killing 1? Can this be rationalised by any means other than adopting proportionalism?

Ender - the physical steps between actor/action and end are not pertinent. In respect of the victim, the act is ordered, by its very nature, to his death and not to anywhere else. You pointed the trolley, or directed the electricity, directly at him. That act is ordered to the deprivation of an innocent’s life; and it is ordered to the saving of the 4. You can’t take away the evil in the act by cutting short its description so as to omit its inherent end.

 

[Rau]

I have said the object is in fact not intrinsically evil, therefore it is the intention and the principles of PODE that matter.

Ha Ha Ender. Assuming the matter in debate is not productive.

In the case of throwing the switch the physical act is always the same; the proximate end is either to direct the trolley at something or away from something.

Evidently it is both. Examine the structure of the problem. To achieve one achieves the other. Now, because we are discussing moral theology (as opposed to rail-yard mechanics), we need to identify the moral character of these ends and recognise the moral meaning of the act that gives rise to them.

 

[Ender]

Please use comparable language - compare apples with apples. I have pulled you up repeatedly on this cheap trick. “Throwing a switch” compares to “squeezing a trigger”.

Please don’t insist that I repeat everything endlessly in each post. I have said repeatedly that the object of the action is “throwing the switch to redirect the trolley”. It should be obvious that this is what I mean when I say “throwing the switch.” So as you said, let’s use comparable language: throw a switch to redirect a trolley away from people on the track compares to … squeeze a trigger to fire a gun into a person’s head? Really? You surely can distinguish between an object directing at saving life from an object directed at taking it. As you have pointed out, the consequence is that the same act that saves four lives also takes the life of one, but that evil outcome is not part of the object, and is part of the intent only to the extent allowed by PODE.

There is a lack of moral content in the description so no morally assessable act is involved. I have compared murder by gun to murder by trolley. Both intrinsically evil. Acts whose “moral meaning” is murder - those acts are intrinsically evil.

It would be murder by trolley only if the intent was to kill the one, which is surely the intent behind shooting someone in the head.

It is not intrinsically evil to “throw a switch”. It is intrinsically evil to murder an innocent.

This completely evades the debate which is about whether the death of the one constitutes murder. Your “argument” is simply to assert it is so.

Continued…

 

[Ender]

Continued…

The bystander did not hurl the trolley at the baby- it was already hurled (directly at the baby) by another who from that moment is guilty (morally) of murder noting the track leads to the baby. The bystander introduces no evil - he does not decide to end a life.

It is the bystander’s act which determines the moment of death for the baby. Remember, your position is that throwing the switch is nothing less than murder by trolley. You cannot claim that simply because someone is going to shoot the baby later you are justified in shooting it earlier. Again, this is the argument for euthanasia.

He merely changes the path of the missile, saving mother and (possibly, according to position on track) varying the distance to the baby. That is not murder.

It is murder if you maintain the arguments you have already presented. You have argued repeatedly that directing a trolley at someone is akin to murder; it is intrinsically evil. If that is so then you cannot carve out an exception in any case, this one included. You are not justified in murdering a person on his way to the death chamber simply because his death is already imminent.

There is no analogy here with the original trolley - where throwing the switch itself (alone) and by its nature causes the death of the innocent - the bystander decided the one innocent was to die at this hand.

What is the object of your action? Whatever you take it to be, it must be the same in both instances as the physical acts are identical as are the proximate ends.

Ender you rely far to much on the circular trolley. For even if the bystander were forbidden (which he’s not) to reverse the course of the trolley, there is no lessen for the original trolley. The differences are stark.

The only difference that matters is in the objects, and it is my contention that you cannot distinguish the object in one case from the object in the other.