Runaway trolley problem

[Ender]

My approach recognises there is no scope for double effect when choosing an act which by its very nature, in and of itself, is directed toward the death of an innocent. This death is not one that can be accepted. I don’t say the bystander desires the death, but he chose an act inherently ordered to that end.

This is the exact argument that prohibits you from throwing the switch to save the mother in the case of the circular track. There is nothing in your position that allows you to commit "an act which by its very nature, in and of itself, is directed toward the death of an innocent."

 

[Rau]

This is the exact argument that prohibits you from throwing the switch to save the mother in the case of the circular track. There is nothing in your position that allows you to commit “an act which by its very nature, in and of itself, is directed toward the death of an innocent.”

Ender, you are being wilfully confused here. I will not explain the distinction a fourth time.

 

[Rau]

Please don’t insist that I repeat everything endlessly in each post. I have said repeatedly that the object of the action is “throwing the switch to redirect the trolley”. It should be obvious that this is what I mean when I say “throwing the switch.”… So as you said, let’s use comparable language: throw a switch to redirect a trolley away from people on the track compares to … squeeze a trigger to fire a gun into a person’s head?

I don’t require repetition, I require that you not draw patently false & misleading comparisons. This is hardly much better. To what ends (of a moral nature) is the physical redirection inherently ordered? What ends does it alone create? There are 2:

• 4 being saved;
• 1 being assaulted.

Your predilection for shorthand (omitting moral content) only serves to give cover to your wish to omit the end which condemns the act. The only reason you omit the 2nd inherent end is because our hero does not desire to kill. That’s Irrelevant. The 2 ends are equally direct.

It would be murder by trolley only if the intent was to kill the one, which is surely the intent behind shooting someone in the head.

The moral species does not derive from Intention. But from what we do - as revealed by the moral object - illuminated by the inherent ordering of the act. A man and his wife are in a small room. I despise the man and want him dead (as an end or for another reason matters not). Knowing the situation, I go ahead and inject a live grenade into the room. I have directly killed both innocents. The species of act is not one for the man and different for the woman because I only “intended” one death.

 

[Rau]

You cannot claim that simply because someone is going to shoot the baby later you are justified in shooting it earlier. Again, this is the argument for euthanasia.

Euthanasia introduces a moral evil not present at all. The fatal drugs were introduced by the doctor. Thus there is no valid comparison with euthanasia.

Remember, your position is that throwing the switch is nothing less than murder by trolley.

Clearly the case in the original trolley. Why did that innocent die? Who introduced the evil that took his life?

Ender what would change about the original trolley if the correct moral choice in the circular trolley is that both mother and baby must be allowed to die? [Akin to the baby too large to be born in past ages.]

You have argued repeatedly that directing a trolley at someone is akin to murder; it is intrinsically evil. If that is so then you cannot carve out an exception in any case, this one included. You are not justified in murdering a person on his way to the death chamber simply because his death is already imminent.

The trolley is already directed at the innocent. If a man is set to be executed on Friday, and I change the situation such that it happens on Thursday, who is responsible for the man’s execution? Me or the magistrate?

What is the object of your action? Whatever you take it to be, it must be the same in both instances as the physical acts are identical as are the proximate ends.

The trolley is already directed at the baby, thus I suggest the only object is saving the mother.

 

[Ender]

To what ends (of a moral nature) is the physical redirection inherently ordered?

Your terms are getting ambiguous again. Your use of “end” here seems synonymous with “inevitable consequences.” Is that what you mean? It doesn’t mean the end (objective) of the action, nor does it mean the proximate end of the act of throwing the switch.

What ends does it alone create? There are 2:

4 being saved;
1 being assaulted.

Again, these are not ends in the sense of objectives; they are consequences.

Your predilection for shorthand (omitting moral content) only serves to give cover to your wish to omit the end which condemns the act.

This only sounds reasonable because of the misuse of the term “end”. The end (objective) of the action is not at issue; everyone recognizes that it is a good end. The proximate end of the act - which is the immediate consequence, is the redirection of the trolley (plus all the other caveats I should no longer have to include) is the focus of our disagreement. The consequences of the act, which you refer to above as ends, do not of themselves determine the moral nature of an action.

The only reason you omit the 2nd inherent end is because our hero does not desire to kill. That’s Irrelevant. The 2 ends are equally direct.

Don’t be uncharitable simply because we disagree. The reason I don’t discuss it is because it is a consequence, not an end (in its proper sense of “objective”). And it is relevant that the evil consequence is not desired; it is a criterion of PODE. If you misapply the terms it’s going to make the discussion endless.

 

[Rau]

The proximate end of the act - which is the immediate consequence, is the redirection of the trolley…

Finish the sentence. You can’t stop there because it has no moral meaning. The redirection…away from 4 and at 1.

You agree with “away from the 4”, but balk at “at the 1”, but the problem was designed to make them inseparable. Not one or the other according to the actor’s objective. I suggest you are denying half the truth here.

 

[Ender]

Clearly the case in the original trolley [is murder]. Why did that innocent die? Who introduced the evil that took his life?

You have defined the act of rerouting the trolley at an innocent person to be an act of murder. We’ll continue with that definition to the other examples.

Ender what would change about the original trolley if the correct moral choice in the circular trolley is that both mother and baby must be allowed to die? [Akin to the baby too large to be born in past ages.]

The difference is that one is a moral evil and the other a physical evil.

The trolley is already directed at the innocent.

So you are justified in murdering someone who is about to die anyway?

If a man is set to be executed on Friday, and I change the situation such that it happens on Thursday, who is responsible for the man’s execution? Me or the magistrate?

These are very different situations, starting with the obvious observation that it doesn’t involve an act of murder.

The trolley is already directed at the baby, thus I suggest the only object is saving the mother.

Again, this is a claim that you may murder someone who is about to die. As I pointed out before, this is the argument for euthanasia.

 

[o_mlly]

@ender, please answer the questions from my prior post.

By what authority does the bystander claim the right to decide who lives and who dies?

The mother and the bomber have a right and a duty to defend their own lives. What right does the bystander claim to kill an innocent?

Remembering that every effect has a in se cause, what in se causes the death of the innocent in your analysis?

You replied “getting killed by a trolley” which is not the cause but rather the very effect for which we are seeking the cause. Please tell us the act that in itself causes death.

 

[Rau]

You have defined the act of rerouting the trolley at an innocent person to be an act of murder.

You are playing a word game here Ender. The circular trolley is already directed at the baby. At her left rather than her right.

I say again - if it was wrong to redirect the trolley in the circular case, it would most certainly be wrong in the OP. It can be that we sometimes have no option but to see maximal harm transpire.

These are very different situations, starting with the obvious observation that it doesn’t involve an act of murder.

Irrelevant. It illuminates the act which kills.

Btw you have yet to provide a meaningful explanation for why you would sometimes kill innocents by electrocution and sometimes not, but will always kill by trolley - in each case when it saves other lives.

 

[Ender]

The mother and the bomber have a right and a duty to defend their own lives. What right does the bystander claim to kill an innocent?

Come, no one claims such a right, but the question could be applied to the doctor as well. What right does he have to kill an innocent person?

You replied “getting killed by a trolley” which is not the cause but rather the very effect for which we are seeking the cause. Please tell us the act that in itself causes death.

The “in se” cause of death would be throwing the switch. The “per se” cause of death is getting hit by a trolley. In the example I’ve used before, sinking a person’s boat would be the “in se” cause of death. Drowning would be the “per se” cause.

 

[o_mlly]

Come, no one claims such a right, but the question could be applied to the doctor as well. What right does he have to kill an innocent person?

The doctor has no right absent the mother’s consent. Just as the bystander has no right absent the innocent man’s consent.

The doctor is not an interesting moral agent in the tubal pregnancy. The mother has the moral dilemma, not the doctor.

Please try again. How does the bystander have the right to kill an innocent?

The “in se” cause of death would be throwing the switch. The “per se” cause of death is getting hit by a trolley. In the example I’ve used before, sinking a person’s boat would be the “in se” cause of death. Drowning would be the “per se” cause.

That would be the coroner’s (physicalist’s) statement as to the cause of death. The detective (moralist) asks, “Who threw that switch that killed that innocent man?” Your answer?

Likewise, “Who sunk that boat that killed that innocent man?” Your answer?

 

[Ender]

You are playing a word game here Ender. The circular trolley is already directed at the baby. At her left rather than her right.

Clearly, the baby will die regardless of whether the switch is thrown or not, but that doesn’t change the nature of the action. You have defined it as an act of murder to consciously direct the trolley at an innocent person, and if you throw the switch in this case that is exactly what you will do - even though the trolley is already coming at that person from the opposite direction. You cannot throw the switch without committing an act you have defined as murder.

I say again - if it was wrong to redirect the trolley in the circular case, it would most certainly be wrong in the OP. It can be that we sometimes have no option but to see maximal harm transpire.

Sometimes there is nothing we can do to make a situation better, but in this one there is: we can save the mother, or, rather, I can save the mother. Your position requires that you stand there and let her die.

Btw you have yet to provide a meaningful explanation for why you would sometimes kill innocents by electrocution and sometimes not, but will always kill by trolley - in each case when it saves other lives.

I did respond to this in several posts (see #881).

 

[Rau]

Clearly, the baby will die regardless of whether the switch is thrown or not, but that doesn’t change the nature of the action.

Do you distinguish the thinking according to where on the circular track the baby sits? If equidistant to the junction by either half of the loop, throwing the switch has no moral meaning at all does it? If the trolley will head to the shorter path, and then the switch is thrown, that too would be “directing a trolley at an innocent” by your physicalist definition. [And in the real world - it might even be good - providing more time to effect rescue.] Does this help you see the error in what you next write (misrepresenting my claim re: the OP in the process):

You have defined it as an act of murder to consciously direct the trolley at an innocent person, and if you throw the switch in this case that is exactly what you will do - even though the trolley is already coming at that person from the opposite direction. You cannot throw the switch without committing an act you have defined as murder.

Ender - you abstract the act away from the setting in the OP - you are viewing the act as just a physical action - though we were discussing rail yard mechanics, not morality. The identical physical action does not always have the same moral object, yet you want to insist it does.

As an example: Shooting holes in an empty boat in port is an act of vandalism. Doing the same knowing the boat to be in the deep ocean, far from rescue and with a man on-board has a different moral object. The “directness” is morally direct, not physically.

I did respond to this in several posts (see #881).

Come Ender, you can’t be serious. To paraphrase your earlier response: “It wasn’t electrocution, I just put the switch in the position that makes the electricity flow”. “Just setting the conditions”. is that the argument you are sticking with? Do you see how you are trimming the analysis to avoid what must be concluded? You agree the redirection is “away from the 4”, but balk at saying it is also "at the 1”, but the problem was designed to make them inseparable. Not one or the other according to the actor’s objective. I suggest you are denying half the truth here.

 

[Ender]

Do you distinguish the thinking according to where on the circular track the baby sits? If equidistant to the junction by either half of the loop, throwing the switch has no moral meaning at all does it?

Here is your earlier post (#833):

Knowingly (deliberately, voluntarily) throwing a switch that directly kills innocents by any technology - bullet aimed at a head, electricity connected to a body, or trolley directed precisely at a man on the track - involves an evil object.

Using that definition, it doesn’t matter where on the track the baby sits or the fact that the mother will die if you don’t throw it. You have declared that “knowingly…throwing a switch that directly kills innocents…involves an evil object.”

Whatever else may be true of the situation, you cannot throw the switch because if you do you meet your own criteria of committing an act with an evil object.

Ender - you abstract the act away from the setting in the OP - you are viewing the act as just a physical action - though we were discussing rail yard mechanics, not morality. The identical physical action does not always have the same moral object, yet you want to insist it does.

No, I am using your own definition of the action, and pointing out the consequences of such a definition.

Come Ender, you can’t be serious. To paraphrase your earlier response: “It wasn’t electrocution, I just put the switch in the position that makes the electricity flow”. “Just setting the conditions”. is that the argument you are sticking with?

Actually, yes. I don’t make any moral distinction between the two actions, but they are in fact different actions in that the death in one case is indirect and in the other it is direct.

Do you see how you are trimming the analysis to avoid what must be concluded? You agree the redirection is “away from the 4”, but balk at saying it is also "at the 1”, but the problem was designed to make them inseparable. Not one or the other according to the actor’s objective. I suggest you are denying half the truth here.

No, I have always recognized that throwing the switch in fact both directs the trolley away from the four and simultaneously at the one. Those are both consequences of the act. The point is that “away from the four” is the proximate end - the immediate objective - of throwing the switch. Directing it “at the one” is no objective at all; it is an entirely unwanted effect. Now the fact that it is undesired alone does not justify the action; it would still be immoral if the act itself was intrinsically wrong. If the death resulting from the act was direct then it would be wrong, but if the death is indirect then the act may be justifiable. This is the distinction I make in the case of the electrocution: it is the difference between direct and indirect.

 

[Rau]

No, I am using your own definition of the action, and pointing out the consequences of such a definition.

It was not an abstract definition One finds in the dictionary ender. It described a particular act. I believe you are being willfully mischievous.

No, I have always recognized that throwing the switch in fact both directs the trolley away from the four and simultaneously at the one. Those are both consequences of the act. The point is that “away from the four” is the proximate end - the immediate objective - of throwing the switch.

They are equally proximate. You cannot properly make the distinction you are trying to make simply because it aligns with the actor’s objective. You must look at what he does and the moral objects. Our good actor direct saves and in the very same act directly kills.

 

[Ender]

It was not an abstract definition One finds in the dictionary ender. It described a particular act. I believe you are being willfully mischievous.

I am pointing up the real difficulties your own definition raises. If it is true that intentionally throwing the switch to redirect a trolley directly kills an innocent person, and is therefore an intrinsically evil act, then you are forbidden to throw it for any reason whatsoever, even if not throwing it lets the mother needlessly die. That is the implication of your position, and you cannot wish it away by attacking me for pointing it out.

They are equally proximate.

The consequences are equally proximate, but they are not equally ends. The object includes the proximate end, but that end is an intention, a desire to achieve a particular…end. As I’ve pointed out before, sending the trolley at the one, even though it is an inevitable consequence, is not an end.

 

[Rau]

The object includes the proximate end, but that end is an intention, a desire to achieve a particular…end.

Your language here is ambiguous. On one reading, your are saying the moral object is a desire of the actor. You believe depriving the life of the innocent is not the moral object because the actor did not desire it, never mind he voluntarily chose an act ordered exactly to that end (as well as to another). Sounds like we don’t need moral objects at all just. Just check out the desire of the actor. Shall we suggest we need only 2 fonts?

On another reading, you are trying to say that the moral object reflects a decision or a choice. Quite right. But you have arbitrarily eliminated the unsavoury aspect of the choice the bystander makes. He makes a choice to directly kill. It is not indirect Ender - it is direct. The man on the track is safe and the act directly imperils him.

See post #889 Ender. The actor killed 2 persons with a grenade in a small room. He only desired the Man to die. Do we say the death of the Woman was mere consequence? No. Because quite apart from the desires of the actor, he chose an act which by its very nature was ordered to the death of the Woman (whom he had no desire to kill) as surely as it was ordered to the death of the Man (his desired target). He knowingly chose to do this. Both deaths are equally direct. Both are in the moral object.

Consider also your boat shooting incident. Shooting holes in a boat at sea far from rescue with persons on board has as moral object their deaths - assuming those deaths are foreseen (and regardless of whether any or all of those deaths are desired, and regardless of any other good consequences). The deaths are physically indirect, but in moral terms - they are as direct as if the shots were aimed at the heart - because the act in question is inherently ordered to their deaths. [BTW, this act has 2 moral objects - destroying property (in fact, depriving the owner or their heirs of it) - and killing those on board. We can’t say where the desires of the shooter lay. And it does not matter.