Grace & Peace!
The solution to social injustices is not necessarily to declare things to be the same that are not. That too can create further injustice. For example: Deeming 2 men eligible for marriage requires everyone in society to view 2 men (or 2 women) entering into a **sexual relationship **as a natural societal unit. And calling it marriage is to require us to view it as a normal means of family formation, identical to the man+woman union intrinsic to our nature. It requires us to acknowledge it to be just the same as man+woman, and failure to acknowledge it as such may be grounds to be prosecuted!
What’s often forgotten in these discussions is a very very basic thing: difference is only discernible against a backdrop of similarity (or, as Aristotle might put it: One and the same is knowledge of opposites). We speak of apples and oranges as being different, but we do so while recognizing their intrinsic similarity: both fruit, both round, both seed-bearing, etc. It wouldn’t occur to us to enumerate the differences between an automobile and a grapefruit because they don’t actually belong to the same category of thing. We can do it if we have to, but it’s a bit of an absurd exercise.
The debate between “traditional” marriage advocates and same-sex marriage advocates is predicated along similar lines: the debate is only comprehensible because
a similarity between the two has already been granted implicitly by both sides. As such, the “traditional” marriage advocates are in a tough position, made to list (or invent) differences that a same-sex marriage advocate might readily grant as differences…but given that the whole debate of difference is predicated on a recognition of similarity, all differences the TM camp can come up with will be dismissed by the SSM camp as extraneous to the fundamental reality in which SSM and TM participate. What the SSM camp argues for is a recognition of equal dignity between SSM and TM–a seed is still a seed whether its an apple seed or a grapefruit seed. What the TM camp argues for is a recognition of distinction based on a perception of teleological difference (an apple seed and a grapefruit seed are
different kinds of seed). But even this TM argument is predicated on an assumption of initial similarity–the difference is in the what-for, not the what. So the SSM people can grant the teleological differences (but only provisionally, for the most part) while writing them off as immaterial to the what.
I say only provisionally because, in the end, the SSM camp does not generally go in for teleological arguments. They’re more interested in possibilities. Is it the case that a same-sex couple can procreate? No, that’s impossible. But is it the case that a same-sex couple’s marriage can be a loving matrix from which and in which children can be raised? Yes, that’s quite possible. Is it inevitable? No. Is it inevitable in the case of TM? No, it’s only possible there, too. So the difference in terms of telos is: no procreation in an SSM. But this assumes that procreation, as opposed to the
nurture of children, is the end of TM and should likewise be the end of SSM. But is it necessary for a couple in a TM to produce children in order for their marriage to be a marriage? No, that’s not really the case. So while procreation is possible in a TM, it isn’t necessary or inevitable, which means (to an SSM inclined person): procreation or its possibility may not, in fact, be what defines marriage.
But shouldn’t people procreate, and isn’t it the case that SSM is against nature in that SSMs are not procreative? While it may be the case that people in general should procreate, it is not the case that anyone (or any couple) in particular should or must. Procreation or its capacity is not determinative of human value, nor is it determinative of the value of human relationships: procreative relationships do not mean more than non-procreative ones, nor are they more natural. But isn’t that what men (qua men) and women (qua women) are for? Doesn’t SSM deny, on some basic level, the realities of human sex (gender being a different story altogether)? Only if human sex is intrinsically linked with human vocation–which is to say, only if our sex determines what we’re for. But not all of us are
for procreation. The SSM sort of person might continue: human sexedness is indicative of a capacity, not a teleology, not a demand from nature. It conditions (and it’s expression is conditioned by) ways of being in relationship with the world and with others, but it does not necessarily and in itself rigidly determine those ways. Human sexedness is therefore capable of a variety of expression and is not strictly determinative of human vocation or individual human identity. I.e., I’m a male. I’m not
called to be a male, my maleness is a given. My maleness conditions my relationship to the world as conditioned by the world with which I am in relationship. My maleness does not demand that I procreate: that’s not what my maleness is
for. My maleness is
for a way of being in the world, but that way of being in the world is not isolated from the world. However, it is not necessary for me to get married. It is not necessary for me to procreate (within or without marriage).
[CONTINUED…]