Schönborn & Coyne on Science Methodology

[NowAgnostic]

How do you think he defines science? As neutral with respect to philosophy? He does think science is neutral and unbiased in this sense as he said in his AAAS speech.

So that’s your disagreement with him? You think science cannot be neutral and unbiased in that sense?

How can you be 100% certain and know that you know 100%?

Science never gives 100% absolutely certain proof.

What is there besides something’s natures?

I do not see how it seems that way to you.It has to due with time. “1)” says God created, and “2)” says He still creates.

But you just said He must still be creating in order to sustain things in existence, didn’t you? So therefore, I presume you wouldn’t have a problem with the idea that God, instead of willing that a frog remain a frog, wills that it transform into a pig?

I guess the question here is this: do possible natures (essences) exist independently from the will of God or do they exist because of the will of God? If the latter, there simply is no distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

There are different types of miracles (Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 101). Some miracles are still miraculous regardless how much we understand them or not.

Aquinas is begging the question here.

The highest degree in miracles comprises those works wherein something is done by God, that nature can never do: for instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still,… The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does something that nature can do, but not in the same order: thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see and walk: but that an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame,…

If nature is “whatever God wills” then it’s silly to say “nature” can’t do something. And Aquinas also says that the ordering of causes does not proceed from necessity, but from the divine will.

So it is utilitarian? There is always a philosophy it could be. Science is never free from the other areas of humanity. Kuhn shows this well, even if I may not agree with his relativist epistemology.

The practice of science indeed is not, since scientists are human.

But he should not approach it totally blindly with a sort of “Monte Carlo” methodology.

That wouldn’t be the most efficient way to do things, no.

 

[Magnanimity]

Necessary truth = something that must be (logically or metaphysically), something that is the case in all possible worlds.

Contingent truth = something that may or may not be, something that is the case in at least one but not all possible worlds.

A necessary truth is that 2 + 2 = 4.
A contingent truth is that intelligent life exists.

Necessary truths exist in all possible worlds, and can therefore be deduced from reason starting with first principles. However, they cannot be inferred from evidence.

Contingent truths are not the case in all possible worlds. Therefore they cannot be deduced from reason and first principles. But they can be inferred from evidence (if not directly observed).

Sorry to be Johnny come lately, but I find this thread intriguing. Mind if I jump in? If so, just tell me to get lost!

First, I doubt whether an equation of basic arithmetic like you have above is a necessay truth. 2+2=4 in all possible worlds? That doesn’t seem obvious to me but then the philosophical utility of “possible worlds” language also escapes me.

I’m not sure how you’re using the words inference and evidence, but everything we know as first principles comes from our experience of contingent things and what we infer from these experiences, no? So, inductive and deductive often run together right? I mean, we’re not arbitrarily deciding on our first principles and then running with them, are we?

 

[Magnanimity]

But you just said He must still be creating in order to sustain things in existence, didn’t you? So therefore, I presume you wouldn’t have a problem with the idea that God, instead of willing that a frog remain a frog, wills that it transform into a pig?

I guess the question here is this: do possible natures (essences) exist independently from the will of God or do they exist because of the will of God? If the latter, there simply is no distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

I’m actually just trying to think through this with you. I don’t think you’ve got it quite right here. First, in all contingent beings there is a distinction between its Essence and its existence, according to Aquinas. So, whether something exists would be dependent on the will of God, I guess, but the dependency of existence doesn’t get at the Essence of a thing. Not sure what you’re getting at in terms of supernatural and natural being indistinct. Can you clarify? Aquinas would say there is one Supernature (God) and then there’s everything else (nature).

 

[bridgeforsale]

The fundamental one:

God is reduced to a redundant, absent parent whose existence is not required…

I guess this begs the question of what exactly do you propose this reduces god from? If our concept of god has been wrong all along, then adjusting it to account for new information doesn’t reduce god in any real sense (unless you believe our perceptions of god can actually alter god, which I’m sure is NOT what you’re proposing). What you’re really saying is according to the “scale” YOU use to quantify god, he is reduced by any view inconsistent with your own. In other words you’re juxtaposing your own perception of what constitutes “greatness” and what “dilutes” greatness unto god. Apparently, or at least inferentially, if god’s power or abilities do not match up with your (and your churches) perceptions, he isn’t as great, or as powerful, or as godly.

I think this underlying assumption should be questioned. For instance, I would find a god who was comfortable creating the universe and promoting evolution even though he lacked the ability to monitor every thought of every human being alive, a more powerful, and more remarkable god, compared to one who created the universe knowing he would have this power. I’m not advocating any particular view of god’s attributes related to mind reading (or even saying this is a necessary view for Catholics, although it is a well accepted view among many Christians, including many Catholics), rather I’m simply illustrating how a preconceived notion of something (that may be so deeply engrained as to form a part of our intuitive reasoning) can be wrong; and completely restrict our ability to discover real answers.

 

[edwest2]

I guess this begs the question of what exactly do you propose this reduces god from? If our concept of god has been wrong all along, then adjusting it to account for new information doesn’t reduce god in any real sense (unless you believe our perceptions of god can actually alter god, which I’m sure is NOT what you’re proposing). What you’re really saying is according to the “scale” YOU use to quantify god, he is reduced by any view inconsistent with your own. In other words you’re juxtaposing your own perception of what constitutes “greatness” and what “dilutes” greatness unto god. Apparently, or at least inferentially, if god’s power or abilities do not match up with your (and your churches) perceptions, he isn’t as great, or as powerful, or as godly.

I think this underlying assumption should be questioned. For instance, I would find a god who was comfortable creating the universe and promoting evolution even though he lacked the ability to monitor every thought of every human being alive, a more powerful, and more remarkable god, compared to one who created the universe knowing he would have this power. I’m not advocating any particular view of god’s attributes related to mind reading (or even saying this is a necessary view for Catholics, although it is a well accepted view among many Christians, including many Catholics), rather I’m simply illustrating how a preconceived notion of something (that may be so deeply engrained as to form a part of our intuitive reasoning) can be wrong; and completely restrict our ability to discover real answers.

“real answers”? The original answers were insufficient? All of science is subject to the authority of the Church. Cardinal Schoenborn is not arguing against any restrictions in methodology, but he rightly points out ideological difficulties.

Check your Bible. God knows our every thought. Every hidden thing we do is not hidden from Him. But He does not force us to follow Him.

What makes God powerful and remarkable? Raising the dead, raising Himself from the dead? These are things God can do. Our concept of God is derived from Jesus Christ and the trustworthy words of the prophets which were given by the power of the Holy Spirit. I am not anxious to accept the word of science over the word of the Church. As this current drama plays out, the Church will have her say. In the meantime there is no requirement to make any commitment to certain scientific pronouncements.

Peace,
Ed

 

[bridgeforsale]

All of science is subject to the authority of the Church.

Fortunately most scientists disagree!

What makes God powerful and remarkable? Raising the dead, raising Himself from the dead? These are things God can do. Our concept of God is derived from Jesus Christ and the trustworthy words of the prophets which were given by the power of the Holy Spirit.

I don’t believe it.

I am not anxious to accept the word of science over the word of the Church.

That’s certainly you’re right & perogative.

As this current drama plays out, the Church will have her say.

If that’s true, then humanity is doomed.

In the meantime there is no requirement to make any commitment to certain scientific pronouncements.

This is only true where there’s a reasonable level of disagreement; and on many aspects of evolution and cosmology there are enough points generally accepted by the scientific community to call into question the classical view of god and his attributes.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Are you using “contingent fact” and “proximate cause” interchangeably?

Not quite - all proximate causes are contingent facts but not all contingent facts are proximate causes.

Of course not because modern science is very restricted, being based on atheist philosophies.

I disagree but it doesn’t matter. The hypothesis of design by an omnipotent entity cannot be proven by empirical science. If you want to base science on theism, design comes as a result of a deduction from the theistic philosophy not an induction from the empirical science.

We appear to disagree on what exactly modern science is, what its foundation is that supports it, what its limits are, and what exactly is its epistemology.

Indeed.

I knew you would . It goes to the heart of the issue.

Of course, because science gives you results you don’t like and don’t support your philosophy. You can’t afford to admit that science is independent in its own realm, because then you might have to admit your philosophy is flawed. Therefore you must take refuge in the thought science is based on a philosophy opposed to yours.

If we do not “refer all things to the divine will as their first cause,” we have relativism and subjectivism; we lose our connection to reality. The reason is that we can invent many proximate causes that appear to be self-consistent within their small domain but have no connection in the chain of proximate to remote causes, of which God is the first.

So what? It doesn’t mean the proximate causes discovered aren’t real.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Sorry to be Johnny come lately, but I find this thread intriguing. Mind if I jump in? If so, just tell me to get lost!

First, I doubt whether an equation of basic arithmetic like you have above is a necessay truth. 2+2=4 in all possible worlds? That doesn’t seem obvious to me but then the philosophical utility of “possible worlds” language also escapes me.

2 + 2 = 4 in all possible worlds, yes. 2 + 2 = 4 is a tautology, logically necessary.

I’m not sure how you’re using the words inference and evidence, but everything we know as first principles comes from our experience of contingent things and what we infer from these experiences, no?

No. If so they aren’t first principles but merely contingent truths.

So, inductive and deductive often run together right? I mean, we’re not arbitrarily deciding on our first principles and then running with them, are we?

Yes, we are, essentially.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m actually just trying to think through this with you. I don’t think you’ve got it quite right here. First, in all contingent beings there is a distinction between its Essence and its existence, according to Aquinas. So, whether something exists would be dependent on the will of God, I guess, but the dependency of existence doesn’t get at the Essence of a thing.

Yeah, but why is the essence what it is? Is it because God willed it so?

Not sure what you’re getting at in terms of supernatural and natural being indistinct. Can you clarify? Aquinas would say there is one Supernature (God) and then there’s everything else (nature).

That distinction is not sufficient to distinguish between what “nature can do” and what “God can do”. If nature is “whatever is willed by God” then nature can do whatever God wills it can do. Thus arguing about whether life can arise “by natural means alone” is meaningless.

 

[Magnanimity]

2 + 2 = 4 in all possible worlds, yes. 2 + 2 = 4 is a tautology, logically necessary.

No. If so they aren’t first principles but merely contingent truths.

Thanks for the reply. In response to your first comment there, classically speaking, necessity vs contingency has more to do with actual necessity. After all, necessity as it applies to God is not logical necessity, it’s actual necessity. His existence is seen as actually necessary not logically so. But I guess you’re approaching things more from an analytic point of view? Possible worlds stuff?

In reply to your second point, I would have to say you’re pretty far from what is normally meant by first principles. Perhaps you’re thinking of them as just a priori stipulations? That’s the only sense I can make of your reply here. But Catholc tradition is more Thomistic in it’s thinking of first principles.

For example, let’s say that “life comes from life” is a first principle of reality. Would you hold that someone got that Principle from experience of the world or just stipulated it from the beginning? Probably the former, in which case first principles are gotten from experience of the contingent world. Where else would basic truths about the world come from? Implanted in our minds?

 

[Magnanimity]

Yeah, but why is the essence what it is? Is it because God willed it so?

That distinction is not sufficient to distinguish between what “nature can do” and what “God can do”. If nature is “whatever is willed by God” then nature can do whatever God wills it can do. Thus arguing about whether life can arise “by natural means alone” is meaningless.

Not sure that I fully understand your first question there. Help me with it. The distinction drawn here is between existence (that somethIng is) and essence (what something is). So if we can agree that the existence of a thing comes from the will of God without problems, you’re asking…does God will what something is? I’m thinking that if we hash this out a little more, it’ll resolve your second concern above. Without this existence/essence distinction in all contingent beings, I think one is lead down a pantheistic path like you’re implying when you say, “If nature is ‘whatever is willed by God…’”

 

[NowAgnostic]

Thanks for the reply. In response to your first comment there, classically speaking, necessity vs contingency has more to do with actual necessity. After all, necessity as it applies to God is not logical necessity, it’s actual necessity. His existence is seen as actually necessary not logically so. But I guess you’re approaching things more from an analytic point of view? Possible worlds stuff?

Yes that’s how I’m approaching things. I don’t understand what is meant by “actual necessity” - do you mean metaphysical necessity? If God is metaphysically, but not logically necessary, then He must indeed exist in all worlds in which anything exists, but something need not exist (a null-world is possible). Thus, ultimately the questions “Why does God exist” or “why is there something rather than nothing” have no answer - God exists without explanation. Saying God is “self-explanatory” is equivalent to saying He is logically necessary. Moreover, if God is an entity whose essence is identical to His existence, then assuming there is no logical contradiction entailed by such an essence, He must exist - the essence can’t be there without the existence.

In reply to your second point, I would have to say you’re pretty far from what is normally meant by first principles. Perhaps you’re thinking of them as just a priori stipulations? That’s the only sense I can make of your reply here. But Catholc tradition is more Thomistic in it’s thinking of first principles.

Yes, I mean a priori stipulations by first principles, without which reason can’t get off the ground. An example is the law of non-contradiction.

Your “Thomistic first principles” is a very good statement of why there is a conflict between philosophy and science, these principles aren’t necessary first principles, they’re just inferred (using a scientific method, actually), and can be wrong.

For example, let’s say that “life comes from life” is a first principle of reality. Would you hold that someone got that Principle from experience of the world or just stipulated it from the beginning? Probably the former, in which case first principles are gotten from experience of the contingent world. Where else would basic truths about the world come from? Implanted in our minds?

And that’s a very problematic example to use, because if “life comes from life” is an inviolable first principle of reality, then God could never create life from inanimate matter or ex nihilo. Moreover, what we infer from experience are not necessary truths, and this certainly isn’t one - we’re quite close to creating life in the lab.

“First principles” can’t be gleaned from the contingent world, because there are other possible worlds with different sets of “first principles”.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Not sure that I fully understand your first question there. Help me with it. The distinction drawn here is between existence (that somethIng is) and essence (what something is). So if we can agree that the existence of a thing comes from the will of God without problems, you’re asking…does God will what something is?

Yes.

I’m thinking that if we hash this out a little more, it’ll resolve your second concern above. Without this existence/essence distinction in all contingent beings, I think one is lead down a pantheistic path like you’re implying when you say, “If nature is ‘whatever is willed by God…’”

Yes but look. Do the essences exist prior to God’s instantiating some of them (e.g. independently of His will) or are the essences such only because God wills them to be what they are. If the latter, any talk of what nature can and can’t do (as Aquinas uses in discussion of miracles) is meaningless. For instance, the example of resurrection. Aquinas claims that to live after death is contrary to the natural order. Yet God could create a super-sheep whose nature it was to live, die, live, die, and live again. Then it wouldn’t be outside the natural order.

 

[Magnanimity]

Yes that’s how I’m approaching things. I don’t understand what is meant by “actual necessity” - do you mean metaphysical necessity? If God is metaphysically, but not logically necessary, then He must indeed exist in all worlds in which anything exists, but something need not exist (a null-world is possible). Thus, ultimately the questions “Why does God exist” or “why is there something rather than nothing” have no answer - God exists without explanation. Saying God is “self-explanatory” is equivalent to saying He is logically necessary. Moreover, if God is an entity whose essence is identical to His existence, then assuming there is no logical contradiction entailed by such an essence, He must exist - the essence can’t be there without the existence.

You’re going to lose me a bit in the possible worlds framework, but I’ll try to keep up. Yes, metaphysical necessity is meant here: as in, God cannot not exist. His existence is actually necessary. To say that His existence is logically necessary has always seemed a little question-begging to me.

“Something need not exist”-it’s just this type of conceptual language that bothers me about possible worlds talk. If there ever was an undeniable first principle, it is this: something exists. (Null world? Why don’t we just deal with the world we have before us. Isn’t that complicated enough? Ok, I’ll relax now and deal with your comments.) In the Thomistic framework, God is his own existence-existence and essence are united in him. God is, necessarily. I agree that saying God is self-explanatory is wrong-headed. God isn’t self-caused, rather he is uncaused.

Yes, I mean a priori stipulations by first principles, without which reason can’t get off the ground. An example is the law of non-contradiction.

This strikes me as an excellent example obtained from experience of reality itself. ~(p&~p) is born out to be true by your experience of the world, no?

Your “Thomistic first principles” is a very good statement of why there is a conflict between philosophy and science, these principles aren’t necessary first principles, they’re just inferred (using a scientific method, actually), and can be wrong.

Wrong according to what? What would prove them wrong? Let me guess, experience of the world?!

And that’s a very problematic example to use, because if “life comes from life” is an inviolable first principle of reality, then God could never create life from inanimate matter or ex nihilo. Moreover, what we infer from experience are not necessary truths, and this certainly isn’t one - we’re quite close to creating life in the lab.

Come now, what are you getting at with these attempts at counter-example? If God is alive and generates living contingent beings that’s an instantiation of the principle. So is the example of the living, Intelligent scientist creating life in the lab.

“First principles” can’t be gleaned from the contingent world, because there are other possible worlds with different sets of “first principles”.

have no idea what that means… But I am interested to know how you think Aristotle (or whoever it was originally) came up with the law of identity (or of non-contradiction). Just arbitrary stipulation from the outset? His experience of the world had nothing to do with it?

 

[Geremia]

So that’s your disagreement with him? You think science cannot be neutral and unbiased in that sense?

No, true science is always subordinate to theology, the study of God.

Science never gives 100% absolutely certain proof.

So mathematics or logic, e.g., are not sciences?

I presume you wouldn’t have a problem with the idea that God, instead of willing that a frog remain a frog, wills that it transform into a pig?

If a frog were a pig, it would be a pig. I do not see your point.

I guess the question here is this: do possible natures (essences) exist independently from the will of God or do they exist because of the will of God?

The latter

If the latter, there simply is no distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

If supernatural here means something beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature as we understand them, then what you say would be true if we had a perfect understanding of everything, i.e., if we were God. But we are not.

Geremia;6118109:

There are different types of miracles (Summa Contra Gentiles

, lib. 3 cap. 101). Some miracles are still miraculous regardless how much we understand them or not.Aquinas is begging the question here.

How so?

If nature is “whatever God wills” then it’s silly to say “nature” can’t do something. And Aquinas also says that the ordering of causes does not proceed from necessity, but from the divine will.

What is the difference? God is the omnipotent lawmaker. Whatever He wills, is.

 

[Geremia]

Geremia;6118111:

modern science is very restricted, being based on atheist philosophies.

I disagree but it doesn’t matter. The hypothesis of design by an omnipotent entity cannot be proven by empirical science.

One never proves one’s assumptions within a system that uses those assumptions. That is circular.

If you want to base science on theism, design comes as a result of a deduction from the theistic philosophy not an induction from the empirical science.

As I said earlier, “empirical science” (which I assume you equate with “modern science”) is limited. A more generalized induction could do it.

NowAgnostic;6112774:

Geremia;6112251:

Thus we have knowledge of proximate causes—scientific knowledge—“provided …] that we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause.”

I dispute this.Of course, because science gives you results you don’t like and don’t support your philosophy.

Like what? I never said all results of modern science—even if their methods are based on atheist philosophies—are at odds with God and reality. Many of them are in fact very consonant with them.

You can’t afford to admit that science is independent in its own realm, because then you might have to admit your philosophy is flawed. Therefore you must take refuge in the thought science is based on a philosophy opposed to yours.

No, the reason I insist that science is not independent is precisely because an independence cripples it. Modern science, after all, progressed because of Catholic universities.

Geremia;6118111:

If we do not “refer all things to the divine will as their first cause,” we have relativism and subjectivism; we lose our connection to reality. The reason is that we can invent many proximate causes that appear to be self-consistent within their small domain but have no connection in the chain of proximate to remote causes, of which God is the first.

It doesn’t mean the proximate causes discovered aren’t real.

If they are real, the route to discovering them would have been much harder and less efficient. We can waste a lot of time on theories that may never explain reality if we base our inquiry on misleading philosophies which themselves ultimately never accord with reality, either.

 

[NowAgnostic]

No, true science is always subordinate to theology, the study of God.

So what does this mean? Scientists are supposed to remain silent every time they come up with a conclusion a theologian doesn’t like? Or pretend, dishonestly, that their evidence supports the conclusion the theologian wants?

So mathematics or logic, e.g., are not sciences?

They aren’t empirical sciences, no.

If a frog were a pig, it would be a pig. I do not see your point.

Well, Aquinas would say the nature of a frog is to remain a frog until death. Yet God could transform a frog into a pig. You don’t see the contradiction there, if nature is simply whatever God wills?

The latter

OK.

If supernatural here means something beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature as we understand them, then what you say would be true if we had a perfect understanding of everything, i.e., if we were God. But we are not.

So IOW you are saying there is no ontological distinction between the natural and supernatural, it is merely epistemological based on our lack of knowledge.

How so?What is the difference? God is the omnipotent lawmaker. Whatever He wills, is.

And if nature is whatever God wills then, tautologically, nature can do everything Aquinas says it can’t. Right?

 

[NowAgnostic]

One never proves one’s assumptions within a system that uses those assumptions. That is circular.

I agree. But theism implies design. Therefore one is not going to prove that using a science based on that assumption.

As I said earlier, “empirical science” (which I assume you equate with “modern science”) is limited. A more generalized induction could do it.

No, it can’t. By “empirical science” I simply meant using observation and inference (induction).

The best you can ever get are arguments like “the chance of a protein molecule self-assembling are a gazillion to one. Therefore, it must have been designed.” If you do not see why this is not a valid inference, I can explain.

Like what? I never said all results of modern science—even if their methods are based on atheist philosophies—are at odds with God and reality. Many of them are in fact very consonant with them.No, the reason I insist that science is not independent is precisely because an independence cripples it.

That’s a contradiction. And, you’re simply wrong that the methods of modern science are based on atheist philosophies. A Catholic doing science does it the same way.

Modern science, after all, progressed because of Catholic universities.

While I agree portraying the relationship between science and religion as “warfare” is too simplistic, attempting to portray it as all peaches-and-cream harmony is way too simplistic in the other direction.

If they are real, the route to discovering them would have been much harder and less efficient. We can waste a lot of time on theories that may never explain reality if we base our inquiry on misleading philosophies which themselves ultimately never accord with reality, either.

That’s true, our inquiry shouldn’t be based on a philosophy.

 

[Geremia]

Scientists are supposed to remain silent every time they come up with a conclusion a theologian doesn’t like?

That all other sciences are subordinate to theology does not mean this. It means that all sciences ultimately help theology like "handmaidens."

Or pretend, dishonestly, that their evidence supports the conclusion the theologian wants?

No, definitely not

Well, Aquinas would say the nature of a frog is to remain a frog until death. Yet God could transform a frog into a pig. You don’t see the contradiction there, if nature is simply whatever God wills?

God would not will anything that is a contradiction; He is rational.

So IOW you are saying there is no ontological distinction between the natural and supernatural, it is merely epistemological based on our lack of knowledge.

No, there is an ontological distinction.

And if nature is whatever God wills then, tautologically, nature can do everything Aquinas says it can’t. Right?

Like what? Give me an example, please.

 

[Geremia]

theism implies design. Therefore one is not going to prove that using a science based on that assumption.

Proving the assumption is different from proving its existence, though. All our natural knowledge can show is God’s existence, not His essence.

By “empirical science” I simply meant using observation and inference (induction).

The best you can ever get are arguments like “the chance of a protein molecule self-assembling are a gazillion to one. Therefore, it must have been designed.” If you do not see why this is not a valid inference, I can explain.

How is that different from a proposition like “The chance of a protein molecule self-assembling are a gazillion to one. Therefore, an enzyme created it.”?

you’re simply wrong that the methods of modern science are based on atheist philosophies.

What are they based on, then? Agnostic philosophies? Theist philosophies?

While I agree portraying the relationship between science and religion as “warfare” is too simplistic, attempting to portray it as all peaches-and-cream harmony is way too simplistic in the other direction.

True

That’s true, our inquiry shouldn’t be based on a philosophy.

What do we base it on, then?