PhilVaz:
HECD << And you can read Michael Ruse’s excellent rebuttal of Plantinga’s atttack on methodological naturalism here:
home.infostations.net/srm/16997749.pdf >>
Thanks for this I’m printing it out now. Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism” does not merely criticize methodological naturalism. There is a
whole book on Plantinga’s argument published by Cornell Univ Press. Perhaps a little over my head.
AMAZON.com listing.
Phil P
Well, so far we have been talking about Plantinga’s attack on methodological naturalism, his desire to conflate methodological and metaphysical naturalism and his attempts to extend the definition of science to include supernatural intervention. That was the scope of the original links to Plantinga’s essays that you gave us. It is that which forms the basis of his apologetics on behalf of the Intelligent Design movement, which in turn is motivated by his distaste for the concept of common descent and, in particular, the evolution of human beings. Of course, since he is not a scientist, his arguments against evolution are painfully naive, a point that Ruse makes very clearly in his rebuttal. I think that Plantinga’s arguments against methodological naturalism as the basis of scientific endeavour don’t bear much scrutiny.
Take for example his characterisation of earthquakes, weather and radioactive decay as natural processes that do not obey natural laws:
“Further, it could be, for all we know, that there are some laws, but not everything is governed by them (or wholly governed by them). Perhaps this is how it is with earthquakes, the weather, and radioactive decay. Would it follow that one couldn’t study these things scientifically?”. We need no starker demonstration of his scientific naivety, for he has confounded fundamentally different phenomena here: earthquakes and weather are classically deterministic, and obey natural laws, but appear random and unpredictable because we don’t know enough about the contributing variables to make the predictions accurately. Radioactive decay on the other hand, is objectively random, the precise moment of decay of an unstable particle is uncaused and forever unpredictable, but the behaviour of an ensemble of particles is precisely quantifiable and predictable according to very clear laws.
However, you have now introduced a different but related thing, Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. This is a far more sophisticated argument which concludes that if we believe in naturalism (that the universe is governed by natural and discoverable laws) and we believe that human cognitive faculties are the consequence of evolutionary processes, then we cannot be sure that any belief, including those in the premise of the argument is reliable. His reason for this is that he claims that the content of a belief cannot lead, semantically, to behaviour that improves fitness and is grist for the natural selection mill. (Plantinga does not, within this argument, suggest whether there are other reliable bases for holding true beliefs, and elsewhere he admits the logical possibility that our faculties lead us to theistic beliefs that are untrue:
leaderu.com/truth/3truth06.html
but claims that a belief in God is, nevertheless, a properly basic belief, and thus insulated against all reason and evidence. It does seem to me that he is applying wildly different criteria to determing the truth of theistic and naturalistic beliefs)
There are of course, many sophisticated arguments from other philosophers that rebut Plantinga’s argument. Be that as it may, no serious scientist, even a theistic one, could accept Plantinga’s argument and remain a scientist, and common sense tells us that it is possible to believe in naturalism and the evolution of cognition and hold true beliefs - in fact our survival every time we cross the street depends on it. Ultimately Plantinga’s argument is sterile, and dare I say it, rather adolescent.
Alec
evolutionpages.com