Should A.I. ever be granted rights?

[Areopagite]

My gradation of consciousness and intellect is based on the complexity of the brain, but it would also have to rely on body it is put in. For instance, a human brain put in a box (aside from being dead) would not be able to see or hear - it has no eyes or ears. So when Aquinas talks of the form of man, I think he is taking into consideration all of the physical aspects of man as well. To clarify, if a human brain was put into a dog’s body, it would not have the rational (intellectual) soul of man because it has got the wrong body. Or if you want to leave the brain of this, a human soul could never occupy a dog’s body because it simply isn’t in the form of man. My point is that the brain, and the complexity of our, is an essential feature to the form of man. I do understand that Aquinas say that thought does not go on in the brain, and I’m with him. The supervenient property of an immaterial self-conscious mental life is “where” the thought would be going down.

Hmm. You might be right. In all honesty, I am horribly unfamiliar with the idea of supervenience. Your examples almost turned a light on in my head, but I still can’t see the whole picture. So, if you would, could you give me more examples of supervenience?

As far as I understand (correct me if I’m wrong) when A supervenes upon B, it means that B is necessary for A, right? But not the other way around? But would that mean that there could be other component/causes for A rather than just B (that might be a little vague).

Has any notable Catholic Theologian/Philosopher taken up this topic before and tried fusing it with Aristotle’s metaphysics? I ask this not to discredit your claims but to find out where I could learn more about this.

If, however, there is some faculty belonging to men which has no corresponding bodily organ, such that it could exist separate from any body, then it would not seem to be a faculty that could supervene upon a body. It might use the body; it might rely on the body so completely that it could not function without it. But one could not simply point to the the existence of appropriate physical makeup and conclude that thus this other creature also possesses the faculty. I believe this is what Areopagite is saying, that the intellect must be such a separable aspect or reality of humans, since its object is reality abstracted from material (to a greater or lesser degree).

I think Newbot has something here. The intellect, which is immaterial and stores immaterial concepts, is separate from the body. This gets into messy epistemology that loses people’s attention, but I think, theoretically, two humans could have the same cerebral construction/state, with the same set of phantasms (the sense images), and yet different intellects that interpret the phantasms in different ways. I don’t know if you could prove that either way. If that’s true, though, it would seem that the supervenience thing wouldn’t apply.

Newbot,

You make a interesting observation the arguments put forth by myself and Aeropagite. Perhaps the intellect is something not even reducible to the mental? Is that what you might be saying? This kind of troubles me because now we have moved from dualism (physical & nonphysical) to a “trism” (?) (physical, nonphysical, and ?) Maybe we call it dualism just the same but the dualism involves 3 parts (1 physical and 2 nonphysical). To me this gets on really shaky ground though. There is already an interaction problem between physical and nonphysical things which the theory I put forth might take care of (the immaterial being another “aspect”). If we are to add another component to this mix, especially a component which you say does not supervene on the physical but nevertheless is there and uses the physical (and the mental?!) I fear I might have to jump ship

Not 100% sure of what’s going on here. Is it a confusion about the relationship of the Intellect vs. Mind vs. Brain? My theory on that is that the human mind includes the immaterial intellect and the material brain…

For humans, MIND = INTELLECT + BRAIN (likewise MENTAL = INTELLECTUAL + CEREBRAL)

For animals, quite simply, MIND = BRAIN.
For Angels, MIND = INTELLECT.

That’s my theory, at least. Well informed theory I will go so far as to say.

The brain stores the imagination (where phantasms are formed), memory (physical storage of past phantasms), the estimative sense (includes instincts), and the “common sense” (that is, the unification of the exterior sense data). It is from the phantasms that we abstract our concepts with the intellect. Nonetheless, as humans, we require phantasms to come up with the concepts (unlike angels who do not require sense imagery for their concepts), and even to recall the concepts to our consciousness, says Aquinas, we need to summon forth the appropriate, corresponding phantasms in our brain. We’re really incarnational in that way.

That may already be very obvious to some people already, and perhaps completely off topic from what you were saying. But perhaps not. Thank you for your responses, though. Hope I have said some useful things.

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem

The Crusades and Inquisitions are examples of hypocrisy because of all the, you know, murders that took place in the name of God. And I don’t know that you are right with your claim that animals can’t have rights. Care to elaborate beyond a question begging argument as to why animals can’t have rights, even if it’s humans within a certain legal system who afford them the rights?

Just in case you need this one too:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Question_begging

Murders?

You should study your history more carefully. And Wiki is hardly an authority to quote.

Animals can not have rights because they are not human. They do not have souls.

Animal-‘rights’ activists are far more concerned with dragging humans to the level of animals than being kind to them.

 

[Anthony_A]

Sailor Kenshin,

If my history is off so be it - your argument is still invalid. This is because you are attacking the people, not the idea of giving animals rights. And I wasn’t citing wikipedia for a historical reference, I was trying to show you how you were committing fallacies. You say:
“Animals cannot have rights because they are not human. They don’t have souls.”
I have some questions concerning that brilliant argument: What evidence is there to show that animals do not have souls? And why are you assuming that humans are the only creatures that can be afforded rights? Why could a society not give animals basic rights? Even if the motives to give them rights are purely “political” and not spiritually based, didn’t our Lord Jesus say something like “Give to Caesar what is Caesars?”

Aeropagite,

I do not know of a historical or contemporary Catholic theologian/philosopher who writes about supervenience. I would love to try and make supervenience as clear as possible, but I only have internet access for a short while. Jaegwon Kim is a contemporary analytic philosopher of mind who really specializes in supervenience. Reading some of his articles should be helpful.

And just another short reply: yes, two people could have the same cerebral structure with all the same data and still differ intellectually. Well, I wouldn’t say that have the same data (or phantasms). It would be impossible for me to collect the exact same sense data at the same spatiotemporal location that you did.

 

[Areopagite]

As I am reading up on supervenience, let me just make sure I’m up to date on what you’re saying about the topic in general, Andy.

You are saying that we can make machines complex enough that they can become self-conscious and even intellectual?

Forgive me for bringing it back to the drawing board.

 

[Areopagite]

When I called you “Andy” I meant “Anthony.” Sorry. I don’t know where that came from.

 

[Benadam]

I have not been arguing that AI would be equal to us. I think I’ve said that in every one of my posts. My point, again, is that when a thing has consciousness we tend to value that thing. I think, especially if/when AI gets to the point of consciousness, which I see no reason why it would not in the future, we need to treat AI with the same moral respect that we treat each other with (or at least say we do).

Untill we can produce an emotion in a lab the idea that we can manufacture non-living matter that can experience anything at all is speculation of the impossible.

How do I know that the behavior of another human is proof that what I see is experiencing what I experience and call consciousness? It’s not based on a similar response to external stimuli. I know in as much as I know it’s human.

No matter how nuanced and subtle AI may come to imitate response to external stimuli founded on the experience of external stimuli the faculty to be able to experience doesn’t exist unless we’ve been able to make non-living matter experience feel and emote.

Is it possible to produce an emotion in a lab? Matter that responds to external stimuli because we are able make matter that feels and experiences? How can we know it is actually experiencing? I can only be certain that I am seeing behavior based on an experience of consciousness if first I know it is experiencing. The only way to first know that is through the union of likeness. I know it not because it acts like me but because I know it is.

 

[tonyrey]

For instance, should A.I. be given the right to live its life with protection from either the government or general moral conscience that it is wrong to murder (take the life, or whatever term) that A.I.?

In the AI context “existence” is a more appropriate term than “life” because AI does not have a biological basis.

The belief that God created everything implies that everything has some value. It seems evident that not everything has the same value. How then do we determine the value of something (or some one)? Not arbitrarily but in terms of the purpose for which it is created. Inanimate matter is instrumentally valuable as a basis for life, not as an end in itself. Persons are intrinsically valuable because the purpose of their existence is self-fulfilment. Persons are irreplaceable whereas inanimate objects are not. Robots and computers may be irreplaceable as regards their utility but not as regards self-fulfilment. It would be wrong to damage or destroy them unnecessarily but incomparably less serious than harming or killing a person or animal. (The status of an animal is less clearcut but it has feelings and I believe it does have intrinsic value.)

So, if we were to create a “robot” that was just comparable to human intelligence (change “human” to “animal” if the scenario offends you) should it be given a certain amount of rights? If so, which rights?

Since rights are linked to intrinsic rather than instrumental value I believe only animals and persons have rights…

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

Sailor Kenshin,

If my history is off so be it - your argument is still invalid. This is because you are attacking the people, not the idea of giving animals rights. And I wasn’t citing wikipedia for a historical reference, I was trying to show you how you were committing fallacies. You say:
“Animals cannot have rights because they are not human. They don’t have souls.”
I have some questions concerning that brilliant argument: What evidence is there to show that animals do not have souls?

.

The word of God, who cannot lie and who gave us dominion over the earth and its animals. While you are busy arguing how many silicon chips can dance on the head of a pin, the world is falling into a cesspit of moral relativism.

It starts with putting animals on the same level as man, and may indeed end with putting machines in charge of us all.

 

[Anthony_A]

As I am reading up on supervenience, let me just make sure I’m up to date on what you’re saying about the topic in general, Andy.

You are saying that we can make machines complex enough that they can become self-conscious and even intellectual?

Forgive me for bringing it back to the drawing board.

Well, kind of. Complexity is a requirement, but not the only one. I think my laptop is very, very complex, but I don’t think it is conscious. What needs to happen is this: When a AI robot has a component that functions like the brain in that when it (the brain-like component) receives a pain ‘(name removed by moderator)ut’ the output will be a pain ‘output’. That’s a template example of what a functional component of the AI robot would be like.

So why do I think this is possible? Well Saul Kripke has an argument against identity theorists (the theory that says pain is equal to c-fiber stimulation, and only that). There seems to be no logical contradiction if I were to be in pain and the c-fiber in my brain were not firing. This is known as privileged access. If I think or feel that I am in pain, I am in pain. I have the privileged access to my subjective experience. So the idea is that what is essential to pain is what it feels like. We could encounter Martians who have a completely different biological make up then what we do and if they said they were in pain, that pain would be real. So it’s not a matter of having the right stuff like a brain made of organic tissue (who knows what the Martian brain is made out of) or even a soul for that matter (a soul in the sense of what a lot of people are trying to refute me with - a Platonic or Cartesian soul trapped in a body). If I smash a Martians hand with a hammer and it receives the proper (name removed by moderator)ut stimulation and outputs the sensation of pain - then the Martian has indeed experienced pain.

It’s this multiple instantiability that is the key to functionalism and the future of AI. Multiple instantiability can be understood with the following example. When someone asks us “What is a fan?” can we point to one example for the full explanation? No, because if we point to a metal fan and say “This is a fan” we could have also pointed to a plastic fan, or a feather fan, etc. A fan isn’t a fan based on what it’s made out of. A fan is a fan because of its functional role. This principle is important for the human brain when thinking about a conscious mind. I want to say that its not important what the brain is made out of, but if it functions as our brains do we should expect to find a thinking, feeling, abstracting, conscious mind like we do (granted that its in a body of some sort that would allow the proper sense data to be taken in. I don’t think if you construct a brain like device and leave it on the table that it will be consciously experiencing the world like we do).

The way supervenience comes in is this: We cannot ever expect to find an object constructed in 360 degrees and yet does not have the shape of a circle. Circularity supervenes on the round object, there’s no logical way around it. Likewise, there cannot be a world that is physically identical to ours (identical down to the very last molecule) in which I am not sitting at a desk typing on a laptop. But, because a conscious mind does not necessarily supervene on a human being (see my previous posts about the zombie argument) it 1) cannot be physical and 2) cannot be limited to a human being (by way of multiple instantiability). In the world, we find that human beings with a normal functioning brain are self-conscious (and people who don’t have a normally functioning brain are not fully self-conscious), and we find that animals with a less sophisticated brain are conscious but perhaps not self-conscious. A conscious mind supervenes on these physical facts. We see that a brain is essential to a conscious mind, but we also see that a brain made out of organic tissue is not essential to a device or organism functioning as a brain (see above paragraphs). So if we were to build a robot what a brain-like component that functions just as our brain does, then we should expect it to have a conscious (even a self-conscious) mind.

-Anthony (not Andy )

 

[davidv]

Well, kind of. Complexity is a requirement, but not the only one. I think my laptop is very, very complex, but I don’t think it is conscious. What needs to happen is this: When a AI robot has a component that functions like the brain in that when it (the brain-like component) receives a pain ‘(name removed by moderator)ut’ the output will be a pain ‘output’. That’s a template example of what a functional component of the AI robot would be like.

So why do I think this is possible? Well Saul Kripke has an argument against identity theorists (the theory that says pain is equal to c-fiber stimulation, and only that). There seems to be no logical contradiction if I were to be in pain and the c-fiber in my brain were not firing. This is known as privileged access. If I think or feel that I am in pain, I am in pain. I have the privileged access to my subjective experience. So the idea is that what is essential to pain is what it feels like. We could encounter Martians who have a completely different biological make up then what we do and if they said they were in pain, that pain would be real. So it’s not a matter of having the right stuff like a brain made of organic tissue (who knows what the Martian brain is made out of) or even a soul for that matter (a soul in the sense of what a lot of people are trying to refute me with - a Platonic or Cartesian soul trapped in a body). If I smash a Martians hand with a hammer and it receives the proper (name removed by moderator)ut stimulation and outputs the sensation of pain - then the Martian has indeed experienced pain.

It’s this multiple instantiability that is the key to functionalism and the future of AI. Multiple instantiability can be understood with the following example. When someone asks us “What is a fan?” can we point to one example for the full explanation? No, because if we point to a metal fan and say “This is a fan” we could have also pointed to a plastic fan, or a feather fan, etc. A fan isn’t a fan based on what it’s made out of. A fan is a fan because of its functional role. This principle is important for the human brain when thinking about a conscious mind. I want to say that its not important what the brain is made out of, but if it functions as our brains do we should expect to find a thinking, feeling, abstracting, conscious mind like we do (granted that its in a body of some sort that would allow the proper sense data to be taken in. I don’t think if you construct a brain like device and leave it on the table that it will be consciously experiencing the world like we do).

The way supervenience comes in is this: We cannot ever expect to find an object constructed in 360 degrees and yet does not have the shape of a circle. Circularity supervenes on the round object, there’s no logical way around it. Likewise, there cannot be a world that is physically identical to ours (identical down to the very last molecule) in which I am not sitting at a desk typing on a laptop. But, because a conscious mind does not necessarily supervene on a human being (see my previous posts about the zombie argument) it 1) cannot be physical and 2) cannot be limited to a human being (by way of multiple instantiability). In the world, we find that human beings with a normal functioning brain are self-conscious (and people who don’t have a normally functioning brain are not fully self-conscious), and we find that animals with a less sophisticated brain are conscious but perhaps not self-conscious. A conscious mind supervenes on these physical facts. We see that a brain is essential to a conscious mind, but we also see that a brain made out of organic tissue is not essential to a device or organism functioning as a brain (see above paragraphs). So if we were to build a robot what a brain-like component that functions just as our brain does, then we should expect it to have a conscious (even a self-conscious) mind.

-Anthony (not Andy )

Until man can create a soul, no machine will have any rights. No matter how complex and life-like the machine is, it will simple be a simulation.

My mind is not my brain. My brain is a material thing. My mind is immaterial, like a soul.

 

[Anthony_A]

davidv,

If you read some of the posts where i’m trying to explain my position, you will see that I said the mind is immaterial.

 

[Anthony_A]

The word of God, who cannot lie and who gave us dominion over the earth and its animals. While you are busy arguing how many silicon chips can dance on the head of a pin, the world is falling into a cesspit of moral relativism.

It starts with putting animals on the same level as man, and may indeed end with putting machines in charge of us all.

Jesus said that animals don’t have souls? Where did He say this, or allude to this?

And I don’t think moral relativism starts with “putting animals on the same level as man” (which is not what I’ve been arguing, but why should I expect you to understand that?). I think moral relativism starts when one (or society) rejects God.

 

[Benadam]

We think we can create our own day. If we can it presents a paradox. Inorganic matter experiencing it’s existence consciously, even if true, would have to be taken as a matter of faith. For it to become known to us with some certainty enoegh for AI to have inherent rights, rights not attached to another responsible party, it would have to demonstrate that it possesses faculties that cause it to be a self determined moral agent. AI would have to love and feel in order to be able to choose moral goods.* Inorganic matter.*

Inorganic matter isn’t bound by the same laws as organic matter. How can we possibly relate to it’s experience of existence? Man said let there be light and there was light…Man created AI …first day .

So there it is, and how long does it take for it’s body to become too old to be animated by it’s principle of existence. Would it experience it’s mortality? Would it know it’s ultimate end is bound to matter? I guess so since that knowledge is part and parcel of determining self.

We will have created our master. Hopefully the absolutes of morals exist otherwise it would not be able to choose to submit to it’s creator. AI would be discussing if organic matter deserves rights.

 

[Anthony_A]

I don’t think the paradox lies only with inorganic material experiencing its own existence. I mean, isn’t it kind of astonishing that organic matter experiences its own existence? If functionalism and supervenience turns out to be true theories we wouldn’t have to take it as a matter of faith that AI would be consciously experiencing the world.

The relation of experience would have to be that we (the AI and humans) would have conscious minds. We have that relation to animals, though animals are not self-conscious. And I see no reason why AI would not be able to experience its mortality. Like all machinery, the components of AI will give out. But that’s just like our components. As a person gets old it may become exceedingly difficult to walk, breath, or even remember past events. After a while, a crucial component gives out and the person as a whole stops functioning. Same for AI.

 

[Benadam]

I

I see no reason why AI would not be able to experience its mortality. Like all machinery, the components of AI will give out. But that’s just like our components. As a person gets old it may become exceedingl difficult to walk, breath, or even remember past events. After a while, a crucial component gives out and the person as a whole stops functioning. Same for AI

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

Until man can create a soul, no machine will have any rights. No matter how complex and life-like the machine is, it will simple be a simulation.

My mind is not my brain. My brain is a material thing. My mind is immaterial, like a soul.

At least someone gets it.

 

[fosio]

I think if you read my latest response to Newbot you will find my position damn near physicalism. Ultimately I’m not opposed to changing my position to physicalism in the future, I just don’t see a full physical reduction of the mental phenomena happening. And to clarify, my position is not Cartesian dualism. Cartesian (substance) dualism is much more committed to the immaterial than I am. I take property dualism (double aspect theory) to be true.

I am not sure how your position is coherently distinct from physicalism. You acknowledge that only physical things exist but simply categorize some of the properties of physical things as “physical properties” and others as “mental properties.” I can likewise acknowledge that only physical things exist but categorize some of the properties of physical things as “unary relations” and others as “superunary relations.” Categorization can be useful but it’s unclear what kind of ontological distinction you are making. Of course there is an ontological distinction between more mudane physical properties and the less mundane – what you call “mental” – physical properties just as there is an ontological distinction between physical properties that are unary and binary and so forth.

I suspect that if humans were blind and then one day through technological suddenly humans began to see that the visual properties of object-subject systems would seem so wondrous and not something we would associate with the physical that we may even after comprehending their physical processes place them in some special category. I suspect that is what is going on with your dual-property theory. We don’t expect physical things to exhibit properties such as conciousness so we place them in a special category.

As for your scenario where physicalism is true and we would still be able to conceive the zombies, here is where it would ultimately happen:
We would say “Okay Chalmers, I can conceive of a zombie world much in the way that I can conceive of a trillion-billion sided square. But just because I can conceive the zombies does not mean its possible. In fact, it would not at all be possible because whenever you are consciously experiencing any ‘mental’ state (like the qualia of pain) I can show and explain to you how this experience is entirely a physical one.”

To say this you would have to account for pain not just at the neural correlative level (c-fiber stimulation) but also the subjective experience of what it’s like to be in pain. That, Chalmers and I argue, is not reducible to physical terms.

Your argument here is not coherent. You may have a good argument about how pain can be expressed in terms of purely physical things but that is an argument whose merits stand apart from any zombie argument. The zombie argument does not strengthen it. It stands or falls on its own. And I think it falls. Every infinity in set theory is reducible to the null set and the membership relation. One would not expect the null set and the membership relation to be able to form virtually all of the beauty of mathematics just as one would not expect wave functions in certain arrangements to form consciousness. One should not expect the world, the physical world, to be any less wondrous than the mathematical world as both come ultimately from God.

As for a trillion billion sided square – I have cognizance of what a square is and what a trillion billion sides is. I don’t have cognizance of the inner workings of the brain or of all the workings of quantum physics so I cannot be expected to be able to conceive of a brain without certain properties (like consciousness) and tell if such is possible. I cannot tell whether two states of affairs are comossible when I don’t have a basic comprehension of one of them (the brain).

Just a side issue, but have you actually read Chalmers’ book? Your flippant dismissal of his work is concerning. You questioned my motives for entertaining dualism (which if you actually expect that to work as a refutation you would be commiting the genetic fallacy) but that certainly cannot be said of Chalmers - he is an atheist.

Atheists can have personal motives in their academic work just as anyone else can. All humans have a desire to feel special, to stand apart from the rest of the world and so forth. We see this in science where scientists have made claim after claim of how humans are distinguished from other animals only to have their claims refuted over time (language, tools, culture have all been observed in animals – the latest distinguishing factor that has been proposed is the human capacity to play games – I am not kidding!).

God is not only omnipresent but also reveals himself in everything. I think that trying to emphasize the specialness of certain properties prevents us from seeing how everything, from pebbles to supernovas are special and are not just revelatory of God but are God’s presence, our communing with him if we listen.

 

[Anthony_A]

I am not sure how your position is coherently distinct from physicalism. You acknowledge that only physical things exist but simply categorize some of the properties of physical things as “physical properties” and others as “mental properties.”

It’s not a matter of labeling a higher order process and a lower order process as being mental and physical. My position is distinct from physicalism in that I claim a thought or volition contains both a material and immaterial aspect. I don’t think a physicalist would say this. At most he would do the labeling game and say there is a mental aspect that is ontologically physical. I wouldn’t

Your argument here is not coherent. You may have a good argument about how pain can be expressed in terms of purely physical things but that is an argument whose merits stand apart from any zombie argument. The zombie argument does not strengthen it. It stands or falls on its own. And I think it falls.

To clarify: if all the things which we attribute to mental states are ultimately reducible to physical properties, then the zombie argument would fail because it would be impossible to say “the zombie is physically identical yet lacks a mental life” since the physical facts logically entail the mental facts. But since my argument claims that mental properties are not reducible to physical properties and thus are non-physical, it is metaphysically possible that we could have a physically identical structure which lacks the non-physical mental life. Now my argument is that zombies do not exist. Mental life is not a logical consequence of physical properties - it is a contingent one.

As for a trillion billion sided square – I have cognizance of what a square is and what a trillion billion sides is. I don’t have cognizance of the inner workings of the brain or of all the workings of quantum physics so I cannot be expected to be able to conceive of a brain without certain properties (like consciousness) and tell if such is possible. I cannot tell whether two states of affairs are comossible when I don’t have a basic comprehension of one of them (the brain).

I want to say that a brain without consciousness would be inconceivable if mental properties were reducible to physical properties. But I don’t think this can be done. Though, many philosophers do take the stance that it’s not possible right now but in the future science should be able to reduce the mental to the physical entirely. If you wish to take that position, so be it. I don’t see it as a refutation but an “I owe you”.

 

[Newbot]

So the idea is that what is essential to pain is what it feels like. We could encounter Martians who have a completely different biological make up then what we do and if they said they were in pain, that pain would be real.

It seems accurate to say that we come to knowledge only through experience – through external senses like sight, internal senses like pain or balance, and awarenesses or emotions built upon these senses, such as our awareness of tension (human emotional tension, I mean) in a room. Thus our knowledge of what is essential or inessential to some kind of thing is based upon our experience of reality, however distantly. Now there seem to be two experiences upon the basis of which we can come to an understanding of pain. One is the internal feeling of pain. The other is our observation of others; for we note that in certain circumstances (it is hot, say, or someone is being pierced by a needle, etc.) others behave in a certain fashion (talk loudly, move about in such a manner, etc.). Finally, however, we observe that the circumstances and behavior of others is similar or identical to the circumstances and behavior of ourselves when in pain. Hence we equate these and say that the others too have this internal feeling of pain. It is an instance of reasoning from effect to cause.

I don’t think the case of c-fibers is separate from our observation of others. We simply observe that, just as or before others behave in such and such a distinct manner by which we know they are in pain, and immediately after the circumstances which we know are causative of pain – or perhaps even just before we ourselves feel the sensation of pain – a stimulation of the c-fibers occurs (I do not know precisely how this is measured – it may be as simple as hooking a wire up and watching a needle move, or it may rely on some more difficulty properties of electrodynamics; but ultimately it comes down to something we see or hear, which we recognized to be caused only by the stimulation). Hence we recognize the stimulation as involved in or necessary to the sensation of pain.

Perhaps this is not wholly right; it is possible that, on the basis of our sensation of pain, we come to a definition in terms of origin (what is evil or destructive of one’s being, especially one’s body) and purpose (to avoid or repair the evil), and seeing these parts of the definition met in others, presume the internal sensation as well; but whatever the case, it must ultimately be derived from what we see, hear, etc., which indicates that the process cannot be too far from the one laid out above (whether done consciously or not).

It seems, then, hard to exclude the sensation of pain from its definition, or at least to deny that it is an inseparable property of pain; yet for the same reason I cannot see how one can exclude the bodily aspect. The sensation of pain is involved in what pain is; but so is its origin or cause (evil to the body), purpose or end (avoidance of the same through such and such bodily actions), and the physical matter in or through which it occurs. One would not wholly know what pain were if one were ignorant of these. Of course this does not mean that the physical matter must be identical in all beings which feel pain (like the Martian case): but some matter does seem involved, and matter with certain characteristics (rapid transmission of information or whatever). This is similar to the axe: it need not be made out of iron or have precisely such a shape, but it must be made of some hard, sharp material and have an edge of some kind.

If this is, however, unconvincing, perhaps we need to consider what ‘definition’ or ‘essential’ means?

(a soul in the sense of what a lot of people are trying to refute me with - a Platonic or Cartesian soul trapped in a body).

Just to be clear, I believe (or hope) that no one is claiming that we have a Platonic or Cartesian soul. By this I presume you mean some immaterial being (immaterial in the sense that its essence or definition does not involve matter or body – perhaps even definable as “thinking being”) which, at the moment, happens to be tied up with a body (in a way which neither Plato nor Decartes are altogether clear on). It only differs from an angel in that angels never were so tied up. Indeed I do believe this is heretical, since, if I am not mistaken, the Church has defined that the human soul is the substantial form of the body (cf. the Council of Vienne).

I have other questions on what you said, but since the conversation has gone on, they are not relevant anymore – besides, I have inflicted enough of my befuddlement. However something that bothers me immensely is the question of what ‘physical’ even means. Does it mean ‘bodily’ or ‘requiring reference to body in the definition’, where by body is meant both/either that which can change (having an underlying which remains and some aspect which is lost in change, i.e. matter and form) and/or extended in three dimensions – or put briefly, existing in space and/or time? This does not seem right, since in your position the mind seems to involve the body in its definition, since it supervenes it. Also what does physical mean when said of components and properties?

This seems to be the primary point of discussion at the moment. Some wish to say that the intellect (not the imagination or mind as such) is immaterial, meaning that it is a faculty whose definition or ‘what it is’ does not have reference to the body as pain, for instance, does. Fosio seems to wish to deny (or at least show the strengths of the argument) that immateriality of some component or part is not necessary, given what we know. You want to claim an immaterial aspect, but still one joined to or supervening a bodily faculty.

Newbot

 

[Anthony_A]

I don’t think the case of c-fibers is separate from our observation of others…Hence we recognize the stimulation as involved in or necessary to the sensation of pain.

Yes, but I want to say that c-fiber stimulation correlating to pain plays a functional role, not a logically necessary role. So in the case of the Martian, if the alien had a component which functioned like a brain and parts that function like c-fibers (though they would not be c-fibers) we could safely say the alien could experience pain.
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The sensation of pain is involved in what pain is; but so is its origin or cause (evil to the body), purpose or end (avoidance of the same through such and such bodily actions), and the physical matter in or through which it occurs. One would not wholly know what pain were if one were ignorant of these. Of course this does not mean that the physical matter must be identical in all beings which feel pain (like the Martian case): but some matter does seem involved, and matter with certain characteristics (rapid transmission of information or whatever). This is similar to the axe: it need not be made out of iron or have precisely such a shape, but it must be made of some hard, sharp material and have an edge of some kind.

This is more or less what I’m getting at. I do think the physical correlate is necessary for us humans to experience pain, I just don’t think it’s limited to c-fibers in an organic tissue brain. Remember my position is Functionalism - if the organism functions like a brain, then it is. If such-and-such functions just like a c-fiber does in a human brain, we should expect there to be a sensation of pain.

I think I had mentioned (way) earlier in the thread about a thought experiment where our entire brain is replaced one by one with silicon chips. Turns out this may not be a self-indulgent thought experiment. My girlfriend gave me an article from a science magazine which talked about the future of neuroprosthetics. Apparently, there has been promising results from patients who have these prosthetics. One person, if I remember correctly, was slowly learning how to talk again. And this is the core of functionalism. We don’t need an organic substance for a brain to work, it just has to function like one. And that’s why I think AI is possible.

This seems to be the primary point of discussion at the moment. Some wish to say that the intellect (not the imagination or mind as such) is immaterial, meaning that it is a faculty whose definition or ‘what it is’ does not have reference to the body as pain, for instance, does. Fosio seems to wish to deny (or at least show the strengths of the argument) that immateriality of some component or part is not necessary, given what we know. You want to claim an immaterial aspect, but still one joined to or supervening a bodily faculty.

Right, I believe that pain does have a reference - it has a neural correlate (the c-fibers). I don’t think that qualia of pain (the conscious exp of what pain feels like) can be pointed out in the brain, organic or functional. It’s the qualia that is irreducible, and what is immaterial. Fosio doesn’t think so.

As for the intellect, I’m not sure. I think I’m more or less committed to the idea that intellectual operations can be functionally reduced. I say functionally because of the multiple instantiability argument I gave.