So, is there such a thing as an invalid Metaphysical proposition?

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How does one go about invalidating metaphysical theories? Or validating something for that matter? šŸ˜‰
 
I fine this as a definition at Dictionary.com:

metā‹…aā‹…physā‹…iā‹…calā€‚ ā€‚/ĖŒmɛtəĖˆfÉŖzÉŖkəl/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [met-uh-fiz-i-kuhl] Show IPA
ā€“adjective 1. pertaining to or of the nature of metaphysics.
2. Philosophy. a. concerned with abstract thought or subjects, as existence, causality, or truth.
b. concerned with first principles and ultimate grounds, as being, time, or substance.
  1. highly abstract, subtle, or abstruse.
  2. designating or pertaining to the poetry of an early group of 17th-century English poets, notably John Donne, whose characteristic style is highly intellectual and philosophical and features intensive use of ingenious conceits and turns of wit.
  3. Archaic. imaginary or fanciful.

Origin:
1375ā€“1425; late ME metaphisicalle < ML metaphysicālis. See metaphysic, -al 1

Could you define your question please?
 
Metaphysics as orignally defined comes from the works of Aristotole not otherwise able to be classified as something else ie ethics, poetics etc. There is a philosophy ā€œurban legendā€ that when they were trying to classify the notes of Aristotleā€™s writtings. They put them in piles when they found the stuff that is now his metaphysics, the question arose where do we put this the answer being "ta meta ta phusica put it beyond the physics shelf.

My favorite quote about metaphysics comes from Voltaire:
ā€œWhen he who speaks and he to whom he speaks
Neither of whom understands what is said, that is metaphysicsā€

OMNIAM GRAECAM MIHI EST!
 
Metaphysics is the attempt to say something true about all being.
 
To validate a proposed metaphysical statement it has to be logically consistent and coherent as well as ā€œempirically adequateā€ (Whiteheadā€™s termā€“donā€™t know zactly what that means).
 
ā€œInvalidā€ is sort of a technical logical term. Letā€™s say ā€œfalseā€ instead. Is there a ā€œfalseā€ metaphysical claim? Sure; hereā€™s one example out of multitudes: ā€œWe do not have free will.ā€ That claim does not satisfactorily account for our human experience, in which we know we are free, nor does it account for our habit of deliberation and choice.

The wife of a friend of mine is a scientific determinist, and she was disputing these claims. I just said, ā€œIf you are correct, then I have been determined to think of myself as free, and our conversation is not going to change my mind. However, if I am correct, then I could change my mind to think you are right. Which would you prefer?ā€
 
I guess I would construct an argument something like this:

If we do not have free will, then we are not free to choose in a meaningful way.
However, we know from experience that we are free to choose.
Therefore, it is not the case that we do not have free will.
 
The wife of a friend of mine is a scientific determinist, and she was disputing these claims. I just said, ā€œIf you are correct, then I have been determined to think of myself as free, and our conversation is not going to change my mind. However, if I am correct, then I could change my mind to think you are right. Which would you prefer?ā€
Excellent, you have shown the evil of determinism quite wellā€¦ I would suppose that scientific determinists contemplate the destruction of those who do not hold their views, it seems inevitable that they would be murderous.
 
Excellent, you have shown the evil of determinism quite wellā€¦ I would suppose that scientific determinists contemplate the destruction of those who do not hold their views, it seems inevitable that they would be murderous.
Sorry, I didnā€™t follow this at all. I guess I take your last sentence to mean that a determinist would believe that if someone was murderous, that fact would be inevitable?
 
The wife of a friend of mine is a scientific determinist, and she was disputing these claims. I just said, ā€œIf you are correct, then I have been determined to think of myself as free, and our conversation is not going to change my mind. However, if I am correct, then I could change my mind to think you are right. Which would you prefer?ā€
What you said was pretty good but be careful. She could have countered that she was right and it was determined that you would change your mind.

Thatā€™s the problem with determinism, itā€™s a complete answer albeit a confining and dull one. I like how Chesterton described it, something along the lines of a small, circle of insanity (what exactly was it again?).

I think the OP question implicitly contains the idea that metaphysics is just story-telling, mythology, etc. How can you 100% disprove the non-existance of, say, unicorns? It doesnā€™t seem like you can. But thankfully itā€™s not like that at all, at least most of the time. It is meaningful to talk about commonalities such as existance and being. Maybe the problem of disproving certain metaphysical claims may be linked to the problem of the ā€œmany and the oneā€ and how real is the reality we perceive compared to real reality. If the two are radically different and somewhat independent, then thatā€™s when you start having serious difficulties. Descartes anyone? 2 cents.

peace,
Michael
 
In response to the question posed in the thread title, it seems that the assumption that logic will always prevail over our understanding of reality is probably a false notion.

As a simple example, there is no logic which provides a theory for why neural networks are able to recognize patternsā€¦
 
In response to the question posed in the thread title, it seems that the assumption that logic will always prevail over our understanding of reality is probably a false notion.

As a simple example, there is no logic which provides a theory for why neural networks are able to recognize patternsā€¦
How do you know you are able to recognize patterns without assuming same?
 
That claim does not satisfactorily account for our human experience, in which we know we are free, nor does it account for our habit of deliberation and choice.
Whilst I donā€™t disagree with what you obviously believe, your argument has a monumental flaw. We do not know we are free at all. We perceive that we are free from the observation of our own behaviour. You have implied that such an observation is 100% trustworthy, which of course is not the case. Michael addressed this issue farily well towards the end of his post, particular with his reference to Descartes. A brief outline of Descartesā€™ relevant meditations can be found here.

As for the actual topic at hand, I think it will be helpful to analyse why a metaphysical theory is postulated. It must be understood that such postulates are made in an attempt to understand the nature of ultimate reality. They are usually concerned with inconsistencies, paradoxes or any source of logical confusion in everyday, perceivable reality. A favourite of course, is the notion of free will. Since the goal of a metaphysical postulate is to explain the inconsistency/ies it concerns, it is invalidated when it is found not to adequately do so.

For example, the notion of materialism is a metaphysical postulate. Yet many people (not necessarily myself, Iā€™ll add) maintain that materialism cannot be reconciled with the notion of free will. I.e. free will cannot logically exist , or cannot be adequately explained in a materialist world. Thus, materialism is ā€œinvalidatedā€ by those people.

Does that make sense?
 
We do not know we are free at all.
I would say we know it with just as much certainty as about anything else. Just as much as, say, that we exist (though obviously not in the same way, just to the same degree).

Sure you can deny it, but youā€™re off the deep end, and yarr, there be monsters there!!

If memory serves me right (though Iā€™m a bit foggy here and this is primarily heresay, not heresy =) ), Aristotle saw Descartes folly way back then and decided not to go down that road because it basically leads nowhere; hence, Aquinas didnā€™t fall into the same trap.

Itā€™s sad, didnā€™t Descartes read his ancient philosophy?

And it makes good sense that Descartes wouldnā€™t be able to reason from his mind to external reality if one starts from the humble assumption that our existence and the world we live in is contingent. Itā€™s funny that humility starts you off in the right direction, at least so it would seem.

peace,
Michael
 
Haha, fair enough. Itā€™s not exactly the happiest, or illuminating philosophy out there.
I would say we know it with just as much certainty as about anything else. Just as much as, say, that we exist (though obviously not in the same way, just to the same degree).
Iā€™m not sure I agree with that. Assuming that pretty much what we see (, hear, smell, taste, touch) is what we get, free will is still not so obvious. There may still be room for determinism in the observable world, which would essentially destroy the notion of free will. Perhaps misinterpretation of our behaviour (that suggests we have free will) is on no grander a scale than the misinterpretation of your brotherā€™s tone of voice when heā€™s complementing you. Heā€™s not really :). Maybe free will isnā€™t really what we are observing? Perhaps itā€™s not as if weā€™re being totally deceived by some demon (Matrix style), itā€™s just an everyday mistake that we humans are sadly very prone to do.

Similarly, for how long did human beings believe the Earth was flat?

Iā€™m not sure about Aristotleā€™s wisdom with regard to Descartesā€™ depressing postulates. Iā€™m not educated enough in philosophical history.
 
Whilst I donā€™t disagree with what you obviously believe, your argument has a monumental flaw. We do not know we are free at all. We perceive that we are free from the observation of our own behaviour. You have implied that such an observation is 100% trustworthy, which of course is not the case. Michael addressed this issue farily well towards the end of his post, particular with his reference to Descartes. A brief outline of Descartesā€™ relevant meditations can be found here.
Despite Descartesā€™ skepticism on this point, Iā€™ll stick with what I wrote. My experience of my own deliberation and freedom to choose is incorrigibly true; that is, yes, I am absolutely sure of it. (Actually, Iā€™d be willing to bet that you are sure of your own freedom, as well.) If I said, ā€œI am hungry,ā€ no one can argue me out of the truth of that introspective, incorrigible truth. No one could rationally convince me, ā€œNo, youā€™re not really hungryā€ if I do in fact feel hungry. Likewise with my own experience of my freedom.

The ā€œearth is flatā€ example is not really parallel, since that does not revolve around a personā€™s internal, introspective experience.
 
There are certainly true and false metaphysical propositions. The problem is to distinguish them. They are false if they entail inconsistency. For example, ā€œWe can choose to act in different ways even though all our actions are determined by physical eventsā€ or ā€œOur lives are purposeful even though we are the product of purposeless eventsā€.
 
I admit that I do like (and probably envy) your take on things, but I will maintain that they are, at least, different to mine. Before you said that you believed your own free will to be incorrigibly true, I wouldā€™ve suggested that our definition of ā€œknowledgeā€ were different, but this is apparently not the case. Iā€™m far too open to be so stubbornly sure of anything really, simply for fear of being wrong. This does not mean that I live in uncertainty, because I have chosen (for the most part) what I believe, accepted those choices and live my life accordingly. I just allow myself room to change my mind.

So, I can honesty say I am not sure of my own free will. But I believe in it. šŸ™‚ Indeed according to my understanding, faith itself is the belief in something you cannot know?
 
How does one go about invalidating metaphysical theories? Or validating something for that matter? šŸ˜‰
Well, i am not sure what everyone else is going on about, but i would have thought that Metaphysics relies first on the premises of classical logic, and is informed by the other sciences, in order to know that which is true or false. But donā€™t rely on me; if i was you Iā€™d read a good book on metaphysics.

Iā€™m not sure what you mean by the term ā€œvalidationā€. Do you mean it in an absolute sense? In the absolute sense of the term, it seems to me that it is not possible for us to validate the existence of that which exists outside of our minds or sensory perceptions. We simply assume that such things exist, because it would not be practical for us to assume or believe otherwise. We know only of appearances, and we try to connect those appearances together to a standard of order or consistency, and in so doing, we assume a realist position about being. All popular knowledge is ultimately based upon this assumption, including the empirical sciences. Thus, for all we know, insofar as practical knowledge is concerned, we might have nothing more then a consistent tautology; and i think its important that people realize that all practical knowledge is in the same boat, even though we may regard certain principles and methods of knowledge as being more trustworthy then others. So to me, something that is valid, is merely something that is consistent with various principles that people assume to be correct, insofar as one requires a foundation that will provide access to the relevant information.

Thats just my take on the subject.
 
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