C
cooterhein
Guest
Hey, good to see you again.Hi again my friend!
I have a different idea. I think it has to do with differing understandings of Aristotelian ontology and the nature of “substance” and “accidents.”What seems to be missing in your [and others] conclusions is that applying HUMAN REASON to Divine Miracles are never going to reach a proper conclusion.
Central to the underpinnings of this topic as it relates to Thomistic Christology is the idea that substance is not truly knowable and it may in any case be divorced from an object’s “accidents”…without exception, if an exception is absolutely necessary. So for example, a three-sided polygon could have the “accidents” of a triangle (three sides, closed figure, interior angles adding to 180 degrees) but still be a square or an octagon or a circle with respect to its “substance.” Or as another example, a yeastless string of carbohydrates could be arranged in such a manner as to be “a bread-like wafer” with respect to its “accidents” at every level from the sub-atomic to regular visibility, but its true “substance” is anyone’s guess. It could be hidden, and it could be completely different from what the “accidents” show it to be.
We probably have some differences here. To wit, I have very little use for this sort of ontology. Some things that you might call “mere accidents” are things that I accept as guarantees of what an object’s substance is. For example, I accept that a closed three-sided polygon is always a triangle and it is not possible to divorce one from the other. (Just one example). But there’s one other important detail that must be recognized lest we continuously talk past each other.
While it’s not necessarily possible in every single situation, there are a pretty good number of situations in which something you might call “substance” is knowable. You will put different limits on this. In your mind, anything that you “know” or “observe” or “demonstrate to exist” isn’t really the substance, it’s just the appearance and the substance remains unknowable. I happen to believe the thing you’d call “substance” is, in many instances, truly knowable.
Thus, when I tell you “the nature of the substance of the host is knowable both before and after the blessing, and the substance does not change,” you might assume that I mean to say “the accidents, as far as I can tell, appear to be similar in both cases but the actual substance is anyone’s guess.” Let me be crystal clear. I am not saying that. What I am saying is “the nature of the substance of the host is knowable both before and after it’s blessed, and it does not change.” That’s exactly what I mean to say, and once this is confirmed, it’s the main reason why I can’t believe transubstantiation.
I don’t want to belabor the comparison too much, but it’s kind of like when a young-earth creationist doesn’t believe it’s possible to reliably measure the age of the earth whereas an old-earth person will have to try very hard in order to demonstrate that we know the age of the earth, and this is based on nothing else but the age of the earth.
In the same manner, we can know what sort of substance a wafer is made of before and after a blessing. Not just the accidents, but the actual substance. Knowledge of this substance is not based on preconceived notions or a certain set of beliefs. It is based on nothing else but the actual reality of what the substance is in either case. And when the “before” and “after” shots are compared, we can know that these elements remain unchanged.
Aristotelian ontology had widespread credibility at the time. It didn’t deserve it, but that’s what it had. I guess they couldn’t do much better than that at the time, but we can now.The Biblical evidence and Early Church history that support these beliefs is over-whelming.
You make your standards of ontological certainty impossibly high whenever it suits you, and then you make them absurdly low when you want to guarantee a certain outcome. I do know how this works.Take all of that and add the PHYSICAL Evidence of Eucharisitic Miracles
Can God cause a closed three-sided polygon to really, truly, and actually be a rectangle even though it still has just three sides?Surely God CAN do this if God chooses to right?
I say no. God is not responsible for absurdities. Transubstantiation is one of those absurdities; hence, God cannot choose to do it in the manner described. Now, it would be a different thing if God miraculously transformed something or multiplied it or created it out of nothing. Those are miracles, but they’re not absurdities. Transubstantiation is an absurdity, though.
More to the point, however, He does not do that. This information is knowable. It is attainable. There is no change to the elements. We know this.