Some misunderstandings of three fonts of morality?

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So the 3 fonts of morality basically say that intention, intrinsic goodness, and proportionality of the reasons, makes a thing good. But I was wondering how does one define each of these fonts? For instance, I could commit suicide by simply saying "I only want to play with the gun, putting the gun to my temple is not inherently immoral, and maybe I could do it if bored to a point bordering on madness. But the point is, I think this reasoning is specious -don’t you but it seems to be morally right given the 3 fonts. Where did I go wrong?
 
So the 3 fonts of morality basically say that intention, intrinsic goodness, and proportionality of the reasons, makes a thing good. But I was wondering how does one define each of these fonts?
The more usual terminology in moral theology is “object,” “end,” and “circumstances,” and in modern philosophy the corresponding terms are “intention,” “motive,” and “circumstances.” The catechism contains a nice discussion of this topic: see CCC 1749-1761.

In a nutshell, the “object” or “intention” specifies what the action is, so the object of an action answers the questions “What are you doing?” and “Why would one do that?” In the suicide example, what you are doing is holding a gun to your temple, and the reason one would do such a thing is blow one’s brains out.

The “end” or “motive” specifies the further reasons that make the action attractive or desirable. In the suicide case, someone might do it because life is terrible, or someone else might do it for fun and games (Russian roulette).

The “circumstances” are everything else that goes into an action. For example, some cultures have encouraged suicide as an alternative to a life spent in shame or ignominy.
For instance, I could commit suicide by simply saying "I only want to play with the gun, putting the gun to my temple is not inherently immoral, and maybe I could do it if bored to a point bordering on madness. But the point is, I think this reasoning is specious -don’t you but it seems to be morally right given the 3 fonts. Where did I go wrong?
The object or (remember this is philosophical jargon) intention is not up to us. As the great philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe emphasized, intention is not a magic formula we whisper to ourselves to make our actions good or bad: the intention or object of an action can be found out by reason and cannot be changed just by adjusting our motives. To take again the suicide example: we know why one would point a gun to one’s own head, and that is merely to check out of this life early. Whether one does that in earnest or for play doesn’t really change the fact that the object, viz., checking out early, is bad.

I hope this doesn’t make the topic seem simple, since it really isn’t. To pursue it further you should look into the catechism and some books on moral theology and philosophy. Here are some links to a couple good ones:
Romanus Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology
G E M Anscombe, Faith in a Hard Ground
 
I guess this sort of changes the topic but I learned more from re-reading the Vatican links and I think that the moral object is a good and it attracts the will and it is the matter of the action not its form -it is the thing being done not the reason for it.

If I understand correctly this just brings up the new question of how we separate what is willed from what is not willed. For instance, I know that it is not wrong to do a good thing if some smaller evil results but is not the will nonetheless attracted to the good in the evil when one does this, and as a result wouldn’t one always will an evil thing to occur which is bad? Somehow we are able to not will the evil but I’m not sure one can reflect and say “I know the company uses immoral methods to make medicine but I’m not willing such methods” on the contrary you are willing the evil under the aspect of the good (bad moral object) which is namely immoral methods under the form of your health and the company’s profits.
 
one last question. In the links provided in the post above, the consequences of an action are separated from that action. But the action can’t produce good from evil. Now taking my company example, I buy something from an evil company for health reasons. But this provides profit to the company to make my medicine. So the latter sentence shows that the action of buying from said company makes good from evil (evil being giving profit to the co. and the good being the co. being enabled to make your medicine). But if people are allowed to make use of medicines from abortion-practicing co.s, which is true, then my example which is analogous must be right too? So where did I misinterpret something?
 
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