Quote:
, and I showed that Aquinas rejected the idea of a universe existing in an infinite past in his short treatise On the Eternity of the World.
That would be quite the trick, as Aquinas, in precisely this work, concludes, “Thus it is clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed.”
Ah, me!

Why do I even bother wasting my time on this forum?
fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-eternity.asp
Thomas Aquinas:
On The Eternity of the World
I am numbering the paragraphs and giving the first words of each paragraph, except for giving the critical paragraphs in toto:
**No, 1 - ** Let us assume, in accordance with the Catholic faith,
**No, 2 - ** If it be impossible that something caused by God has always existed, it will be so either because God could not .
**No, 3 - ** If such a thing cannot be made, the impossibility will arise for one of two reasons: either because of an absence of a passive potentiality or because of some contradiction between the ideas involved.
**No, 4 - ** In regard to the second, someone may hold that something that has
**No, 5 - ** We thus ought to determine whether there is any contradiction between these two ideas, namely, to be made by God and to have always existed.
**No, 6 - ** That they are not contradictory can be shown as follows.
**No, 7 - ** First, we should show that it is not necessary that an agent cause, in
**No, 8 - ** For, at whatever instant a thing exists, at that instant it can begin to act,
**No, 9 - ** Nor can the conclusion be avoided by saying that God is an
**No, 10 - ** Further, a cause that produces the whole substance
**No, 11 - ** Further, if, granted a cause, its effect does not immediately exist as well,
**No, 12 - ** Further, the will of the voluntary agent in no way diminishes his power, and this is
No, 13 - **** It remains to be seen, then, whether there is a contradiction in saying that something made has always existed, on the grounds that it may be necessary that its non-being precede it in time**,
**No, 14 - ** Further, let us even suppose that the preposition “out of” imports some affirmative order of non-being to being, as if the proposition that the creature is made out of nothing meant that the creature is made after nothing. Then this expression “after” certainly implies order, but order is of two kinds: order of time and order of nature. If, therefore, the proper and the particular does not follow from the common and the universal, it will not necessarily follow that, because the creature is made after nothing, non-being is temporally prior to the being of the creature. Rather, it suffices that non-being be prior to being by nature. Now, whatever naturally pertains to something in itself is prior to what that thing only receives from another. A creature does not have being, however, except from another, for, considered in itself, every creature is nothing, and thus, with respect to the creature, non-being is prior to being by nature. Nor does it follow from the creature’s always having existed that its being and non-being are ever simultaneous, as if the creature always existed but at some time nothing existed, for the priority is not one of time. Rather, the argument merely requires that the nature of the creature is such that, if the creature were left to itself, it would be nothing. For example, if we should say that the air has always been illuminated by the sun, it would be right to say that the air has always been made lucid by the sun. Thus, since anything that comes to be such-and-such comes to be such-and-such from being not such-and-such, we say that the air is made lucid from being non-lucid, or opaque, not because the air was once non-lucid or opaque, but because the air would be opaque if the sun did not illuminate it. This is clearly the case with the stars and those celestial bodies that are always illuminated by the sun.
**No, 15 - ** Thus it is clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed.
**No, 16 - ** How remarkable it would be that even the most noble of philosophers failed to see a contradiction in the idea that something made by God has always existed.
**No, 17 - ** Still, since certain authorities seem to argue on the side of such men, we ought to show that they base themselves on a weak foundation. Damascene says (I De Fide Orthodoxa cap. 8), “What is made out of nothing is by nature not such that it is coeternal to what has no causal principle and always exists.” [PG 94, 814B] Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacramentis I-1 cap. 1), “The ineffable omnipotent power could not have anything coeternal beyond itself that would help it in making.” [PL 176, 187B]
( continued in next post )