Soul and first way

[STT]

I am sure that most of you are familiar with the first way proof of God given by Thomas Aquinas. I am providing the proof in the following for those who are familiar with it:

1. Our senses prove that some things are in motion.
2. Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion.
3. Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion.
4. Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another).
5. Therefore nothing can move itself.
6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
7. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.
8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second premises claims that “Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion”. I just give a counter-example of soul which moves itself and its act is not because of reaching to an actuality from a potentiality. This means that the second premises is wrong so the argument doesn’t follow.

 

[Wesrock]

Thomas Aquinas held that the will is given “pre-motion” by God, so the objection doesn’t necessarily work. Anyway, it could also be that God is what gives the will the ability to move from potential to actual and is the impetus behind that movement, without which it could not move, but that he doesn’t force it into any one direction. That is, by working in tandem, the will determines it’s own ends but God is what allows it to move in such a fashion. Without him it would remain static.

Or maybe we can just say that the wills existence is only made actual by God sustaining it and then, kept actual by God, is able to move itself.

 

[STT]

Thomas Aquinas held that the will is given “pre-motion” by God, so the objection doesn’t necessarily work.

Actually Thomas Aquinas believes that soul moves itself:

The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the “vegetative soul”; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). (Summa Theologica, Q78)

I also think that the creation of soul is incomplete if your claim is correct. This simply means that the faculty of will is an illusion.

Anyway, it could also be that God is what gives the will the ability to move from potential to actual and is the impetus behind that movement, without which it could not move, but that he doesn’t force it into any one direction.

I have problem with this. The power of will cannot be related to the tendency to move from potential to actual since that means that the power of will is an illusion.

That is, by working in tandem, the will determines it’s own ends but God is what allows it to move in such a fashion. Without him it would remain static.

Then things doesn’t really move from potentiality to actuality if God moves everything. So I don’t agree with your interpretation.

Or maybe we can just say that the wills existence is only made actual by God sustaining it and then, kept actual by God, is able to move itself.

That makes sense to me but then my objection to second premises becomes valid.

 

[Wesrock]

To go from potential to actual is to go from not being to being. God’s action, direct or not, doesn’t change that.

Quaestiones disputatae de malo 6.1 ad 3

God immutably moves our will on account of the efficacy of His moving power, which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will that is moved, which relates indifferently to diverse things, necessity is not introduced; just as in all things divine providence operates infallibly; and yet from contingent causes effects are contingently produced, insofar as God moves all things proportionately, each being according to its mode.

ST I.83.1: Whether man has free-will?

Objection 3. Further, what is “free is cause of itself,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Proverbs 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it” and (Philippians 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” Therefore man has not free-will.

Reply to Objection 3. Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

That makes sense to me but then my objection to second premises becomes valid.

Once a stick’s motion is actualized the stick can actualize the rock’s motion. Once God actualized the will the will can the actualize other potentials.

 

[STT]

To go from potential to actual is to go from not being to being. God’s action, direct or not, doesn’t change that.

Then that is a contradiction in his system of belief if your citation is correct. That is true because in one place he believes that soul can moves itself and in another place he believes that God moves our will.

I really have trouble with the second interpretation since it questions the reality of will. What will could possibly mean if God moves our wills?

Once a stick’s motion is actualized the stick can actualize the rock’s motion.

Not really since rock does not move if its movement is not actualized by God.

Once God actualized the will the will can the actualize other potentials.

That is doesn’t follow since your example (previous comment) doesn’t follow either.

 

[Wesrock]

Created things can actualize the potentials of others. They can be the cause of motion, they are just not the first cause.

Anyway, the issue seems to be in assuming that it’s in the nature of all things to have only necessary effects if they are caused. Things such as the will are caused but have voluntary effects. There isn’t a contradiction when Thomas says the will moves itself, you just need to take it in context. It’s motion (effect) is voluntary. It determines how it moves. But it does not cause itself. It’s the difference between necessary motion and voluntary motion where Aquinas draws the line between things that don’t move themselves and things that do. Ultimately, though, the cause of all motion can be traced back to God as the first cause.

 

[STT]

Created things can actualize the potentials of others. They can be the cause of motion, they are just not the first cause.

I agree with this part given the definition of first cause, the act of sustaining the universe.

Anyway, the issue seems to be in assuming that it’s in the nature of all things to have only necessary effects if they are caused. Things such as the will are caused but have voluntary effects. There isn’t a contradiction when Thomas says the will moves itself, you just need to take it in context. It’s motion (effect) is voluntary. It determines how it moves. But it does not cause itself. It’s the difference between necessary motion and voluntary motion where Aquinas draws the line between things that don’t move themselves and things that do. Ultimately, though, the cause of all motion can be traced back to God as the first cause.

I disagree with the bold part. The will is then an illusion if it is caused. We simply decide what to do and we do it with the power of our wills.

 

[Wesrock]

Why is the will an illusion if it’s caused if the motion is voluntary to what the will decides?

 

[STT]

Why is the will an illusion if it’s caused if the motion is voluntary to what the will decides?

I am not talking about voluntary cause but necessary cause. How could you possibly initiate decision at any given time you wish if you don’t have the power of self cause?

 

[Wesrock]

I’m not sure Aquinas saw God as the cause of the will as a series of discrete causes, with each decision you make being prompted by a different action of God, all separate events. I think he saw it as more of a continuous, sustaining cause that allows the will to persist in voluntary operation. This is probably a poor, incomplete analogy, but probably in the sense a power source of electricity is a cause for a computer’s operation. God is not a generator, and the human mind is not just a computer, but the analogy seems loosely correct.

 

[STT]

I’m not sure Aquinas saw God as the cause of the will as a series of discrete causes, with each decision you make being prompted by a different action of God, all separate events. I think he saw it as more of a continuous, sustaining cause that allows the will to persist in voluntary operation. This is probably a poor, incomplete analogy, but probably in the sense a power source of electricity is a cause for a computer’s operation. God is not a generator, and the human mind is not just a computer, but the analogy seems loosely correct.

To me the correct picture is as following. God sustains creation by first cause. Universe however move on its own based on cause and effect. So everything is fine with Thomas’s proof until here. There is however a problem in this framework which is soul with the power of will to decide at any given moment. This power however is self caused otherwise we couldn’t have full control on our decisions. This questions the second premises as it was discussed in OP. In simple word, a self cause action is not an act from potentiality to actuality so here there is a counter example.

 

[Wesrock]

I see no counter example under Aquinas’ conception. The will has God as it’s first cause. God as it’s cause is what allows it to move voluntarily and direct itself, which is according to its nature. God being the cause does not mean the specific effects follow necessarily (deterministically). Aquinas paid specific attention to addressing this very objection.

 

[STT]

I see no counter example under Aquinas’ conception. The will has God as it’s first cause. God as it’s cause is what allows it to move voluntarily and direct itself, which is according to its nature. God being the cause does not mean the specific effects follow necessarily (deterministically). Aquinas paid specific attention to addressing this very objection.

This means that you didn’t read my post carefully.

Lets try it again. Do you have full control on your decision (not simply what to choose but also when to choose)? Here we are interested to know if you can make a decision at any given time you wish. This means that you have to have the self cause ability otherwise you cannot have control at time of your decision. This is obviously an example against the second premises since a self cause act is not a simple cause and effect act.