Souls

[EnterTheBowser]

LatinCat:

He started with a premise that was falicious. When one does not start with falicious premises, then one’s deductive arguement is much more solid.

Which premise exactly are you referring to?

J.J.C. Smart considers exactly this argument in his paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” and I think that his response is compelling.
J.J.C. Smart:

Objection 5. It would make sense to say of a molecular movement in the brain that it is swift or slow, straight or circular, but it makes no sense to say this of the experience of seeing something yellow.

Reply. So far we have not given sense to talk of experiences as swift or slow, straight or circular. But I am not claiming that “experience” and “brain-process” mean the same thing or even that they have the same logic. “Somebody” and “the doctor” do not have the same logic, but this does not lead us to suppose that talking about somebody telephoning is talking about someone over and above, say, the doctor. The ordinary man when he reports an experience is reporting that something is going on, but he leaves it open as to what sort of thing is going on, whether in a material solid medium or perhaps in some sort of gaseous medium, or even perhaps in some sort of nonspatial medium (if this makes sense). All that I am saying is that “experience” and “brain-process” may in fact refer to the same thing, and if so we may easily adopt a convention (which is not a change in our present rules for the use of experience words but an addition to them) whereby it would make sense to talk of an experience in terms appropriate to physical processes

In other words, two distinct words may having different meanings, and have different rules for proper usage, but may in fact turn out to refer to the same thing (e.g. “Morning Star” and “Evening Star”).

 

[LatinCat]

EnterTheBowser:

Which premise exactly are you referring to?

J.J.C. Smart considers exactly this argument in his paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” and I think that his response is compelling.

In other words, two distinct words may having different meanings, and have different rules for proper usage, but may in fact turn out to refer to the same thing (e.g. “Morning Star” and “Evening Star”).

I am reffering to the premise that the “sun rises and sets”. The sun does not rise or set, so the argument is falacious. As for JJC Smart’s argument, it is really not an argument at all. He provides no evidence or deductive reasoning. He simply provides an alternate explanation. Alternate explanations, although interesting, do not PROVE anything per se. They simple articulate a postion. As we both know, there is a difference between articulationg a position and arguing in favor of said position. Futhermore, he does not provide an answer of how a a spiritial (I am using the term spiritual here to refer to a non-material yet substantial being), i.e., a thought, cannot be produced by a material brain. You cannot give what you don’t have. A material body does not possess spirituality/ non-materiality, therefore, it cannot give being to non-material things such as thoughts. I am waiting for an answer to this objection.

 

[LatinCat]

EnterTheBowser:

I’m curious to hear a Catholic perspective on this question:

Let’s say that we’re not really sure if Susan has a soul. How would we go about figuring out if she does or not? Or, equivalently, how would we tell the difference between SusanA, who has a soul, and SusanB, who is physically identical to SusanA, but has no soul?

According to Catholic theology, everyone has a soul. Even a clone would have a soul if it was a living human being. Heck, its not just Catholic theology, but good realist philosophy.

 

[buffalo]

Fidelis:

Good question.

If the OP, who describes himself in his profile as an “Atheist” is asking “what proof is there of the soul’s existence” then he (or she) should right out and ask it, rather than play juvenile Socratic mind games as if we were his students.

He asks the question from a discussion on an evolution thread.

In other words how can you tell when a non-human became oa human and how would you tell the difference.

 

[LatinCat]

buffalo:

He asks the question from a discussion on an evolution thread.

In other words how can you tell when a non-human became oa human and how would you tell the difference.

Oh, I see. In that case it would be a matter of when free will becomes evident in the species. The moment that man became capable of religion, the moment he started asking why we are here, the moment he started seeking the sprititual, we can say clearly that man had a soul. But in the end, it matters not when we can tell man stated to have a soul. What is important, is that we know that we have a soul now and we should be concerned with the well being of that soul.

 

[buffalo]

LatinCat:

Oh, I see. In that case it would be a matter of when free will becomes evident in the species. The moment that man became capable of religion, the moment he started asking why we are here, the moment he started seeking the sprititual, we can say clearly that man had a soul. But in the end, it matters not when we can tell man stated to have a soul. What is important, is that we know that we have a soul now and we should be concerned with the well being of that soul.

Next he will ask - could they both have existed at the same time? and how could an observer tell the difference?

 

[john_doran]

the soul is the seat of rationality - without a soul, SusanB would not be capable of rational thought. that, i think, would be a pretty obvious difference.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

buffalo:

He asks the question from a discussion on an evolution thread.

Did I?

In other words how can you tell when a non-human became oa human and how would you tell the difference.

I suppose that’s a possible application of this issue, but to tell the truth I hadn’t thought about it.

buffalo:

Next he will ask - could they both have existed at the same time? and how could an observer tell the difference?

Well, the question regarding the observer was the question I originally asked; regarding the other question - you’re right, that might indeed be an interesting question, but that bears less on the theory and more on the application.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

the soul is the seat of rationality - without a soul, SusanB would not be capable of rational thought. that, i think, would be a pretty obvious difference.

Just to make sure: are you saying that physical processes cannot produce rational behavior?

 

[EnterTheBowser]

LatinCat:

I am reffering to the premise that the “sun rises and sets”. The sun does not rise or set, so the argument is falacious. As for JJC Smart’s argument, it is really not an argument at all. He provides no evidence or deductive reasoning. He simply provides an alternate explanation. Alternate explanations, although interesting, do not PROVE anything per se. They simple articulate a postion. As we both know, there is a difference between articulationg a position and arguing in favor of said position. Futhermore, he does not provide an answer of how a a spiritial (I am using the term spiritual here to refer to a non-material yet substantial being), i.e., a thought, cannot be produced by a material brain. You cannot give what you don’t have. A material body does not possess spirituality/ non-materiality, therefore, it cannot give being to non-material things such as thoughts. I am waiting for an answer to this objection.

Alright, let me try to articulate the point more specifically. There are two possibilites: it is part of the very meaning of the word “thought” that it refers to an immaterial thing, or that “thought” leaves open whether its referent is material or immaterial. In the second case, your argument fails immediately.

In the first case, someone at the time of Copernicus might have argued that the Sun is something which rises and sets by the very meaning of the word. The linguistic use of “Sun” involves its rising and setting. Therefore, they conclude, Copernicus is wrong.

Now, we know that the Sun doesn’t really rise in the proper sense of the word. But we know this because meanings can change while referents remain the same. For example, at the moment, part of the meaning of “Aristotle” is “the person who wrote the Nichomachean Ethics.” If we were to find out that Aristotle did not in fact write it - then we would realize that we were wrong about one of the meanings ascribed to that particular referent. As Saul Kripke points out, we could actually be wrong about everything that we think Aristotle did - and if were to find out that this was the case, we would not say that we weren’t really talking about Aristotle at one of these times (before or after), but rather that the meaning of “Aristotle” changed - while its referent remained the same.

So, in the second case, we might find out that the things we refer to as “thoughts” are not actually immaterial. Consequently, it requires more than assertion or appeal to linguistic usage to establish that thoughts are immaterial.

 

[LatinCat]

EnterTheBowser:

Alright, let me try to articulate the point more specifically. There are two possibilites: it is part of the very meaning of the word “thought” that it refers to an immaterial thing, or that “thought” leaves open whether its referent is material or immaterial. In the second case, your argument fails immediately.

In the first case, someone at the time of Copernicus might have argued that the Sun is something which rises and sets by the very meaning of the word. The linguistic use of “Sun” involves its rising and setting. Therefore, they conclude, Copernicus is wrong.

Now, we know that the Sun doesn’t really rise in the proper sense of the word. But we know this because meanings can change while referents remain the same. For example, at the moment, part of the meaning of “Aristotle” is “the person who wrote the Nichomachean Ethics.” If we were to find out that Aristotle did not in fact write it - then we would realize that we were wrong about one of the meanings ascribed to that particular referent. As Saul Kripke points out, we could actually be wrong about everything that we think Aristotle did - and if were to find out that this was the case, we would not say that we weren’t really talking about Aristotle at one of these times (before or after), but rather that the meaning of “Aristotle” changed - while its referent remained the same.

So, in the second case, we might find out that the things we refer to as “thoughts” are not actually immaterial. Consequently, it requires more than assertion or appeal to linguistic usage to establish that thoughts are immaterial.

How can a thought be material? It is abstract. It has nothing to do with linguistics. I am not denying that our physical bodies to not react along with our thoughts. That is quite true. An idea or a thought is not a phyical thing. The thought, “The air is blue” is not a physical thing. It is a concept. Concepts cannot be measured in any way. They do not fall under the catergory of material. I think what you are missing is the difference between the actions my brain takes and the thought/idea/concept associated with those actions.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

LatinCat:

How can a thought be material? It is abstract. It has nothing to do with linguistics. I am not denying that our physical bodies to not react along with our thoughts. That is quite true. An idea or a thought is not a phyical thing. The thought, “The air is blue” is not a physical thing. It is a concept. Concepts cannot be measured in any way. They do not fall under the catergory of material. I think what you are missing is the difference between the actions my brain takes and the thought/idea/concept associated with those actions.

Just like there’s a difference between flash of lightnng and a measurable electric discharge during a storm? If you have access to it, you might want to look at Smart’s paper - it really is a good introduction to arguments in favor of materialism. Nomalogical danglers abound in dualism…

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Just to make sure: are you saying that physical processes cannot produce rational behavior?

not exactly: i’m saying that physical processes cannot produce rationality. rational behaviour, or behaviour that appears rationally motivated could certainly be produced by physical processes. i mean, the robot arms on an automobile assembly line appear to be rationally motivated within the range of their activity.

but honest-to-goodness rationality requires an immaterial fundament.

what’s more, so does free choice.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Now, we know that the Sun doesn’t really rise in the proper sense of the word. But we know this because meanings can change while referents remain the same. For example, at the moment, part of the meaning of “Aristotle” is “the person who wrote the Nichomachean Ethics.” If we were to find out that Aristotle did not in fact write it - then we would realize that we were wrong about one of the meanings ascribed to that particular referent. As Saul Kripke points out, we could actually be wrong about everything that we think Aristotle did - and if were to find out that this was the case, we would not say that we weren’t really talking about Aristotle at one of these times (before or after), but rather that the meaning of “Aristotle” changed - while its referent remained the same.

i know that this isn’t really a philosophy forum, but kripke’s account of proper names (which is importantly different from an account of sense and reference simplicter) is not the last word. personally, i prefer plantinga’s or katz’s stories.

EnterTheBowser:

So, in the second case, we might find out that the things we refer to as “thoughts” are not actually immaterial. Consequently, it requires more than assertion or appeal to linguistic usage to establish that thoughts are immaterial.

propositions, numbers, sets, properties, etc. are all abstract objects. if we can think about them, then our thinking faculties - the faculties with which we are acquainted with abstract objects - cannot themselves be concrete.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

not exactly: i’m saying that physical processes cannot produce rationality. rational behaviour, or behaviour that appears rationally motivated could certainly be produced by physical processes. i mean, the robot arms on an automobile assembly line appear to be rationally motivated within the range of their activity.

but honest-to-goodness rationality requires an immaterial fundament.

what’s more, so does free choice.

Well, my question is about how we would go about figuring out the difference between SusanA and SusanB. How we - as observers of their behavior - would go about figuring out which Susan has a soul.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

i know that this isn’t really a philosophy forum, but kripke’s account of proper names (which is importantly different from an account of sense and reference simplicter) is not the last word. personally, i prefer plantinga’s or katz’s stories.

Indeed, I’ll have to look into those.

propositions, numbers, sets, properties, etc. are all abstract objects. if we can think about them, then our thinking faculties - the faculties with which we are acquainted with abstract objects - cannot themselves be concrete.

I’d love to ask why, but I realize that I’m derailing my own thread - so I won’t.

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Well, my question is about how we would go about figuring out the difference between SusanA and SusanB. How we - as observers of their behavior - would go about figuring out which Susan has a soul.

because the susan without a soul wouldn’t exhibit rationality. in your language, she wouldn’t behave rationally.

the difference between susanB and a robot that facially acts in a rational manner, is that robots are programmed to act in such ways by rational beings; susanB wouldn’t have any such direction, so wouldn’t act in any way that could be considered evidence of rational thought. what’s more, it wouldn’t simply be a case of lacking the requisite pedagogical history - susanB would be immune from any kind of learning. at least of rational subject matter (math, language, etc.).

 

[john_doran]

EnterTheBowser:

Indeed, I’ll have to look into those.

there may be proponents of the kripkean view (i haven’t kept up on the literature), but the causal theory of names set forth in Naming and Necessity has crippling problems.

EnterTheBowser:

I’d love to ask why, but I realize that I’m derailing my own thread - so I won’t.

for the same reason that you could never draw “triangleness”, or collect “fiveness” on your desk. all physical things are necessarily tokens of the types that we, as rational, are able to recognize. if our thinking is reducible to brain-states (or some other purely physical process), how could such physical mechanisms or states of affairs ever instantiate types/abstracta?

i’m not sure how to be clearer.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

john doran:

because the susan without a soul wouldn’t exhibit rationality. in your language, she wouldn’t behave rationally.

the difference between susanB and a robot that facially acts in a rational manner, is that robots are programmed to act in such ways by rational beings; susanB wouldn’t have any such direction, so wouldn’t act in any way that could be considered evidence of rational thought. what’s more, it wouldn’t simply be a case of lacking the requisite pedagogical history - susanB would be immune from any kind of learning. at least of rational subject matter (math, language, etc.).

Why, exactly, would a physical system be incapable of demonstrating learning behavior?

 

[LatinCat]

EnterTheBowser:

Just like there’s a difference between flash of lightnng and a measurable electric discharge during a storm? If you have access to it, you might want to look at Smart’s paper - it really is a good introduction to arguments in favor of materialism. Nomalogical danglers abound in dualism…

I’ll take a look at his paper but materialism was anihilated by the piercing logic of St. Thomas Aquinas. But I still submitt this challenge: Just becasue a person has a materialistic view, does not mean that they have proven materialism. And furthermore, I think that you are missing something still. A thought, i.e. “The sky is blue” is not a physical thing. It is a concept. Concepts are abstract things, not material things. Yet they are still things.