Souls

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EnterTheBowser:
Why, exactly, would a physical system be incapable of demonstrating learning behavior?
it would be able to learn, it just wouldn’t be able to learn anything requiring rationality. because rationality requires what, on this thread, we’re calling a soul.

so a purely physical being could learn physical processes and behaviours (there was a dog on letterman once who would go to the fridge, open it, grab a beer, close the fridge, and bring it to his master) - it just wouldn’t be able to learn things like calculus. or shakespeare.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
Just like there’s a difference between flash of lightnng and a measurable electric discharge during a storm? If you have access to it, you might want to look at Smart’s paper - it really is a good introduction to arguments in favor of materialism. Nomalogical danglers abound in dualism…
I think that you should read C.S. Lewis’s book, “Miracles”. He doesn’t disprove materialism but he shows how it is an impossible view to hold from a rational perspective.
 
john doran:
it would be able to learn, it just wouldn’t be able to learn anything requiring rationality. because rationality requires what, on this thread, we’re calling a soul.

so a purely physical being could learn physical processes and behaviours (there was a dog on letterman once who would go to the fridge, open it, grab a beer, close the fridge, and bring it to his master) - it just wouldn’t be able to learn things like calculus. or shakespeare.
Are you telling me that a computer can’t do calculus?
 
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LatinCat:
I’ll take a look at his paper but materialism was anihilated by the piercing logic of St. Thomas Aquinas. But I still submitt this challenge: Just becasue a person has a materialistic view, does not mean that they have proven materialism. And furthermore, I think that you are missing something still. A thought, i.e. “The sky is blue” is not a physical thing. It is a concept. Concepts are abstract things, not material things. Yet they are still things.
I would really recommend you go search out Smart’s paper. Regarding Aquinas - could you give a reference? I’d like to take a look at his argument.
 
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LatinCat:
I think that you should read C.S. Lewis’s book, “Miracles”. He doesn’t disprove materialism but he shows how it is an impossible view to hold from a rational perspective.
I’ll take it out of the library next chance I get. As for yourself, Hume had something to say about miracles that you might find interesting.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
I’m curious to hear a Catholic perspective on this question:

Let’s say that we’re not really sure if Susan has a soul. How would we go about figuring out if she does or not? Or, equivalently, how would we tell the difference between SusanA, who has a soul, and SusanB, who is physically identical to SusanA, but has no soul?
Rev 6
9When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain because of the word of God and the testimony they had maintained. 10They called out in a loud voice, “How long, Sovereign Lord, holy and true, until you judge the inhabitants of the earth and avenge our blood?” 11Then each of them was given a white robe, and they were told to wait a little longer, until the number of their fellow servants and brothers who were to be killed as they had been was completed.

We only know that both susans have a soul if they are human, because that is what has been revealed in scripture – otherwise we do not know.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
Are you telling me that a computer can’t do calculus?
i’m telling you that a computer does only what we tell it to do. it’s a stimulus-response machine and is not acquainted with any kind of mathematical abstracta.

see what i’m saying? it can do math to the extent that it’s a complicated abacus that we have constructed from the gorund-up precisely to take certain (name removed by moderator)uts, perform certain mechanical transformations on them, and then spit out certain outputs.

computers can’t think about math.
 
john doran:
i’m telling you that a computer does only what we tell it to do. it’s a stimulus-response machine and is not acquainted with any kind of mathematical abstracta.

see what i’m saying? it can do math to the extent that it’s a complicated abacus that we have constructed from the gorund-up precisely to take certain (name removed by moderator)uts, perform certain mechanical transformations on them, and then spit out certain outputs.

computers can’t think about math.
Again, that was not my question. How would we go about figuring out whether Susan (presuming we don’t know if she’s A or B) was really thinking about calculus or merely performing mechanical transformations on given (name removed by moderator)uts?
 
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EnterTheBowser:
I’ll take it out of the library next chance I get. As for yourself, Hume had something to say about miracles that you might find interesting.
it comes down to this:
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Hume:
Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.
this is the application of a rudimentary (and utterly false) epistemology; the statistical math doesn’t actually come out the way he claims. not necessarily, at any rate (i.e. not in principle, which is what he argues).
 
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EnterTheBowser:
Again, that was not my question. How would we go about figuring out whether Susan (presuming we don’t know if she’s A or B) was really thinking about calculus or merely performing mechanical transformations on given (name removed by moderator)uts?
i think you’re missing my point…

susanB isn’t a robot or a computer, in that she, arguendo, hasn’t been programmed by us - she’s just a humanoid organism physically isomorphic with susanA, but without a soul. (which is why i observed that computers only do what we construct them and ***tell ***them to do).

and the observable difference would be that susanB is incapable of putatively rational behaviour.

it would be no different from my ability to determine that my dog has no (rational) soul - no matter how many books i read to him, and no matter how much i try to teach him about the continuum hypothesis, i make no progress.

however, if what you’re really asking is how one could tell, by observation, the difference between an ensouled susanA and a soulless susanB, assuming that they are in every observable respect the same, then the question is tautological, and amounts to “what observable differences are there between two objects that are observationally indistinguishable?”. and the answer, obviously enough, is “none”.

but then, your question is trivial and uninteresting, and doesn’t have anything to do with souls.
 
john doran:
i think you’re missing my point…

susanB isn’t a robot or a computer, in that she, arguendo, hasn’t been programmed by us - she’s just a humanoid organism physically isomorphic with susanA, but without a soul. (which is why i observed that computers only do what we construct them and ***tell ***them to do).

and the observable difference would be that susanB is incapable of putatively rational behaviour.

it would be no different from my ability to determine that my dog has no (rational) soul - no matter how many books i read to him, and no matter how much i try to teach him about the continuum hypothesis, i make no progress.
So is your argument then that since human brains have not been constructed in the same way that a person might go about constructing a robot which behaves rationally (but is not actually rational), human brains cannot provide for the (illusion of) rational behavior? If that’s the case, I wonder what basis you have for so asserting - that the human brain is not “constructed” (i.e. produced by genes environment etc) so that it can produce rational behavior.
however, if what you’re really asking is how one could tell, by observation, the difference between an ensouled susanA and a soulless susanB, assuming that they are in every observable respect the same, then the question is tautological, and amounts to “what observable differences are there between two objects that are observationally indistinguishable?”. and the answer, obviously enough, is “none”.

but then, your question is trivial and uninteresting, and doesn’t have anything to do with souls.
I’ve specifically stayed away from stipulating something like that, because you’re right - the question would be trivial and uninteresting.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
So is your argument then that since human brains have not been constructed in the same way that a person might go about constructing a robot which behaves rationally (but is not actually rational), human brains cannot provide for the (illusion of) rational behavior?
yes.
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EnterTheBowser:
If that’s the case, I wonder what basis you have for so asserting - that the human brain is not “constructed” (i.e. produced by genes environment etc) so that it can produce rational behavior.
because, at a minimum, rationality requires acquaintance with abstract objects. and a concrete entity cannot have such an acquaintance. nor can any concrete entity produced solely by other purely concrete entities (like genes or the environment).

that is, if there is no rational programmer/designer in the creative chain, then none of the products of that chain can exhibit rational-type behaviour (since the appearance of rationality in robots and computers is itself the result of rational design and implementation). or, in yet other words, a computer can appear to do math only because it was made to do it by a being capable of thinking about math.
 
john doran:


that is, if there is no rational programmer/designer in the creative chain, then none of the products of that chain can exhibit rational-type behaviour (since the appearance of rationality in robots and computers is itself the result of rational design and implementation). or, in yet other words, a computer can appear to do math only because it was made to do it by a being capable of thinking about math.
So how a thing was designed takes precedence over how it is? That is, if, through absurd accident - a tornado blows through a junkyard - a robot is thrown together by random forces, and this robot happens to be structurally identical to another robot designed by an intelligent designer to mimic rational behavior, the accidental robot would not actually mimic rational behavior? Is that what you’re saying?
 
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EnterTheBowser:
So how a thing was designed takes precedence over how it is? That is, if, through absurd accident - a tornado blows through a junkyard - a robot is thrown together by random forces, and this robot happens to be structurally identical to another robot designed by an intelligent designer to mimic rational behavior, the accidental robot would not actually mimic rational behavior? Is that what you’re saying?
more or less.

keep in mind that i was careful to limit my case of robotics to “the range of their activity”; in fact, we are capable only of producing entities that mimic rational behaviour in certain specific and specifically limited ways…

in your example, neither robot is actually rational, something which would easily be discernible to anyone attempting it to get it to manifest behaviour indicative of “higher” rationality, like math or language (the linguistic expression of acquaintance with mathematical abstracta).

the interesting question, of course, is what would we say about a robot designed comprehensively enough actually to reproduce every human behaviour, like the replicants in blade runner? is such a thing possible? would they have a soul?

and here, i think, we’ve run into the limits of the gedankenexperiment; the fact remains that i believe that we occupy opposite sides of an epistemic divide: whereas you would only accept the existence of a soul based on certain uniquely instantiable behavioural evidence, i accept the soul (based on principled reasoning) and would stipulate that anything behaving in such a way is ensouled.

which may very well commit me to the idea that god would actually invest artificial creatures with spiritual life, so that the moment we threw the switch on a roy batty (blade runner), god would breathe life into him.

and that would be fine.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
So how a thing was designed takes precedence over how it is? That is, if, through absurd accident - a tornado blows through a junkyard - a robot is thrown together by random forces, and this robot happens to be structurally identical to another robot designed by an intelligent designer to mimic rational behavior, the accidental robot would not actually mimic rational behavior? Is that what you’re saying?
by the by, i would also probably be inclined to believe that, in such a case as the one you describe, the evidence favors not randomness, but intelligent design.

but i accept your stipulation, just for argument’s sake.
 
john doran:
which may very well commit me to the idea that god would actually invest artificial creatures with spiritual life, so that the moment we threw the switch on a roy batty (blade runner), god would breathe life into him.
Doesn’t that seem like Bomb-Shelter Theology?
I’m prepared to admit that if humans create an artificial lifeform which demonstrates genuine free-will, abstract intellect and self-identity–the dogma of the spiritual soul (and all dogma thereby) is in trouble. I’m pretty confident that this will never happen, but it’s only confirming a skeptic’s suspicion that believers will believe regardless of evidence if we deny that any dogma is empirically falsifiable.
it wouldn’t simply be a case of lacking the requisite pedagogical history - susanB would be immune from any kind of learning. at least of rational subject matter (math, language, etc.).
What do you think of groups such as this who claim that parrots can learn mathematic and linguistic concepts? I’ve seen some documentaries on primatology which suggested that they can also understand basic commands and even arithmetic–though I suppose alot of that could be simulated and/or induced, especially considering that these groups have vested interests. Besides, if I tell my dog to roll over and he does so, does that mean he understands english? Or if I tell him to add one plus one, and he barks twice, is he a mathematician? Animals can be ‘programmed’ in a sense, to respond to stimuli, much like computers; but they do not demonstrate the independent, creative, and analytical intellect of human beings. Anyway, food for thought.
 
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Neithan:
Doesn’t that seem like Bomb-Shelter Theology?
no.
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Neithan:
I’m prepared to admit that if humans create an artificial lifeform which demonstrates genuine free-will, abstract intellect and self-identity–the dogma of the spiritual soul (and all dogma thereby) is in trouble.
well, i disagree. as i said, that will be better evidence to me, not that the soul has got nothing to do with rationality and free will, but rather that the entity displaying such properties has a soul.
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Neithan:
I’m pretty confident that this will never happen, but it’s only confirming a skeptic’s suspicion that believers will believe regardless of evidence if we deny that any dogma is empirically falsifiable.
i disagree. for one thing, the so called principle of falsifiability has been far too often uncritically accepted as the sine qua non of meaningful science. it isn’t. not by a long, long shot.
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Neithan:
What do you think of groups such as this who claim that parrots can learn mathematic and linguistic concepts?
i think they’re wrong. pardon the pun, but “parroting” sounds that happen to resemble linguistic phenomena isn’t evidence of rationality - it’s evidence of mimicry. which itself does not (necessarily) involve rationality.
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Neithan:
Besides, if I tell my dog to roll over and he does so, does that mean he understands english? Or if I tell him to add one plus one, and he barks twice, is he a mathematician?
well, no. and that’s my point: it’s much more reasonable to believe that your dog is behaving in the manner your repetitive instruction caused it to behave, than it is that it actually has some kind of linguistic or mathematical facility.
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Neithan:
Animals can be ‘programmed’ in a sense, to respond to stimuli, much like computers; but they do not demonstrate the independent, creative, and analytical intellect of human beings. Anyway, food for thought.
exactly.
 
john doran:


and here, i think, we’ve run into the limits of the gedankenexperiment; the fact remains that i believe that we occupy opposite sides of an epistemic divide: whereas you would only accept the existence of a soul based on certain uniquely instantiable behavioural evidence, i accept the soul (based on principled reasoning) and would stipulate that anything behaving in such a way is ensouled.

Well… what if the designer of that robot could say, “Well, look, here’s the algorithm which we designed, and here’s all the material parts which instantiate that algorithm, and we can explain every single action taken by the robot by looking to those material parts…” Would you still hold that the thing must have a soul?

I’ll admit that I’m not a dualist and I’m not an idealist, but for the purposes of this discussion, I’m willing to grant that we can be sure that we - and other humans - do have souls and that it’s reasonable to so believe.
 
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EnterTheBowser:
Well… what if the designer of that robot could say, “Well, look, here’s the algorithm which we designed, and here’s all the material parts which instantiate that algorithm, and we can explain every single action taken by the robot by looking to those material parts…” Would you still hold that the thing must have a soul?
yes. because there’s no physical evidence that could be presented that there isn’t a non-corporeal principle of intellection present, a principle required by reasons for which i currently lack any defeating reasons.
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EnterTheBowser:
I’ll admit that I’m not a dualist and I’m not an idealist, but for the purposes of this discussion, I’m willing to grant that we can be sure that we - and other humans - do have souls and that it’s reasonable to so believe.
well, i’m neither a dualist nor an idealist, either. and i may believe in the robust theology of the “soul” as a result of my catholicism, but i believe in a non-physical component of intellection purely from the “light of natural reason”.
 
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