Space, Time, and Knowledge

[iNs1d3tRiP]

I’ve recently been studying Karl Rahner’s Spirit in the World. In light of this it has struck up several great conversations regarding epistemology. One of the most intriguing conversations I’ve been entangled in is about God’s knowledge of your choices.

Basically there are two positions and they go as follows:

The first asserts that God knows everything, definitively, even that of the future. The argument goes like this.

God is all-knowing.
knowledge of the future includes everything.
Therefore God knows the future.

However, the second argument is developed in direct opposition to this argument. It goes as follows.

The future is not yet.
What is not yet, does not exist.
Therefore, what does not exist cannot be known.

Of course this position holds that the future cannot be known definitively. It appears that we can definitely make very very good estimations, or even guesses if you are skeptic, as probability is really just the mathematics behind potentiality and actuality. Also notice, this view does not question God’s Omniscience because it doesn’t say there is something God does not know. Rather it says it would be nonsensical for God to know it because if he did then it would be. The implications of God definitively knowing the future would mean that we would already be actualized in our state which God knows we would be. Ergo double predestination.

However, this argument is usually countered by saying God exists outside of time therefore God sees all. While this in itself is very convincing at face value, I am unable to explain myself after the following explanation of knowledge is given:

All intuition must come through the material or the sensible. This is the case because there are no explicit Forms of anything, rather the form of everything is in the particular itself. By sensing the particular, the object can then be abstracted and all the possibilities and limits can be understood. These possibilities and limits is essentially what the form is, it says what the thing could be and still at the same time remain the kind of thing it is. As far as I know this epistemological view is extremely Thomistic, as it is virtually identical to St. Aquinas’ Naive Realism.

However, this understanding of knowledge completely and utterly destroys the argument for God knowing the future definitively at the rational level. Of course God can still make very accurate estimations through probability, since He/She has practical knowledge of everything in all of Creation.

This leads me to my request. I would really appreciate it if someone could point me in the right direction as to what St. Aquinas would say on the issue. I’m very curious what position he held because this problem directly stems from Naive Realism.

 

[Eucharisted]

Saint Thomas Aquinas said:

I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Question 22, Article 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): “Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. ‘justified’].”

newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm#article2

I like this theory of predestination:

The theory of predestination post prævisa merita
This theory defended by the earlier Scholastics (Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus), as well as by the majority of the Molinists, and warmly recommended by St. Francis de Sales “as the truer and more attractive opinion”, has this as its chief distinction, that it is free from the logical necessity of upholding negative reprobation. It differs from predestination ante prævisa merita in two points: first, it rejects the absolute decree and assumes a hypothetical predestination to glory; secondly, it does not reverse the succession of grace and glory in the two orders of eternal intention and of execution in time, but makes glory depend on merit in eternity as well as in the order of time. This hypothetical decree reads as follows: Just as in time eternal happiness depends on merit as a condition, so I intended heaven from all eternity only for foreseen merit. — It is only by reason of the infallible foreknowledge of these merits that the hypothetical decree is changed into an absolute: These and no others shall be saved.
This view not only safeguards the universality and sincerity of God’s salvific will, but coincides admirably with the teachings of St. Paul (cf. 2 Timothy 4:8), who knows that there “is laid up” (reposita est, apokeitai) in heaven “a crown of justice”, which “the just judge will render” (reddet, apodosei) to him on the day of judgment. Clearer still is the inference drawn from the sentence of the universal Judge (Matthew 25:34 sq.): “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat” etc. As the “possessing” of the Kingdom of Heaven in time is here linked to the works of mercy as a condition, so the “preparation” of the Kingdom of Heaven in eternity, that is, predestination to glory is conceived as dependent on the foreknowledge that good works will be performed. The same conclusion follows from the parallel sentence of condemnation (Matthew 25:41 sq.): “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat” etc. For it is evident that the “everlasting fire of hell” can only have been intended from all eternity for sin and demerit, that is, for neglect of Christian charity, in the same sense in which it is inflicted in time. Concluding a pari, we must say the same of eternal bliss. This explanation is splendidly confirmed by the Greek Fathers. Generally speaking, the Greeks are the chief authorities for conditional predestination dependent on foreseen merits. The Latins, too, are so unanimous on this question that St. Augustine is practically the only adversary in the Occident. St. Hilary (In Ps. lxiv, n. 5) expressly describes eternal election as proceeding from “the choice of merit” (ex meriti delectu), and St. Ambrose teaches in his paraphrase of Rom., viii, 29 (De fide, V, vi, 83): “Non enim ante prædestinavit quam præscivit, sed quorum merita præscivit, eorum præmia prædestinavit” (He did not predestine before He foreknew, but for those whose merits He foresaw, He predestined the reward). To conclude: no one can accuse us of boldness if we assert that the theory here presented has a firmer basis in Scripture and Tradition than the opposite opinion.

newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htm

 

[Bluegoat]

It seems to me that saying that the form is in the particular is not the same as saying there are no forms at all. As well, Thomas, like Aristotle, does allow that there are forms without a material component, like angels.

As well, your description is of how human knowledge is possible, and I think that you will find that it does not apply to God in the same way, who is the origin of these things and in the Christian understanding, wills them. If it did, it would not mean God had no knowledge of the “future” but rather that he has no knowledge of creation at all - and thus that he does not will creation.

It doesn’t really impact on God being outside of time at all - that would still be the case even in the scenario that he had no knowledge of creation.

I think on this topic generally, if you aren’t interested just in how Thomas sees it, Boethius is the best read, in the Consolation of Philosophy.

 

[iNs1d3tRiP]

As well, your description is of how human knowledge is possible, and I think that you will find that it does not apply to God in the same way, who is the origin of these things and in the Christian understanding, wills them. If it did, it would not mean God had no knowledge of the “future” but rather that he has no knowledge of creation at all - and thus that he does not will creation.

I completely agree. For example if God’s knowledge is how it was described in either argument he would still contain potential in himself. (One for knowing potential and the other for having the potential for knowing.) Its clear that it must be different in some way.

.

IIRC Boethius description is the problem of the first argument. I do believe Thomas disagreed with him on some points about this? However, I could be very wrong there I’m not extremely educated about Thomas is this regard, and even less of Boethius. (I just remember this came up in the discussion and this point was made by someone other than myself.)

The more I think about this, the more I think concepts about God like this is somehow beyond our understanding to reason to it. I believe it is because of God’s intensity of being, and the only way we will ever understand is if God reveals it to us directly. Because as I said, both positions which seem to be polar opposites of each other actually entail the same conclusion, that God would contain potential knowledge or the knowledge of potential. Both conclusions accuse God of not being fully actual which I do believe would be a heresy?

After meditating on this issue I’ve concluded that I need to meditate more.

 

[Bluegoat]

IIRC Boethius description is the problem of the first argument. I do believe Thomas disagreed with him on some points about this? However, I could be very wrong there I’m not extremely educated about Thomas is this regard, and even less of Boethius. (I just remember this came up in the discussion and this point was made by someone other than myself.)

The more I think about this, the more I think concepts about God like this is somehow beyond our understanding to reason to it. I believe it is because of God’s intensity of being, and the only way we will ever understand is if God reveals it to us directly. Because as I said, both positions which seem to be polar opposites of each other actually entail the same conclusion, that God would contain potential knowledge or the knowledge of potential. Both conclusions accuse God of not being fully actual which I do believe would be a heresy?

After meditating on this issue I’ve concluded that I need to meditate more.

I’m afraid I also have no idea what Thomas thought of what Boethius said. But the Consolation is well worth reading in any case, it is a very delightful read with lots of poetry, not at all like reading much of Thomas.

But, it still isn’t quite clear to me what you are finding a problem with God having knowledge of creation?

 

[iNs1d3tRiP]

I’m afraid I also have no idea what Thomas thought of what Boethius said. But the Consolation is well worth reading in any case, it is a very delightful read with lots of poetry, not at all like reading much of Thomas.

But, it still isn’t quite clear to me what you are finding a problem with God having knowledge of creation?

Lots of poetry? I’ll definitely have to check it out. Why did you not say so before?

My problem isn’t with God having knowledge of Creation. My problem is understanding how that actually makes sense.

If God knows what I will choose, then he also knows what I will become.
Everything God knows is actual, not potential.
Therefore I have already become, and am not becoming. (Already in heaven or hell.)

However, on the other side, if God does not know what I will become then he has the potential for knowledge.
If God has the potential for something then he is not fully actual.
Therefore God is not actual.

Obviously the second argument is worse than the first, so I’ll stick with the first. However, I do not understand how God, can know me actualized without me actually being actualized. How can God possibly know something which is actual while it is still potential. If he knows the actualization of my potential then I’m not really potential, I’m actual. Does that clarify what my problem of understanding is? I’m fully willing to admit God does know this, but what I don’t understand is why I am currently potential and actual. As I write this I remember that the only One fully actual is God, which further mystifies how he can know the potential without it being actual.

Like I said earlier it’s not really that I have a hard time accepting this, the problem is understanding. I think the problem is that I’m trying to understand what God is, instead of what he is not.

 

[Bluegoat]

Lots of poetry? I’ll definitely have to check it out. Why did you not say so before?

My problem isn’t with God having knowledge of Creation. My problem is understanding how that actually makes sense.

If God knows what I will choose, then he also knows what I will become.
Everything God knows is actual, not potential.
Therefore I have already become, and am not becoming. (Already in heaven or hell.)

However, on the other side, if God does not know what I will become then he has the potential for knowledge.
If God has the potential for something then he is not fully actual.
Therefore God is not actual.

Obviously the second argument is worse than the first, so I’ll stick with the first. However, I do not understand how God, can know me actualized without me actually being actualized. How can God possibly know something which is actual while it is still potential. If he knows the actualization of my potential then I’m not really potential, I’m actual. Does that clarify what my problem of understanding is? I’m fully willing to admit God does know this, but what I don’t understand is why I am currently potential and actual. As I write this I remember that the only One fully actual is God, which further mystifies how he can know the potential without it being actual.

Like I said earlier it’s not really that I have a hard time accepting this, the problem is understanding. I think the problem is that I’m trying to understand what God is, instead of what he is not.

Ah, but are you sure you aren’t actualized? And are we ever fully actualized in life? In any case, I would agree that for God, all things are completed, that is, fully actualized, so in some sense we certainly are too.

I heard a very interesting physicist on the radio recently who was studying time. He thought that time was not a thing which flows, taking us along with it. Rather each moment in time exists simultaneously, one along side another, each with a slightly different version of ourselves in it. (!!!???) Which raises lots of interesting questions if it were true - one which stumped me and the interviewer didn’t ask about is what is a “moment” if there is no measurement of time involved? (No doubt it would have been some incomprehensible mathematical answer, which may be why the question didn’t get asked for the purposes of a radio program.) Also, what in that case is the nature of conciousness, and what is an individual? (They did talk about that, the physicist had some interesting thoughts but essentially said he really didn’t know but would like to.)

In any case, I thought it made a lot of sense theologically in many ways.

 

[seeker_of_God]

This is an interesting discussion.

We know that God cannot receive knowledge. The act of receiving knowledge implies succession of time, which God transcends. If He did not know the future, then he would be receiving knowledge as the future was actualized. What must be understood I think is that there is no future for God.

I think I read once that it is said that we have our being successively. That is, we are not the same as we were a year ago, nor as we will be a year from now, but all of that is part of our whole being. I think then that God must know that whole being fully, even into the future.

The thing also to keep in mind with God is that with him, there is just one act of knowing, and all is known. That act of knowing is from eternity, outside of time.

How that translates into our own potentiality, I have no idea, but I am fairly confident that the above assertions about God are true.

 

[jimmy85]

I
God is all-knowing.
knowledge of the future includes everything.
Therefore God knows the future.

However, the second argument is developed in direct opposition to this argument. It goes as follows.

The future is not yet.
What is not yet, does not exist.
Therefore, what does not exist cannot be known.

In the many world interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is accepted as the modern interpretation of QM, the second argument is flawed, every possible outcome and every possible future already exist.