St. Thomas a Physicalist?

[Geremia]

In an interesting article by Ralph McInery on St. Thomas Aquinas, he says, in the section “Body & Soul,” that one might

think then that, not being a dualist, Aquinas must be a physicalist, there being only two broad possible positions. Now, the difficulties of providing an adequate account of just what Physicalism is are well known. But suppose we take a minimal characterization of Physicalism as involving the claim that there is some privileged physical science or set of physical sciences, using the term ‘physical’ merely nominally and sociologically as we use it of certain sciences today, that ideally will provide a fully adequate account of all that exists and the fundamental characteristics of reality. Then Aquinas cannot be understood to be a physicalist, since the result of his analysis of perception and thought was to say that these activities are “immaterial,” which was to say, not adequately captured by the kinds of physical descriptions that do adequately account for much of the being and change we observe in the world. There are actually many variations on Dualism and Physicalism in play in recent philosophy. However, the difficulty of placing Aquinas in the broad outlines of that setting ought now to be clear.

I also found an interesting article about how Christians should be Physicalists. Certain forms of Physicalism are not equivalent to materialism.

My questions are, in this vein:

• How does St. Thomas reconcile free-will with the seeming determinism and limits in the physical world? (Cf. [ article on thisSumma (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1).)
• Modern physics studies that upon which human bodies are based. Could the nature of atoms, e.g., contain within them clues about what it means to be human?

Thanks

 

[JohnDamian]

Remember when reading the scholastics that often they will phrase things in a question answer format; where they present arguments which they later oppose - so context is everything!

This is Thomas Aquinas View on free will:

*Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. *
&
Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

Now the second question is much harder, but I would refer you to the following works as they cover this issue more fully (as far as I am aware Thomas was not particularily original in the ideas of individuation and distinction; so to find out how different things are composed in different ways - that is; what is it to be something I’d read:

Abelard; Logica Ingredientibus
Henry of Ghent Quodlibeta Theologica
Duns Scotus Ordinatio
William of Ockham Ordinatio

Particularily the latter two.



NB: Since Aquinas was studied Alexander of Hales, who’s work was valuable in the integration of Aristotelian thought into christian thought it would be difficult to say he was a physicalist. In fact, just opening one of the books of the Summa on the first page (question 74) on the matter of the Eucharist it is clear that Aquinas cannot be described as a physicalist.

 

[Geremia]

And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

Yes, this reminds me of what Boethius says in his Consolation of Philosophy.

Just because there are things that assume free-will does not imply there is free-will, i.e., that one’s will is not determined by anything physical that comprises him. This seems to be part of the objection 5 of articleSumma.

Now the second question is much harder, but I would refer you to the following works as they cover this issue more fully (as far as I am aware Thomas was not particularily original in the ideas of individuation and distinction; so to find out how different things are composed in different ways - that is; what is it to be something I’d read:

Abelard; Logica Ingredientibus
Henry of Ghent Quodlibeta Theologica
Duns Scotus Ordinatio
William of Ockham Ordinatio

Particularily the latter two.

Thanks for the suggestions. The latter two are written by the only ones I have heard of, too.

it would be difficult to say he was a physicalist. In fact, just opening one of the books of the Summa on the first page (question 74) on the matter of the Eucharist it is clear that Aquinas cannot be described as a physicalist.

Since that would lead to pantheism, true. But that is God. (He is outside the real world; He is not the world; and He acts on it from outside it.) What about us?

 

[JohnDamian]

Since that would lead to pantheism, true. But that is God. (He is outside the real world; He is not the world; and He acts on it from outside it.) What about us?

Citing from De Ente Et Essentia (Aquinas), with regards to man, and individuation;

Since everything is individuated by matter and is placed in its genus or species through its form, the accidents that follow from the matter are accidents of the individual, and by these accidents individuals of the same species differ one from another. But the accidents that follow from the form are properly passions of the genus or species, and so they are found in all things participating in the nature of the genus or species, as risibility in man follows from the form, for laughter comes from a certain kind of understanding in the soul of man.

It is evident from this that the composition of matter is not the only thing, although it is the individuating thing of man. So, in regards to man - saying that he (Aquinas) is a physicalist would be wrong.

 

[rvilbig]

My questions are, in this vein:

• How does St. Thomas reconcile free-will with the seeming determinism and limits in the physical world? (Cf. [his Summa (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1) article on this.)
• Modern physics studies that upon which human bodies are based. Could the nature of atoms, e.g., contain within them clues about what it means to be human?

Thanks

Aquinas teaches that the soul is that which brings the potencies of the body to act. From Summa Theologica: “[A] body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body” (Aquinas, Summa Q 75, 1).

This actually agrees entirely with modern physicists’ conception of free will and neurons. Consider Oxford mathematician Roger Penrose’s comments from his book Shadows of the Mind: “With the possibility that quantum effects might indeed trigger much larger activities within the brain, some people have expressed the hope that, in such circumstances, quantum indeterminacy might be what provides an opening for the mind to influence the physical brain. Here, a dualistic viewpoint [of mind and matter] would be likely to be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. Perhaps the ‘free will’ of an ‘external mind’ might be able to influence the quantum choices that actually result from such non-deterministic processes. On this view, it is presumably through the action of quantum theory’s [wave-function collapse] that the dualist’s “mind-stuff” would have its influence on the behaviour of the brain” (Shadows of the Mind, page 349).

Heisenberg actually argued that wavefunction collapse in QM (which is nondeterministic) was a transition from potency to act in according to the principles of Aristotelian mechanics. I speculate that this actualization of the will occurs in sodium channel proteins where quantum effects trigger action potentials in neurons.

Hope this helps/ makes sense.

-Ryan Vilbig
ryan.vilbig@gmail.com

 

[Geremia]

It is evident from this that the composition of matter is not the only thing, although it is the individuating thing of man. So, in regards to man - saying that he (Aquinas) is a physicalist would be wrong.

Thanks for the help

I was reading an article by Yves Simon entitled “Maritain’s Philosophy of Science,” and he said, commenting on Wolff’s false division of the sciences, that "considering the philosophy of the world (cosmology) and the philosophy of the soul (psychology) as parts of metaphysics is, from a Thomistic point of view, completely nonsensical ; for the whole observable world, including the human soul which is the form of a perishable body, belongs to the order of objects which can neither exist nor be thought of apart from matter." (pg. 87). I agree that Wolff had it wrong by starting with metaphysics, but the human soul “belongs to the order of objects which can neither exist nor be thought of apart from matter?” It is the form of the human body, so how can it subsist apart from the body, unlike a non-human animal’s soul? Thanks

 

[Geremia]

Aquinas teaches that the soul is that which brings the potencies of the body to act. From Summa Theologica: “[A] body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body” (Aquinas, Summa Q 75, 1).

Like I said in a previous post on this thread, how exactly can the human soul, unlike an brute animal’s soul, subsist apart from the body, being its form? This sounds almost Platonic to me.

Roger Penrose

I hadn’t heard of the book by Penrose you quoted, but I wouldn’t doubt he would say that quantum indeterminacy leaves room for freewill. But he doesn’t prove that quantum indeterminacy is ontological. I personally think it is epistemological.

Heisenberg

I have heard of this Heisenberg quote on potency and act in quantum before.