St. Thomas Aquinas...Help me understand the 5 proofs

[balto]

@polytropos @AndrewW94 and everyone else…Again thanks very much for all of your responses.

I got the book,Ed Feser’s book Aquinas, added to my wishlist…I found this recently after my post on EWTN ewtn.com/vondemand/audio/file_index.asp?SeriesId=7132 Fr. Robert Spitzer which I found very helpful in this line of apologetics.

Prof. Feser also has some videos of talks he has given on the subject on his website if you are interested (and have hours to kill ): edwardfeser.com/mediaappearances.html. I kind of like hearing someone talk more than reading a book, although his books are very instructive. He only really deals with the First Way in these lectures, but the First Way seems to be one of the more wildly misunderstood arguments that Aquinas makes. Fr. Spitzer also has a book called New Proofs for the Existence of God if you haven’t read it already.

 

[Oreoracle]

I take you to mean “simultaneous” here. And yes: the shaping of a clay pot on a pottery wheel.

If I may interject: I think when most people hear “cause” or “effect”, they have in mind events that have happened. In other words, they want something in the past tense. But your example is in the progressive tense. The shaping is “happening”–it has not “happened”.

If events that are continuously occurring but haven’t yet been completed count, then you could have simply used living your life rather than shaping a pot, for example. But again, that’s not what people usually mean by cause and effect relationships.

 

[polytropos]

If I may interject: I think when most people hear “cause” or “effect”, they have in mind events that have happened. In other words, they want something in the past tense. But your example is in the progressive tense. The shaping is “happening”–it has not “happened”.

I don’t deny that there are causes and effects in the temporal sense. Aquinas would call such series of causes a series per accidens.

That doesn’t imply that cause and effect are coextensive with that usage. Indeed, if a couple people are watching another man shape a pot, and one asks, “What is the cause of the shaping of the pot?”, it is eminently reasonable for the other to respond, “His hands.”

The Thomist position is that accidental causal series can be analyzed as collections of essential (per se) causal series. A father begets a child. In that sense he “caused” the child to exist. You could say that the father was the cause and the child was the effect. And I have no quarrel with that terminology; it is just not the type of causation that is referred to in Aquinas’s cosmological arguments. But the sort of per se causal series exist at each stage of the process of begetting a child (intercourse, development in the womb, growth as a child, etc.).

If events that are continuously occurring but haven’t yet been completed count, then you could have simply used living your life rather than shaping a pot, for example. But again, that’s not what people usually mean by cause and effect relationships.

Well, if my example of causality is an event that is continuously occurring, it does not exactly follow that all events under the description of continuously occurring would be examples of the sort of causality I am talking about. That said, while “living your life” is very broad description (in that it refers to a large collection of processes), I think many of those processes do consist of the type of causation I am referring to. (The examples would be less “paradigmatic.” But to take one example, mastication and various stages of digestion could be so construed.)

 

[catholix_cool]

Prof. Feser also has some videos of talks he has given on the subject on his website if you are interested (and have hours to kill ): edwardfeser.com/mediaappearances.html. I kind of like hearing someone talk more than reading a book, although his books are very instructive. He only really deals with the First Way in these lectures, but the First Way seems to be one of the more wildly misunderstood arguments that Aquinas makes. Fr. Spitzer also has a book called New Proofs for the Existence of God if you haven’t read it already.

SWEET! I have already added Fr. Spitzer’s book to my wishlist. Hopefully I can find these at my local library/church library.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Doesn’t seem plausible to me. As I’ve pointed out twice now (without response), Aquinas can’t be getting his divine sustaining efficient cause by unreflectively extending the concept of accidental efficient causes, since accidental efficient causes do not adhere to the principle of proportionate causality.

If you could translate this sentence into something less technical I’ll have a go at responding.

In the sensible world, from which we gain our definition/understanding of “instrumental causality” and “efficient causality”, cause/effect changes, by definition, do not seem to be simultaneous.

I don’t think this is true. (I’ll give my example of a simultaneous cause/effect relation below.) All that is absolutely necessary to the significations of “cause” and “effect” is that there is a priority to cause and some sense of dependence of the effect on the cause. There does not seem to be a prima facie case against excluding logical priority.

Can you give an example of exactly what you define as “logical priority.” I am not sure that your definition of effect is what most people understand by that word. Instrumental causes are always prior to their effects both temporally and logically (though I am not sure if you use the word logical in the same way). Examples observed in the sensible world of such changes (from where we define “effect”) always seem to take a finite amount of time.
If they are truly simultaneous then we may well conclude they are both effects of a prior common cause not yet discovered.

Aquinas seems to agree:
“Those things alone are measured by time which are in motion” SCG 1:15
“Everything imperfect is derived from something perfect: for perfection is naturally
prior to imperfection, as actuality to potentiality” (SGC 1:44)
And as Rickaby comments," In the series of created causes, the imperfect is doubtless
prior in time to the perfect." It is the instrumental cause that acts on the imperfection.

I take you to mean “simultaneous” here.

Yes that was a slip on my part - but why you think the difference is significant?

And yes: the shaping of a clay pot on a pottery wheel.

Why do you think changing the shape of clay happens at exactly the same time that the potter presses his fingers? The very fact that one feels pressure on one’s fingers means one’s fingers compress before force can be effectively applied to the clay to change its shape.
Compression of matter always takes time, no matter how small. No matter is perfectly inelastic as I have already mentioned.

When Aquinas talks about God’s knowledge of future contingents, Aquinas is not referencing particular future contingents. He is conceiving of possible entities, but those entities are conceptual.

Lets go back to what you originally said: "I would argue that it is not possible to refer to something which does not yet exist. "

Yet Aquinas posits exactly this of God in SCG. Nobody said anything about the effect having to actually exist…See below.

… not because he knows the state of the universe currently and extrapolates based on laws (or something of the sort)…

I am just paraphrasing his extensive statements in SCG. While your own statement of what I said is a C17th mechanistic way of putting it - it is pretty much what Aquinas seems to be saying.

“God knows nonentities inasmuch as in some way they have being, either in the power of God, or in their (creature) causes…”
“As thus known, it should be said to be seen by God as already present in its existence.”
“As from a necessary cause the effect follows with certainty, with like certainty does
it follow from a contingent cause, when the cause is complete, provided no hindrance be placed. He knows not only the causes of contingent events, but like-wise the means whereby they may be hindered from coming off…” (SGC 1:65-68)

And Rickaby comments, “To an omniscient mind there would be no uncertainty. Such a mind would read the contingent event as necessarily contained in and necessarily following from its causes. I speak of events of pure physical causation: for, as I have said, of such only is there question here…”

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I don’t deny that there are causes and effects in the temporal sense. … .

How could anyone deny this, this is essential to learning what “cause/effect” means.
Temporal priority would also seem essential to the definition held by most English speakers as well. Perhaps medieval Latins and ancient Greek thinkers held something different. If they did then The 2nd Way perhaps is invalidly translated using the words “cause/effect”

On cultural definitions depends whether or not the words/principles are used analogically or univocally. Who decides what is a correct definition:shrug:.

And would this have some bearing on the validity of the logic used?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The parent child example is a bit weak and not directly relevent to the point I think you are making. (To take away the cause is to take away the effect would be more generously exemplified by saying that to kill a man before he procreates is to kill his progeny. And that is quite reasonable an example of what Aquinas’s phrase may mean too).
Even the usual example given of what Aquinas meant (a locomotive jolting a train of tightly coupled carriages all the way to the rear caboose) is not instantaneous in the real world. All matter has some elasticity, even iron.

Also, like it or not, it seems time is intrinsic to the definition of sensible change and therefore of efficient causality even if it wasn’t what Aquinas was primarily saying. All worldly change, by definition, requires some duration of prior time to be associated with the instrumental causes. The word “change” may be problematic as below.

The problem I see here is that there is no consistency of definitions.
(a) While Aquinas is not really talking about time series that is clearly the sort of “sense world” examples he presents to the reader to start with. He even speaks about multiple efficient causes. But if he is not also talking about temporal time/causality why does he say this. For if he is really talking about ontological “sustaining” causality (causal series per se) then how can there be multiple efficient causes? There cannot. Only a god (who is existence) is capable of a “sustaining” efficient causality when we speak of being “per se”. Not even angels can assist there. So there can only be one such efficient cause anyway . So its a case of I know what Aquinas meant but I heard what he said. Much analogy is at work in this 2nd Way.

(b) We only define/understand efficient causality by way of the senses. ie, by examples of temporal/material change. But the sort of efficient causality Aquinas really seems to be speaking of is about creation ex nihilo and “sustaining” of created things in existence. But we have no experience of such a “change” and strictly speaking we cannot assume this is an example of the same “change” or efficient causality as we know it. We cannot assume it works the same way. We can only speak by analogy not univocally.
Therefore logical defintions breakdown. It is especially hard to see how time is involved in such “change” or “efficient causality.”

I find it interesting that the Catholic Church never uses the word “change” when speaking of transubstantiation - presumably in acknowledgement of exactly the same limitation. We speak of “transforming” or passively “it will become for us…” - at least in the latin.

A black smith using multiple hammers successively is an example of incidental causality. This kind of causality could theoretically have been going on forever. But if the blacksmith stops at one or a few, you have accidental causality, where the causality of the hammer is derived from the effecient causality of the blacksmith’s mind. He is the material agent cause. But he does not act at all unless some agent ( God ) has given him a form or nature or essence by which he acts. It is this per se series that cannot go on infinitely. Thomas is leaving open the possibility that there are other effecient causes causiing the blacksmith to act which are infinite themselves ( angels or the " celestial spheres " ) which themselves depend on God. It is like the sailor in the boat, which is held up by the sea, which is held up by the earth, etc. One must come to an end or the sailor would not be sailing.

I have never heard of " proportionate causality " in Thomas. The only reference to " proportionatality " I have seen in Thomas referres to the various ways perfections, such as being or good, are applied to God and his creatures. God is being and good in an absolutely perfect sence, we are being and good in an analogous sense only and in a fitting proportion. One could apply the term to causality but it should then be defined exactly what is meant. Certainly the causality of creatures is not total and is dependent upon the efficient causality of God. If that is what is meant, then it would be " proportionate " causality. I don’t think Thomas ever used the term that way. At least I don’t recall running into it.

When you say " I find it interesting that the Catholic Church never uses the word “change” when speaking of transubstantiation - presumably in acknowledgement of exactly the same limitation. We speak of “transforming” or passively “it will become for us…” - at least in the latin, " that is absolutely incorrect. If you check the CCC, you will find that transubstantiation is described as the act by which the substance of the bread and wine are changed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ while the accidents alone remain - but in no subject. You can check it for for yourself. I’m a bit surprised that you are unaware of that.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

If you could translate this sentence into something less technical I’ll have a go at responding.

Your Kantian concern seems to be that Aquinas is not justified in extending the usage of efficient cause in the temporal sense to the divine-sustaining sense. What I’m saying is that that reading of Aquinas is inconsistent. The fact that he believes the principle of proportionate causality to be applicable to his Second Way shows that he is not extending the temporal usage to the divine-sustaining usage. This is because the principle of proportionate causality (ie. that that which the effect receives is contained virtually or eminently in the cause) doesn’t apply in the temporal sense. So he has other metaphysical principles at work; he is not extrapolating from the temporal usage.

Can you give an example of exactly what you define as “logical priority.”

I did. The potter shaping the pot.

Instrumental causes are always prior to their effects both temporally and logically (though I am not sure if you use the word logical in the same way). Examples observed in the sensible world of such changes (from where we define “effect”) always seem to take a finite amount of time.

Your second sentence here casts doubt upon your assertion in the first. I’m not denying that changes occur over periods of time. That is indeed what is meant by “simultaneous” as opposed to “instantaneous” (occuring in a single instant).

Why do you think changing the shape of clay happens at exactly the same time that the potter presses his fingers? The very fact that one feels pressure on one’s fingers means one’s fingers compress before force can be effectively applied to the clay to change its shape.
Compression of matter always takes time, no matter how small. No matter is perfectly inelastic as I have already mentioned.

Here again, it seems like you are confusing “simultaneous” and “instantaneous.” I wouldn’t expect the relation to be perfectly inelastic; it seems that only an instantaneous cause would be perfectly inelastic.

Regarding whether the fingers must compress before force can be applied to the clay–I don’t think so. While the fingers are compressing, force is being imparted to the clay. It’s not like the fingers must be completely compressed (whatever that would mean) for the clay to change. The change might be minimal; but the fingers only compress for a brief period of time before the pottery really begins.

If they are truly simultaneous then we may well conclude they are both effects of a prior common cause not yet discovered.

Why? What sort of cause would this be (in the case of the clay)? Though your other comments seem to show that we aren’t on the same page vis-a-vis the definition of “simultaneous.”

I’ll get to the stuff on time and referring to future contingents later.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Your Kantian concern seems to be that Aquinas is not justified in extending the usage of efficient cause in the temporal sense to the divine-sustaining sense.

Lets not put views in boxes - you may end up short-circuiting a fruitful discussion by assuming things that are not there. In fact I have not really studied Kant on this point at all - my observations are purely those of (hopefully) a reasonable man.

Lets back up the truck. You stated:
“A cause (per se) is simultaneous to its effect”.

Lets ignore the problematic expression “cause per se” for the moment and concentrate on sensible cause and effects which you quote Aquinas opining as always “simultaneous”.

If you want to use this definition of cause/effect univocally in both the realms of metaphysics and physics then surely the definition must prove true for all given examples in both realms. And certainly it most prove true in those many sensible examples which were used to induct the principle of cause/effect in the first place.

In other words you must logically accept that your above statement is in principle a falsifiable one. Do you? No point proceeding if you do not.

But to continue… yes, agreed that “instantaneous” is not the same thing as simultaneous. And not just because it refers to a frozen point in time - but also because this word is not one of event relation.

Anways, I am not sure if we both understand the word “simultaneous” univocally then.
Sounds like “at the same time” to me so its a word relating events on a temporal “timeline”.
Unlike “instantaneous” that relation of two events on a timeline could be dynamic, that is, two events could be happening at the same time over a given duration. Also, these simultaneous events could be (together) “instantaneous” - that is, at successive frozen points of time they could be observed to arise simultaneously.

If you accept that definition of simultaneous then I observe your statement above still looks to have speed wobbles in the sensible world. It seems one still cannot get away from the charge that sensible change (which is intrinsic to observing cause/effect examples) could still involve efficient causality producing an instantaneous effect (ie no duration of time between them).

If causes are always truly simultaneous with their effects then two consequences follow:
(a) in the sensible world we would never be able to perceive an “arrow of time”. In other words we would not able to “per se” (objectively) judge which sensible event has temporal priority over the other. So we would not be able to judge which event was cause and which was effect (“dependence” as you put it). Actually, we would not be able to per se objectively judge that any cause/event relation existed between these two events at all.
Both events may also be simultaneous effects of some other unobserved causal event.

(b) the sensible world is perfectly inelastic. This does not seem to be true.

Logically then, if you continue to hold that sensible change is “simultaneous” whence the judgement of “dependence.” It cannot be from observation, it can only be from subjective “intuition” or from a certain culturally learnt “sense-making habit” of reason as applied to pre and post circumstances surrounding the alleged “example.” If this is Kant’s view then, though I have not really read him,…its suggests there may be some appreciation of “objective reality” in my off the top of my head observations here. Or it could just be chance.

CONTINUED BELOW

 

[Blue_Horizon]

CONTINUED FROM ABOVE…

What I’m saying is that that reading of Aquinas is inconsistent. The fact that he believes the principle of proportionate causality to be applicable to his Second Way shows that he is not extending the temporal usage to the divine-sustaining usage. This is because the principle of proportionate causality (ie. that that which the effect receives is contained virtually or eminently in the cause) doesn’t apply in the temporal sense. So he has other metaphysical principles at work; he is not extrapolating from the temporal usage.

I am warmed that you agree that Aquinas understands causality differently at the metaphysical level compared to the physical. The problem then is how do we make the logical leap from the physical to the metaphysical if the concept of cause/effect is not the same and the usage is not univocal. The argument seems to become a non-sequiter and so less than coercive.

There is one solution (I got the idea from Rickaby SJ who used this concept wrt another matter). “Limit Theory”
Of could resolve the physics/metaphysics contradiction (that sensible reality points to cause/effect being “per se” simultaneous even though no sensible example ever is) by observing that the elastic physical world “at the limit” (a mathematical term applied to the never reached value (asymptotes) that hyperboles tend to at infinity) does point to the “simultaneous-ness” of cause/effect.

Interestingly this logic is validly used/assumed in Newton’s First Law of Motion. For how can we hold that an object will continue to move forever at a constant velocity when we have never yet observed such an example in the sensible world. Not even the planets are so perfect. Yet we can see a pattern, a mathematical calculation that consistently applies to all such examples that justifies the law because “at the limit” this is what the algorithm points to. I suppose it is a form of induction.
It is moot whether it is truly falsifiable. If we ever cam across an example which defied the algorithm (F=ma) we would just make use of the “measurement error” escape clause or assume there were forces acting on this object “that must exist” but which we cannot see yet. (This of course is how Pluto was discovered - which only reinforced the truth of Newton’s Laws).

So this argument may justify a definition of cause/effect that holds at the metaphysical level (“per se”) but which does not hold at the physical level.

I’m not denying that changes occur over periods of time. That is indeed what is meant by “simultaneous” as opposed to “instantaneous” (occuring in a single instant).

This is extremely ambiguous. You could mean many things. If you can correct my definition of simultaneous above that should sort this out.

I wouldn’t expect the relation to be perfectly inelastic; it seems that only an instantaneous cause would be perfectly inelastic.

Agreed. Yet your understanding of simultaneous seems at odds with this.

Regarding whether the fingers must compress before force can be applied to the clay–I don’t think so. While the fingers are compressing, force is being imparted to the clay. It’s not like the fingers must be completely compressed (whatever that would mean) for the clay to change. The change might be minimal; but the fingers only compress for a brief period of time before the pottery really begins.

If you are trying to say that there is no “before/after” (durational as well as logical) in the act of the hands and the deformation/change in the clay then Physics is agin you. That is always guaranteed due to principles/definitions of things like inertia, force, work, energy and elasticity. Sensible nature resists change and this causes latency. It takes a transfer of energy to overcome such resistance/inertia and energy transfer is intrinsically a duration thing.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

A black smith using multiple hammers successively is an example of incidental causality. This kind of causality could theoretically have been going on forever. But if the blacksmith stops at one or a few, you have accidental causality, where the causality of the hammer is derived from the effecient causality of the blacksmith’s mind. He is the material agent cause. But he does not act at all unless some agent ( God ) has given him a form or nature or essence by which he acts. It is this per se series that cannot go on infinitely. Thomas is leaving open the possibility that there are other effecient causes causiing the blacksmith to act which are infinite themselves ( angels or the " celestial spheres " ) which themselves depend on God. It is like the sailor in the boat, which is held up by the sea, which is held up by the earth, etc. One must come to an end or the sailor would not be sailing.

Interesting but doesn’t help L2.
The problem for me isn’t the logic of finite number of instrumental causes but a metaphysical definition of “cause/effect” (“per se”) that seems inconsistent with the definition used in the physical world. If that is the case then the “logic” for the existence of God based on such analogical usage is considerably attenuated.

I have never heard of " proportionate causality " in Thomas. The only reference to " proportionatality " I have seen in Thomas referres to the various ways perfections, such as being or good, are applied to God and his creatures. God is being and good in an absolutely perfect sence, we are being and good in an analogous sense only and in a fitting proportion. One could apply the term to causality but it should then be defined exactly what is meant. Certainly the causality of creatures is not total and is dependent upon the efficient causality of God. If that is what is meant, then it would be " proportionate " causality. I don’t think Thomas ever used the term that way. At least I don’t recall running into it.

Neither have I but I think PT means singular causes cause singular effects, universal ones universal effects etc. Then again maybe not.

When you say " I find it interesting that the Catholic Church never uses the word “change” when speaking of transubstantiation - presumably in acknowledgement of exactly the same limitation. We speak of “transforming” or passively “it will become for us…” - at least in the latin, " that is absolutely incorrect. If you check the CCC, you will find that transubstantiation is described as the act by which the substance of the bread and wine are changed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ while the accidents alone remain - but in no subject. You can check it for for yourself. I’m a bit surprised that you are unaware of that.

It doesn’t surprise me if the CCC does L2. It is more a pastoral effort than a systematic theology tomb for scholars - though having said that such “typos” are rare in the CCC and I have much faith in it.

By “Catholic Church” I certainly meant Aquinas (in Latin).
If you can prove me wrong in a good Latin source of the ST or SCG I would be very interested as I had a debate on this some years ago. Somebody quoted Aquinas using the word “change” but when it was more deeply investigated it was not Aquinas.

Did you know that the headings for each of his questions look to be added by the editors?
One of those headings used the Latin word for “change”. But the content of the question never did. A very fine but important philosophical point.

I suspect the CCC has made a similar “mistake”. Of course it is an acceptable enough colloquialism but strictly speaking I maintain it is not philosophically accurate. I am now sourcing the CCC in the Latin out of curiosity.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

When you say

" I find it interesting that the Catholic Church never uses the word “change” when speaking of transubstantiation - presumably in acknowledgement of exactly the same limitation. We speak of “transforming” or passively “it will become for us…” - at least in the latin, "

Linus2nd my quick confirmatory research appears to confirm me in my original assertion and that you are mistaken.

Yes the English translation of the CCC does indeed use the word “change” in the classic quote from Trent (DS 1642) defining the “Dogma” of Transubstantiation.

CCC1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: “… by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation.”

However this English translation of Trent is, to put it bluntly, wrong.
The Latin word for “change” is “mutatio.”
In fact the words used by Trent above are actually “conversionem” and “conversio” which should properly be translated as “conversion.”

You can research the highly inaccurate philosophical use of the word “change” (mutatio) further at these links:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=9530410&highlight=transubstantiation#post9530410 (Responses 30-37)
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=6312680&postcount=16
newadvent.org/cathen/05573a.htm#section3 (half way down under the Transubstantiation heading)

If we check out more authoritative English quotes of Trent DS 1642 (eg Papal Encyclicals) we see that it is more accurately translated as “conversion”: e.g.
Mysterium Fidei vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_03091965_mysterium_en.html

 

[polytropos]

Lets ignore the problematic expression “cause per se” for the moment and concentrate on sensible cause and effects which you quote Aquinas opining as always “simultaneous”.

If you want to use this definition of cause/effect univocally in both the realms of metaphysics and physics then surely the definition must prove true for all given examples in both realms.

You are attributing a much stronger position to me than I have defended. I didn’t say that causes and effects are “always” simultaneous. Nor did I say that “cause” and “effect” are always used univocally. I in in fact do not agree with either claim, and neither does Aquinas, which is why he distinguishes between series per se and series per accidens. The per se series are ontologically fundamental, but that doesn’t imply that cause/effect are always univocal.

In other words you must logically accept that your above statement is in principle a falsifiable one. Do you?

Of course. If the cases were genuinely shown not to be simultaneous, then it would be falsified.

Anways, I am not sure if we both understand the word “simultaneous” univocally then.
Sounds like “at the same time” to me so its a word relating events on a temporal “timeline”.
Unlike “instantaneous” that relation of two events on a timeline could be dynamic, that is, two events could be happening at the same time over a given duration. Also, these simultaneous events could be (together) “instantaneous” - that is, at successive frozen points of time they could be observed to arise simultaneously.

Can you rearticulate this in a more clear way?

It seems one still cannot get away from the charge that sensible change (which is intrinsic to observing cause/effect examples) could still involve efficient causality producing an instantaneous effect (ie no duration of time between them).

Do you mean no duration of time between the cause and effect? Even on simultaneous causality, there is not duration between the cause and effect, although the cause and effect occur over the same duration. (I can’t tell what you mean here.)

So I take your objection to be that there could be a cause and effect which occur only for an instant. (Of course, please correct me if I am misinterpreting.) Would that not be your dreaded inelastic collision?

(a) in the sensible world we would never be able to perceive an “arrow of time”. In other words we would not able to “per se” (objectively) judge which sensible event has temporal priority over the other. So we would not be able to judge which event was cause and which was effect (“dependence” as you put it).

I don’t see how this follows.

It is not even an issue of temporal priority. Consider the potter. The question is not of which comes first timewise. What is relevant is that an accidental form is being imposed upon the clay by the action of the potter’s fingers, as the potter works.

The change occurs over time. As long as we don’t believe that our observation of time-directional change is what constitutes the arrow of time (full stop), then there is not an issue. But that would be an odd position for a realist to take.

Actually, we would not be able to per se objectively judge that any cause/event relation existed between these two events at all.
Both events may also be simultaneous effects of some other unobserved causal event.

I don’t find this level of skepticism tenable. I am not usually one to throw around Occam’s razor indiscriminately, but positing an invisible cause in each case of simultaneous causality, which already appears proximately sufficient, is about as violent a violation of the principle of parsimony as I could think of.

(b) the sensible world is perfectly inelastic.

Again, I’m very puzzled by this claim. It seems to me like the elasticity of the sensible world is a paradigm case of the fundamentality of simultaneous (occurring over a period of time) causation. It is perfectly inelastic collisions which would occur in a single instant, and which do not actually occur.

 

[polytropos]

I have never heard of " proportionate causality " in Thomas.

Feser refers to it in Aquinas. It’s briefly mentioned in this blog post as well.

 

[polytropos]

In fact the words used by Trent above are actually “conversionem” and “conversio” which should properly be translated as “conversion.”

Aquinas definitely does use conversio when talking about transubstantiation, though the two English translations I looked at translated it as change.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You are attributing a much stronger position to me than I have defended. I didn’t say that causes and effects are “always” simultaneous. Nor did I say that “cause” and “effect” are always used univocally. I in in fact do not agree with either claim, and neither does Aquinas, which is why he distinguishes between series per se and series per accidens. The per se series are ontologically fundamental, but that doesn’t imply that cause/effect are always univocal.

Of course. If the cases were genuinely shown not to be simultaneous, then it would be falsified.

Can you rearticulate this in a more clear way?

Do you mean no duration of time between the cause and effect? Even on simultaneous causality, there is not duration between the cause and effect, although the cause and effect occur over the same duration. (I can’t tell what you mean here.)

So I take your objection to be that there could be a cause and effect which occur only for an instant. (Of course, please correct me if I am misinterpreting.) Would that not be your dreaded inelastic collision?

I don’t see how this follows.

It is not even an issue of temporal priority. Consider the potter. The question is not of which comes first timewise. What is relevant is that an accidental form is being imposed upon the clay by the action of the potter’s fingers, as the potter works.

The change occurs over time. As long as we don’t believe that our observation of time-directional change is what constitutes the arrow of time (full stop), then there is not an issue. But that would be an odd position for a realist to take.

I don’t find this level of skepticism tenable. I am not usually one to throw around Occam’s razor indiscriminately, but positing an invisible cause in each case of simultaneous causality, which already appears proximately sufficient, is about as violent a violation of the principle of parsimony as I could think of.

Again, I’m very puzzled by this claim. It seems to me like the elasticity of the sensible world is a paradigm case of the fundamentality of simultaneous (occurring over a period of time) causation. It is perfectly inelastic collisions which would occur in a single instant, and which do not actually occur.

If you cannot understand my numerous attempts to ponder what I interpret your understanding of “sumultaneous” is in this context then I think its your turn - or lets put this painful disconnect in the too hard basket .

Lets reverse back to:

“A cause (per se) is simultaneous to its effect, which is consistent with its occurring over a period of time.”

Are you able to restate this assertion without using the word simultaneous (which presently doesn’t seem to agree with the oxford dictionary)?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linus2nd my quick confirmatory research appears to confirm me in my original assertion and that you are mistaken.

Yes the English translation of the CCC does indeed use the word “change” in the classic quote from Trent (DS 1642) defining the “Dogma” of Transubstantiation.

CCC1376 The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: “… by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation.”

However this English translation of Trent is, to put it bluntly, wrong.
The Latin word for “change” is “mutatio.”
In fact the words used by Trent above are actually “conversionem” and “conversio” which should properly be translated as “conversion.”

You can research the highly inaccurate philosophical use of the word “change” (mutatio) further at these links:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=9530410&highlight=transubstantiation#post9530410 (Responses 30-37)
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=6312680&postcount=16
newadvent.org/cathen/05573a.htm#section3 (half way down under the Transubstantiation heading)

If we check out more authoritative English quotes of Trent DS 1642 (eg Papal Encyclicals) we see that it is more accurately translated as “conversion”: e.g.
Mysterium Fidei vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_03091965_mysterium_en.html

I think the Church knows what it is doing. " Conversion " and " change " mean the same thing. You are reading much too much into this. I think the meaning is made clear by the term " transubstantion, " which can mean nothing but a substantial change, a change in substance, in which the entire substance or being of the bread and wine are changed or converted into the Body and Blood. Of course the Church is not " teaching " philosophy but trying to express the facts of what takes place here. One has to be very careful in trying to express more than the Church has actually said.

I read your " sources " and disagree with their interpretation as I do with yours. But let’s get off this particular side bar, since it really has no bearing on the topic and can lead to confusion in the minds of the public - Catholic and non-Catholic.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

If you cannot understand my numerous attempts to ponder what I interpret your understanding of “sumultaneous” is in this context then I think its your turn - or lets put this painful disconnect in the too hard basket .

Lets reverse back to:

Are you able to restate this assertion without using the word simultaneous (which presently doesn’t seem to agree with the oxford dictionary)?

All it means is that the cause and effect occur over the same period of time, as opposed to in a single instant (ie. as opposed to being perfectly inelastic). I don’t care what Oxford dictionary says, as dictionaries do not capture the philosophical usage of terms. But I don’t see what is opaque about simultaneous as opposed to instantaneous. Both occur “at the same time,” but the latter requires that cause and effect exist in a single instant, which is an implausible claim. The former simply requires that they occur over the same period of time.

If that doesn’t make sense, I don’t know if I can help you. Maybe you should pick up Feser’s Scholastic Metaphysics when it comes out in late May. The table of contents can be found here; there will be a section on causal series, simultaneity, and per se versus per accidens series.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Feser refers to it in Aquinas. It’s briefly mentioned in this blog post as well.

That’s good, it is important to be exact about the definition of terms. But I don’t think Thomas used the term.

Linus2nd

 

[jonathan_hili]

Here’s an article I wrote for my school newspaper, hope it helps.