St. Thomas Aquinas - is "necessary being" the ultimate argument of his for the existence of God?

[RebeccaJ]

Something cannot be moved, caused, gradated or purposeful if it is not necessary (or possible) in the first place? Would that be an accurate description of how Aquinas’ argument from necessity is his ultimate argument?

 

[Magnanimity]

Something cannot be moved, caused, gradated or purposeful if it is not necessary (or possible) in the first place? Would that be an accurate description of how Aquinas’ argument from necessity is his ultimate argument?

Not quite. You’re on the right track though in considering “motion” and “possible” in trying to understand his arguments. Basically, the cosmological argument of St Thomas attempts to ground all actual contingent beings in the only other type of actually existing being there could be outside of ‘series’ of all contingent being, which would be a necessary being.

 

[RebeccaJ]

Not quite. You’re on the right track though in considering “motion” and “possible” in trying to understand his arguments. Basically, the cosmological argument of St Thomas attempts to ground all actual contingent beings in the only other type of actually existing being there could be outside of ‘series’ of all contingent being, which would be a necessary being.

Thanks. I think I said the same thing. So, I’m not seeing how you are differentiating.

If the attempt is to ground all contingent beings on a necessary being, aren’t all contingent beings dependent on the other attributes (moved, caused, etc).

 

[RebeccaJ]

Can I just say, coming from a computer programming background, this is like a recursive call to me. That is, I think Aquinas was trying to get at the common denominator of God. It seems to be difficult for me to wrap my mind around this. Is he trying to say “necessary being” is the common denominator?

 

[Magnanimity]

Thanks. I think I said the same thing. So, I’m not seeing how you are differentiating.

If the attempt is to ground all contingent beings on a necessary being, aren’t all contingent beings dependent on the other attributes (moved, caused, etc).

Rebecca,

You initially asked whether something would have to be necessary in the first place before it could be moved, caused, etc. This is not what is meant by St Thomas. In fact, just the opposite–the necessary Being (God) is the unmoved mover (or, “uncaused cause”) of all contingent beings. “Motion” here is not locomotion (ie, movement across space over time). Rather, by the term motion is meant the actualization of a potentiality. All contingent beings are composed of act (they exist) and potential (eg, they change). It is this potentiality of contingent beings which St Thomas believes needs a cause which itself is not contingent (ie, has no potentiality whatsoever).

Is that helpful at all?

 

[RebeccaJ]

No. It is all very circular.

How is “necessary being” the ultimate argument? Merely by stating that this being must exist?

 

[RebeccaJ]

It is not your explanation that is tripping me up. It is my atheist background. I have never understood Aquinas’ arguments for God. Only now, I find myself having to write a paper about it.

I think your last sentence gets at what I’m supposed to argue for, so I’ll just go on down this path…you know…wing it.

Thanks again.

 

[Magnanimity]

No. It is all very circular.

How is “necessary being” the ultimate argument? Merely by stating that this being must exist?

Rebecca,

I recently addressed a recent reformulation of the basic cosmological argument from St Thomas. The thread, titled “(Another) Cosmological Argument-Norman Geisler” can be found here: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=423977

Here’s the basic structure of the argument:

1. Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
2. My nonexistence is possible.
3. Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
4. There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
5. Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.

Do you follow? Certainly, this is not an ontological argument where we merely postulate from the outset that a necessary being must exist. A being which is not itself contingent, but which actually exists, is the only type of “ground” for the existence of all contingent beings, and this is what is meant by a necessary being.

For more reading on this, I would recommend The following sources. Hopefully, yonfind them beneficial.

Peter Kreeft & Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics
Norman Geisler & Winfried Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2d ed.
I seem to remember that Frederick Copleston is quite good in these arguments too.

Best to you in all of this!

 

[RebeccaJ]

Yes, thanks. I wrote my paper, and I see I was reading “ultimate cause”, as “ultimate argument”. I didn’t get this until I was writing the summary. When, my summary said to me hi, Aquinas said “efficient cause”, but “ultimate cause” works too…oh, I put it as ultimate argument in my thread title. :hypno:

The first three arguments, where my paper was focused, describes deism, really. I didn’t delve into 4 or 5. And now I’m onto skepticism. :yawn:

 

[Magnanimity]

Sounds like fun, kind of nerdy fun, but fun nonetheless! I always enjoyed these sorts of papers in school…

 

[punkforchrist]

Rebecca, I hope writing your paper went well. I agree with Magnanimity’s analysis. Be careful not to use “necessary” in the modal sense, however. Let me start by offering an illustration about how words like “possible” and “contingent” can be misconstrued. It is impossible for me to fly by flapping my arms like a bird. But, in what sense is this “impossible”? Surely, one can envisage a possible world in which I can fly by flapping my arms. What this shows, I think, is that something can be metaphysically impossible (impossible in the actual world), but not necessarily logically impossible.

The same can be said of terms like “necessity.” When Thomas says that contingent beings are ultimately caused by a necessary being, what he really means is that dependent beings are caused by a necessary-in-the-actual-world being. I’m sure Thomas would also say that God is logically necessary, but his Five Ways don’t actually entail that. The first three of the Five Ways especially concern only God’s metaphysical necessity.

To understand, say, the First Way, just think of a universe with no First Mover as a watch without a spring. No matter how many gears there are (even infinitely-many), without a spring, none of the gears will move. By analogy, if the universe has no First Mover, then nothing would be in motion, which of course is contrary to our experience of things. I mention this example primarily because the example that Thomas himself gives (e.g. a stone being moved by a stick, which is moved by the hand) can sound incredibly esoteric to modern ears. Moreover, people often object that if the universe is eternal, no First Mover is needed, but this would be a mistake. An eternal watch would still have to have a spring. An eternal house would still have to have a foundation. The First Mover/First Cause is not necessarily something that precedes its effects in time, but is something that causally precedes its effects.

This may all be a moot point when it comes to your paper, I’m not sure. In any case, I hope you find these responses helpful.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Yes, thanks. I wrote my paper, and I see I was reading “ultimate cause”, as “ultimate argument”. I didn’t get this until I was writing the summary. When, my summary said to me hi, Aquinas said “efficient cause”, but “ultimate cause” works too…oh, I put it as ultimate argument in my thread title. :hypno:

Nothing is ultimate simply because it is first in line. God is ultimate because God is an “existential cuase”. It is in that fact that we see God as an efficient cuase, rather than just a abirtrary cuase we have placed first.

Do you know what an existential cuase is?

 

[RebeccaJ]

Nothing is ultimate simply because it is first in line. God is ultimate because God is an “existential cuase”. It is in that fact that we see God as an efficient cuase, rather than just a abirtrary cuase we have placed first.

Do you know what an existential cuase is?

uh no, or maybe, hell no. I googled “existential cause” and google says, Did you mean: "nausea

:ehh:

 

[RebeccaJ]

Rebecca, I hope writing your paper went well. I agree with Magnanimity’s analysis. Be careful not to use “necessary” in the modal sense, however. Let me start by offering an illustration about how words like “possible” and “contingent” can be misconstrued. It is impossible for me to fly by flapping my arms like a bird. But, in what sense is this “impossible”? Surely, one can envisage a possible world in which I can fly by flapping my arms. What this shows, I think, is that something can be metaphysically impossible (impossible in the actual world), but not necessarily logically impossible.

The same can be said of terms like “necessity.” When Thomas says that contingent beings are ultimately caused by a necessary being, what he really means is that dependent beings are caused by a necessary-in-the-actual-world being. I’m sure Thomas would also say that God is logically necessary, but his Five Ways don’t actually entail that. The first three of the Five Ways especially concern only God’s metaphysical necessity.

To understand, say, the First Way, just think of a universe with no First Mover as a watch without a spring. No matter how many gears there are (even infinitely-many), without a spring, none of the gears will move. By analogy, if the universe has no First Mover, then nothing would be in motion, which of course is contrary to our experience of things. I mention this example primarily because the example that Thomas himself gives (e.g. a stone being moved by a stick, which is moved by the hand) can sound incredibly esoteric to modern ears. Moreover, people often object that if the universe is eternal, no First Mover is needed, but this would be a mistake. An eternal watch would still have to have a spring. An eternal house would still have to have a foundation. The First Mover/First Cause is not necessarily something that precedes its effects in time, but is something that causally precedes its effects.

This may all be a moot point when it comes to your paper, I’m not sure. In any case, I hope you find these responses helpful.

Thanks. The watch analogy reminds me of when I was atheist and people would make this argument against evolution by that watch analogy. It was obvious to me a watch is a made thing, a person is organic and not put together on a table, like a computer. (Good thing, eh?!)

I get what Aquinas is saying. There is an unmoved, uncaused, necessary thing. What is not provable, is that necessary thing is GOD.

Of course, I understand Aquinas wrote this at time and place of homogenized belief. As a person of that same belief, I can see how his arguments support it. As a person with an atheist background, I can see he makes a final leap of faith to GOD as the conclusion.

But hey, that is after one whole week of studying Aquinas, so I’m by no means the expert.

 

[punkforchrist]

RebeccaJ:

Thanks. The watch analogy reminds me of when I was atheist and people would make this argument against evolution by that watch analogy. It was obvious to me a watch is a made thing, a person is organic and not put together on a table, like a computer. (Good thing, eh?!)

Right, and the watch analogy in this instance isn’t an attempt to infer design. That’s the teleological argument.

I get what Aquinas is saying. There is an unmoved, uncaused, necessary thing.

Exactly.

What is not provable, is that necessary thing is GOD.

Yeah, I mean, the divine attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) are not made explicit by any of the Five Ways. Once you delve into other parts of Thomas’ writings, you’ll discover that he argues that the First Cause does, in fact, possess most, if not all, of the divine attributes.

Of course, I understand Aquinas wrote this at time and place of homogenized belief. As a person of that same belief, I can see how his arguments support it. As a person with an atheist background, I can see he makes a final leap of faith to GOD as the conclusion.

I can certainly relate to what you’re saying. The benefit of studying Thomas is actually one of the reasons I retained my faith some years back. The Thomistic doctrine of the relationship between faith and reason is basically this: we can know that God exists, but it takes faith to believe in God. A man has faith that his wife loves him, even though he already has good reasons to believe that she exists, etc.

But hey, that is after one whole week of studying Aquinas, so I’m by no means the expert.

I would just encourage you to continue in your studies. Keep up the good work!

 

[RebeccaJ]

The melding of faith and reason is what attracted me to Catholicism in the first place. One of the first RCIA classes I went to, the Deacon there described it like this

reason |-----------------------------------------------------| faith

If we use faith alone:

reason |---------------------------------------------------O| faith

we can do and think things that are irrational, and call it “faith”.

If we have reason alone

reason |O---------------------------------------------------| faith

we have atheism. Being an atheist at the time, I agreed to this. I also had this desire to understand faith, and why people had it. In that observing, atheist, way of doing things. ie, discounting personal experience as unreliable.

I can see, reading the little of Aquinas that I have, this way of understanding faith and reason as:

reason |--------------------------O-------------------------| faith

comes from Aquinas’ natural reasoning.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

uh no, or maybe, hell no. I googled “existential cause” and google says, Did you mean: "existential nausea"
:ehh:

Existential-Causality.

We can see that things “exist”. They have a reality and an act or nature; and in perceiving their reality we are given the ability to conceive of concepts such as “objective truth” . Objective truth is what you might call the existential facts of reality as opposed to non-reality. They are existential in that they “exist” in opposition to absolute nothingness, and they are objective insofar as they are not the manifestations of your imagination. We see that things have causes, and causes have effects. We come to realize that there are things which exist now that did not exist before. We see change. Some are small, and some our more fundamental. We see push and shove causality and mechanistic functionality. But we should also become aware of something more intimately true. We perceive the “potentially real”. We can see that a things “being” in reality, in the here and now, is not a product of its own nature or act in the present. They are not real by virtue of their own “natures”. If they were necessarily real by nature, they would have always existed without potentiality, and that means that they would exist timelessly, because that which is existence by nature exists irrespective of change. It cannot have a beginning or an end. It cannot lose its reality to the “past”, or have a potential future, because its existence is intrinsic to its being, and thus its being is absolutely true. If i confirm that such a beings existence is true, then that truth must contain the entirety of its existence. Thus we know that at least some natures do not have existence as a property. Their “esse” is not the same as their essence. Thus without the sustaining virtue of “esse” as a distinct act in its own right, there can be no essence.

We know from metaphysical logic that out of nothing comes nothing and that it is impossible for absolute nothingness to be objectively real; for nothing is not a positive reality by definition. That is to say that, if you said to me that nothing actually existed as a nature, then you would in fact be saying that nothing is actually something, for the simple fact that you are giving it a reality and a nature by saying that it exists. But this cannot be true, because “absolute nothingness” contains no reality and thus cannot be included in objectively “true” statements about that which exists or is natural.

Thus existence is an absolute. It’s impossible for there to not be a reality, because for there to be otherwise would result in a contradiction. So we know that there must be such a thing as “reality” or existence before there can be anything else; also there is the fact that we have knowledge of it either directly or indirectly of sense perception. We also know that the future, and everything it contains, is potentially real in respect of the present reality. Thus we must acknowledge that the future “receives reality” from something else, and that therefore all time or change and everything it contains is receiving reality. Natures are coming “into” reality; they are not causing it. We must accept by force of logic that all change is potential reality. Thus anything that is changing is not a reality by virtue of its nature or act, but rather it exists because something has given to it its existence and actuality.

This “giver of the real”, must exist by virtue of its own nature and its nature has to be existence (its esse is the same as its essence). It must also be timeless, because its esse is intrinsic to its essence (Its esse is its essence), which is the reason why it is ultimate eternal and necessary (sounds like a particular God you might know?). Thus there is not merely a push and shove causality or a mechanistic functionality in nature, but rather there is also an “Existential cause”.

This is what I mean by the term “existential cause”. Anyone hoping to be successful in producing a logical argument for Gods existence would do well by using the concept of an existential cause as a template for future production. Once you understand the fundamental relationship between esse and essence, you will be on your way to understanding Aquinas’ 5 ways. Until then, you will not grasp the full power of his work.

 

[JP2Admirer]

The same can be said of terms like “necessity.” When Thomas says that contingent beings are ultimately caused by a necessary being, what he really means is that dependent beings are caused by a necessary-in-the-actual-world being. I’m sure Thomas would also say that God is logically necessary, but his Five Ways don’t actually entail that. The first three of the Five Ways especially concern only God’s metaphysical necessity.

This was exactly the problem Aquinas saw with Anselm’s famous argument. That which nothing greater can be thought of is merely a logical concept, not a really existing one.

This is what is so attractive about Aquinas – he was an honest thinker. Perhaps the most honest there ever was. I find it appalling that he is not required reading in philosophy 101 courses simply because he has been branded a “theologian” and therefore partisan. He is the cleanest thinker I’ve ever encountered, i.e. following things where they led rather than to predetermined ends. Moderns could learn so much from him if they’d merely listen. Sadly, it’s only Catholics who seem to take him seriously.

 

[RebeccaJ]

I find it appalling that he is not required reading in philosophy 101 courses simply because he has been branded a “theologian” and therefore partisan. He is the cleanest thinker I’ve ever encountered, i.e. following things where they led rather than to predetermined ends. Moderns could learn so much from him if they’d merely listen. Sadly, it’s only Catholics who seem to take him seriously.

My class is an intro to philosophy course. But, we’re breezing through so much in such a short a time. Aquinas got one week, and about 30 pages or so in the textbook. We spent about 2 weeks each on Plato and Aristotle.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

My class is an intro to philosophy course. But, we’re breezing through so much in such a short a time. Aquinas got one week, and about 30 pages or so in the textbook. We spent about 2 weeks each on Plato and Aristotle.

Sorry to butt in, but have you seen post number 17 yet? I am interested in your response.