St. Thomas' Argument from Contingency

[CatholicSoxFan]

One of St. Thomas’ five ways of proving God’s existence went like this (from Wiki)

1. Many things in the universe may either exist or not exist and are all finite. Such things are called contingent beings.
2. It is impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, for then there would be a time when nothing existed, and so nothing would exist now, since there would be nothing to bring anything into existence, which is clearly false.
3. Therefore, there must be a necessary being whose existence is not contingent on any other being or beings.
4. This being is whom we call God.
   Just something I’d like to point out first, which refutes Richard Dawkins’ objection; the first premise says that many things in the universe are contingent, not that all things are contingent. Calling God necessary, therefore He doesn’t have a cause, isn’t special pleading, because there is good reason that is used to say that He doesn’t have a cause, namely that He is necessary (and the universe changes, which means it can’t be necessary, so Sagan’s famous comeback doesn’t work.)
   So, does this argument work? That’s what this thread is about.

 

[belorg]

One of St. Thomas’ five ways of proving God’s existence went like this (from Wiki)

1. Many things in the universe may either exist or not exist and are all finite. Such things are called contingent beings.
2. It is impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, for then there would be a time when nothing existed, and so nothing would exist now, since there would be nothing to bring anything into existence, which is clearly false.
3. Therefore, there must be a necessary being whose existence is not contingent on any other being or beings.
4. This being is whom we call God.
   Just something I’d like to point out first, which refutes Richard Dawkins’ objection; the first premise says that many things in the universe are contingent, not that all things are contingent. Calling God necessary, therefore He doesn’t have a cause, isn’t special pleading, because there is good reason that is used to say that He doesn’t have a cause, namely that He is necessary (and the universe changes, which means it can’t be necessary, so Sagan’s famous comeback doesn’t work.)
   So, does this argument work? That’s what this thread is about.

Contingent in this context does not mean logically contingent as in ‘there is at least one possible world in which it doesn’t exist’. For Aquinas, contingent means ‘not eternal’.
So, what this argument establishes is, at most, that there is at least one eternal entity.

And there is no real argument against eternal changeable entities, so the universe can be eternal and Sagan’s comeback does work. There is harldy anu-y Cosmologist who thinks everything can ever go out of existence, so in that sense, the universe is eternal.

BTW, there is nothing preventing even a logically necessary entity from changing.

 

[empther]

contingency

dependence on chance or on the fulfillment of a condition; uncertainty; fortuitousness: Nothing was left to contingency.
2.
a contingent event; a chance, accident, or possibility conditional on something uncertain: He was prepared for every contingency.
3.
something incidental to a thing.

Contingency, as Aquinas uses it, refers to the indeterminancy of things once created.
Thus, a galaxy may form in a region of space, or not. A lion may chase down this antelope or that one.

I wouldn’t get my Aquinas from wikipedia. Look how different the Summa is from wikipedia.

newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

So Aquinas’ argument is about the possibility to exist.

Whether or not created things act contingently or deterministically is something to be considered another day,
and Aquinas does.

 

[TomD123]

Contingent in this context does not mean logically contingent as in ‘there is at least one possible world in which it doesn’t exist’. For Aquinas, contingent means ‘not eternal’.

.

True, I suggest looking into philosopher Edward Feser and reading his book Aquinas for more on the argument.

So, what this argument establishes is, at most, that there is at least one eternal entity.
.

So far…but wikipedia misses the latter half of the argument where Aquinas attempts to demonstrate that there has to be at least one eternal entity that is etnernal on account of itself and does not have it derived from another.

And there is no real argument against eternal changeable entities, so the universe can be eternal and Sagan’s comeback does work. There is harldy anu-y Cosmologist who thinks everything can ever go out of existence, so in that sense, the universe is eternal.
.

Well it seems as though our universe, at least as we know it, isn’t eternal. But even so, Aquinas wouldn’t argue that point necessarily (as Feser points out in his book which I suggested above).

Aquinas seems to be saying that whatever is eternal is either eternal on account of its own nature, or because something else which is keeping it in existence. (another way I think that you might look at it is that Aquinas uses "necesssary " to mean “naturally indestructible” so not necessarily eternal, but it would be eternal provided it is not taken out of existence…but in any case…)

BTW, there is nothing preventing even a logically necessary entity from changing.

Well, this is not entirely correct. A logically necessary being would be one that had an essence not distinct from its share in existence. Therefore, its essence would be pure existence or “pure act” as Aquinas states. Something that is pure act cannot change because there is no potency in it (potency is a form of non-being or limitation which cannot exist by definition in a being that is simply the act of existence). For more, check out Feser

 

[Linusthe2nd]

One of St. Thomas’ five ways of proving God’s existence went like this (from Wiki)

1. Many things in the universe may either exist or not exist and are all finite. Such things are called contingent beings.
2. It is impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, for then there would be a time when nothing existed, and so nothing would exist now, since there would be nothing to bring anything into existence, which is clearly false.
3. Therefore, there must be a necessary being whose existence is not contingent on any other being or beings.
4. This being is whom we call God.
   Just something I’d like to point out first, which refutes Richard Dawkins’ objection; the first premise says that many things in the universe are contingent, not that all things are contingent. Calling God necessary, therefore He doesn’t have a cause, isn’t special pleading, because there is good reason that is used to say that He doesn’t have a cause, namely that He is necessary (and the universe changes, which means it can’t be necessary, so Sagan’s famous comeback doesn’t work.)
   So, does this argument work? That’s what this thread is about.

Given that Thomas was arguing from the position that the eternity of the universe is a fact, if all things were merely contingent, then since an eternity of time has already passed nothing would now exist because all contingent things must have their necessity for existence given to them by something that was the cause of its own existence and therefore necessary and which caused the existence and necessity of all contingent and unnecessary things. But if all things are merely contingent, nothing would now exist since all contingent things would have ceased to exist long ago and nothing would now exist.

But since this is obviously not the case, there must exist some thing which is necessary itself, which exists under its own power, and from which all merely contingent extents derive their existence and necessity. And there could only be one such being since that being would have existed for all eternity and is necessary per se…There could only be one such being since its eternal existence implies infinite power and infinite power could only exist in one being. And this we call God.

Visions of multiverses simply pushe the argument forward to the same conclusion since the same necessary extent being would be the cause of the existence of any other universe as well. Such arguments ( pipe dreams ) are merely Sophist attempts to escape reality and logic.

Linus2nd

 

[chimo]

One of St. Thomas’ five ways of proving God’s existence went like this (from Wiki)

1. Many things in the universe may either exist or not exist and are all finite. Such things are called contingent beings.
2. It is impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, for then there would be a time when nothing existed, and so nothing would exist now, since there would be nothing to bring anything into existence, which is clearly false.
3. Therefore, there must be a necessary being whose existence is not contingent on any other being or beings.
4. This being is whom we call God.
   Just something I’d like to point out first, which refutes Richard Dawkins’ objection; the first premise says that many things in the universe are contingent, not that all things are contingent. Calling God necessary, therefore He doesn’t have a cause, isn’t special pleading, because there is good reason that is used to say that He doesn’t have a cause, namely that He is necessary (and the universe changes, which means it can’t be necessary, so Sagan’s famous comeback doesn’t work.)
   So, does this argument work? That’s what this thread is about.

Probably at the time when St. Thomas Aquinas had spoken about it but I wonder about the present time if such an argument is convincing. I wonder what St. Thomas would have said if he had lived in our times. There is so much more we know today than what the generation he lived in had known. The argument which you have given from St. Thomas is the first time I had seen it and it is remarkable he would have said this at the time he had lived in. Since I am an Astronomer who loves to deal with those aspects of which the Universe also points out God I understand fully his argument. Yet I am a man of faith who needs no argument. St. Thomas just agrees to what I already know yet I find it remarkable he said this many centuries ago. He probably had convinced many people of his time but I suspect a much more different line of argument is necessary for the times we are living in at least for those who have no faith.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Contingent in this context does not mean logically contingent as in ‘there is at least one possible world in which it doesn’t exist’. For Aquinas, contingent means ‘not eternal’.
So, what this argument establishes is, at most, that there is at least one eternal entity.

And there is no real argument against eternal changeable entities, so the universe can be eternal and Sagan’s comeback does work. There is harldy anu-y Cosmologist who thinks everything can ever go out of existence, so in that sense, the universe is eternal.

BTW, there is nothing preventing even a logically necessary entity from changing.

Actually, there is; if a being with properties x, y and z exists necessarilly, it has properties x, y and z necessarilly, which means at all times. So yes, necessary means unchanging. If a law of logic (we’ll just say they have real existence for the purpose of this argument; I know that is anything but a settled issue) all of a sudden became material, then that immaterial law of logic wouldn’t exist necessarilly. And the reason why Sagan’s comeback doesn’t work is that there is a reason to believe that God is eternal that is not a reason to believe that the universe is eternal, meaning that saying that an eternal God creating a universe that isn’t eternal doesn’t violate Occam’s Razor, which is what Sagan’s comeback derives from.

 

[empther]

From belorg’s post two:

Contingent in this context does not mean logically contingent as in ‘there is at least one possible world in which it doesn’t exist’. For Aquinas, contingent means ‘not eternal’.

Wrong. For Aquinas contingent means the created thing operates independently rather than in a deterministic way. The wikipedia article has it wrong.

So, what this argument establishes is, at most, that there is at least one eternal entity.

Wrong. The wikipedia article does not do that since it has changed the wording of Aquinas, as I pointed out in post 3
Even the wording of this thread’s title is wrong. :bigyikes:

And there is no real argument against eternal changeable entities,

Aquinas definitely does not say that. Where do you get this stuff?

so the universe can be eternal and Sagan’s comeback does work. There is harldy anu-y Cosmologist who thinks everything can ever go out of existence, so in that sense, the universe is eternal.

Aquinas: “I answer that, nothing except God can be eternal.”

BTW, there is nothing preventing even a logically necessary entity from changing.

A necessary entity must always remain the same. If it changed, it would not be what it was yesterday and not tomorrow what it is today. Never, then, is it necessary to be as it is at anytime. Why is this so hard to understand? It’s extremely simple.

 

[belorg]

Actually, there is; if a being with properties x, y and z exists necessarilly, it has properties x, y and z necessarilly, which means at all times. So yes, necessary means unchanging. If a law of logic (we’ll just say they have real existence for the purpose of this argument; I know that is anything but a settled issue) all of a sudden became material, then that immaterial law of logic wouldn’t exist necessarilly. And the reason why Sagan’s comeback doesn’t work is that there is a reason to believe that God is eternal that is not a reason to believe that the universe is eternal, meaning that saying that an eternal God creating a universe that isn’t eternal doesn’t violate Occam’s Razor, which is what Sagan’s comeback derives from.

I that were true, God, who has free will, could not be necessary either.

 

[belorg]

True, I suggest looking into philosopher Edward Feser and reading his book Aquinas for more on the argument.

So far…but wikipedia misses the latter half of the argument where Aquinas attempts to demonstrate that there has to be at least one eternal entity that is etnernal on account of itself and does not have it derived from another.

Which does not rule out a natural entity.

Well it seems as though our universe, at least as we know it, isn’t eternal. But even so, Aquinas wouldn’t argue that point necessarily (as Feser points out in his book which I suggested above).

No, Aquinas wouldn’t argue that point necessarily.

Aquinas seems to be saying that whatever is eternal is either eternal on account of its own nature, or because something else which is keeping it in existence. (another way I think that you might look at it is that Aquinas uses "necesssary " to mean “naturally indestructible” so not necessarily eternal, but it would be eternal provided it is not taken out of existence…but in any case…)

And, as I have already said, there is hardly any cosmologist who thinks that it is even possible for every single thing to go out of existence.

Well, this is not entirely correct. A logically necessary being would be one that had an essence not distinct from its share in existence. Therefore, its essence would be pure existence or “pure act” as Aquinas states. Something that is pure act cannot change because there is no potency in it (potency is a form of non-being or limitation which cannot exist by definition in a being that is simply the act of existence). For more, check out Feser

That’s Aquinas’ reasoning, but since Pure Act cannot account for potency, this is necssarily false.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

I that were true, God, who has free will, could not be necessary either.

If you think of God as a being who decides to do things and then does them in more or less the same way we do, you’d be correct. But God doesn’t work like that, any “decisions” He makes are built in to who He is, He does not go from a state of not planning on doing something to one where He has decided to. God’s free will is not like our free will - the best simple way to describe it would be to say that everything about Him is determined by and only by Himself.

 

[Counterpoint]

So, does this argument work? That’s what this thread is about.

It works for me. God is the only satisfactory explanation that accounts for nature’s contingency.

 

[belorg]

If you think of God as a being who decides to do things and then does them in more or less the same way we do, you’d be correct. But God doesn’t work like that, any “decisions” He makes are built in to who He is, He does not go from a state of not planning on doing something to one where He has decided to. God’s free will is not like our free will - the best simple way to describe it would be to say that everything about Him is determined by and only by Himself.

Exactly, that is why God is an automaton and does not have free will.
The way you describe it, in every possible world, God does exactly the same. That does not seem to fit the traditional Christian description of God, but if it satisfies you, that’s OK with me.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

I that were true, God, who has free will, could not be necessary either.

Can you explain that? What attributes of His would have to change for God to do something freely?

 

[belorg]

Can you explain that? What attributes of His would have to change for God to do something freely?

His preference for starters. Is it really coherent to say that “Actus Purus” could have had the preference to create something different?

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

His preference for starters. Is it really coherent to say that “Actus Purus” could have had the preference to create something different?

God would have the freedom to create something different, but His nature would provide boundaries (since His nature is a necessary truth, His doing anything that would contradict it would be logically impossible, so His inability to do so wouldn’t mean He isn’t omnipotent.)

 

[empther]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Iron Donkey
If you think of God as a being who decides to do things and then does them in more or less the same way we do, you’d be correct. **But God doesn’t work like that, any “decisions” He makes are built in to who He is :bigyikes: **

, He does not go from a state of not planning on doing something to one where He has decided to. God’s free will is not like our free will - the best simple way to describe it would be to say that everything about Him is determined by and only by Himself.

( belorg replies )
Exactly, that is why God is an automaton and does not have free will.

Oh brother!
Let’s see what aquinas says:

newadvent.org/summa/1019.htm#article3

Article 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?

Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.

Objection 2. Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Reply to Objection 2. Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.

Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (2, 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Reply to Objection 3. It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Reply to Objection 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Objection 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

Reply to Objection 6. As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

First, I didn’t mean to say that God’s decisions are necessarily as they are. It may be possible that I am implying this indirectly, and if so then I’m wrong. I’m still thinking about this, but I’ll try to explain what I meant below. I think I am not implying this though, primarily because, as I understand it, God is self determining in every sense of the phrase.

Exactly, that is why God is an automaton and does not have free will.
The way you describe it, in every possible world, God does exactly the same. That does not seem to fit the traditional Christian description of God, but if it satisfies you, that’s OK with me.

Fair warning: I’m very much an amateur at this, so the following is not guaranteed to make sense. I’ll do my best to explain what I’m trying to say though.

I’m not actually sure that it makes sense to talk about different possible worlds, from God’s perspective, as though they were separate distinct things that we would behave differently in. There is only one world, and to God it is as a single point, so that all that happens ever is eternally present to Him. Things like our choices that affect the world are also known to Him, if not to us, so the possible things that don’t happen might as well not be possible so far as deciding what to do is concerned. It might be that He would act differently if things were different than He knows them to be, but since that is not possible it is hard to say.

But more related to the point, that His decisions are not made one after another like ours does not make them any less decisions. God is pure act, what He does is what He is, but He is also entirely self determining. Everything about God comes from God, but this includes what He is. And again, He is pure act. So what He does is decided by who He is, which is decided by Him. You could just as easily say that what He is is determined by what He does as the other way around, because they are identical. If it sounds circular, well, that’s part of being the first cause. Nothing about Him could possibly have any other source, and He simply Is.

So yes, what He does follows from what He is, but that doesn’t make Him less free because He is exactly as He chooses. Exactly. Because the choosing is in fact what He is. This is partially why I at least fidget when people say things like God is bound by logic - not because it isn’t true, but because it can be read as saying that there is some external constraint on God, which is false. One might as well say that logic is the reflection of what God decides as that God is constrained by it. Rather, God is only bound by Himself and logic is merely a description of how He chooses to be so.

In the same way, God doesn’t sit around scratching His chin until He figures out what He wants to do; He simply Is, and in being how He is has already determined absolutely everything there is to determine. But again, though this is not reactive, it is still done by Him as He wishes it done and so is still free.

Hopefully some of that is intelligible.

 

[belorg]

God would have the freedom to create something different, but His nature would provide boundaries (since His nature is a necessary truth, His doing anything that would contradict it would be logically impossible, so His inability to do so wouldn’t mean He isn’t omnipotent.)

That is not an aswer to my question.

 

[belorg]

First, I didn’t mean to say that God’s decisions are necessarily as they are. It may be possible that I am implying this indirectly, and if so then I’m wrong. I’m still thinking about this, but I’ll try to explain what I meant below. I think I am not implying this though, primarily because, as I understand it, God is self determining in every sense of the phrase.

That means that there are different possible worlds, in each of which God is different, according to what He determines Himself to be in that particular world.

Fair warning: I’m very much an amateur at this, so the following is not guaranteed to make sense. I’ll do my best to explain what I’m trying to say though.

I’m not actually sure that it makes sense to talk about different possible worlds, from God’s perspective, as though they were separate distinct things that we would behave differently in.

With all due respect, but I don’t think you really understand possible world semantics.

But more related to the point, that His decisions are not made one after another like ours does not make them any less decisions. God is pure act, what He does is what He is, but He is also entirely self determining. Everything about God comes from God, but this includes what He is. And again, He is pure act. So what He does is decided by who He is, which is decided by Him. You could just as easily say that what He is is determined by what He does as the other way around, because they are identical. If it sounds circular, well, that’s part of being the first cause. Nothing about Him could possibly have any other source, and He simply Is.

See, above? If that is true, then it is true that there are different possible worlds in each of which God determines Himself to be different.

So yes, what He does follows from what He is, but that doesn’t make Him less free because He is exactly as He chooses. Exactly. Because the choosing is in fact what He is. This is partially why I at least fidget when people say things like God is bound by logic - not because it isn’t true, but because it can be read as saying that there is some external constraint on God, which is false. One might as well say that logic is the reflection of what God decides as that God is constrained by it. Rather, God is only bound by Himself and logic is merely a description of how He chooses to be so.

Tha means that God could choose to exist and not exist at the same time.