L
Lief_Erikson
Guest
Dear JReducation,
You raise some interesting points that I would like to consider. At the same time, my deepest interest is to know more specifically the answer to my question about infallibility. We are clear now that the principles, “The ends do not justify the means” and “it is always wrong to violate human dignity” are infallible. These are the principles on the basis of which, from what you’ve been saying, it is believed that religious freedom is infallible. I’m interested in the question of whether this belief does flow logically from those principles, which is the issue your most recent post focuses on, and I’m definitely planning to look into that. But before I really go into that, would you please help me get rid of this nagging question that remains without (to my understanding) a clear answer? If a future Pope said that using law to prohibit the spread of heresies among Catholics does not violate the two infallible principles stated above, would Catholics be at liberty to believe what he says on the matter? Does the infallibility of religious freedom come entirely from those two principles or is it “self-contained,” as it were, like a dogma . . .
When a dogma is defined, the wording is infallible. We don’t believe dogmas because we believe they logically follow from infallible principles – we believe them because they are themselves infallible definitions. If a Catholic tried to prove that a dogma did not follow from certain infallible principles on which the dogma is supposed to be based, his action would show an unacceptable lack of faith. All Catholics are obliged to give dogmas not only religious submission of intellect and will, but the assent of faith as well. All Catholics have to give dogmas the assent of faith. If a Catholic believes that the dogma does not follow logically from premises that the Church says it flows from, and that it therefore is untrue, that Catholic is wrong and we can say that as a certain statement of faith.
From what you’ve been saying, though, I’m getting (possibly mistakenly) a somewhat different picture of moral teachings that are believed to be infallible. These teachings, if I’m not mistaken, are logical but fallible conclusions based on infallible principles. In the case of religious freedom, these infallible principles would be, “the ends do not justify the means,” and, “it is always wrong to violate human dignity.” Based on these infallible premises, the Magesterium has a flow of reasoning on which religious freedom is based. If the flow of reasoning is solid, then religious freedom is necessarily infallible. If the flow of reasoning contains flaws, then religious freedom is not necessarily infallible – that possibility exists because the reasoning is not infallible. Only the premises are. With dogmas, on the other hand, infallibility is always present not just as a logical conclusion from infallible premises (dependent infallibility) but because the dogma’s statement and wording are themselves independently rendered infallible through the power of the Holy Spirit operating through the Magesterium.
Is this a correct understanding of how infallibility exists in the case of moral teachings, and of how these teachings differ in the nature of their infallibility from dogma?
If the reasoning and conclusions of the Church’s moral teachings, in addition to their premises, are (like dogmas) infallible, I would very much like to know.
You raise some interesting points that I would like to consider. At the same time, my deepest interest is to know more specifically the answer to my question about infallibility. We are clear now that the principles, “The ends do not justify the means” and “it is always wrong to violate human dignity” are infallible. These are the principles on the basis of which, from what you’ve been saying, it is believed that religious freedom is infallible. I’m interested in the question of whether this belief does flow logically from those principles, which is the issue your most recent post focuses on, and I’m definitely planning to look into that. But before I really go into that, would you please help me get rid of this nagging question that remains without (to my understanding) a clear answer? If a future Pope said that using law to prohibit the spread of heresies among Catholics does not violate the two infallible principles stated above, would Catholics be at liberty to believe what he says on the matter? Does the infallibility of religious freedom come entirely from those two principles or is it “self-contained,” as it were, like a dogma . . .
When a dogma is defined, the wording is infallible. We don’t believe dogmas because we believe they logically follow from infallible principles – we believe them because they are themselves infallible definitions. If a Catholic tried to prove that a dogma did not follow from certain infallible principles on which the dogma is supposed to be based, his action would show an unacceptable lack of faith. All Catholics are obliged to give dogmas not only religious submission of intellect and will, but the assent of faith as well. All Catholics have to give dogmas the assent of faith. If a Catholic believes that the dogma does not follow logically from premises that the Church says it flows from, and that it therefore is untrue, that Catholic is wrong and we can say that as a certain statement of faith.
From what you’ve been saying, though, I’m getting (possibly mistakenly) a somewhat different picture of moral teachings that are believed to be infallible. These teachings, if I’m not mistaken, are logical but fallible conclusions based on infallible principles. In the case of religious freedom, these infallible principles would be, “the ends do not justify the means,” and, “it is always wrong to violate human dignity.” Based on these infallible premises, the Magesterium has a flow of reasoning on which religious freedom is based. If the flow of reasoning is solid, then religious freedom is necessarily infallible. If the flow of reasoning contains flaws, then religious freedom is not necessarily infallible – that possibility exists because the reasoning is not infallible. Only the premises are. With dogmas, on the other hand, infallibility is always present not just as a logical conclusion from infallible premises (dependent infallibility) but because the dogma’s statement and wording are themselves independently rendered infallible through the power of the Holy Spirit operating through the Magesterium.
Is this a correct understanding of how infallibility exists in the case of moral teachings, and of how these teachings differ in the nature of their infallibility from dogma?
If the reasoning and conclusions of the Church’s moral teachings, in addition to their premises, are (like dogmas) infallible, I would very much like to know.