St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

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Translation: Linusthe2nd cannot refute my argument with real philosophy, and so he is now telling me to read a book that he doesn’t understand himself; a book that even refutes his own position.

Passing the buck will not make your argument true or even probable.
Nice try but there are too many out there who have actually read all or at least a fair portion of wha I have challenged you to read. Really, I’m not being facitious, start with " Elements of Christian Philosophy, " esp. chaps 7 & 8. It’s for your own good. Linus2nd
 
What do you mean by saying that, “in mathematics, there are actual infinities?” Mathematics is abstract, and abstract is the opposite of actual. In mathematics, we actually deal with infinities, I’ll grant you that. But those infinities are as abstract as any of the values we assign to numbers. That is why, in mathematics, we can deal equally well with rational or irrational, positive or negative, real or imaginary. There is no real square root of negative one, but mathematically, i makes just as much sense as -1 or 1. That is because in mathematics, everything is abstract. So in mathematics, there are infinities, and, mathematics is useful in describing the world, even though in the world there are no actual infinities.

The proper question is, is mathematics useful in describing the world, and can its use be extended to the territory in which we now find ourselves? I submit that, certainly it can. I see no reason to assume that there is some limit to the use we can make of our power of abstraction that is manifest in mathematics. Can we usefully apply the theory of sets, and the generation of the natural numbers as sets from 0, to the possible worlds scenarios? Is it, in fact, legitimate to assign G = 1 and wG = 2? That is the question; that would be the basis of your objection.

And I think, as least insofar as my understanding goes, it is legitimate. It seems intuitively sound. If you maintain that it is not legitimate, then please, give a demonstration of why, if you would. Thanks!

And, by the way, the empty set, the null set, {} is precisely == 0. It is Nothing, by definition.
I always love it when people start arguing against their own position, makes it much easier for me. The point is: is a set an abstraction or not. if it is, there is no real difference between a set containing God and God. If it isn’t, then there is a real difference but it also means that even the empty set is not nothing.
Either way, your criticism of my argument is irrelevant.
 
Existence is absolutely other than the essence of created things. It is the essence of created things that differentiates between God and creation. Esse has nothing to do with it. Esse is that which actualises potential essences, and thus esse has to exist absolutely as actually distinct before we can rationally speak of actualising potential. God is the esse of created things, but he is not the essence of created things, and therefore it is not pantheism. Nothing you say is going to change that fact.
Ah, but Linux you keep making the same error. You are confusing two very different realities, the eternal realm of God and the finite, contingent, limited, created realm of the universe. The realm of the eternal God is absolutely other than and outside of the realm of the universe. God created the finite universe out of nothing ( not even virtual particles - we have discussed this before ). Nor did he create it " out of " his own esse.

He created whole, entire substances with their own esse. In other words he created substances or beings composed of essence and esse. Their esse was limited by their respective essences which had a potential for so much esse and no more. You must think of the esse of the universe as entirely other than the esse of God. The esse of the universe can be imagined ( incorrectly of course ) as a created " something " in which all created substances participate or share to the extent their respective essences will allow. So it is the universe’s own version of esse totally other than God’s Esse but created by him along with each beings substance in which each substance participates or shares, not God’s Esse.

Only if we conclude that the esse of God and the esse of creatures are entirely different and other than each other is God’s creation of the universe from nothing secure. And I will add, only in this way are we saved from Pantheism.

As far as the concept of being is concerned, that goes back to the very earliest Greek philosophers. But it was Aristotle who hit on the notion of the potency - act principles of being. But it was St. Thomas who made the greatest contribution to the concept of being as a universal concept by analogy. Being came to be understood as any essence that existed. God of course was a Being or Essence that was Existence or Esse pure and simple.

All created beings were substances composed of essence and *esse or existence.[l]. Material beings were essences composed of matter and form. In material beings it was the forms which receive and limit the being’s respective esse or existence. So the existence of each material being or substance came through its respective form. And this existence was created out of nothing along with the being or substance. Matter is understood as prime matter, the underlying stuff of all material being. But prime matter, form, and esse are not beings in themselves but principles of being, they do not exist alone except in the case of God who is Pure Esse or Existence.

As far as creation out of nothing is concerned, this is an element of Faith in Divine Revelation. As I have said before it cannot be demonstrated, at least that was the opinion of Thomas and the Church. He accepted it on Faith and then went on to explain what this meant. So to ask for proof of this is to beat a dead horse, wasted effort. And no one today is any closer to offering a valid proof than in Thomas’ day. Linus2nd*
 
I always love it when people start arguing against their own position, makes it much easier for me.
That’s kind of a weird thing to say, I wonder what contribution that statement actually makes to your argument. Certainly, I am not arguing against my own position. It puzzles me why you would perceive that, but as you just made the statement and dropped it, I guess I will concentrate instead on actually making my own argument and refuting yours. Maybe you should concentrate on the same? Just a thought.
The point is: is a set an abstraction or not. if it is, there is no real difference between a set containing God and God. If it isn’t, then there is a real difference but it also means that even the empty set is not nothing.
Either way, your criticism of my argument is irrelevant.
OK, help me here. You SEEM to be saying the following:
  1. My criticism of your argument is irrelevant because both of the following lines of thought lead to that conclusion.
A. A set is an abstraction, and therefore sets can comfortably be dismissed as not holding any possible isomorphism with reality.

B. A set is not an abstraction, and therefore {} =/= 0.

1.A. My criticism of your argument (to wit, G = 1, wG = 2, 1 =/= 2) is irrelevant because it is impossible to use numbers to describe reality at all, because numbers are abstractions.

1.B. My criticism of your argument ( G = {{}}, wG = {{{}}}, {{}} =/= {{{}}} ) is irrelevant because ( {} =/= {} ).

That is what I could discern from your statements. I’ll offer a brief criticism of each. For 1.A., the problem is that numbers, despite your dismissal of them as abstract and therefore useless or ignorable, are actually quite useful, and can easily be put to good use describing reality. Anyone in the world familiar with numbers knows this. I surmise that you know it, and are pulling my leg with this “there is no real difference” garbage. But fun is fun, let’s get down to serious discussion, if we may. For 1.B., it is not in fact the case that {} =/= {} nor that 0 =/= 0. In reality, the null set is zero, {} == 0. Even if you were to dismiss all numbers as useless, the fact remains that in our fantasy world where our calculations have consequences, {} == 0.
 
That’s kind of a weird thing to say, I wonder what contribution that statement actually makes to your argument. Certainly, I am not arguing against my own position. It puzzles me why you would perceive that, but as you just made the statement and dropped it, I guess I will concentrate instead on actually making my own argument and refuting yours. Maybe you should concentrate on the same? Just a thought.

OK, help me here. You SEEM to be saying the following:
  1. My criticism of your argument is irrelevant because both of the following lines of thought lead to that conclusion.
A. A set is an abstraction, and therefore sets can comfortably be dismissed as not holding any possible isomorphism with reality.

B. A set is not an abstraction, and therefore {} =/= 0.

1.A. My criticism of your argument (to wit, G = 1, wG = 2, 1 =/= 2) is irrelevant because it is impossible to use numbers to describe reality at all, because numbers are abstractions.

1.B. My criticism of your argument ( G = {{}}, wG = {{{}}}, {{}} =/= {{{}}} ) is irrelevant because ( {} =/= {} ).

That is what I could discern from your statements. I’ll offer a brief criticism of each. For 1.A., the problem is that numbers, despite your dismissal of them as abstract and therefore useless or ignorable, are actually quite useful, and can easily be put to good use describing reality. Anyone in the world familiar with numbers knows this. I surmise that you know it, and are pulling my leg with this “there is no real difference” garbage. But fun is fun, let’s get down to serious discussion, if we may. For 1.B., it is not in fact the case that {} =/= {} nor that 0 =/= 0. In reality, the null set is zero, {} == 0. Even if you were to dismiss all numbers as useless, the fact remains that in our fantasy world where our calculations have consequences, {} == 0.
I have never claimed that numbers are useless or ignorable, but either you stay in your fantasy world and treat sets and numbers as abstractions, or you treat them as real. What you are doing is conflating the two concepts.
 
I have never claimed that numbers are useless or ignorable, but either you stay in your fantasy world and treat sets and numbers as abstractions, or you treat them as real. What you are doing is conflating the two concepts.
They are really abstractions. Their reality is in their existence as abstractions. We then use these mental abstractions to guide our actions in physical reality.

Now in philosophy or theology, which is what we are doing here, a similar principle applies, except that philosophical concepts and theological concepts are abstract similarly to numbers, so the possibility of correlation is actually more direct. As an atheist, you might personally hold that there is no reality to correspond to any of our theological concepts, but you can’t assume that in an argument, unless you’ve actually proved it.

Given, then, the possibility that God is real and that there is some possible world prior to God’s creating of anything, we can certainly represent that possible world, as you’ve already done, as wG, and God as G. My contention is simply that wG =/= G, or {G} =/= G. I used a symbol earlier that I failed to define, to wit, ’ {- '. I was trying to make an ‘E’ symbolically, to denote the function, “is an element of.” So that,

2 {- {1, 2, 3}.

Thus, G {- {G}. God is an element or subset of the set that contains only Him and nothing else. There is, in abstract mathematical reality, another subset of that set, namely 0 or {}, the null set. That is one thing we mean when we specify, “and nothing else.” Thus, {G} == { {}, G }. The set containing God alone has the cardinality 2. It correlates exactly to the number 2. It is constructed identically to the number 2.

What we have here is either an identity or an isomorphism. If we take literally the phrase, in Scripture, “God is One,” then we can assert a direct identity between God and 1, or God and {0}, and thus the set {God} or {G} or wG is identical to 2, or {0, 1}, or { {}, G }.

If we do not take that phrase literally, then there is not identity, but there is still isomorphism, and that is all that is necessary for the math and thus the philosophy to be sound. If you want to debunk this, you’ll have to show either why it is not legitimate to draw the isomorphism between possible worlds and mathematical sets, or between God and 1, or, that it is not legitimate to derive the natural numbers according to the schema referenced, but that is already pretty widely accepted among mathematicians, I think.
 
As a matter of set theory, it is not true that {G} = { {}, G } except for the trivial case of G = {}. Nor is it true that elements and subsets are the same thing.

However, I can’t see the relevance of any of this to set theory.
 
As a matter of set theory, it is not true that {G} = { {}, G } except for the trivial case of G = {}. Nor is it true that elements and subsets are the same thing.

However, I can’t see the relevance of any of this to set theory.
Or what relevance any of this has to metaphysics ? Linus2nd
 
Oi, pardon, yes - I meant to say “relevance to natural theology,” but the wrong words came out.
 
Looks like the posts on this thread have been raised and discussed before
  • couple of examples follow and the link is at the end of this post.It is
    provided because the posters on this thread may learn something.
Truth, Love and Peace.

OchsFam http://forums.catholic-questions.org/member.php?u=136949
Junior Member
Join Date: March 17, 2009
Posts: 346
Religion: Catholic

Re: Thomas Aquinas, The Unmoved Mover…

The unmoved mover concept is a natural result that derives from Newton’s
laws of motion.

We know all objects in motion remain in motion and all objects at rest
remain at rest unless acted upon by an outside force. We also know that
energy is neither created nor destroyed. Because objects in motion were
either created in motion or put into motion by some outside force, you get
into a what moved what argument. Eventually the argument will boil down to
“what started that movement” or “what created that explosion.” If energy
is neither created nor destroyed, you are left with an unprovable
hypothesis that is “time can go back infinitely” which is not only
unprovable but in my opinion would be unlikely and force more ridiculous
hypotheses to support it.

So the answer Thomas Aquinas came to is that eventually, you have to get
to an initial mover that is not dependent on movement. The mover would
need to be infinite movement (which is a concept physics could use but I
still cannot wrap my head around) and he termed that mover “the unmoved
mover.” Physics points you in this direction as one of its hypotheses for
the creation of the universe. While close minded scientists will reject
this theory because they do not want to believe in God nor do they want to
even entertain anything that shows there may be an initial cause outside
of their own imaginations.

It is funny to me that it is easier for people to believe that time can go
back infinitely and that everything is cyclical with no beginning or end
than to believe that maybe some intelligence beyond our understanding
created everything we know. Both require faith, one is in men (which is
scary beyond all else) and one in the creator. Choose wisely, your eternal
life may depend on it.

Keep in mind, the unmoved mover concept is co-dependent on his other five
proofs which use physics to define certain properties of God. For example,
God being outside of time and space are necessities to the unmoved mover
theory. All of this is easily concluded using only physics and its
fundamental laws. Again though, this is just one hypothesis and it is
ultimately the only one which makes sense of everything.

God Bless.

“The riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man.” - G.
K. Chesterton (Introduction to the Book of Job, 1907)

This is the infinite regress. More info can be found here:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress

Quote:
Originally Posted by TheTrueCentrist
http://forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=7697691#post7697691
Why must there be an unmoved mover, i.e. why can’t time extend back
infinitely?

You are basically saying: there is no unmoved mover, therefore there must
be an unmoved mover.

Because there is no such thing as “time” there is only change. Change ends
with G-d because as the being whose substance is existence there is
nowhere beyond Him to go. “No-thing exists” is a logical contradiction and
therefore impossible. no-thing=some-thing, notA=A. Any being who is not
literally the act of existing would itself be contingent and therefore a
creation, not G-d.

@Ochsfam- Whats up JoCo? Whats you’re Parish?. I live in the Dotte, St.
Patricks

I have dealt with great things that I do not understand; things too
wonderful for me, which I cannot know. -Job 42:3

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=547757
 
The Existence of God

newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm

The topic will be treated as follows:

Finding God through Faith and Reason
As Known Through Natural Reason
A. The Problem Stated
  1. Formal Anti-Theism
  2. Types of Theism
    B. Theistic Proofs
  3. A Posteriori Argument
    (a) The general causality argument
    (b) The argument from design
    (c) The argument from conscience
    (d) The argument from universal consent
  4. A Priori, or Ontological, Argument
    II. As Known Through Faith
    A. Sacred Scriptures
    B. Church Councils
    C. The Knowability of God
The website hereunder came up using the words “God Existence”. One of the links “Finding God through Faith and Reason” may be useful to both sides of the debate. Only Parts 1 to 5 of the contents( there are 14 parts in total) are stated here due to lack of space. Click on the link below to get all 14 Parts.The contents cover several points of posts in this thread.

ewtn.com/vondemand/audio/file_index.asp?SeriesId=7132

EWTN Audio Library File Index
Finding God through Faith and Reason Back to Series List
Program Name Audio File Name - Click to download
  1. How Can You Prove God’s Existence?
    Host - Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. godfaithreas_01.mp3
    Fr. Spitzer surveys the types of evidence as A Priori, A Posteriori, as well as publicly and privately accessible, and distinguishes between evidence that has recourse to experience or sensation and that which does not. Using the argument that to “achieve the unachievable,” as in saying “past time is infinite,” is a contradiction and therefore impossible, Fr. Spitzer concludes that there must be a “creation event” because time must be finite, and hence a creator must exist.
  2. St. Thomas Aquinas’ Proof of an Uncaused Cause
    Host - Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. godfaithreas_02.mp3
    In the history of life in the universe, Fr. Spitzer distinguishes between two forms of beings: the Caused Causes, which rely on something else in order to exist; and the Uncaused Cause, or that which needs nothing other than itself to exist. Going back into the past and positing an infinite number of caused causes gets us nowhere in determining ultimate causality.
St. Thomas sheds light with his Proof of the Uncaused Cause:
There must be at least one uncaused cause
The Uncaused Cause cannot cause itself
There can only be one Uncaused Cause (God).
  1. Metaphysical Proof Part One: Proof of an Unconditioned Reality
    Host - Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. godfaithreas_03.mp3
    In the history of life in the universe, Fr. Spitzer distinguishes between two realities: Conditioned Reality, or that which must have conditions fulfilled in order to exist; and Unconditioned Reality, that which does not need to have any conditions fulfilled in order to exist. If going back in the line of successive causalities or agents, there are a finite number of conditions, the final condition must also be a conditioned reality, needing something else to fulfill its conditions for existence. If there are only conditioned realities, then nothing can exist. If the cat is dependent on an infinite number of conditions to exist, it is unachievable, and will never exist. Therefore at least one Unconditioned Reality must exist.
  2. Metaphysical Proof Part Two: Proof of an Absolutely Simple Reality
    Host - Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. godfaithreas_04.mp3
    Fr. Spitzer examines the Proof of an Absolutely Simple Reality. As a presupposition, he states that, “If there is no Unconditioned Reality, then no conditioned reality (that which must have conditions fulfilled) can exist.” How does one describe the coexistence of the Unconditioned Reality with all conditioned realities? The Unconditioned Reality must be defined as absolutely simple. “Simplicity” denotes Something so transparent to itself that it literally has no intrinsic or extrinsic boundaries. “Absolute Simplicity” connotes no exclusivity, only total compatibility with everything. Hence we see how God can co-exist with the created universe, permeating it with his omnipresence.
  3. Metaphysical Proof Part Three: Proof of a Unique, Unrestricted Reality
    Host - Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., Ph.D. godfaithreas_05.mp3
    Fr. Spitzer looks into the Proof of a Unique, Unrestricted Reality. It is the nature of finites and boundaries to exclude. Therefore the simpler the reality, the more inclusive. Absolutely Simplicity means lacking all intrinsic and extrinsic boundaries, or excluding properties. An Unconditioned Reality cannot exclude anything from itself (Absolutely Simple). An Absolutely Simple being must be infinite and unique (one and only one).
Atheism

newadvent.org/cathen/02040a.htm
 
Unmoved Mover for Unmoved Doubters

acceptingabundance.com/unmoved-mover-for-unmoved-doubters/

Extracts follow. If replying please read the whole article. It would seem reasonable to me that anyone who believes that the proofs are in error would need to prove both the error AND what is posited to be correct or in lieu of the claimed error. I look forward to reasoned comments .

"The Proofs

Everything that is moved is moved by another. Proved in three ways:
  1. Whatever is moved is divisible (Aristotle Physics VI, 4). Moving things must be divisible, must have parts. Why? Because to be moving or changing, the same thing cannot be both unchanged and changed all at once. Aristotle wrote this before we knew of atomic structure, but consider what we’ve learned since. Everything that has been discovered is further broken into parts, and is constantly changing. If you move your arm, it is moved by both arm muscles and other muscles, which are moved by muscle cells and other cells, which are moved by molecules, which are moved by atoms, which are moved by atomic particles, et cetera.
So, for something not to be moved by another thing, the moving thing would have to primarily move itself, be moved by reason of itself, not by reason of a part of itself. It would have to be, as a whole, at rest, and then, as a whole, move. If a part were at rest the whole would be at rest, because there would be no parts. Since moving things must logically have parts, this is a logical impossibility.

This is called a conditional proposition. St. Thomas gave the example, “If man is an ***, he is irrational.” Man cannot be an *** (stop snickering, he means the animal), nor can he be irrational (possessing an irrational soul), but if he were an *** he would necessarily also be irrational.
  1. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself (Aristotle Physics VIII, 4). “Accident” means a property or quality not essential to a thing. To be moved by violence, means to be moved unnaturally by another. So things that are not animals that move (rocks) must be moved by another, since the movement is by accident. This is a proof by induction.
  2. And to return to divisibility, since things that move are divisible, the same thing cannot be both action and potential (Aristotle Physics VIII, 5). Thus nothing can be both mover and moved, and therefore, nothing moves itself. Logically impossible.
In movers and things moved one cannot proceed to infinity. Proved in three ways:
  1. If all movers and things moved proceed to infinity, then there is no succession. All infinities move together. If one of them is finite, i.e. moved in a finite time, then all the infinites are moved in finite time. This is impossible. The mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously, which would mean all things move as one single mobile, and one infinite is moved in finite time, which is, again, logically impossible (Aristotle Physics VII, 1).
  2. Or, in an ordered series of movers and things moved in succession (a series where one thing is moved by another), but a succession that proceeds to infinity, there still must be identified a first mover. Why? Because if there is no first mover, there is no thing moved. If the first mover is removed, or ceases to move, no other mover will move or be moved. The first mover is the cause of motion for all the others. There can be no infinite series of intermediate movers, it is a logical impossibility.
  3. Or, reverse the order. That which is moved cannot move unless there is a principal moving cause. Nothing will be moved."
 
Belorg, I seem to recall your request to evidence the relationship between God and man.

For my part much of the evidence is found in Catholic doctrine, the basis of which comes from its founder, Jesus Christ, the Son of God. The interaction between God and man through his words and deeds were on a "one on one " basis or witnessed (often by many) and faithfully passed on to the then current generation and future generations. Eventually such words and deeds were put to writing and formed sacred scripture. The Old and New Testaments very clearly define such relationship. For example let us look at some of these deeds:

1.The parting of the Red Sea (Exodus)
  1. God’s Ten commandments given to Moses at Mt Sinai.
  2. Curing several lepers, the sick and the blind by Jesus Christ and theApostles and disciples of Jesus Christ during and after the ministry of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.
  3. Jesus Christ turning a few loaves and fishes to feed 5000 men and later, 4000 men.
  4. Jesus Christ raising the dead (twice)
  5. The resurrection of Jesus Christ.
7.The ascension of Jesus Christ into heaven witnessed by 100 disciples.
  1. The relationship between the Saints and God which were witnessed and recorded including but not limited to miracles performed by the Saints.
  2. The miracle cures at Lourdes of which 74 I think have been approved by the Catholic Church. Such miracles were subjected to very thorough and independent investigations.
Note that such deeds defy the laws of physics.To put it another way the deeds cannot be explained by physical science. Belorg,Linux and any others may posit that such deeds are illogical and therefore cannot have happened. They would probably say that even if they did occur there would be a natural explanation which is logical. Well, if they do offer such a view they need to provide the natural explanation and prove that such deeds did not occur in the way witnessed and subsequently recorded in sacred scripture.The point is that God is the Creator of everything and has revealed to us what he wants to reveal- no more and no less.We Catholics also do not understand how such deeds happened - we believe that they did as recorded because we believe in God.

The real issue is not about the origin of motion but whether God is or is not.

In any event I would think the article in the link below maybe of help. The article deservedly should be read in its entirety but a few selected parts of the article follow to give some idea on what the article is about:

The atheists on this thread have not put up their reasoning for their beliefs like Alex Rosenberg or have put forward the name of an author(s) who they claim has the correct view of the origin of motion. By this post I would encourage the atheists to spell out the atheist position of the origin of motion as defined by modern physics ( based on empirical evidence and not just ideas or simple one –liners without any supporting evidence.

edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/metaphysical-middle-man.html

Edward Feser
“One of the best contemporary writers on philosophy” National Review

“A terrific writer” Damian Thompson, Daily Telegraph

“Feser… has the rare and enviable gift of making philosophical argument compulsively readable” Sir Anthony Kenny, Times Literary Supplement

Selected for the First Things list of the 50 Best Blogs of 2010 (November 19, 2010)

"But it is not just in the area of efficient causality that this middle ground position is theologically and philosophically essential. Final causality too must be regarded as immanent to nature, and precisely because efficient causal powers are. For Aquinas, there is no way to make sense of the fact that an efficient cause A regularly generates a certain specific effect or range of effects B – rather than C, or D, or no effect at all – if we don’t suppose that A inherently “points to” or is “directed at” B as toward an end or goal. Immanent efficientcausal power goes hand in hand with immanent finality or directedness; deny the latter and you implicitly deny the former, which is why Humean skepticism about efficient causality as a real, objective feature of the world followed upon the early moderns’ chucking-out of immanent final causes.

“For Aquinas,there is in general no way to argue from the world to God if potency is not a real feature of the world. which That means that potency as a real feature of nature would go out the door with immanent finality, since a potency is always a potency forsome particular outcome, toward which it “points” or is directed. If there is no finality inherent in nature, then there are no real potencies in nature either. And if potency is not a real feature of the world, then there is no basis for an Aristotelian-Thomistic argument from change or motion – that is to say, from the actualization of potency – to the existence of an Unmoved Mover (or “Unactualized Actualizer”) of the world. (Indeed, as I argued in my 2011 lecture at Franciscan University of Steubenvill you can view on YouTube”

And

“You might say that the natural order is the metaphysical middle manbetween human beings and God. There are certain kinds of religious sensibility eager to cut out the middle man – to deny nature, or do dirt on it, or make it “respectable” by absorbing it into the order of grace. Sometimes this takes a “high church” form – pantheism, say, or occasionalism, or Barthianism and some other strains of Protestantism, or the Catholic nouvelle theologie. (I said something about some of these views in an earlier post.)”
 
The whole article is a very worthy read and I highly recommend to those searching for truth or feel they would like to learn more about the reality of God.

SUMMA THEOLOGICA
St. Thomas Aquinas
QUESTION 2
The Existence of God

(In Three Articles)

A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA

Walter Farrell O.P., S.T.D., S.T.M.

Volume I—The Architect of the Universe

CHAPTER II

(Outline)
He Who Is
(Q. 2)
  1. Beginners and the beginning:
    (a) The mystery and difficulty of beginnings.
    (b) Difficulty for beginners.
    (c) Reasons for a beginning:
(1) Their modernity:
a. Objections against them.
b. Their perennial strength.
(2) Their completeness.
  1. Preliminary notions to proof of the beginning:
    (a) Potentiality and actuality.
    (b) Change: potential, process and product.
    (c) Limitations of proofs of existence.
  2. The five proofs:
    (a) From passivity—motion.
    (b) From activity—causality.
    (c) From defectibility—contingency.
    (d) From perfection—participation.
    (e) From order—finality.
  3. Characteristics of the proofs:
(a) A posteriori arguments.
(b) Not cumulative but independently sufficient.
(c) Strictly limited to the evidence.
(d) Foundations of the deductive tract on the nature of God.

Conclusion:
  1. Significance of the proofs.
  2. Real mystery of beginnings.
Continued
 
Continued

I have selected the following extracts only because they relate to the subject matter or points made by a number of posters.

"3. Allegedly non-mysterious substitutes.Specifically these proofs for the existence of God start with a simplicity worthy of the divinity they demonstrate, demanding just two things: a fact evident to the senses and the first principles of the intellect.
The proofs for the existence of God do not belong on the dubious fringe of philosophy but in a place of honor; they have fought a bitter battle in defense of the intellect of man. A complete treatment of the existence of a beginning of things must always be a three-sided fight which must be won on all fronts or the intellect is lost. On one side are the champions of the ineptitude of man who insist that man’s one distinctive power of intellect has no intrinsic value; of course it cannot prove the existence of God. At the opposite extreme is the camp of optimists and emotionalists, one group insisting the existence of God needs no proof since it is self-evident, the other tacitly admitting the intellectual incapacity of man but holding for an emotional assurance of the Supreme Being. In the middle, carrying the brunt of the offensive today, are those who champion man by destroying God, claiming there is no God, at least no such God as the Christians worship.

The fight is bitter. Because not all men and women have the appetite for fighting, or the time and ability to carry on the fight to the end, and because so very much hangs on the outcome of the battle, infallible authority has come forth to protect those who by force of circumstance are non-combatants. By that authority, the man who cannot follow the intricacies of proof, either by reason of inability or lack of leisured time, knows beyond question that the reason of man, by its own power, can certainly know the existence of God and that God, the supreme Being, certainly exists.

The gesture of authority is necessary, not because the truth it defends is beyond the range of the guns of reason, but because it is essential that every man know of God’s existence for his individual life, just as it is essential for the world about man that God exist. The thinker who has seen and grasped the proof has no need of authority; he holds that truth by a clear insight into a natural truth. This man can prove the existence of God; by that proof he has also shown that the existence of God is not self-evident, it does not rest on an emotional assurance, it does not escape the powers of the mind of man. It is a proved fact.

Of course this man did not arrive at the proof of the existence of God effortlessly, as he might come to the point of raising a beard. The proof demands hard work, the hard work of thinking; certainly this man would have to have some preliminary notions accurately in mind before he could take a step towards the proof itself.

There is, for instance, the simple, but decidedly abstract notion of potentiality and actuality, a notion that is perhaps grasped more easily by seeing it in the complex notion of change. Let us look at these notions in a rather clumsy example. Let us take a large, perfectly plain block of marble; then put a sculptor to work on it and have him make a statue of that block of marble. We say, rightly, that in the original marble block there is the potentiality of becoming a statue, the principle or aptitude for receiving this further perfection, the quality of being changed. It may be worth noting that by “perfection” here we mean any respect in which a thing can be completed or become more determinate in its being. When the process is complete, that potentiality has been realized, the marble block has become a statue.****

to be continued
 
continued

Red highlight is mine for emphasis
The particular value of clarity in this notion of change lies in the fact that it brings out the complete necessity of explaining every realized potentiality, every perfection. by an explanation external to the realized potentiality itself. It makes more obvious the truth that a developed perfection is not its own explanation. it has not developed itself, nor is it explained by the potentiality which it perfected.

One other preliminary notion that must be clarified before proceeding to the actual proofs for the existence of God is the limitation of all proofs for existence. As a matter of fact, there arc only two possibilities for proof of the existence of anything: the direct proof offered by sense experience, such as a man has of the existence of a door by ramming his nose against it; and the inferential or a posteriori proof, such as a detective might have of the existence of a murderer when he finds an armless paralytic dangling on a four-foot rope from a rafter fifteen feet above the floor. The detective, by his type of proof, may never come to more than an extremely great probability because it may be impossible to rule out all possibilities other than murder. Where it is possible to rule out all other possibilities, this proof by inference, the a posteriori proof, gives complete certitude.

No other proof of existence is possible, no “a priori” proof is valid, because existence in no way enters into the very nature of created things; we cannot argue from the nature of things to their existence, as we can argue from the nature of man to the spirituality of his soul. As we shall see, when the proof for God’s existence is completed, existence does enter into the very nature of God; but we cannot presuppose that when starting off on the task of proving God does exist. In other words, a conclusion about existence cannot be drawn from premises which do not assert the existence of anything; to assert the existence of something in the conclusion of a line of reasoning, you must assert the existence of something somewhere among the premises.

The contrary is the sophism inherent in all “a priori” or ontological proofs for God’s existence, the sophism which Kant attributed to all proofs for God’s existence. He argued that some concept of God is essential at the start of any proof for the existence of God and such a concept includes the notion of God’s existence. Kant is right, of course, in maintaining that some concept of God is necessary from the very beginning of these proofs; after all, the proofs are trying to prove something. But it is quite enough, for the purpose of the proofs, that that concept be no more than a statement of the absence of contradiction between God and existence; in other words, that concept, required to begin the proofs, need be no more than a construct which demands only the possibility of the union of the subject and predicate in the proposition “God exists.”

Experience assures us emphatically that we do not have a direct sense knowledge of God’s existence. When, in the course of this volume, we learn more about the divine nature, we shall see why we cannot have a sense knowledge of God. For the present, it is sufficient to accept the dictum of experience and concentrate our efforts along the only line of proof left open to us, the inferential or a posteriori proof, the proof of the cause from the effects.

The first proof proceeds from the fact of motion or, to put the same thing in another way, from the fact of the passivity of things. Its extremely simple formulation can be made in these terms: because nothing that is moved moves or changes itself, the unquestionable fact of movement or change in the world about us, forces us to conclude to the existence of a first mover who is not himself moved. That is all of the proof. Its very brevity is reason enough for a somewhat lengthy explanation of it.

The phrase, “nothing moves or changes itself,” means only that a thing cannot be, relative to the same goal, merely movable and already moved, merely changeable and already changed; for the starting point and the goal of the process of becoming are necessarily different. The mere aptitude for receiving motion is not its own completion. The common sense fundamental back of this phrase, then, is simply that what is not possessed cannot be bestowed; and the very notion of potentiality is the absence of perfection that can be possessed but so far is not, for, unless we maintain that contraries are identical, a potentiality is not its actualization.

Actually this argument goes back a step farther, beyond the cause of change to the cause of that which is changed, back of the cause of becoming to the cause of being. For the immediate cause of change alone is itself in the process of becoming by its very causality; the mover of a potentially movable thing is himself moved by the very movement by which he moves this thing, he becomes something other than he was. The peddler does something to himself as well as to his pushcart when he bends his strength to its movement. Unless we come to a cause that produces that which is subject to change, to a cause that does not itself become something other than it was, the process of becoming or change cannot start. Briefly, what is in question here is not the process of motion, but the existence of that perfection which is motion.

continued
 
Final and continued from previous post-
It is obvious, then, that the term “mover” is used of the first and of secondary movers not in an identical, but only in a proportional, sense; for the first mover is the cause of being and is himself unchanged, while secondary movers are causes of change and are themselves changed in their action. It is to this unique first mover that the argument concludes.

A not uncommon fallacy today is to suppose that since this particular movement is caused by another, this latter by another, and so on, there is no need for further explanation since it is taken for granted that the world is eternal. From this point of view, since you can never come to the end of the chain of movers, there is no mystery about the present movement. The fallacy lies in the fact that without a beginning the whole thing could not start; no one of these previous movers is sufficient explanation of itself and its effect on others, yet a sufficient explanation must be found if the fact of movement is to be intelligible, if we are not to have something coming from nothing. The haze of distance or the weight of time do not do away with the necessity of explanation any more than they offer a positive explanation. To be satisfied with this is to be satisfied with the removal of the question to more obscure quarters, comforted by its consequent vagueness. The plain fact is that unless we come to a mover that is in no way dependent we have not explained the existence of the movers who are undoubtedly dependent either for their actual movement or for the power to move; where the effects are patently present the cause ultimately explaining them is not to be denied.

Two things are to be particularly noted about this first proof for the existence of God: the narrowness of the conclusion and the independence of the argument from the element of time. The argument adheres rigidly to the limits of its premises; it concludes to a first mover unmoved—and to nothing more. There is nothing more which can be concluded from the sensible fact of motion with which the argument started. Because there is movement, there is a cause of cosmic movement which is itself unmoved. The argument is not a sputtering flame to be extinguished by the simple expedient of blanketing it with centuries. There is no question here of movement beginning in time. It is not a question of a present reality demanding a cause in the past. It is simply a question of the universe as given, movement or change as experienced, and the conclusion that such a movement or change is unintelligible without a first mover communicating movement to all things. Time makes no difference. If the eternity of the world were to be proved tomorrow beyond all doubt, this proof would be in no way affected; the fact of change is there, the effect is with us, its cause cannot be denied."

END
 
Why science cannot explain why anything at all exists

Selected extract from the article in the link hereunder follows:

"Firstly, the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” is equivalent to the question “why does anything at all exist?”. However, Krauss et al have decided to creatively redefine nothing (with no mandate from science – more on that in a later post) so that the question becomes more like “why is there a universe rather than a quantum space time foam?”. So I’ll focus on the second formulation, since it is immune to such equivocations.
Here is my argument.
A: The state of physics at any time can be (roughly) summarised by three things.
  1. A statement about what the fundamental constituents of physical reality are and what their properties are.
  2. A set of mathematical equations describing how these entities change, move, interact and rearrange.
  3. A compilation of experimental and observational data.
In short, the stuff, the laws and the data.

B: None of these, and no combination of these, can answer the question “why does anything at all exist?”.

C: Thus physics cannot answer the question “why does anything at all exist?”.

Let’s have a closer look at the premises. I’m echoing here the argument of David Albert in his review of Krauss’ book, which I thoroughly recommend. Albert says,

[W]hat the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all there is for the fundamental laws of nature to be about, insofar as physics has ever been able to imagine, is how that elementary stuff is arranged."

The subject matter of this thread is “St. Thomas Motion Argument and Modern Physics”

Now the point I wish to make is that posts to this thread when discussing the origin of motion in a physical sense should do so in accordance with the three (3) points under “A” above. But this has not been the case at all. The atheists have presented more or less ‘one liners’ with little, if any of the three things stated in the highlighted section above. IMO the atheist position appears to be nothing more than speculative ideas or perhaps beliefs without any physics being presented.The atheists should confine their comments to St. Thomas’s statement on motion which he uses as one of five ways to prove the existence of God and modern physics as defined above.Indeed this whole thread has not for the main part addressed the “fit in” and relationship between the two as requested by the originator of this thread.

Pity!!!

file:///Users/robertdebeer/Desktop/Universe%20and%20cosmology/Why%20science%20cannot%20explain%20why%20anything
 
They are really abstractions. Their reality is in their existence as abstractions. We then use these mental abstractions to guide our actions in physical reality.

Now in philosophy or theology, which is what we are doing here, a similar principle applies, except that philosophical concepts and theological concepts are abstract similarly to numbers, so the possibility of correlation is actually more direct. As an atheist, you might personally hold that there is no reality to correspond to any of our theological concepts, but you can’t assume that in an argument, unless you’ve actually proved it.

Given, then, the possibility that God is real and that there is some possible world prior to God’s creating of anything, we can certainly represent that possible world, as you’ve already done, as wG, and God as G. My contention is simply that wG =/= G, or {G} =/= G. I used a symbol earlier that I failed to define, to wit, ’ {- '. I was trying to make an ‘E’ symbolically, to denote the function, “is an element of.” So that,

2 {- {1, 2, 3}.

Thus, G {- {G}. God is an element or subset of the set that contains only Him and nothing else. There is, in abstract mathematical reality, another subset of that set, namely 0 or {}, the null set. That is one thing we mean when we specify, “and nothing else.” Thus, {G} == { {}, G }. The set containing God alone has the cardinality 2. It correlates exactly to the number 2. It is constructed identically to the number 2.

What we have here is either an identity or an isomorphism. If we take literally the phrase, in Scripture, “God is One,” then we can assert a direct identity between God and 1, or God and {0}, and thus the set {God} or {G} or wG is identical to 2, or {0, 1}, or { {}, G }.

If we do not take that phrase literally, then there is not identity, but there is still isomorphism, and that is all that is necessary for the math and thus the philosophy to be sound. If you want to debunk this, you’ll have to show either why it is not legitimate to draw the isomorphism between possible worlds and mathematical sets, or between God and 1, or, that it is not legitimate to derive the natural numbers according to the schema referenced, but that is already pretty widely accepted among mathematicians, I think.
None of this has any sort of relevance to my argument.
 
If you don’t know how God created the universe, then why should they accept God as the cause?
Because there is no other explanation. Thomas demonstrated that the God of Christianity exists. By Faith we know that the material, limited, contingent universe came into existence, whereas there was no prior existent substance or being ( including the being of God ) from which it sprung. In other words, we know by an act of Faith, strictly and absolutely, that God created this universe out of nothing. How he created it, is also a mystery as has been pointed out before ( see some of my posts above ). Thomas explained how it was necessary, that is logically necessary and ontologically necessary, but neither he nor anyone else could, can, or ever will be able to explain " how. "

So we know logically that the universe is not part of God ( See, S.C.G. Part 1, chap 26 - the Being of God is not the being of the universe) and it was created ex nihil. So God did indeed create " something " from " nothing. " The well worn phrase " ex nihil nihilo, fit " applies only between the activities of the limited, contingent beings of creation. Because of their contingent natures, they cannot create other beings. Only God can do that.

For you and other " budding " philosophers, that is the key thing. We just have to realize that our intellects are limited just as the limited beings of our universe. Our knowledge flows from our sense experience of the universe. From this we can logically conclude to the existence of God. But the full extent of God’s nature and how He accomplishes His will is tied up with His very Essence, so the " how " is for ever a part of " hiddeness " of His Essence. We can know that it " must be " but we cannot know " how " it is done.

It is like the condition of a friend I had in High School. In Geometry class the teacher pointed out that no one could " square a circle. " You know he stayed up all that night trying to do just that. The next day, wore out from his all night oddessy, he admitted he couldn’t do it. And for the wise, that was a lesson to take to heart, no need for all of us to stay up all night trying do the impossible. Linus2nd
 
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