St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

[Linusthe2nd]

Hello Al Moritz. I agree that it makes rational sense to say that God can create an “essence” out of nothing since it doesn’t involve the same problem as bringing an act or reality of nothing, so long as we also agree that God is the esse of every essence. Thats how you get around the apparent contradiction. But I will never agree that God can create esse from nothing which is what linus and unfortunately most Catholic thinkers seem too think on this forum for fear of pantheism, which is not what I believe in.

God is the Being of all beings. Existence is absolute. It does not change or have quantity or distinction in it. There is no rational distinction between the esse of a hippo and the esse of a man. It is only essences that are distinct from each-other.

THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS ( S.C.G. 1, ch 26)

[1] We are now able to refute the error of certain persons who said that God is nothing other than the formal being of each thing.

[2] This being is divided into the being of substance and the being of accident. Now, we have proved that the divine being is neither the being of substance nor that of accident. God, therefore, cannot be that being by which each thing formally is.

[3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.

[4] Then, too, a principle is naturally prior to that whose principle it is. Now, in certain things being has something that is as its principle. For the form is said to be a principle of being, and so is the agent, that makes things to be in act. If, therefore, the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has some cause. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this conclusion above.

[5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things.

[6] Again, strictly speaking, generation is the way to being and corruption the way to non-being. For form is not the terminus of generation, and privation is not the terminus of corruption, except because a form causes being and privation non-being. If a form did not cause being, a thing which received such a form would not be said to be generated. Hence, if God is the formal being of all things, He will consequently be the terminus of generation. This is false, since, as we have shown above, God is eternal.

[7] It will also follow that the being of each thing has existed from eternity. Generation or corruption is therefore impossible. If it does exist, pre-existing being must accrue to something anew. It will therefore accrue either to something pre-existing or to something in no way pre-existing. In the first instance, since according to the above position the being of all existing things is one, it will follow that a thing that is said to be generated acquires, not a new being, but a new mode of being. The result is alteration, not generation. But, if the generated thing in no way pre-existed, it will follow that it is produced from nothing—which is contrary to the nature of generation. This position, therefore, entirely ruins generation and corruption and, as a consequence, is evidently impossible.

[8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside this error in confessing that God is “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah (6:1), and that He is “over all,” according to Romans (9:5). For, if He is the being of all things, He is part of all things, but not over them.

[9] So, too, those who committed this error are condemned by the same judgment as are the idolaters who “gave the incommunicable name,” that is, of God, “to wood and stones,” as it is written (Wis. 14:21). If, indeed, God is the being of all things, there will be no more reason to say truly that a stone is a being than to say that a stone is God.

cont…

 

[Linusthe2nd]

cont. from post # 477 ( S.C.G., 1, ch 26

10 ] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error. The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [De caelisti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [De divinis nominibusi II, 5].

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

It would be worth your while to also read Thomas’ reference to De divinis nominibus.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

cont. from post # 477 ( S.C.G., 1, ch 26

10 ] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error. The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [De caelisti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [De divinis nominibusi II, 5].

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

It would be worth your while to also read Thomas’ reference to De divinis nominibus.

Linus2nd

1. Esse is absolutely distinct from essence and is perfectly simple. Essences have divisions and quantitiess; not esse. There is no real rational distinction between the esse of a hippo and the esse of a man; but there is a real rational distinction between the nature of a hippo and the nature of a man. Conjoining is not the same thing as being intrinsic to a things nature. So whether we are right or wrong, you cannot claim that we are pantheists. You are simply being dishonest or willfully ignorant.
2. You cannot get esse out of nothing, for that is a violation/contradiction of the absolute distinction between being and nothing. Quoting famous philosophers and showing us your interpretation of their words in-order to suite your thesis, cannot change that fact. Neither does it help you to repeat the mantra that you are invincibly ignorant of how creation is a achieved and that therefore we should just accept your interpretation out of faith. The fact remains; metaphysical reason dictates that the act of reality (esse) is absolute. Its logically impossible to make esse out of absolute nothingness. Thus the question of how God creates cannot involve bringing esse out of nothing, regardless of whether or not we can have positive knowledge how God creates.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Firstly nobody said that creatures have a “part” of God in them.

Secondly, that something cannot come from nothing (the absence of reality) is the underlying bases of Aquinas’ arguments. His Arguments simply don’t work without that logical principle. You cannot create esse out of nothing without violating the absolute logical distinction between something and nothing. Its a logical impossibility, no more logical than saying that a magician really did pull a rabbit out of nothing. The act of reality is absolute, and what your proposing is magic. Not a miracle.

See my posts #s 476, 477, 478 above

The only way that creation can exist is for it to participate in Gods esse, for there is no esse other than God; there is only one God. Through God and in God we have our being. That is in no way saying that God is the essence of creatures. Therefore it is not pantheism; rather it is Existential-Thomism.

As will be seen form what follows to say that " …there is no esse other than God…" is absolutely false. There is the esse of God and there is the esse of creatures, two entirely different realities related only as effect to cause. To say that the only esse is that of God is also to say the esse of creatures is fused with the esse of God or visa verse and this indeed is Pantheism.

The term " participation " used by Thomas has books written about it. See : 1. Participation & Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 1995, Rudi A. Te Velde, 2. The Metaphical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 2000, John F. Whipple, Part 1, ch 4 ( ch 5, Essence and Esse ), The Philosophy of St.Thomas Aquinas, trans. from 3rd edition, 3rd reprint, 1983, Etienne Gilson, ch 7, creation.

This a very complicated and detailed but rewarding study for those interested in finding the correct understanding of Thomas Aquinas. The term " participation " is a troubling one because of the style of Thomas’ writing. The short and tall of it is that when Thomas uses the term " participation " in regard to the " existence " or the " act of existence " of created essences he means " to imitate " or to " be like God. " In other words, the " being " of creatures is not the " Being " of God but is a " likeness or reflection " of the Being of God. So in this sense the " being " or " existence " of creatures " participates in " or " shares in " the Being of God. In other words they " imitate " in some manner, or are a reflection of the " existence, " they are not part of God’s existence.

There are thus two realms of existence, ontologically and logically, entirely and utterely separate from and different from one another. The creaturely bing is a " faint " reflection ot the " eternal " Being of God.

Thus Gilson says in chapter 4, creatures ( including all that is contained in their essence ) are indeed from God in that they are contained in His Ideas of them ( in whole and in all their parts ). He " knows " them and creates them. So they do come from " something " in that sense. They participate in God’s Being because they are the external manifestation of His Ideas of them. But they are not in any way part of His Being or existence, they have their exisence through His act of creation but there is an infinite distance between the being of creatures that the Being of God. They are two entirely separate realities. There is no " fusion " between the two separate realities.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

1. Esse is absolutely distinct from essence and is perfectly simple. Essences have divisions and quantitiess; not esse. There is no real rational distinction between the esse of a hippo and the esse of a man; but there is a real rational distinction between the nature of a hippo and the nature of a man. Conjoining is not the same thing as being intrinsic to a things nature. So whether we are right or wrong, you cannot claim that we are pantheists. You are simply being dishonest or willfully ignorant.
2. You cannot get esse out of nothing, for that is a violation/contradiction of the absolute distinction between being and nothing. Quoting famous philosophers and showing us your interpretation of their words in-order to suite your thesis, cannot change that fact. Neither does it help you to repeat the mantra that you are invincibly ignorant of how creation is a achieved and that therefore we should just accept your interpretation out of faith. The fact remains; metaphysical reason dictates that the act of reality (esse) is absolute. Its logically impossible to make esse out of absolute nothingness. Thus the question of how God creates cannot involve bringing esse out of nothing, regardless of whether or not we can have positive knowledge how God creates.

If you are not open to instruction, there is nothing I or anyone can do to help you.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

If you are not open to instruction, there is nothing I or anyone can do to help you.

Linus2nd

It is I who is instructing you. But you refuse to understand.

 

[Linux]

Your worst nightmare has finally revealed itself.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It is ii who is instructing you.

It appears that you have not read my posts. If you had you would have seen they are " chapter and verse, " from Thomas and other philosophers. All you seem able to do is respond with the same two paragraphs you have repeated for weeks. No one is denying the distinction between essence and existence. That indeed is a basic teaching and innovation of Thomas. What Thomas has said in S.C.G. part 1, ch 26 and what Gilson and others have pointed out is that the esse of created essences is bestowed by God and is not His own esse but a likeness or imitation of it, for which reason Thomas calls it a participation. In the second sentence of chapter 26 of the S.C.G. above, Thomas says that the being ( existence ) of God is not the being ( existence ) of created beings or substances. The remaining of the chapter explains how Thomas arrives at this conclusion.

Now you may disagree with that but if you do, you reject the teaching of Thomas. And Thomas would also deny that there is only one being and that is the being of God. Both positions are Pantheistic and would be rejected by the Catholic Church.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

All you seem able to do is respond with the same two paragraphs you have repeated for weeks.

That’s because you haven’t given a genuine rebuttal for them, and you can’t because your interpretation of Aquinas is Metaphysically impossible.

I don’t think I am contradicting Aquinas but rather I am rejecting your interpretation and for valid reasons. But even if I am contradicting Aquinas, in the end it really does not matter who said what. The truth is what matters.

 

[Linux]

Thomas would also deny that there is only one being and that is the being of God. Both positions are Pantheistic and would be rejected by the Catholic Church.

Linus2nd

God is identical to what esse is, so it is irrational to say that God creates new esse’ that are distinct from himself. Its illogical to have species of esse. God is identical to the esse of every essence.

The reason why a created essence can be caused to exist and cease to exist is because an essence is not identical or intrinsic to esse. If it were intrinsic then such an essence would always exist just like God. God is eternal because his essence is esse; he is not a composite of two distinct things. “Esse” cannot come into existence or cease to be since that would be a contradiction of the fact that it is an esse. Thus we can only say that essences come in and out of existence. We cannot logically say that esse comes into existence. It is always existence, and it is the existence to which all contingent things stand in potency.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Your worst nightmare has finally revealed itself.

 

[Linux]

Yes, you know…the nightmare where you are actually WRONG.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

That’s because you haven’t given a genuine rebuttal for them, and you can’t because your interpretation of Aquinas is Metaphysically impossible.

I don’t think I am contradicting Aquinas but rather I am rejecting your interpretation and for valid reasons. But even if I am contradicting Aquinas, in the end it really does not matter who said what. The truth is what matters.

You mean you think your " opinions " are equivalent to truth, or at least your philosophical powers are superior to that of Thomas Aquinas. That’s quite a stretch. By the way, if you really did know anything about Thomas, you would know that I haven’t interpreted anything. What I gave you is pure Thomism taken from his own documents. And of course I did use the comments and analyses of other universally well known Thomists of the past and present centuries. None of what I gave you is my own interpretation or opinion except the conclusion that your " theory " amounts to Pantheism, which is indeed condemned by the Catholic Church.

And while you have accused me of propagating my personal opinions as philosophical fact ( an accusation I absolutely deny ), you have conveniently ignored the fact that you continuously repeat that very error yourself.

Thomas may be wrong, so may Gilson, Wipple, and Feser, but you can hardly accuse them of being opinion mongers. They at least made and do make a living as reputable philosophers, scholars all. How about yourself?

Nothing wrong with trying to formulate your own philosophy but don’t be so arrogant as to claim it is so compelling as to unseat these scholars.

Now, instead of fuming away and trying to score points why not read over my last few posts of yesterday and today and think about them, since they represent the thinking of scholars in the field.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Yes, you know…the nightmare where you are actually WRONG.

 

[Linux]

You mean you think your " opinions " are equivalent to truth, or at least your philosophical powers are superior to that of Thomas Aquinas. That’s quite a stretch. By the way, if you really did know anything about Thomas, you would know that I haven’t interpreted anything. What I gave you is pure Thomism taken from his own documents. And of course I did use the comments and analyses of other universally well known Thomists of the past and present centuries. None of what I gave you is my own interpretation or opinion except the conclusion that your " theory " amounts to Pantheism, which is indeed condemned by the Catholic Church.

And while you have accused me of propagating my personal opinions as philosophical fact ( an accusation I absolutely deny ), you have conveniently ignored the fact that you continuously repeat that very error yourself.

Thomas may be wrong, so may Gilson, Wipple, and Feser, but you can hardly accuse them of being opinion mongers. They at least made and do make a living as reputable philosophers, scholars all. How about yourself?

Nothing wrong with trying to formulate your own philosophy but don’t be so arrogant as to claim it is so compelling as to unseat these scholars.

Now, instead of fuming away and trying to score points why not read over my last few posts of yesterday and today and think about them, since they represent the thinking of scholars in the field.

Linus2nd

I have presented my arguments. When you are ready with a genuine rebuttal and not just a commentary, I am all ears.

 

[Love4All]

None of this has any sort of relevance to my argument.

I was replying originally to this,

So, wG is God combined with…?

wG has God + nothing else, which means that, unless’ nothin else’ has properties wG has the same properties as God. IIfnyou truly want to deny this, then I am done with you.

I am asking you to prove that wG, which according to Catholic doctrine is a possible world with God and nothing else can have properties that God does not have, or to admit that you do not know what you are talking about.

The purport of your argument here was that SINCE wG = G, and since God cannot change, consequently wG cannot change and Creation is impossible. Since your argument hinges on wG = G, it seems absolutely relevant to your argument, that wG =/= G. It seems, in fact, to destroy your argument. Since wG =/= G, consequently wG and G can and do have different properties. Specifically, G can be immutable while wG is mutable, and consequently, Creation, or Creatio Ex Nihilo, is both coherent and possible.

If this had nothing to do with your argument, then I apologize, I must have you confused with someone else.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God is identical to what esse is, so it is irrational to say that God creates new esse’ that are distinct from himself. Its illogical to have species of esse. God is identical to the esse of every essence.

May be irrational to you, not to God or St. Thomas or to thousands of Scholastic Philosophers and Theologians, nor to the Catholic Church for the past 2000 years. That is pure Pantheism.

The reason why a created essence can be caused to exist and cease to exist is because an essence is not identical or intrinsic to esse.

You are so confused here that I hardly know where to begin. To start **essence and esse/] are distinct in all cases except for God in Whom Essence and Esse/] are identical or rather God’s Essence is Pure Existence. You have equated identical and intrinsic which do not have equivalent definitions.

All other acutally existing essences have existence or esse given to them by God and which makes them to be existing essences. So while it is true to say that their esse is external to their essence, it is also true to say that their esse forms a composit with the essence such that together they form one definite, identifiable substance or being. And this is why I would rather discard the term essence when talking about actual existents. Essence is to Esse
as potency is to act.

What makes a substance exist is the Will of God willing to " diffuse " the knowledge He has of an infinite number of Ideas of possible beings or substances or essences, in order to reflect this knowledge outside Himself in a limited or concrete way which will reflect, imitate, be somewhat like His eternal Ideas. And thereby give Him glory.

What makes a substance cease to exist is the action of some other existing being on it or just some degenerating factor designed into its nature by God. Metaphysically, we would say that material substances are subject to dissolution because there is in their matter the potential of other froms which may add to or subtract from their current manner of existing.

Except spiritual substances like the human soul and the spiritual essences of Angels will not cease to exist except that God should will to annihilate them, which does not seem likely. Let’s just say there is no natural cause which could cause them to cease to exist.

If it were intrinsic then such an essence would always exist just like God.

Existence is intrinsic in the sense that it is at the very root of any created substance, forming a composit with its essence and making it an acting, existing being. But existence is always limited by being received into a limiting form or essence. If you subtract the esse you have nothing left in reality, only a conceptual form or essence. Everything in reality depends on having an esse.

God is eternal because his essence is esse; he is not a composite of two distinct things.

Correct.

“Esse” cannot come into existence or cease to be since that would be a contradiction of the fact that it is an esse.

But in created things, we are speaking of limited esses created along with each substance. Created esse is the first object of God’s creation and everything else in the composit substance is " concreated " along with esse, to make an existent being. You fell into this trap because you refused to recongnize the essense - existence composit of the substance or being. It is the whole substance, including its esse which goes out of existence.

Thus we can only say that essences come in and out of existence. We cannot logically say that esse comes into existence. It is always existence, and it is the existence to which all contingent things stand in potency.

Well, that is just wrong. Where did you ever get this idea. It certainly seems to be your ide’e fixe. You didn’t get it from Feser. Suggest you read him again. It is an easy evenings read. Linus2nd**

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I have presented my arguments. When you are ready with a genuine rebuttal and not just a commentary, I am all ears.

Oh, I think I’ve given you plenty of rebuttal. I am curious though just how you came up with this ide’e fixe of yours. Looks to me like you got it right of some Pantheist handbook.

Linus2nd

P.S. I’m giving up on you if you keep responding as usual, so don’t waste your time.

 

[Linux]

May be irrational to you, not to God… nor to the Catholic Church for the past 2000 years. That is pure Pantheism.

False.

You claim that God knows otherwise, but that is your opinion. Below is a logical argument, not an opinion…

God is identical to what esse is, so it is irrational to say that God creates new esse’ that are distinct from himself. Its illogical to have species of esse. God is identical to the esse of every essence.

You are so confused here that I hardly know where to begin. To start essence and esse/] are distinct in all cases except for God in Whom Essence and Esse/] are identical or rather God’s Essence is Pure Existence. You have equated identical and intrinsic which do not have equivalent definitions.

Intrinsic can refer to what a thing is essentially, its nature, and that is the context in which I have clearly used the term. Substance has no existence without a conjoining of esse and essence. Material substances are a particular genus, a class of essences that share a fundamental nature that is material; for example man, trees, goats, and sheep, have a material substance. This is to speak of an underlying nature that man, trees, goats and sheep’s are made out of or share in common as they actually exist. It is a fallacy however to identify substance with esse, since esse has nothing to do with describing the nature of a thing, and besides, a material substance stands in potency to act; not its esse. While it is true a material substance is by definition an actual essence, esse remains absolutely distinct.

All other actually existing essences

have existence or esse given to them by God and which makes them to be existing essences.

I have not denied that.

So while it is true to say that their esse

is external to their essence, it is also true to say that their esse forms a composit with the essence such that together they form one definite, identifiable substance or being.

Again; the substance of a contingent thing is not identical to esse. Esse is not intrinsic to a material substance since material substances begin to exist. It is irrelevant that a conjoining of esse and essence form an actual material substance.

And this is why I would rather discard the term essence

when talking about actual existents. Essence is to Esse
as potency is to act.

An actually existing thing, in respect of contingent things, are a conjoining of esse and essence and they remain distinct even after being conjoined. A material substance is an existing essence. Your preference is irrelevant.

What makes a substance exist is the Will of God willing to " diffuse " the knowledge He has of an infinite number of Ideas of possible beings or substances or essences, in order to reflect this knowledge outside Himself in a limited or concrete way which will reflect, imitate, be somewhat like His eternal Ideas. And thereby give Him glory.

I haven’t denied that. God is the esse of all material substances.

Existence is intrinsic in the sense that it is at the very root of any created substance

Wrong. You are speaking of intrinsic in a mechanistic or functional sense, for example a ball needs a hill in-order to roll down it. Material substances need an esse in-order to be actual material substances, but material substances do not intrinsically exist.

But in created things, we are speaking of limited esses

created along with each substance.

That is logically contradictory. Material substances are limited, but that can only refer to the nature of a thing as it is actual, and not to that which makes it actual.

Created esse

is the first object of God’s creation

False for reasons that I do not care to repeat.

Well, that is just wrong. Where did you ever get this idea. It certainly seems to be your ide’e fixe. You didn’t get it from Feser. Suggest you read him again. It is an easy evenings read. Linus2nd

Its irrelevant where I got the idea from. What is relevant is that you cannot refute my argument, and what you have produced essentially amounts to an argument from authority which you assert as being backed up by Gods authority. That’s not an argument, that’s a cop-out.

 

[Linux]

According to Aquinas, substances are what are primarily said to exist, and so substances are what have existence but yet are not identical with existence. Aquinas’s ontology then is comprised primarily of substances, and all change is either a change of one substance into another substance, or a modification of an already existing substance. Given that essence is that which is said to possess existence, but is not identical to existence, substances are essence/existence composites; their existence is not guaranteed by what they are.