St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

[Linusthe2nd]

False.

You claim that God knows otherwise, but that is your opinion. Below is a logical argument, not an opinion…

God is identical to what esse is, so it is irrational to say that God creates new esse’ that are distinct from himself. Its illogical to have species of esse. God is identical to the esse of every essence.

Intrinsic can refer to what a thing is essentially, its nature, and that is the context in which I have clearly used the term. Substance has no existence without a conjoining of esse and essence. Material substances are a particular genus, a class of essences that share a fundamental nature that is material; for example man, trees, goats, and sheep, have a material substance. This is to speak of an underlying nature that man, trees, goats and sheep’s are made out of or share in common as they actually exist. It is a fallacy however to identify substance with esse, since esse has nothing to do with describing the nature of a thing, and besides, a material substance stands in potency to act; not its esse. While it is true a material substance is by definition an actual essence, esse remains absolutely distinct.

I have not denied that.

Again; the substance of a contingent thing is not identical to esse. Esse is not intrinsic to a material substance since material substances begin to exist. It is irrelevant that a conjoining of esse and essence form an actual material substance.

An actually existing thing, in respect of contingent things, are a conjoining of esse and essence and they remain distinct even after being conjoined. A material substance is an existing essence. Your preference is irrelevant.

I haven’t denied that. God is the esse of all material substances.

Wrong. You are speaking of intrinsic in a mechanistic or functional sense, for example a ball needs a hill in-order to roll down it. Material substances need an esse in-order to be actual material substances, but material substances do not intrinsically exist.

That is logically contradictory. Material substances are limited, but that can only refer to the nature of a thing as it is actual, and not to that which makes it actual.

False for reasons that I do not care to repeat.

Its irrelevant where I got the idea from. What is relevant is that you cannot refute my argument, and what you have produced essentially amounts to an argument from authority which you assert as being backed up by Gods authority. That’s not an argument, that’s a cop-out.

If that is what you want to peddle, that’s you business. Tried to help you but it is hopeless. So long. Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

If that is what you want to peddle, that’s you business. Tried to help you but it is hopeless. So long. Linus2nd

Goodbye.

 

[belorg]

I was replying originally to this,

The purport of your argument here was that SINCE wG = G, and since God cannot change, consequently wG cannot change and Creation is impossible. Since your argument hinges on wG = G, it seems absolutely relevant to your argument, that wG =/= G. It seems, in fact, to destroy your argument. Since wG =/= G, consequently wG and G can and do have different properties. Specifically, G can be immutable while wG is mutable, and consequently, Creation, or Creatio Ex Nihilo, is both coherent and possible.

If this had nothing to do with your argument, then I apologize, I must have you confused with someone else.

Since you have in no way proven that wG and G ca have different properties, what you said was and is irrelevant to my argument.

 

[Eleve]

You haven’t proved that G and wG must have the same properties. It’s your argument; you make it.

 

[Love4All]

Since you have in no way proven that wG and G ca have different properties, what you said was and is irrelevant to my argument.

It hinges on wG == {G}. Do you accept this or not? Is not wG the world with God alone in it? This would be properly represented by the set with God alone as a member, wouldn’t it?

 

[Love4All]

God is identical to what esse is, so it is irrational to say that God creates new esse’ that are distinct from himself. Its illogical to have species of esse. God is identical to the esse of every essence.

1. “God is identical to what esse is.”

No doubt you are deriving this from, “In God, existence (esse) and essence are identical.” You appear, here, to be equivocating on the term “identical.” While God’s existence is identical with God’s essence, that is not the same thing as to say that God’s essence is to be the existence of other things. God’s essence is to exist, Himself. He does not enter into composition with other things.

The reason why a created essence can be caused to exist and cease to exist is because an essence is not identical or intrinsic to esse. If it were intrinsic then such an essence would always exist just like God. God is eternal because his essence is esse; he is not a composite of two distinct things. “Esse” cannot come into existence or cease to be since that would be a contradiction of the fact that it is an esse.

The esse of a particular thing comes into existence with that thing. How does the beginning of an existence contradict that it is an existence?

Thus we can only say that essences come in and out of existence. We cannot logically say that esse comes into existence. It is always existence, and it is the existence to which all contingent things stand in potency.

God always exists, yes. But particular things do not always exist, so their existence, likewise, does not always exist. A thing’s existence is the thing itself; it is sophistry, I think, to get so hung up on all these philosophical concepts. What is, is. A thing’s existence is not some magical component God must derive from himself, it is merely the fact that it does exist. The fact that something exists comes into existence when the thing does.

 

[belorg]

It hinges on wG == {G}. Do you accept this or not? Is not wG the world with God alone in it? This would be properly represented by the set with God alone as a member, wouldn’t it?

No it wouldn’t. To say that wG has God ‘in it’ is a misunderstanding of the concept of possibe worlds. And even if it would, be accurate to say that wG has God in it, you still do not have a point.

 

[Eleve]

Pray tell, what is your manual for the “correct understanding” of possible worlds, and where does it say that a singleton world is identical with the object that it contains?

 

[levinas12]

So, back to prime mover - since some things move, and some things are in an essentially ordered relationship, a prime mover is required. Since you cannot have infinite regress, the prime mover cannot be moved, else it would not be the “prime” mover. To paraphrase Aquinas, that which is the prime mover we call God.

Frater Bovious

I apologize if you have already addressed this question (there have been so many postings on this thread; I haven’t been able to read them all).

Aquinas, I suppose, is assuming the truth of Aristotle’s astronomy of spheres. So it’s not hard to picture how the entire universe is involved in an essentially ordered, simultaneous chain of causes back to the Unmoved Mover.

But Aristotle’s astronomy is discredited. So how does this affect Aquinas’ proof?

 

[Eleve]

Depends on how you interpret the argument. Anthony Kenny thought that Aquinas’ arguments were based on that cosmology, which is why he rejects the arguments in his book The Five Ways. But there are ways of reconstructing the argument that don’t depend on Aristotle’s astronomy. The one that gets touted here the most often is Edward Feser’s Aquinas.

 

[Linux]

I apologize if you have already addressed this question (there have been so many postings on this thread; I haven’t been able to read them all).

Aquinas, I suppose, is assuming the truth of Aristotle’s astronomy of spheres. So it’s not hard to picture how the entire universe is involved in an essentially ordered, simultaneous chain of causes back to the Unmoved Mover.

But Aristotle’s astronomy is discredited. So how does this affect Aquinas’ proof?

It doesn’t affect Aquinas, because whether Aquinas is right or wrong, his arguments are based on Aristotle’s “metaphysics” (beyond physics), not his “physics” or astronomy.

 

[Linux]

Pray tell, what is your manual for the “correct understanding” of possible worlds, and where does it say that a singleton world is identical with the object that it contains?

I think you would both benefit from agreeing on what a possible world is, because I personally don’t see God as a possible world, but rather as that which is required to exist in order for there to be possible worlds. There has to be a necessary being before you can speak coherently about possibilities; otherwise you are only speaking about objects that don’t have to exist and therefore have no reason to exist in the first place.

Also if you admit that God (a perfect act of existence) is a possibility, then you have to admit that such a being exists in all possible worlds because it is logically impossible for a Perfect act of existence not to exist.

 

[Linux]

God always exists, yes. But particular things do not always exist

The “essence” does not always exist; that says nothing about esse. It only means that esse and essence are not always conjoined. Saying that esse comes into and out of existence with an essence is an additional assertion that violates the absolute distinction between something and nothing. If esse is identical with Gods essence, then it makes no rational sense for God to create new esse’ that are not identical with God, since there is no rational distinctions in esse. There are only distinct differences in the essence of contingent beings.

 

[levinas12]

It doesn’t affect Aquinas, because whether Aquinas is right or wrong, his arguments are based on Aristotle’s “metaphysics” (beyond physics), not his “physics” or astronomy.

The “meta” in the “metaphysics” builds on the “physics” and the “heavens”.

Particularly with respect to the “motion” argument.

So I wouldn’t be too quick to sever the connection.

I’m sure there are good scholarly articles that address this issue.

In the meantime, just try to picture, in the absence of the “spheres”, an essentially ordered system of simultaneous causes that encompasses the entire universe.

Certainly, Aristotle was thinking in the astronomical mode. It’s precisely the motion of the spheres that the Unmoved Mover is invoked to explain.

 

[levinas12]

Depends on how you interpret the argument. Anthony Kenny thought that Aquinas’ arguments were based on that cosmology, which is why he rejects the arguments in his book The Five Ways. But there are ways of reconstructing the argument that don’t depend on Aristotle’s astronomy. The one that gets touted here the most often is Edward Feser’s Aquinas.

Can you unpack Feser’s reconstruction for me? If not, it’s OK.

But this would allow me to respond.

I wonder if Copleston, Gilson, Owens, Pegis or some other Thomist has weighed in on this.

 

[Linux]

Certainly, Aristotle was thinking in the astronomical mode. It’s precisely the motion of the spheres that the Unmoved Mover is invoked to explain.

Spheres just happen to be in motion, but it is not spheres that he is concerned with but rather it is the fact of motion itself, and it is this general fact upon which he constructs a metaphysics. If that were not the case then there would be no reason to make the distinction he calls metaphysics, he would just call it physics.

 

[Love4All]

No it wouldn’t. To say that wG has God ‘in it’ is a misunderstanding of the concept of possibe worlds. And even if it would, be accurate to say that wG has God in it, you still do not have a point.

Please clarify for me the concept of possible worlds you are using. I thought you said wG is the possible world with God alone existing. Did I get that wrong? For example, the present real world is a possible world, and I am in it. So how is it wrong to say a possible world containing God has God “in it”?

Let us understand each other in the first place, before we get to whether either of us has a point. I certainly think I do, and that you don’t get it doesn’t by itself make it not valid; perhaps I have explained it poorly. But first, let us understand what we both mean by possible worlds. That would help a lot, I think.

 

[Love4All]

The “essence” does not always exist; that says nothing about esse. It only means that esse and essence are not always conjoined.

In reality, a thing either exists or does not exist. There are no existing things without essences, nor essences, except of existing things!

Saying that esse comes into and out of existence with an essence is an additional assertion that violates the absolute distinction between something and nothing.

Existence is not a substance, it is a condition of substances. So it is not “something” in and of itself. To be is an act. So if something begins to exist, then its esse begins. God is the necessary esse. If His esse were the esse of created things, they all would be necessary as well, and we can see that they are not.

If esse is identical with Gods essence, then it makes no rational sense for God to create new esse’ that are not identical with God, since there is no rational distinctions in esse. There are only distinct differences in the essence of contingent beings.

If they are contingent, they are not necessary, and if they are not necessary, then how can their esse be said to be identical with that of the Necessary Being?

 

[Linux]

In reality, a thing either exists or does not exist. There are no existing things without essences, nor essences, except of existing things!

There are no contingent essences without esse. Gods essence is his esse; they are synonymous, not composite.

 

[Linux]

In reality, a thing either exists or does not exist. There are no existing things without essences, nor essences, except of existing things!

False. There are no actual essences that are not conjoined with esse. Your claim that there is no esse that is not conjoined with an essence is an assertion and impossible since you cannot produce an act of reality out of nothing at all. Its a metaphysical contradiction.

Gods essence is identical with esse, they are synonymous. Thus to speak of Gods esse is to speak of his essence. Thus there is an esse that is not a conjoining of esse and essence.

Existence is not a substance, it is a condition of substances.

It is not the condition of substances, it is the fact that it is a thing instead of nothing. That an essence is something does not necessitate that esse is identical with it.

God is the necessary esse. If His esse were the esse of created things, they all would be necessary as well, and we can see that they are not.

False. You are ignoring the real distinction between esse and essence. With that distinction it does not follow that an essence is necessarily co eternal with esse. If esse is identical with an essence like we find in God, then it would be eternal.

If they are contingent, they are not necessary, and if they are not necessary, then how can their esse be said to be identical with that of the Necessary Being?

Conjoined does not mean identical, that’s why.