B
belorg
Guest
Forget it, Love4All. You obviously haven’t got a clue as to what I am talking about.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
- Status
- Not open for further replies.
R
robbodb
Guest
Belorg, simply because you have asserted that something comes out of nothing . The Facts of the Casimer experiments clearly reveal that not to be the case.Why do you try to refute my argument by quoting articles that support it?
In addition why would you posit more than once about articles popping out of nothing when clearly they don’t?
My post also states that particles must be moved by something and do not move by themselves as you seem to imply.
E
Eleve
Guest
Yes, I am the Schmod-expert and and say it’s entirely unclear why anything about Schmod should need to change.Which property exactly? You are the Schmod-expert, Eleve.
You say that “Schmod’s creative power” might be the thing that changes. Why would this be so? I have not stipulated that Schmod’s power to create is different if different things exist. Presumably Schmod can create the same things which he did before, and can create them in all the same ways and so on.
You seem to want to just stipulate that creation entails that some already-existing object is changed, but this is ad hoc, question-begging, and explicitly denied by Aquinas (see Objection 2).
So your argument lacks force against the Thomist who wants to say that God is prior to every object (actually, do Thomists even say this? Do you have any evidence that any particular theist is committed to the view which you are attacking?), because they will deny that creation involves change. And it lacks force against a more contemporary force of theism, which is fine with admitting that God does not create things like possible worlds or abstract objects, but can therefore suppose that the change simply occurs in the world itself.
Or you could argue that those theists are wrong and that they have to accept your principles about causation. But every time I’ve asked you to do that, you’ve gotten angry and suggested that I haven’t understood your posts.
My suggestion is that you do something else, i.e., instead of insisting that you are right for the next ten pages, explain why we should believe that you are right.
L
Love4All
Guest
You were attempting to establish that God cannot create from nothing. You don’t seem to able to do so coherently. So now you lash out at me? Make a good argument, and I will be impressed.Forget it, Love4All. You obviously haven’t got a clue as to what I am talking about.
So far, we have this:
- Possible world wG: God alone existing.
- God is immutable.
- Therefore every inhabitant of wG is immutable.
- Therefore wG as a whole is immutable.
If you cannot demonstrate why we should take the world as equivalent to its inhabitants, then they may be different, and if so then it should not be surprising that a world is mutable although its sole inhabitant is immutable. And if this is the case, then there is no reason why God can’t create something from nothing.
But if you say God Can’t create something from nothing, then you place a limitation on God’s power. But how would such a limitation arise? If there is nothing at all except for God, what is there to limit God?
R
robbodb
Guest
Linux quote post 341
You and Elve are merely asserting that the act of creating something from absolutely nothing makes rational sense.
And so it does make sense to the vast majority of the world’s peoples.
From a physical science point of view I agree it does not make sense. Physical science is nothing more than a process of discovery of the material. If you see it you can believe it- if you don’t then you don’t believe it is the way atheists seem to think.
The problem atheists have is that they do nor allow for God. They don’t want to know about Church doctrine and dogma.They appear not to want to study the theist basis for belief in God which has been theologically proven.
The fact that theists such as we Catholics believe in God and what he has revealed to us in words and deeds means it is perfectly reasonable to believe that God created everything material and immaterial by his will. God willed creation.We don’t know how but we know he did. God has performed deeds through the ages which are not logical in the physical science context. His miracles defy the laws of physics and yet they happened.
Nothing is impossible for God.
You and Elve are merely asserting that the act of creating something from absolutely nothing makes rational sense.
And so it does make sense to the vast majority of the world’s peoples.
From a physical science point of view I agree it does not make sense. Physical science is nothing more than a process of discovery of the material. If you see it you can believe it- if you don’t then you don’t believe it is the way atheists seem to think.
The problem atheists have is that they do nor allow for God. They don’t want to know about Church doctrine and dogma.They appear not to want to study the theist basis for belief in God which has been theologically proven.
The fact that theists such as we Catholics believe in God and what he has revealed to us in words and deeds means it is perfectly reasonable to believe that God created everything material and immaterial by his will. God willed creation.We don’t know how but we know he did. God has performed deeds through the ages which are not logical in the physical science context. His miracles defy the laws of physics and yet they happened.
Nothing is impossible for God.
R
robbodb
Guest
Response.
The universe is not necessary for God.
God desired the universe and fulfilled such desire in creating it.
A somewhat crude example is the idea of a building in the mind of the architect which then becomes a desire which in turn is turned into reality in the building constructed.
L
Linux
Guest
I don’t understand why you would consider the fact of people believing something to be evidence of it being true.The fact that theists such as we Catholics believe in God and what he has revealed to us in words and deeds means it is perfectly reasonable to believe that God created everything material and immaterial by his will.
L
Linux
Guest
God cannot do the logically impossible.Nothing is impossible for God.
R
robbodb
Guest
Belorg, God can and did create the universe when no thing, not anything existed. This reality is confirmed in God himself, his very existence which has been proven and evidenced.No, God cannot create out of nothing.
, What you are describing here is creatio ex deo Some of the esse of God becomes the esse of something else, or gets conjoined with some essence. that is a change, which is impossible for an immutable being.
Your answer also commits the fallacy of confusing the cardinality of an infinite set with its quality. Although it may be true that if you remove one element from an infinity of elements
the result is still infinite, it is nevertheless a fact that the element in question is missing from the original set. Imagine an set containing an infinite number of people. If we remove Al Moritz from the set, the set is still infinite but does not contain Al Moritz.
On the point you make about the missing element I suggest you are in error. If we line up an infinite of dominoes such that the distance between each of them is just sufficient for the tip of each domino to hit the one behind when it falls. Now if you take out say the 60th domino then the 61st domino will not fall because of the gap created by the removal of the 60th domino and the process is terminated. No infinity here.
So if Al Moritz is removed the set may not be infinite and your claim that the “set is still infinite” is false.
R
robbodb
Guest
ewtn.com/vexperts/showmessage_print.asp?number=391438&language=en
Please open the link above for the question posed .The answer below is an interpretation of St Thomas on infinity and regression. I hope it clarifies the debate.
"Answer by Richard Geraghty on 02-21-2004:
Dear Scott,
There may be others out there like yourself who, knowing their math and their science, are curious about the philosophical proof of St. Thomas about the existence of God. Now I am not strong on the scientific and mathematical elements but I do know the philosophy involved. So let me deal with the question you brought up. Then you can present further questions. Let us, however, deal with the first part. Now Aristotle and St. Thomas take the position that in the theory of mathematics there is, as you pointed out, an infinite number of points between a real number like one and a real number like two. One can keep dividing the space between the real numbers on to infinity and never reach number two. In theory, then, one could never cross the space between one and two. But experience shows that in practice we all can cross the space between one and two; we do that every day. Aristotle and St. Thomas conclude, then, that in reality there cannot be an actual number of infinite points between one and two. The fact that we can cross from one to two shows that. So they conclude that the space is only potentially infinite, only potentially infinitely divisible, not actually so. I suppose the scientists today assume the same thing. The next point is this. The proof of St. Thomas does not assume the proposition that time or material things actually had a beginning. It leaves that question open. What St. Thomas intends to show, then, that there must be a cause outside of the supposedly infinite series of cause and effect in the real world. For the infinite series still does not explain the fact that there are rocks, trees, animals and men existing before our very eyes today. St. Thomas then asks the question of what the cause of the reality of these things is. Whether one assumes that the series of cause and effect either had a beginning or did not have a beginning, one still does not know the cause of the very existence of the whole series. For example, let us assume that the chicken caused the egg, that the egg then caused the chicken, that the chicken caused the egg on to infinity. We still do not know the cause for the existence of either the chicken or the egg. And if we assume that there was a first chicken or a first egg, we still do not know what caused the first chicken or the first egg. The first chicken or the first egg could not have come from sheer nothingness by itself. Thus the question of St. Thomas is about the cause of the reality of the series, whether it be infinite or finite. St. Thomas then notes that the particular chicken and the particular egg only have existence for a while and then lose it, thus giving way to another chicken and another egg. He then shows that one cannot explain this series by saying that there is a cause which only has existence. The cause must be one that is existence itself. In other words, St. Thomas notes that all the material things which we experience only have existence. Thus there is some kind of distinction between their nature (what they are) and their being or existence (that they are). The question of St. Thomas, then, is about what kind of cause can give existence to material things. Material things themselves cannot be this type of cause because they only have existence and then lose it. So St. Thomas answers that the cause of all material natures must be a nature that includes existence or being itself. In this cause there is no distinction between its nature and its being or existence. Because there is no distinction here, the existing nature or cause has to exist. It cannot have had a beginning. It is uncaused. It is the first cause. It causes everything else to exist but nothing causes it to exist because it exists because of its very nature. In summary, the proof goes like this. We start with realities like rocks and trees, which are natures which do not have to exist. There is a distinction between their nature and their being. We conclude that the cause of the existence of these natures, then, must be a cause whose nature and existence are identical. This being we call God.
Dr. Geraghty"
Please open the link above for the question posed .The answer below is an interpretation of St Thomas on infinity and regression. I hope it clarifies the debate.
"Answer by Richard Geraghty on 02-21-2004:
Dear Scott,
There may be others out there like yourself who, knowing their math and their science, are curious about the philosophical proof of St. Thomas about the existence of God. Now I am not strong on the scientific and mathematical elements but I do know the philosophy involved. So let me deal with the question you brought up. Then you can present further questions. Let us, however, deal with the first part. Now Aristotle and St. Thomas take the position that in the theory of mathematics there is, as you pointed out, an infinite number of points between a real number like one and a real number like two. One can keep dividing the space between the real numbers on to infinity and never reach number two. In theory, then, one could never cross the space between one and two. But experience shows that in practice we all can cross the space between one and two; we do that every day. Aristotle and St. Thomas conclude, then, that in reality there cannot be an actual number of infinite points between one and two. The fact that we can cross from one to two shows that. So they conclude that the space is only potentially infinite, only potentially infinitely divisible, not actually so. I suppose the scientists today assume the same thing. The next point is this. The proof of St. Thomas does not assume the proposition that time or material things actually had a beginning. It leaves that question open. What St. Thomas intends to show, then, that there must be a cause outside of the supposedly infinite series of cause and effect in the real world. For the infinite series still does not explain the fact that there are rocks, trees, animals and men existing before our very eyes today. St. Thomas then asks the question of what the cause of the reality of these things is. Whether one assumes that the series of cause and effect either had a beginning or did not have a beginning, one still does not know the cause of the very existence of the whole series. For example, let us assume that the chicken caused the egg, that the egg then caused the chicken, that the chicken caused the egg on to infinity. We still do not know the cause for the existence of either the chicken or the egg. And if we assume that there was a first chicken or a first egg, we still do not know what caused the first chicken or the first egg. The first chicken or the first egg could not have come from sheer nothingness by itself. Thus the question of St. Thomas is about the cause of the reality of the series, whether it be infinite or finite. St. Thomas then notes that the particular chicken and the particular egg only have existence for a while and then lose it, thus giving way to another chicken and another egg. He then shows that one cannot explain this series by saying that there is a cause which only has existence. The cause must be one that is existence itself. In other words, St. Thomas notes that all the material things which we experience only have existence. Thus there is some kind of distinction between their nature (what they are) and their being or existence (that they are). The question of St. Thomas, then, is about what kind of cause can give existence to material things. Material things themselves cannot be this type of cause because they only have existence and then lose it. So St. Thomas answers that the cause of all material natures must be a nature that includes existence or being itself. In this cause there is no distinction between its nature and its being or existence. Because there is no distinction here, the existing nature or cause has to exist. It cannot have had a beginning. It is uncaused. It is the first cause. It causes everything else to exist but nothing causes it to exist because it exists because of its very nature. In summary, the proof goes like this. We start with realities like rocks and trees, which are natures which do not have to exist. There is a distinction between their nature and their being. We conclude that the cause of the existence of these natures, then, must be a cause whose nature and existence are identical. This being we call God.
Dr. Geraghty"
R
robbodb
Guest
I thought it appropriate to post authoritative work St. Thomas Aquinas writings. If nothing else they should be referred to before making our own personal interpretation and what the good Doctor did or did not say or what he meant and did not mean.
ewtn.com/library/theology/reality.htm
REALITY—A Synthesis Of Thomistic Thought
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.
Index
Preface
Chapter 1: Philosophical writings
Chapter 2: Theological works
Chapter 3: Thomistic commentators
Chapter 4: Intelligible being and first principles
Chapter 5: Act and potency
Chapter 6: Nature of theological work
Chapter 7: Proofs of god’s existence
Chapter 8: Divine eminence
Chapter 9: God’s knowledge
Chapter 10: God’s will and God’s love
Chapter 11: Providence and predestination
Chapter 12: Omnipotence
Chapter 13: Augustine and Thomas
Chapter 14: Divine processions
Chapter 15: Divine relations
Chapter 16: Divine persons
Chapter 17: Notional acts
Chapter 18: Equality and union
Chapter 19: Trinity naturally unknowable
Chapter 20: Proper names and appropriations
Chapter 21: Indwelling of the blessed trinity
Chapter 22: Sources
Chapter 23: Angelic nature and knowledge
Chapter 24: Angelic will
Chapter 25: Angelic merit and demerit
Chapter 26: Treatise on man
Chapter 27: Nature of the soul
Chapter 28: Union of soul with body
Chapter 29: Faculties of the soul
Chapter 30: Separated soul
Chapter 31: Original sin
Chapter 32: Introduction
Chapter 33: Hypostatic union
Chapter 34: Consequences of the hypostatic union
Chapter 35: Freedom and impeccability
Chapter 36: Christ’s victory and passion
Chapter 37: Mariology
Chapter 38: Sacraments in general
Chapter 39: Transubstantiation
Chapter 40: Sacrifice of the mass
Chapter 41: Attrition and contrition
Chapter 42: Reviviscence of merit
Chapter 43: Treatise on the church
Chapter 44: Soul’s immutability after death
Chapter 45: Man’s ultimate purpose and goal
Chapter 46: Human acts
Chapter 47: Virtues and vices
Chapter 48: Law
Chapter 49: Treatise on grace
Chapter 50: Theological virtues
Chapter 51: Moral virtues
Chapter 52: Christian perfection
Chapter 53: Charismatic graces
Chapter 54: Conclusion
Chapter 55: Twenty-four Thomistic theses
Chapter 56: Realism and first principles
Chapter 57: Realism and pragmatism
Chapter 58: Ontological personality
Chapter 59: Efficacious grace
Endnotes
Extracts of the preface follow:
His whole life, all his intelligence, all his forces, were bent to the service of the Christian faith, both in his doctrinal battles and in the serenity of contemplation. Justification of this statement appears in the way he conceived his vocation as teacher. You find therein an ascending gradation which arouses admiration.
1.Whereas on the one hand he fully recognizes all that is excellent, from the philosophical standpoint, in the teaching and method of Aristotle, he shows, on the other hand, against the Averroists, that reason can prove nothing against the faith. This latter task he accomplished by demonstrating against them from philosophy itself, that God’s creative act is free, that creation need not be ab aeterno, that man’s will is free, that the human soul is characterized by personal immortality.
3. He shows that philosophy deserves to be studied, both for its own sake, and also to establish, by arguments drawn simply from reason, that the praeambula fidei are attainable by the natural force of human intelligence.
4. Theology must rather, he goes on to show, be studied as a branch of knowledge, which establishes scientifically a system of doctrine with objectivity and universal validity, a synthesis that harmonizes supernatural truths with the truths of the natural order. Theology is thus conceived as a science, in the Aristotelian sense of the word, a science of the truths of faith. [5].
5. This position granted, it follows that reason must subserve faith in its work of analyzing the concepts and deepening the understanding of revealed truths, of showing that many of these truths are subordinated to the articles of faith which are primary, and of deducing the consequences contained virtually in the truths made known by revelation.
7. Further, this conception of theology does not in any way lower Christian faith from its elevation. For, as the saint teaches, the source of theology is contemplation, [7] that is, infused faith, vivified, not only by charity, but also by the gifts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom, gifts which make faith penetrating and pleasant of taste. Thus theology reaches a most fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries, by finding analogies in truths which we know naturally, and also by tracing the intertwining of these mysteries with one another and with the last end of our life. [8].
The present work is an exposition of the Thomistic synthesis, an exposition devoted to the principles often formulated by the saint himself. We do not undertake to prove historically that all the doctrinal points in question are found explicitly in the works of St. Thomas himself, but we will indicate the chief references to his works. And our main task will be to set in relief the certitude and universality of the principles which underlie the structure and coherence of Thomistic doctrine.
Truth, Love and Peace
ewtn.com/library/theology/reality.htm
REALITY—A Synthesis Of Thomistic Thought
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.
Index
Preface
Chapter 1: Philosophical writings
Chapter 2: Theological works
Chapter 3: Thomistic commentators
Chapter 4: Intelligible being and first principles
Chapter 5: Act and potency
Chapter 6: Nature of theological work
Chapter 7: Proofs of god’s existence
Chapter 8: Divine eminence
Chapter 9: God’s knowledge
Chapter 10: God’s will and God’s love
Chapter 11: Providence and predestination
Chapter 12: Omnipotence
Chapter 13: Augustine and Thomas
Chapter 14: Divine processions
Chapter 15: Divine relations
Chapter 16: Divine persons
Chapter 17: Notional acts
Chapter 18: Equality and union
Chapter 19: Trinity naturally unknowable
Chapter 20: Proper names and appropriations
Chapter 21: Indwelling of the blessed trinity
Chapter 22: Sources
Chapter 23: Angelic nature and knowledge
Chapter 24: Angelic will
Chapter 25: Angelic merit and demerit
Chapter 26: Treatise on man
Chapter 27: Nature of the soul
Chapter 28: Union of soul with body
Chapter 29: Faculties of the soul
Chapter 30: Separated soul
Chapter 31: Original sin
Chapter 32: Introduction
Chapter 33: Hypostatic union
Chapter 34: Consequences of the hypostatic union
Chapter 35: Freedom and impeccability
Chapter 36: Christ’s victory and passion
Chapter 37: Mariology
Chapter 38: Sacraments in general
Chapter 39: Transubstantiation
Chapter 40: Sacrifice of the mass
Chapter 41: Attrition and contrition
Chapter 42: Reviviscence of merit
Chapter 43: Treatise on the church
Chapter 44: Soul’s immutability after death
Chapter 45: Man’s ultimate purpose and goal
Chapter 46: Human acts
Chapter 47: Virtues and vices
Chapter 48: Law
Chapter 49: Treatise on grace
Chapter 50: Theological virtues
Chapter 51: Moral virtues
Chapter 52: Christian perfection
Chapter 53: Charismatic graces
Chapter 54: Conclusion
Chapter 55: Twenty-four Thomistic theses
Chapter 56: Realism and first principles
Chapter 57: Realism and pragmatism
Chapter 58: Ontological personality
Chapter 59: Efficacious grace
Endnotes
Extracts of the preface follow:
His whole life, all his intelligence, all his forces, were bent to the service of the Christian faith, both in his doctrinal battles and in the serenity of contemplation. Justification of this statement appears in the way he conceived his vocation as teacher. You find therein an ascending gradation which arouses admiration.
1.Whereas on the one hand he fully recognizes all that is excellent, from the philosophical standpoint, in the teaching and method of Aristotle, he shows, on the other hand, against the Averroists, that reason can prove nothing against the faith. This latter task he accomplished by demonstrating against them from philosophy itself, that God’s creative act is free, that creation need not be ab aeterno, that man’s will is free, that the human soul is characterized by personal immortality.
3. He shows that philosophy deserves to be studied, both for its own sake, and also to establish, by arguments drawn simply from reason, that the praeambula fidei are attainable by the natural force of human intelligence.
4. Theology must rather, he goes on to show, be studied as a branch of knowledge, which establishes scientifically a system of doctrine with objectivity and universal validity, a synthesis that harmonizes supernatural truths with the truths of the natural order. Theology is thus conceived as a science, in the Aristotelian sense of the word, a science of the truths of faith. [5].
5. This position granted, it follows that reason must subserve faith in its work of analyzing the concepts and deepening the understanding of revealed truths, of showing that many of these truths are subordinated to the articles of faith which are primary, and of deducing the consequences contained virtually in the truths made known by revelation.
7. Further, this conception of theology does not in any way lower Christian faith from its elevation. For, as the saint teaches, the source of theology is contemplation, [7] that is, infused faith, vivified, not only by charity, but also by the gifts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom, gifts which make faith penetrating and pleasant of taste. Thus theology reaches a most fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries, by finding analogies in truths which we know naturally, and also by tracing the intertwining of these mysteries with one another and with the last end of our life. [8].
The present work is an exposition of the Thomistic synthesis, an exposition devoted to the principles often formulated by the saint himself. We do not undertake to prove historically that all the doctrinal points in question are found explicitly in the works of St. Thomas himself, but we will indicate the chief references to his works. And our main task will be to set in relief the certitude and universality of the principles which underlie the structure and coherence of Thomistic doctrine.
Truth, Love and Peace
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
Robbodb
Thank you for the last two posts. How did you find the links ? Linus2nd
Thank you for the last two posts. How did you find the links ? Linus2nd
R
robbodb
Guest
ewtn.com/library/theology/provid.htm
Below is an extract from the link above.
It is provided so as to facilitate correct interpretation of motion.
In th event anyone disagrees with the author on the issue of motion some of which is stated here
then it would be IMO appropriate to point out the passage in contention and explain clearly
the basis and rationale of any such dis agreement. Only this way can the debate proceed sensibly
and be of benefit to all.
"PROVIDENCE
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.
Index
Foreword
Translator’s Preface
Part I : The Existence Of God And Of Providence
Part II :The Perfections Of God Which His Providence Presupposes
Part III : Providence According To Revelation
Part IV : Self-Abandonment To Providence
Part V : Providence, Justice And Mercy
Foreword
Having treated elsewhere of God [1] and of providence [2] from a purely speculative point of view, we here resume the consideration of these great questions in their relation to the spiritual life. The primary object of contemplation is, in fact, God Himself and His infinite perfections, especially His goodness, His wisdom, and His providence. Our activity and our progress toward eternity must be directed from the higher plane of this contemplation. From this point of view we shall treat here: (1) of the existence of God and of His providence; (2) of those perfections of God which His providence presupposes; (3) of providence itself according to the Old and New Testaments; (4) of a trusting self-abandonment to God’s providence; (5) of providence in its relation to justice and mercy
God The Prime Mover Of Corporeal And Spiritual Being
Before we proceed to consider the meaning and import of the proofs for the existence of God and His providence, it will be well to point out one general proof that virtually contains them all. It may be summed up in this way: The greater does not come from the less, the more perfect does not come from the less perfect, since the latter is incapable of producing this effect
There are in the world living, intelligent beings that come into existence and disappear again; they are therefore not self-existent. And what we say of the present applies equally to the past.
Consequently they require a cause, one that is self-existent. Hence there must exist from all eternity a first Being who owes His being to none but Himself and is able to confer being on others: a first living being, a first intelligence, a first goodness and holiness. If it were not so, the life, intelligence, goodness, and holiness of which we have experience could never have made their appearance in this world of ours.
Already open to common sense, this proof may be further scrutinized by philosophical reason, but no fault can be found with it.
The greater cannot come from the less as from its wholly adequate, efficacious cause, for the additional perfection would itself then be without a cause, without a reason for its existence, and hence absolutely unintelligible. It is utterly absurd to maintain that the intelligence or the goodness of Jesus, of the great saints—of St. John, St. Paul, St. Augustine—are the result of unintelligent matter, of a material and blind fatality.
This general proof is at once more convincing when we consider the motion of bodies and spirits—motions from which it is shown that God is the first mover of every being, both corporeal and spiritual."
Continued over
Below is an extract from the link above.
It is provided so as to facilitate correct interpretation of motion.
In th event anyone disagrees with the author on the issue of motion some of which is stated here
then it would be IMO appropriate to point out the passage in contention and explain clearly
the basis and rationale of any such dis agreement. Only this way can the debate proceed sensibly
and be of benefit to all.
"PROVIDENCE
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.
Index
Foreword
Translator’s Preface
Part I : The Existence Of God And Of Providence
Part II :The Perfections Of God Which His Providence Presupposes
Part III : Providence According To Revelation
Part IV : Self-Abandonment To Providence
Part V : Providence, Justice And Mercy
Foreword
Having treated elsewhere of God [1] and of providence [2] from a purely speculative point of view, we here resume the consideration of these great questions in their relation to the spiritual life. The primary object of contemplation is, in fact, God Himself and His infinite perfections, especially His goodness, His wisdom, and His providence. Our activity and our progress toward eternity must be directed from the higher plane of this contemplation. From this point of view we shall treat here: (1) of the existence of God and of His providence; (2) of those perfections of God which His providence presupposes; (3) of providence itself according to the Old and New Testaments; (4) of a trusting self-abandonment to God’s providence; (5) of providence in its relation to justice and mercy
God The Prime Mover Of Corporeal And Spiritual Being
Before we proceed to consider the meaning and import of the proofs for the existence of God and His providence, it will be well to point out one general proof that virtually contains them all. It may be summed up in this way: The greater does not come from the less, the more perfect does not come from the less perfect, since the latter is incapable of producing this effect
There are in the world living, intelligent beings that come into existence and disappear again; they are therefore not self-existent. And what we say of the present applies equally to the past.
Consequently they require a cause, one that is self-existent. Hence there must exist from all eternity a first Being who owes His being to none but Himself and is able to confer being on others: a first living being, a first intelligence, a first goodness and holiness. If it were not so, the life, intelligence, goodness, and holiness of which we have experience could never have made their appearance in this world of ours.
Already open to common sense, this proof may be further scrutinized by philosophical reason, but no fault can be found with it.
The greater cannot come from the less as from its wholly adequate, efficacious cause, for the additional perfection would itself then be without a cause, without a reason for its existence, and hence absolutely unintelligible. It is utterly absurd to maintain that the intelligence or the goodness of Jesus, of the great saints—of St. John, St. Paul, St. Augustine—are the result of unintelligent matter, of a material and blind fatality.
This general proof is at once more convincing when we consider the motion of bodies and spirits—motions from which it is shown that God is the first mover of every being, both corporeal and spiritual."
Continued over
R
robbodb
Guest
Continued from previous post
"All motion requires a mover
How are we to explain this universal fact of motion, be it either corporeal or spiritual? Is the explanation to be found in motion itself? Is it its own reason, its own cause? To answer this question, we must begin by pointing out two facts. First, in motion there is something new that requires explanation. Where does this new element come from, which previously had no existence? The question applies to past as well as to present forms of motion. Secondly, motion exists only in a movable object: it is this individual motion for the sole reason that it is the motion of this mobile object. There is no displacement without a body that is displaced, no flowing without a fluid, no current without a liquid, no flight without a bird that flies, no dream without a dreamer, no motion or volition apart from an intelligent being that wills.
But if there is no motion apart from a mobile object, is it possible for that object to move itself by its own power and without a cause of any kind? Can the stone of itself set itself in motion without someone to throw it into the air, or without some other body to attract it? Can the cold metal become hot of itself, without a source of heat?
But, you may say, a living thing moves itself. True, but is there not in the living thing a part that is moved and another that moves? If the blood circulates through the arteries of an animal, is it not because the heart by its contraction makes it circulate?
So also in man. If the hand moves, is it not because the will moves it? And if in its turn the will is moved, passing from a state of indetermination to one of determination, must it not be moved by some object attracting it, by some good? And is it sufficient merely for the good to be presented to it? Must not the will direct itself or be directed to it? It does in fact direct itself to the means because it first of all desires the end; but in the case of the first desire of an end, as when we come to the age of reason or when on waking in the morning we begin to exercise our will, is not an impulse from some higher source necessary to start our volitional activity, so as to make our will pass from the state of repose, of inactivity, to that first act which is to be the cause of all the acts that follow? That act contains something new which demands a cause; and the will, not yet in possession of this new perfection, cannot give it to itself. (Cf. St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.)
Shall we say that this particular motion, whether corporeal or spiritual, has as it cause another motion anterior to it? But, if we consider motion as such, whether realized in this present motion or in the motions that precede, we shall see that it is a transition from potency to act. Now potency is less perfect than act; potency, therefore, cannot confer act upon itself. Once again, if there were not a mover for every motion, the greater would come from the less.
The stone was capable of displacement; now it changes its position, it does not do so without a mover that projects or attracts it.
The plant in its growth passes from potency to act, but not without the action of the sun, air, and moisture from the earth. The animal passes from potency to act when it pursues the prey that attracts it, but only in virtue of that higher activity which has endowed it with the instinct to feed upon this object rather than upon some other.
Man himself passes from potency to act, from ignorance to knowledge; for him it is an intellectual acquisition. But the intellect does not give itself these acquisitions which hitherto it did not possess.
Our will, too, passes from potency to act, to which at times it clings heroically. Where does this new perfection come from? The will could not confer this upon itself, since it did not possess this before.
All motion, then, whether corporeal or spiritual, requires a cause: without a mover the mobile thing is not moved. The mover may be within, as the heart is within the living animal; but if this mover is itself moved, it demands another mover superior to itself. The heart that at the moment of death stops beating cannot set itself going again; in this case it would require the intervention of the Author of life Himself, by whom that life was given and who maintained its motion until the organism finally spent itself.
Every motion demands a mover: such is the principle by which St. Thomas throws light upon this great universal fact of motion. The irrational animals perceive, indeed, that there are motions of the sensible order; but, that every motion demands a mover, is beyond their comprehension. They have no grasp of intelligible being or of the raison d’etre of things, but only of sensible phenomena—color, sound, heat, and the like. On the other hand, being and the raison d’etre of things constitute the very object of our intellect; hence we are able to grasp the truth, that without a mover all motion is impossible."
continued next post
"All motion requires a mover
How are we to explain this universal fact of motion, be it either corporeal or spiritual? Is the explanation to be found in motion itself? Is it its own reason, its own cause? To answer this question, we must begin by pointing out two facts. First, in motion there is something new that requires explanation. Where does this new element come from, which previously had no existence? The question applies to past as well as to present forms of motion. Secondly, motion exists only in a movable object: it is this individual motion for the sole reason that it is the motion of this mobile object. There is no displacement without a body that is displaced, no flowing without a fluid, no current without a liquid, no flight without a bird that flies, no dream without a dreamer, no motion or volition apart from an intelligent being that wills.
But if there is no motion apart from a mobile object, is it possible for that object to move itself by its own power and without a cause of any kind? Can the stone of itself set itself in motion without someone to throw it into the air, or without some other body to attract it? Can the cold metal become hot of itself, without a source of heat?
But, you may say, a living thing moves itself. True, but is there not in the living thing a part that is moved and another that moves? If the blood circulates through the arteries of an animal, is it not because the heart by its contraction makes it circulate?
So also in man. If the hand moves, is it not because the will moves it? And if in its turn the will is moved, passing from a state of indetermination to one of determination, must it not be moved by some object attracting it, by some good? And is it sufficient merely for the good to be presented to it? Must not the will direct itself or be directed to it? It does in fact direct itself to the means because it first of all desires the end; but in the case of the first desire of an end, as when we come to the age of reason or when on waking in the morning we begin to exercise our will, is not an impulse from some higher source necessary to start our volitional activity, so as to make our will pass from the state of repose, of inactivity, to that first act which is to be the cause of all the acts that follow? That act contains something new which demands a cause; and the will, not yet in possession of this new perfection, cannot give it to itself. (Cf. St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 4; q. 10, a. 4.)
Shall we say that this particular motion, whether corporeal or spiritual, has as it cause another motion anterior to it? But, if we consider motion as such, whether realized in this present motion or in the motions that precede, we shall see that it is a transition from potency to act. Now potency is less perfect than act; potency, therefore, cannot confer act upon itself. Once again, if there were not a mover for every motion, the greater would come from the less.
The stone was capable of displacement; now it changes its position, it does not do so without a mover that projects or attracts it.
The plant in its growth passes from potency to act, but not without the action of the sun, air, and moisture from the earth. The animal passes from potency to act when it pursues the prey that attracts it, but only in virtue of that higher activity which has endowed it with the instinct to feed upon this object rather than upon some other.
Man himself passes from potency to act, from ignorance to knowledge; for him it is an intellectual acquisition. But the intellect does not give itself these acquisitions which hitherto it did not possess.
Our will, too, passes from potency to act, to which at times it clings heroically. Where does this new perfection come from? The will could not confer this upon itself, since it did not possess this before.
All motion, then, whether corporeal or spiritual, requires a cause: without a mover the mobile thing is not moved. The mover may be within, as the heart is within the living animal; but if this mover is itself moved, it demands another mover superior to itself. The heart that at the moment of death stops beating cannot set itself going again; in this case it would require the intervention of the Author of life Himself, by whom that life was given and who maintained its motion until the organism finally spent itself.
Every motion demands a mover: such is the principle by which St. Thomas throws light upon this great universal fact of motion. The irrational animals perceive, indeed, that there are motions of the sensible order; but, that every motion demands a mover, is beyond their comprehension. They have no grasp of intelligible being or of the raison d’etre of things, but only of sensible phenomena—color, sound, heat, and the like. On the other hand, being and the raison d’etre of things constitute the very object of our intellect; hence we are able to grasp the truth, that without a mover all motion is impossible."
continued next post
R
robbodb
Guest
continued from previous post
"The characteristics of the supreme mover
Since the first mover is pure act with no admixture of the imperfection of potentiality, it follows that He is in no way perfectible. He is infinitely perfect, pure being, the pure and ever actual intellection of supreme truth, the pure and ever actual love of the fullness of being ever actually loved.
He is omnipresent, because to move all beings whether spiritual or corporeal, He must be present, since these beings do not move themselves, but are moved by Him.
He is eternal, for He has always by and of Himself all His being and all His action of thought and love. In one immobile instant transcending time, He possesses His life simultaneously in all its completeness. When the world was created, the creative act did not commence in God, for it is eternal; but it produced its effect in time at the desired moment fixed from all eternity.
The first mover is unique: for pure act does not receive existence, it is existence; it is being itself, which cannot be multiplied. Were there two first movers, since one would not be the other, each would be limited and imperfect and would no longer be pure act and being itself."
Sorry for the long post but it seems to me that somme people don’t bother to open links and read the contents without first seeing some extracts which amy or may not arouse their interest.
In any event those genuinely looking for truth will almost always consider everything and especially material not consistent with their tastes or beliefs. indeed we should IMO consider such material in case it contains a truth(s) or if, upon investigation it does not do so then it will at least confirm our current thinking.
Truth, Love and Peace
"The characteristics of the supreme mover
Since the first mover is pure act with no admixture of the imperfection of potentiality, it follows that He is in no way perfectible. He is infinitely perfect, pure being, the pure and ever actual intellection of supreme truth, the pure and ever actual love of the fullness of being ever actually loved.
He is omnipresent, because to move all beings whether spiritual or corporeal, He must be present, since these beings do not move themselves, but are moved by Him.
He is eternal, for He has always by and of Himself all His being and all His action of thought and love. In one immobile instant transcending time, He possesses His life simultaneously in all its completeness. When the world was created, the creative act did not commence in God, for it is eternal; but it produced its effect in time at the desired moment fixed from all eternity.
The first mover is unique: for pure act does not receive existence, it is existence; it is being itself, which cannot be multiplied. Were there two first movers, since one would not be the other, each would be limited and imperfect and would no longer be pure act and being itself."
Sorry for the long post but it seems to me that somme people don’t bother to open links and read the contents without first seeing some extracts which amy or may not arouse their interest.
In any event those genuinely looking for truth will almost always consider everything and especially material not consistent with their tastes or beliefs. indeed we should IMO consider such material in case it contains a truth(s) or if, upon investigation it does not do so then it will at least confirm our current thinking.
Truth, Love and Peace
R
robbodb
Guest
Linus, refer link below.Robbodb
Thank you for the last two posts. How did you find the links ? Linus2nd
ewtn.com/index.asp
Just used the search engine top right corner and entered the appropriate words.
R
robbodb
Guest
There has been a lot of discussion about the universe . How many of us actually are familiar with modern physics or up to date knowledge of the universe?
.
You will find the NASA link below plus some others which I consider to be some of the better ones on the universe. Another I would recommend is the European
Agency Website and CERN.
The first and second websites give some extraordinary pictures of the universe.
map.gsfc.nasa.gov/
atlasoftheuniverse.com/
helios.gsfc.nasa.gov/.index.html
astro.ucla.edu/~wright/cosmolog.htm
Truth,Love and Peace
.
You will find the NASA link below plus some others which I consider to be some of the better ones on the universe. Another I would recommend is the European
Agency Website and CERN.
The first and second websites give some extraordinary pictures of the universe.
map.gsfc.nasa.gov/
atlasoftheuniverse.com/
helios.gsfc.nasa.gov/.index.html
astro.ucla.edu/~wright/cosmolog.htm
Truth,Love and Peace
B
belorg
Guest
It’s not that wG cannot berepresented in set theory, it’s that this representation does not alter the reality of wG.You were attempting to establish that God cannot create from nothing. You don’t seem to able to do so coherently. So now you lash out at me? Make a good argument, and I will be impressed.
So far, we have this:
I tried to demonstrate via set theory that the possible world is not the same as its inhabitants, but for some reason you don’t agree that your possible worlds are representable in set theory.
- Possible world wG: God alone existing.
- God is immutable.
- Therefore every inhabitant of wG is immutable.
- Therefore wG as a whole is immutable.
The rason is the assertio n by Catholic docrine that “God is the creator of everything”. So thee is no other “inhabitant” in wG.But there you have it, the flaw in your argument, however you would like to dress it up. You have no way of concluding 4 from 3 without assuming that the world is equal to its only inhabitant. You have no reason to believe such a thing, or at least you have given no reason.
Don’t try to shift the burden here. You must demonstrate that wG is a different reality than God. But if you do, you contradict Catholic doctrine.If you cannot demonstrate why we should take the world as equivalent to its inhabitants, then they may be different, and if so then it should not be surprising that a world is mutable although its sole inhabitant is immutable. And if this is the case, then there is no reason why God can’t create something from nothing.
I also say that God cannot create square circles.But if you say God Can’t create something from nothing, then you place a limitation on God’s power. But how would such a limitation arise? If there is nothing at all except for God, what is there to limit God?
B
belorg
Guest
So, there is no difference between a state in which his creative power is not activated and one in which it is?Yes, I am the Schmod-expert and and say it’s entirely unclear why anything about Schmod should need to change.
You say that “Schmod’s creative power” might be the thing that changes. Why would this be so? I have not stipulated that Schmod’s power to create is different if different things exist. Presumably Schmod can create the same things which he did before, and can create them in all the same ways and so on.
No, I don’t want yo stipulate this.You seem to want to just stipulate that creation entails that some already-existing object is changed, but this is ad hoc, question-begging, and explicitly denied by Aquinas (see Objection 2).
The Catholic Thomists should say this, because it’s catholic doctrine.So your argument lacks force against the Thomist who wants to say that God is prior to every object (actually, do Thomists even say this?
They will deny whatever threatens their position.Do you have any evidence that any particular theist is committed to the view which you are attacking?), because they will deny that creation involves change.
I have never claimed that my argument works against every possible God concept.And it lacks force against a more contemporary force of theism, which is fine with admitting that God does not create things like possible worlds or abstract objects, but can therefore suppose that the change simply occurs in the world itself.
I haven’t “gotten angry” but you clarly do not have a clue as to what my argument is about.Or you could argue that those theists are wrong and that they have to accept your principles about causation. But every time I’ve asked you to do that, you’ve gotten angry and suggested that I haven’t understood your posts.
I have been doing this for pages and pages. But you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make it drink.My suggestion is that you do something else, i.e., instead of insisting that you are right for the next ten pages, explain why we should believe that you are right.
L
Love4All
Guest
I have taken the liberty of correcting all your spelling below, I hope you don’t mind. It is less confusing for me.
Indeed, the last thing anyone would want to do would be to attempt to misrepresent, or “alter,” reality. I don’t quite grasp the intent of your disclaimer, but I’m sure it has some significance to you. But we agree that set theory is useful.
Will you also agree that the possible world wG can be represented as {G} ?
{G} = G.
Is there any reason to assert that a set is the same as its elements? Is there nothing about being a set that sets a set apart from its elements? This get to the heart of the matter.
In general, x is different from {x}. Otherwise, if we assume x = {x}, then {} = {{}}, 0 = 1. a contradiction. Thus assuming x = {x} leads to contradiction, so there is no reason to assume G = {G}, and thus no reason to assume God is the same as wG. In fact, to assume God = wG is precisely to assume x = {x} and 0 = 1. I have actually shown a contradiction entailed by your assumption, as opposed to merely asserting one. So it seems, you were mistaken.
Ah! So you DO acknowledge that it is legitimate to represent these ideas using set theory! Good to know, that will save some trouble.Love4All;10471459:
It’s not that wG cannot be represented in set theory, it’s that this representation does not alter the reality of wG.You were attempting to establish that God cannot create from nothing. You don’t seem to able to do so coherently. So now you lash out at me? Make a good argument, and I will be impressed.
So far, we have this:
I tried to demonstrate via set theory that the possible world is not the same as its inhabitants, but for some reason you don’t agree that your possible worlds are representable in set theory.
- Possible world wG: God alone existing.
- God is immutable.
- Therefore every inhabitant of wG is immutable.
- Therefore wG as a whole is immutable.
Indeed, the last thing anyone would want to do would be to attempt to misrepresent, or “alter,” reality. I don’t quite grasp the intent of your disclaimer, but I’m sure it has some significance to you. But we agree that set theory is useful.
Will you also agree that the possible world wG can be represented as {G} ?
Indeed, we are given that there is no other inhabitant of wG, and I can see that you derived this from the Catholic Doctrine. What I still don’t see is how that fact gets you from 3 to 4, i.e. how it allows you to assert thatLove4All;10471459:
The reason is the assertion by Catholic doctrine that “God is the creator of everything”. So there is no other “inhabitant” in wG.But there you have it, the flaw in your argument, however you would like to dress it up. You have no way of concluding 4 from 3 without assuming that the world is equal to its only inhabitant. You have no reason to believe such a thing, or at least you have given no reason.
{G} = G.
Is there any reason to assert that a set is the same as its elements? Is there nothing about being a set that sets a set apart from its elements? This get to the heart of the matter.
wG is different from God, just as {G} is different from G. No contradiction to Catholic Doctrine. If you want to assert a contradiction, it is on you to show it.Love4All;10471459:
Don’t try to shift the burden here. You must demonstrate that wG is a different reality than God. But if you do, you contradict Catholic doctrine.If you cannot demonstrate why we should take the world as equivalent to its inhabitants, then they may be different, and if so then it should not be surprising that a world is mutable although its sole inhabitant is immutable. And if this is the case, then there is no reason why God can’t create something from nothing.
In general, x is different from {x}. Otherwise, if we assume x = {x}, then {} = {{}}, 0 = 1. a contradiction. Thus assuming x = {x} leads to contradiction, so there is no reason to assume G = {G}, and thus no reason to assume God is the same as wG. In fact, to assume God = wG is precisely to assume x = {x} and 0 = 1. I have actually shown a contradiction entailed by your assumption, as opposed to merely asserting one. So it seems, you were mistaken.
That is for the specific reason that to be a square and to be a circle are contrary. On the other hand, to be something, and to be called into existence from nothing by God, are not contrary but rather are both easily predicated of every existing thing apart from God.Love4All;10471459:
I also say that God cannot create square circles.But if you say God Can’t create something from nothing, then you place a limitation on God’s power. But how would such a limitation arise? If there is nothing at all except for God, what is there to limit God?
- Status
- Not open for further replies.