St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

[belorg]

First of all, thank you for finally exposing your mind via analogy. It is said truly, that the physician cannot heal that of which he remains ignorant. This why we communicate, to expose our minds to one another, and why we debate on forums is to expose our reasoning to the scrutiny of others who can examine it more objectively than ourselves.

That said, I have a twofold response to your explanation. First, you expose a more basic flaw in your thinking, but it is not where you went with your argument. Before I address the substance of your argument, then, I have the desire to help you to see this flaw. You begin your analogy with, “Say X is a blue entity that cannot change colour.” No doubt your intention is to make some analogy to God, but immediately a flaw in your entire mind set comes to light. An inability to change color in a being we would naturally surmise ought to be able to change color, is a flaw. God has no flaw. So to predicate inability of God is to posit something akin to a square circle. God cannot have an inability to do any particular thing.

Lack of change in God is not a flaw but a perfection. Therefore we must treat it, if we mean to gain real understanding, as a perfection, not a flaw. But I recognize that this is not the point of your analogy, so now I will address your actual point.

You caricatured in straw, my argument, as follows,

1 X’s colour can’t change
2. When X becomes mad, he turns red.
3 Turning red cannot be a chnage in colour because X can’t change colour.

Now in order to hold up as an argument, your analogy will of course have to match up with my thesis point by point. Let’s see how you do.

1. X’s colour can’t change — has to be an analogy to “God is immutable.”
2. When X becomes mad, he turns red. — must be an analogy to, “when God creates, He mutates.”
3. Turning red cannot be a chnage in colour because X can’t change colour — by analogy this would read, “Mutating can’t be mutating because God can’t mutate.”

I see your logic. I agree that IF we accept your premises as given, your conclusion follows. That would indeed be a specious argument on my part.

But, there is the small problem of what your #2 represents. The statement, “when God creates, He mutates,” appears to be an unsupported assumption. One might even be tempted to say it is your conclusion dressed up to look like a premise. Almost as if you were committing the fallacy of begging the question. But, you wouldn’t be doing that, would you? Because, people rarely get caught accusing others of what they themselves do?

I used my analogy to show that your reply in that particluar case was question-begging, which ii obviously is. The analogy in no way represents my argument.

Your assertion is that in order to create, the Creator must mutate.

I have argued for that, I have not asserted anything at all.

It is up to you to support that with some cogent argument. You can’t just assume it, and it seems plain by all that we have seen above that that is what you have been doing. So, there you go — there is your burden of proof, there is your task. Demonstrate that in order to create, the Creator must mutate.

To help you focus on your task, I offer the following consideration: God is Pure Act.

The only possible mutation that can occur in a being who is Pure Act would be to somehow become less than Pure Act. So what you must demonstrate is how it is that a being who is Pure Act, and can create, loses His Pure Actuality in the act of creating.

Again, you are begging the question, because whether God can be Pure Act or not is exectaly what is at stake here, so you can’t just assume that.

 

[rom422]

Hi Belorg,

I 'm sorry I am late on this thread, and I seldom ever intrude on a thread that has long been started. I was just reading this thread from the beginning when I came across a statement that struck me with wonder. It is this

I can explain how an eternally existing univrese could be uncaused. The same way an allegedly eternal God could be uncaused.

OK, forget about proving the second sentence. I am just curious to know how you explain that an eternally existing universe could be uncaused. Would you be kind enough to do that?

Thanks.

 

[Love4All]

I used my analogy to show that your reply in that particluar case was question-begging, which ii obviously is.

What is “ii”?

The analogy in no way represents my argument.

That’s funny, because as I pointed out the best it does to mine is to caricature it in straw. So, it seems your analogy isn’t really representing anything at all.

I have argued for that, I have not asserted anything at all.

How are you able to argue without making assertions? That is a neat trick.

Anyway, you say you have argued for the point that in order to create, the Creator must mutate. Remember that, because you contradict yourself below.

Again, you are begging the question, because whether God can be Pure Act or not is exectaly what is at stake here, so you can’t just assume that.

Now which is it? Are you saying God cannot mutate because He is not Pure Act, or are you saying God cannot be Pure Act because He must mutate? You can’t make a double-headed argument here. If both propositions stand or fall together, you cannot use them both to argue against each other, because that is nothing but a circle. You must establish one, or the other, and then you can support whichever you do not establish by the one that you do.

Neither of the following two propositions is consistent with Catholic Doctrine as far as I know. You wish to assert both, but if your argument for A is B and your argument for B is A, then you have some more arguing to do, as circular logic is in general not acceptable.

A. God cannot be Pure Act.
B. God cannot create without mutating.

Pick one, and present a cogent argument, if you don’t mind. It is high time.

 

[belorg]

What is “ii”? it

That’s funny, because as I pointed out the best it does to mine is to caricature it in straw. So, it seems your analogy isn’t really representing anything at all.

It’s not supposed to be a caricature of your argument, it’s supposed to be an analogy of one of your latetst replies in which you were question-begging.

How are you able to argue without making assertions? That is a neat trick.

You should try it some time. Of course I argue without assertions. That’s the point of arguing.

Anyway, you say you have argued for the point that in order to create, the Creator must mutate. Remember that, because you contradict yourself below.

I strongly suspect that my interlocuters here have somehow lost the ability to read, beacsue I have been arguing for my position for pages and pages. If you really want to reply to me, then reread all my posts. If you can’t be bothered, then please do not reply anymore, because you lack the information to do so.

Now which is it? Are you saying God cannot mutate because He is not Pure Act, or are you saying God cannot be Pure Act because He must mutate? You can’t make a double-headed argument here. If both propositions stand or fall together, you cannot use them both to argue against each other, because that is nothing but a circle. You must establish one, or the other, and then you can support whichever you do not establish by the one that you do.

I use the fact that God must mutate in order to cerate something as an argument against God’s immutability. And I argue why God has to mutate.

Neither of the following two propositions is consistent with Catholic Doctrine as far as I know. You wish to assert both, but if your argument for A is B and your argument for B is A, then you have some more arguing to do, as circular logic is in general not acceptable.

I don’t assert any of these, I argue from B , and the logical consequecne is A

 

[tonyrey]

An excellent analysis. I have just pointed out on another thread that relativism (absolute mutability!) is self-destructive. The notion of “relative relativism” is absurd…

No one has ever answered the simple question “Relative to what?”.

If everything is relative there is at least one absolute truth:

Everything is relative!

 

[Love4All]

It’s not supposed to be a caricature of your argument, it’s supposed to be an analogy of one of your latetst replies in which you were question-begging.

Allow me to reiterate and expand.

You caricatured in straw, my argument, as follows,

1 X’s colour can’t change
2. When X becomes mad, he turns red.
3 Turning red cannot be a chnage in colour because X can’t change colour.

Now in order to hold up as an argument, your analogy will of course have to match up with my thesis point by point. Let’s see how you do.

1. X’s colour can’t change — has to be an analogy to “God is immutable.”
2. When X becomes mad, he turns red. — must be an analogy to, “when God creates, He mutates.”
3. Turning red cannot be a chnage in colour because X can’t change colour — by analogy this would read, “Mutating can’t be mutating because God can’t mutate.”
4. “God is immutable.”
5. “when God creates, He mutates.”
6. “Mutating can’t be mutating because God can’t mutate.”

This is what you claim my argument is. Premise 2 is not mine, but yours. I do not accept it, and you have never proved it, so there is no reason I should accept it. This is why I call your characterization a gross caricature of my argument. I have never accepted 2 and I have never used 2 as a premise, yet you ape my argument by claiming I say something like, “when X becomes mad, he turns red.” Unless I got your intent wrong, which seems pretty transparent, the phrasing above is exactly what you intended to convey as “my” argument.

3 is of course a contradiction in terms, but I never invoked any contradiction in terms. I don’t have any dilemma to solve when it comes to deciding whether or not mutating is mutating because I consistently hold that God does not. Including when He creates. So since you derived what you claim I said in 3 from what you claim I said in 2, it can easily be seen that both 2 and 3 fall by the wayside as just so much straw you have piled up.

You should try it some time.

Assertion.

Of course I argue without assertions.

Assertion.

That’s the point of arguing.

Assertion.

Maybe you are unclear on the meaning of the word? That was an interrogation. And that was an assertion. So was that. We use assertions, all the time. Every sound syllogism is composed of two true assertions as premises and one more assertion as the conclusion, which the premises prove. Every sentence in this paragraph apart from the first is an assertion, and without the question mark, the first one is too.

I strongly suspect that my interlocuters here have somehow lost the ability to read, beacsue I have been arguing for my position for pages and pages. If you really want to reply to me, then reread all my posts. If you can’t be bothered, then please do not reply anymore, because you lack the information to do so.

I know exactly what you are trying to say, and exactly why your thinking is wrong. I can explain it to you clearly. The only remaining question is whether you will have the humility to accept that you were mistaken, and then change your thinking to reflect the new truth you will have discovered?

I use the fact that God must mutate in order to cerate something as an argument against God’s immutability. And I argue why God has to mutate.

Not yet once.

I and others have been asking you for pages upon pages to spell out your argument, and you have yet to do so. I suspect it’s because you haven’t really got one.

I don’t assert any of these, I argue from B , and the logical consequecne is A

O.K., now we are getting somewhere. I have run out of room in this post, I’ll continue in the next.

 

[Love4All]

I don’t assert any of these, I argue from B , and the logical consequecne is A

So your argument, so far, is that,

1. God cannot create without mutating.
2. That which mutates cannot be Pure Act.
3. Therefore God cannot be Pure Act. (If He creates.)

This is going to wreak havoc with the rest of philosophy if it gets out, so we’re going to have to see if we can contain it. We derived that God must be Pure Act shortly after we derived that there must be a First Cause that everyone calls God. If God can’t be Pure Act, then there must be something wrong with the Cosmological Argument as well!

This is a strange principle in philosophy, I think, where one first establishes something clearly, and then derives other things from it that contradict the first things one has established. It is almost as if logic itself can lead to a self-contradiction. I don’t really think so, but it seems like what you are trying to prove.

Anyway, there is plainly something you have assumed but failed to establish clearly first.

“God cannot create without mutating.” And why is that, exactly? I’m taking the liberty of quoting you to someone else to illustrate my main point, here.

Firstly, I can understand how someone can claim that God can do diiferent things in diffrent worlds. There may be some weird magical property of God’s creative force that allows it to have different results indiffrent worlds. To be honest, I think that is a crazy idea, but I am willing to say for the sake of the argument that this is not really a different or a changing property of God. IOW, I am willing to grant that God’s creative force could create a rabbit in one world and a dove in another, all be remaininf exactly the same.
What I am not willing to grant is that God, whose essence is his existence and who is ultimately simple and uncomposed, can in one world be applying a force (which , under Thomism is just God Himself, not a part of God) and in the other world do absolutely nothing with that same force. that is, now matter how you look at it, an essential diffrence between the God in w1 and the God in w2.

O.K., now we’ve got something to work with, confusing as the thoughts are that I quoted above.

You have invented a money wrench, thrown it into the works that is Thomistic Philosophy, and sounded the alarm saying, “see? the machine does not work!”

But the machine works just fine, and your monkey wrench is imaginary, as you allude to understanding above, but can’t quite grasp clearly enough to let it go.

There is no “God’s creative force.” There is only God, and what God wills, happens. The nearest entity you could name that would be similar to your concept of “God’s creative force” is God’s Will. But God’s Will is not, as you correctly pointed out, something external to God. And God, moreover, is entirely Simple. So it would be a wrong understanding, to surmise that God has a “God’s creative force” that He can either apply or not apply. God has an eternal, immutable Will. He creates, with His Will.

So if tomorrow, some particular apple will fall from some particular tree, that can only be because from eternity God willed for that particular apple to fall from that tree, at that specific time that it is about to fall. There was never a time when God did not will that specific, particular space-time event. The fact that it happens, is in accordance with God’s Will. Now from the perspective of someone watching the tree, there is indeed a change in the tree. The tree first has an apple growing on it, and then that apple falls to the ground — clearly, a change. But there is no change at all in God, who willed for that particular space-time event to occur at that place and in that time, from all eternity, with One Immutable Will.

So too, if in some possible world the apple falls next Thursday instead of tomorrow, that can only be because the same God willed for it to fall next Thursday in that world, and tomorrow in this. It is in no way inconsistent with One God for God to will one thing in one space-time location and another thing in another, nor even for different things to be happening in entirely different realities. If you think you can show some inconsistency between all these possibilities and the immutability of God, go right ahead, but I don’t think you can.

 

[belorg]

So your argument, so far, is that,

1. God cannot create without mutating.
2. That which mutates cannot be Pure Act.
3. Therefore God cannot be Pure Act. (If He creates.)

This is going to wreak havoc with the rest of philosophy if it gets out, so we’re going to have to see if we can contain it. We derived that God must be Pure Act shortly after we derived that there must be a First Cause that everyone calls God. If God can’t be Pure Act, then there must be something wrong with the Cosmological Argument as well!

This is a strange principle in philosophy, I think, where one first establishes something clearly, and then derives other things from it that contradict the first things one has established. It is almost as if logic itself can lead to a self-contradiction. I don’t really think so, but it seems like what you are trying to prove.

You make it sound as if Aquinas’ cosmological argument is undisputed. It’s not. it is widely disputed, by theists and atheists alike. So, this is not going to wreak havoc with the rest of philosophy, at most it’s going to wreak havoc with the minority of philosophers who are pure Thomists.

Anyway, there is plainly something you have assumed but failed to establish clearly first.

The Cosmological argument is also something that is assumed but not established, so, I am in good company.

“God cannot create without mutating.” And why is that, exactly? I’m taking the liberty of quoting you to someone else to illustrate my main point, here.

You haven’t been able to refute my argument from wG and G yet, so you cannot assert this.

There is no “God’s creative force.” There is only God, and what God wills, happens. The nearest entity you could name that would be similar to your concept of “God’s creative force” is God’s Will. But God’s Will is not, as you correctly pointed out, something external to God. And God, moreover, is entirely Simple. So it would be a wrong understanding, to surmise that God has a “God’s creative force” that He can either apply or not apply. God has an eternal, immutable Will. He creates, with His Will.

His will created, it has an effect on reality outside God,hence it is a creative force, that is either applied or not applied.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think you two are arguing over semantics. God creates by an act of his will. Obviously this is an application of God’s Power. I see nothing wrong in thinking of this as a " force " which results in an outflowing of physical creation which is external to God’s Being and completly other than himself. And as long as we understand this " force " is not itself physical in any real sense.

Well, Belorg, those who disagree with Thomas are simply wrong, however many they are. This is not to say that he was never wrong, he was human after all. Linus2nd

 

[belorg]

I think you two are arguing over semantics. God creates by an act of his will. Obviously this is an application of God’s Power. I see nothing wrong in thinking of this as a " force " which results in an outflowing of physical creation which is external to God’s Being and completly other than himself. And as long as we understand this " force " is not itself physical in any real sense.

Well, Belorg, those who disagree with Thomas are simply wrong, however many they are. This is not to say that he was never wrong, he was human after all. Linus2nd

Those who disagree with me are simply wrong, however many they are. That is not to say I am never wrong. I am human after all.

Ok, Love4All, here you have my argument ‘spelled out’. Quite impressive, isn’t it?

 

[Eleve]

In this thread we are discussing Thomistic concepts. the whole idea of immutability is closely cannot be seen separately from divine simplicity.
So, no offense, but you simply do not know enough baout these issues to have a proper discussion.

Well, it’s easy for you to say that your argument would be obviously right if we knew what we were talking about. Much harder for you to actually explain, apparently, how any of this makes a difference to the doctrine of creation.

I 'started claiming ’ this because you brought in the concept of God’s a-temporality as an attempt to refute what I said.

Yes, I know that. What I don’t know is why you think that the question of whether God could have been in some other state is relevant to the question of whether God is atemporal or whether the creation interferes with divine immutability.

My central argument has been stated clearly. I have posited a possible world with only an immutable being, and asked several times to account for ppssible change in that world.
So far, nobody has even come close to doing that.

I’ve already done that, more than once. And instead of responding, you’ve just stomped your foot and called me an idiot. Or you’ve changed the subject.

But let me give it another go. According to the Thomist picture, nothing changes when the universe is created. Now, that’s going to sound weird, for isn’t it true that we went from a situation where there was just one thing to a situation where there’s more than one thing? Well, yes. But it can still be true that “nothing changes,” in the sense “There is no X such that X changed.” For according to the Thomist, God did not change. And the objects which came into existence did not change, for they did not go from being in one state to being in another. It was that they didn’t exist (and therefore could not be in any state) and then they did exist. So “nothing changed” - but things did indeed begin existing.

(This is coming directly from ST Iq45a2, Objection 2.)

But now you might say, isn’t it natural to say that “The world changed” from containing only God to containing God and some other things? This is also true. But we don’t have to think that the world is a real object which changed in order to talk about the creation of the world any more than we have to be modal realists to talk about these possible worlds. Instead, we can be fictionalists, adopting the view that it is useful to speak of possible worlds without thinking that they are real objects.

Belorg, what I find so weird about your argument is that it requires you to adopt this weird hybrid picture of possible worlds. On the one hand you have to reject fictionalism in order to say things like “wG is immutable” - if talk about wG is just a useful fiction, then how on earth can it have a property like immutability? Nor will it even work to say that wG is an abstract object or a set of propositions, as many non-fictionalists would like to treat possible worlds. For it is true that such abstract possible worlds are immutable, but this holds for all abstract objects, and that’s no obstacle to their representing change: the proposition “London Bridge is falling down,” if it is indeed an abstract object, is immutable, but it also denotes a change in London Bridge.

On the other hand, you do have to be a sort of fictionalist about possible worlds in order to say that wG has all the same properties as God. Because if you want to say “There is nothing other than God” and conclude from that that the only thing that exists is immutable, then you can’t treat wG as a distinct object from God.

So it looks as if you have to either say “Yes, there are these possible worlds, and they’re real independent things, not just a particular way of looking at a set of objects,” or you have to say “No, there’s no such thing as a possible world; that’s just a useful fiction for talking about modality.” In the first case it is impossible to posit a world with just God, because once you’ve posited the world there’s no way to introduce some other thing and say that it’s along. (Imagine a world that consists of a) an apple in a world by itself and b) an orange.) In the second case, there’s no way to say that God and the world have the same properties, because the world doesn’t have properties. It’s not even a thing, just a useful linguistic device.

 

[Love4All]

Those who disagree with me are simply wrong, however many they are. That is not to say I am never wrong. I am human after all.

Ok, Love4All, here you have my argument ‘spelled out’. Quite impressive, isn’t it?

Wow. Sorry I bothered replying to you at all then. Peace.

 

[Love4All]

You haven’t been able to refute my argument from wG and G yet,

So, wG and G are the same, because you say so, and anyone who disagrees is wrong. There is none so blind as one who will not see.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well, it’s easy for you to say that your argument would be obviously right if we knew what we were talking about. Much harder for you to actually explain, apparently, how any of this makes a difference to the doctrine of creation.

Yes, I know that. What I don’t know is why you think that the question of whether God could have been in some other state is relevant to the question of whether God is atemporal or whether the creation interferes with divine immutability.

I’ve already done that, more than once. And instead of responding, you’ve just stomped your foot and called me an idiot. Or you’ve changed the subject.

But let me give it another go. According to the Thomist picture, nothing changes when the universe is created. Now, that’s going to sound weird, for isn’t it true that we went from a situation where there was just one thing to a situation where there’s more than one thing? Well, yes. But it can still be true that “nothing changes,” in the sense “There is no X such that X changed.” For according to the Thomist, God did not change. And the objects which came into existence did not change, for they did not go from being in one state to being in another. It was that they didn’t exist (and therefore could not be in any state) and then they did exist. So “nothing changed” - but things did indeed begin existing.

(This is coming directly from ST Iq45a2, Objection 2.)

But now you might say, isn’t it natural to say that “The world changed” from containing only God to containing God and some other things? This is also true. But we don’t have to think that the world is a real object which changed in order to talk about the creation of the world any more than we have to be modal realists to talk about these possible worlds. Instead, we can be fictionalists, adopting the view that it is useful to speak of possible worlds without thinking that they are real objects.

This would be wrong. God did not exist in a " world. " That would imply that God, a purely spiritual being, required a " place " in order " to be " or " to exist. " That would imply a dependency on " place " as a condition of God’s existence. This state of " dependency " would imply that God was not infinite in His Existence, which is contradictary to his definition. Consequently, God is absolutely other than the universe he created.

God existed and exists eternally but not as a part of the universe of contingent, changing beings. Though, see below, he operates most intimately in all things.

On the other hand, once cration was a fact God is present in everything ( S.T. Part 1, ques 8, a. 1 and the rest up to and including a. 2-3) but not as part of it. In other words God is working in the world but is not a part of it.

Bringing X’s and 0-'s and possible worlds confues the issue and just pushes the goal posts futher along. It is this world we have to account for, not some imaginary one.

Linus2nd

 

[rom422]

AN ANALYSIS OF BELORG’S ARGUMENT

My argument is that if God is the cerator of everything, it follows that there is a possible world in which God is alone.
In such a world there is act but no potency. Hence, since God is immutable, there can never be potency. Hence God cannot create potency. Hence potency cannot have been crated by God. Hence, either potency is eternal and uncreated, which contradicts Cattholic doctrine, or potency can be crated, which contradicts the fact that God is pure act.

Let me analyze this one by one: (I will give my comments in red.)

1. My argument is that if God is the cerator of everything, it follows that there is a possible world in which God is alone.

God is alone in the sense that in that world He is the only actually existing being. This I concede.

1. In such a world there is act but no potency.

Non-sequitur. There is an actual being (God), but there are possible (or potential ) beings that exist in His Power to create. But be careful. Since these beings are only possible beings, they have no actual existence in God, but only virtual existence. Therefore, God is still alone as the only actual being.

Note: The potential being of creatures exist in God, but they are not God’s potency. They are the potency of His possible creatures.

1. Hence, since God is immutable, there can never be potency.

There can never be potency in Him, but there can be potency in His possible creatures. Also, possible beings can exist virtually in His Power, and ideally in His Mind.

1. Hence God cannot create potency.

God does not create pure potency. Since potential beings are not actual beings, they don’t need to be created. That does not mean that potential beings have no principle or source (because their source is God’s Power), but strictly speaking, they have **no cause **because, as merely possible beings, they have no actual being or existence. Therefore, they don’t need a cause.

1. Hence potency cannot have been crated by God.

Non-sequitur again. God indeed does not create pure potency. However, He can create potency, but not apart from act. In fact, potency, as the mere potency of creatures, is never created without act. Purely possible or potential beings only exist in God’s power, but they are not created as such. However, potency, as the limitation or limiting principle of an actually existing creature, is created when the finite creature is created.

It is important to realize this. Do not imagine that in the process of creation God creates potency first, and then adds actuality to it. That is flawed metaphysics, for God cannot create a potency *as if *it is an actual being. This is like thinking that God can make a square circle. The truth is, God creates actual creatures that are finite, and the fact that they are limited in actuality gives them potentialities for further actualization. Therefore, potency exists because a finite actual being exists. If God is the cause of this finite being, so He is also the cause of this creature’s potencies.

1. Hence, either potency is eternal and uncreated, which contradicts Cattholic doctrine, or potency can be crated, which contradicts the fact that God is pure act.

This conclusion is a disjunctive proposition with two parts.

The first part is this: potency is eternal and uncreated, which contradicts Catholic doctrine. Actually, I agree that purely possible or potential beings are eternal and uncreated. However, I do not agree that it contradicts Catholic doctrine. Of course, it is true that God is the creator of everything, including prime matter and the latent potentiality of things. But He does not create them apart from material things or real beings. Potency exists because God has created something actual of which it is the potency.

The second part of your conclusion is this: Potency can be created, which contradicts the fact that God is pure act. Another non-sequitur. The fact that potency can be created (in an actually existing finite being) confirms rather than contradicts that God alone is Pure Act. All creatures, on the other hand, are limited in being, and so are composed of potency and act.

 

[belorg]

Wow. Sorry I bothered replying to you at all then. Peace.

If Linus can assert this, why can’t I?

 

[belorg]

Well, it’s easy for you to say that your argument would be obviously right if we knew what we were talking about. Much harder for you to actually explain, apparently, how any of this makes a difference to the doctrine of creation.

Yes, I know that. What I don’t know is why you think that the question of whether God could have been in some other state is relevant to the question of whether God is atemporal or whether the creation interferes with divine immutability.

I’ve already done that, more than once. And instead of responding, you’ve just stomped your foot and called me an idiot. Or you’ve changed the subject.

But let me give it another go. According to the Thomist picture, nothing changes when the universe is created. Now, that’s going to sound weird, for isn’t it true that we went from a situation where there was just one thing to a situation where there’s more than one thing? Well, yes. But it can still be true that “nothing changes,” in the sense “There is no X such that X changed.” For according to the Thomist, God did not change. And the objects which came into existence did not change, for they did not go from being in one state to being in another. It was that they didn’t exist (and therefore could not be in any state) and then they did exist. So “nothing changed” - but things did indeed begin existing.

(This is coming directly from ST Iq45a2, Objection 2.)

But now you might say, isn’t it natural to say that “The world changed” from containing only God to containing God and some other things? This is also true. But we don’t have to think that the world is a real object which changed in order to talk about the creation of the world any more than we have to be modal realists to talk about these possible worlds. Instead, we can be fictionalists, adopting the view that it is useful to speak of possible worlds without thinking that they are real objects.

Belorg, what I find so weird about your argument is that it requires you to adopt this weird hybrid picture of possible worlds. On the one hand you have to reject fictionalism in order to say things like “wG is immutable” - if talk about wG is just a useful fiction, then how on earth can it have a property like immutability? Nor will it even work to say that wG is an abstract object or a set of propositions, as many non-fictionalists would like to treat possible worlds. For it is true that such abstract possible worlds are immutable, but this holds for all abstract objects, and that’s no obstacle to their representing change: the proposition “London Bridge is falling down,” if it is indeed an abstract object, is immutable, but it also denotes a change in London Bridge.

On the other hand, you do have to be a sort of fictionalist about possible worlds in order to say that wG has all the same properties as God. Because if you want to say “There is nothing other than God” and conclude from that that the only thing that exists is immutable, then you can’t treat wG as a distinct object from God.

So it looks as if you have to either say “Yes, there are these possible worlds, and they’re real independent things, not just a particular way of looking at a set of objects,” or you have to say “No, there’s no such thing as a possible world; that’s just a useful fiction for talking about modality.” In the first case it is impossible to posit a world with just God, because once you’ve posited the world there’s no way to introduce some other thing and say that it’s along. (Imagine a world that consists of a) an apple in a world by itself and b) an orange.) In the second case, there’s no way to say that God and the world have the same properties, because the world doesn’t have properties. It’s not even a thing, just a useful linguistic device.

Of course possible worlds are a useful fiction. So God and the world have the same properties, because the world is just God. It is just a linguistic device.
So, what my argument attempts to show is that we can imagine a situtaion in which there is nothing but God, and this can be described as wG, which is, indeed just another way of saying G, that is the whole situation we have can also be descibed as God, because every property of wG is a property of God.
So, there is nothing about the situation that can change.
And no you say: but there is no X such that X changed, because X came from absolutely nothing, and nothing cannot be desribed as X. But if that is true, it is not true that ex nihilo nihil fit. You have X popping into existence here.
Moreover, if you object: but X is caused by God. This requires some sort of creative force that is applied by God, and since there is clearly a world in which God applies this force and also one in which He doesn’t, we still see a change. Not in a temporal sense, but in an ontological sense. Now, according to Thomism, that is impossible.

Now, suppose we do treat a possible world as a real, independent thing (which I don’t), then it is true that it’s impossible to introduce a world with just God, but that means that Catholic doctrine which says that God created evrything, both visible and invisible is also false.

Now, as for calling you an idiot, I never used that word and remember: you were the one who started calling my claims ridiculous.

 

[belorg]

AN ANALYSIS OF BELORG’S ARGUMENT

Let me analyze this one by one: (I will give my comments in red.)

1. My argument is that if God is the creator of everything, it follows that there is a possible world in which God is alone.

God is alone in the sense that in that world He is the only actually existing being. This I concede.

1. In such a world there is act but no potency.

Non-sequitur. There is an actual being (God), but there are possible (or potential ) beings that exist in His Power to create. But be careful. Since these beings are only possible beings, they have no actual existence in God, but only virtual existence. Therefore, God is still alone as the only actual being.

Here you have already shot your own foot, because if beings exist in His power to create and have no actual existence and some of those beings are created ‘afterwards’ (not necessarily in a temporal sense), then something that existed in the power of God (which is internal to God) became actual (and exterior to God). That is pantheism or panentheism.

Note: The potential being of creatures exist in God, but they are not God’s potency. They are the potency of His possible creatures.

But admitting this, you have lost your argument.

The rest of your post becomes irrelevant once we have established this.

 

[belorg]

So, wG and G are the same, because you say so, and anyone who disagrees is wrong. There is none so blind as one who will not see.

wG and G are the same because I started from Catholic doctrine that says that God is the creator of everything, visible and invisible. Maybe you do not agree with that doctrine, of course, but then this discussion is not meant for you.

 

[Paddy_Walker]

Here you have already shot your own foot, because if beings exist in His power to create and have no actual existence and some of those beings are created ‘afterwards’ (not necessarily in a temporal sense), then something that existed in the power of God (which is internal to God) became actual (and exterior to God). That is pantheism or panentheism.

But admitting this, you have lost your argument.

The rest of your post becomes irrelevant once we have established this.

would it be useful to make a mundane example of your idea, and correct it if it is inaccurate;

• so, i am me. and in my mind i think of a number. now i am both me and this number.

am i now changed?