St. Thomas' Motion Argument and Modern Physics

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All the standard arguments plus Paul again. In 1 Cor 1:18-31 he argues that all attempts to prove anything about God are foolishness, nonsense when put beside Christ crucified. Christ should be more than enough for us, looking elsewhere is a stumbling block, it impedes us.

Maybe Thomas finally understood that when he made his “straw” remark.
We Catholics do not rely on the Bible alone as you know. We adhere to the Scriptures and Tradition as interpreted by the Magisterium of the Church. No one knows what Thomas meant by the " straw " remark. But he had a vision that was so remarkable that he lost all interest in earthly things. Linus2nd
 
I accept this. It is an article of faith that the universe of actual beings was produced by God out of nothing. The key here is to understand what the Church means by “nothing.” I think that by this the Church simply means “no pre-existing thing.” I got a confirmation of this from the CCC #296:

Therefore, the dogma of creation does not exclude the fact that a creature, before creation, was merely a possible being, which means that it has no actual existence. As a possible being (or essence without entitative esse) we can in no way regard it as a pre-existent thing; so in a sense it is truly “nothing.”

There are two kinds of potency in relation to existence. There is subjective potency and *objective potency. *Subjective potency is the potency that you find in a real subject. In relation to the act of existence it is the potency of essence as it exists in, and is created at the same time as, the creature. It is potency properly understood, and is an intrinsic principle of the composite subject. You are CORRECT: creatures in the world are not derived from this kind of potency.

However, there is another kind of potency, called objective potency, which represents the potency of a possible being as an object of God’s Power, or as an object of God’s Knowledge. A possible being has no actual existence (no entitative esse). Yet it exists virtually in God’s Power (virtual esse), and cognitively in God’s Mind (cognitive esse). This is the kind of potency that I am talking about. It is the objective potency of a possible being to be an actual being by God’s creative act. Before anything is created, it already exists – not entitatively, of course, – but virtually in God’s Power and cognitively in God’s Mind (as a being of reason).

If there is an all-powerful God, then anything that has no intrinsic contradiction would be possible for Him to create. The possibility of things – which I have defined as “objective potency” - is therefore rooted in Divine Omnipotence (See S.T. Part 1, Q. 25, Art.3). Take God out of the picture and nothing would be possible. The result would be absolute nothingness. In that state of absolute nothingness, nothing will ever come to be.
If you can find a place in Thomas where he referes to God’s knowledge of all possible beings as " potencies, " I will withdraw my objection. Otherwise I will continue to view your interpretation as an unwarranted and confusing novelty. Linus2nd
 
Yes, read Paul.

belorg has shown great restraint, you haven’t.

Although I must admit that these threads about folk who still believe in medieval nonsense are very entertaining.

Grief, Thomas himself said he wrote straw. Correcto mundo. In spades.
To allude to medieval philosophy as " nonsense " is an unwarranted assumption. Have you actually read any of it ? Linus2nd
 
So one day God is working and the next is resting, which is a change over time.
But since “God is eternal” is one of His attributes, God can be neither confined nor held captive within the limits of time.
You can cite all number of post hoc doctrines, but if we’re debating the biblical God and not some other deity then it’s right there in scripture, God changed.
God’s carrying out His will, using His own free-will choice, to work six days and rest one day would not have changed His nature. God’s free-will choices are always made in perfect harmony with each of His attributes, including his attribute of immutability. The fundamental nature of free will is to make use of that free will. If a person one day makes the free-will choice to have cake for dessert rather than to have his or her usual pie, that choice will not change or alter the inherent qualities of that person: that person will remain the same person before, during and after his choice to have cake. God created the universe out of love; and God’s creating the universe and then resting could neither subtract love from God’s nature nor add love to it. God’s nature, therefore, remains the same always.
 
Straw man. Genesis doesn’t say that God needs to rest, it doesn’t say why God decides to rest, it just says “By the seventh day God had finished the work he had been doing; so on the seventh day he rested from all his work”.

So one day God is working and the next is resting, which is a change over time. You can cite all number of post hoc doctrines, but if we’re debating the biblical God and not some other deity then it’s right there in scripture, God changed. 🙂
God is absolutely immutable. Ps. 101, 27 & following: " They ( the heavens ) whall perish but thou remainest and all of them shall grow old. And as a vestment thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art always the selfsame. " And James 1,17, " with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration. "

Cf. Ps 32, 11; Is 46, 10; Hebr. 6, 17; Mal 3, 6 indicates in the Divine Name of God the basis of the absolute immutability of God; " For I am the Lord, and I change not. "

Life and activity are associated with God’s immutability, Cf. Wisdom 7, 24, 27. St. Augustine says: " God knows to act in restfulness and to rest in activity.

Source. Fundamentas of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott

Linus2nd
 
If you can find a place in Thomas where he referes to God’s knowledge of all possible beings as " potencies, " I will withdraw my objection. Otherwise I will continue to view your interpretation as an unwarranted and confusing novelty. Linus2nd
Linus, it is not God’s knowledge that I call “potencies.” What I refer to as “potencies” or “potential beings” are those possible beings that are in His knowledge. Possible beings that exist in God’s Mind have an objective potency toward existence. And St. Thomas did refer to these possible beings as “in potentiality” (toward existence). For example, in the ST, Part I, Q.14, Art. 9, Reply to Obj. 1, he says:
Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.
“Potency,” like “being”, is an analogous term. We say, for instance, that essence is a potency in relation to existence, but obviously, it is not a potency in exactly the same way that prime matter is a potency in relation to form. Even immaterial substances (or pure forms without matter) are, before creation, merely in potentiality toward existence. You can see this, for instance, in a text from St. Thomas’ De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 5:
Everything that receives something from something else is in potentiality with respect to what it receives and the latter is its actuality. Therefore, the quiddity or form that is the intelligence has to be in potentiality with respect to the existence it receives from God, while the existence received is its actuality. And in this way there is potentiality and actuality in the intelligences, although not form and matter, unless equivocally. Thus, also to undergo [change], to receive, to be a subject, and the like, which appear to pertain to things on account of their matter, equivocally apply to intellectual substances and to corporeal ones, as the Commentator remarks in Book 3 of On the Soul.45 And since, as has been said, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is what itself is, and its existence received from God is that by which it subsists in the nature of things. For this reason, these substances are said to be composed of that *from which *something is ex quo est] and *that which is *quod est], or that which exists id quod est] and existence esse], as Boethius declares.46 faculty.fordham.edu/klima/Blackwell-proofs/MP_C30.pdf
You can find this quote on page 241 in the link that I provided.
 
Linus, it is not God’s knowledge that I call “potencies.” What I refer to as “potencies” or “potential beings” are those possible beings that are in His knowledge. Possible beings that exist in God’s Mind have an objective potency toward existence. And St. Thomas did refer to these possible beings as “in potentiality” (toward existence). For example, in the ST, Part I, Q.14, Art. 9, Reply to Obj. 1, he says:

“Potency,” like “being”, is an analogous term. We say, for instance, that essence is a potency in relation to existence, but obviously, it is not a potency in exactly the same way that prime matter is a potency in relation to form. Even immaterial substances (or pure forms without matter) are, before creation, merely in potentiality toward existence. You can see this, for instance, in a text from St. Thomas’ De Ente et Essentia, Chapter 5:

You can find this quote on page 241 in the link that I provided.
Yes, I understand all that. But there is nothing there that justifies referring to the knowledge God has of all " possible " things as " potencies. " Thomas refers to " potency " only in reference to created substances in that their " essence " is in " potency " to their existence which they have from God. However, the reason I have objected has to do with the confusion this may cause in the minds of those who do not know Thomas or reject his philosophy all together. It just gives them a chance to introduce " potency " in the nature of God. From this they feel justified in saying God must be composed in some manner and therefore is not simple. Linus2nd
 
Yes, I understand all that. But there is nothing there that justifies referring to the knowledge God has of all " possible " things as " potencies. " Thomas refers to " potency " only in reference to created substances in that their " essence " is in " potency " to their existence which they have from God. However, the reason I have objected has to do with the confusion this may cause in the minds of those who do not know Thomas or reject his philosophy all together. It just gives them a chance to introduce " potency " in the nature of God. From this they feel justified in saying God must be composed in some manner and therefore is not simple. Linus2nd
Will you please tell me where I referred to the knowledge that God has of all possible things as “potencies”?

It is the possible beings that I described as potential, not God’s knowledge of potential beings. This is very clear, especially in Post #731 above - particularly the note in paragraph #2 and the text of paragraph #3.
 
No one knows what Thomas meant by the " straw " remark.
I don’t think his statement was all that obscure. Everything he wrote, he saw as straw in comparison to the Infinite Glory of Almighty God.

And the verdict of the Church is that his work was not straw, but rather precious stones.
 
But since “God is eternal” is one of His attributes, God can be neither confined nor held captive within the limits of time.

God’s carrying out His will, using His own free-will choice, to work six days and rest one day would not have changed His nature. God’s free-will choices are always made in perfect harmony with each of His attributes, including his attribute of immutability. The fundamental nature of free will is to make use of that free will. If a person one day makes the free-will choice to have cake for dessert rather than to have his or her usual pie, that choice will not change or alter the inherent qualities of that person: that person will remain the same person before, during and after his choice to have cake. God created the universe out of love; and God’s creating the universe and then resting could neither subtract love from God’s nature nor add love to it. God’s nature, therefore, remains the same always.
God freely chose to create the universe, but not with what we generally call “free will.”

Free will is something a creature with an immortal soul has, for deciding to love and serve God or reject and hate Him, as the final decision. That is why two of the “last things” are heaven and hell, not purgatory and not earth.

So free will is that with which we decide to either conform ourselves to God’s Will or defy God’s Will. Since it is incoherent to think God could ever defy His own Will, consequently the idea of free will doesn’t apply to God.

God’s Will is sovereign, and God’s Will is free, but it isn’t “free will” per se.
 
Will you please tell me where I referred to the knowledge that God has of all possible things as “potencies”?

It is the possible beings that I described as potential, not God’s knowledge of potential beings. This is very clear, especially in Post #731 above - particularly the note in paragraph #2 and the text of paragraph #3.
Your post #857 : " However, there is another kind of potency, called objective potency, which represents the potency of a possible being as an object of God’s Power, or as an object of God’s Knowledge. A possible being has no actual existence (no entitative esse). Yet it exists virtually in God’s Power (virtual esse), and cognitively in God’s Mind (cognitive esse). This is the kind of potency that I am talking about. It is the objective potency of a possible being to be an actual being by God’s creative act. Before anything is created, it already exists – not entitatively, of course, – but virtually in God’s Power and cognitively in God’s Mind (as a being of reason). "

This is what I am talking about. The " possible " beings known by God in his intellect are not " potencies, " either subjective or objective. " Potencies " exist only in created beings.
But it isn’t a big thing with me. I just think people not very familiar with Thomas would get confused. This is certainly not a distinction he ever made. But have it your way.

The only time he ever used " potency " in any context to God’s Being was to say that God had an " active potency " in relation to created and governed beings. And that was not a real potency but a way of saying that God could and did create and govern… Linus2d
 
Even today’s experts in Physics have trouble understanding mass-energy and 4 dimensional spacetime.

When Einstein was working out his theory of General Relativity (or geometrodynamics), he was very interested in some things Ernst Mach had written about inertia. I found this midway through the Misner-Thorne-Wheeler book Gravitation
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitation_%28book%29
pp 543-547 drchristiansalas.org.uk/MathsandPhysics/Relativity/Gravitation.pdf

Mach’s principle is that “matter there governs inertia here,” and he was referring to stars many light years away. “Specify everywhere the distribution and flow of mass-energy and thereby determine the inertial properties of every test particle everywhere and at all times.”
Quite a bit beyond what St Aquinas thought in his day, but he did help build the medieval foundations of science.
 
Your post #857 : " However, there is another kind of potency, called objective potency, which represents the potency of a possible being as an object of God’s Power, or as an object of God’s Knowledge. A possible being has no actual existence (no entitative esse). Yet it exists virtually in God’s Power (virtual esse), and cognitively in God’s Mind (cognitive esse). This is the kind of potency that I am talking about. It is the objective potency of a possible being to be an actual being by God’s creative act. Before anything is created, it already exists – not entitatively, of course, – but virtually in God’s Power and cognitively in God’s Mind (as a being of reason). "

This is what I am talking about. The " possible " beings known by God in his intellect are not " potencies, " either subjective or objective. " Potencies " exist only in created beings.
But it isn’t a big thing with me. I just think people not very familiar with Thomas would get confused. This is certainly not a distinction he ever made. But have it your way.

The only time he ever used " potency " in any context to God’s Being was to say that God had an " active potency " in relation to created and governed beings. And that was not a real potency but a way of saying that God could and did create and govern… Linus2d
I see that you are still struggling with the idea of calling possible beings as “potencies.” Yet I pointed to you a text from the Summa which shows that even St. Thomas referred to possible beings as “in potentiality” toward existence. He said, “Those things that are not actual that means, possible beings] are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God” (ST, Part 1, Q.14, Art. 9, Reply to Obj. 1. [The phrase in parenthesis is mine, inserted for clarity.]

Maybe the following will help to clarify this further. Consider the term “being.” Strictly speaking, the only thing that we can properly call a being is something that exists; that means, a real being. Yet, we also apply the term “being” even to non-real or fictional beings, such as a mermaid or a centaur. Since these are not real beings, and exist only in our minds, we call them by a special term: “beings of reason” (or entia rationis).

In like manner, the only thing that we can properly call a potency is the potency that we find in actual subjects (such as the prime matter of existing bodily substances, or the essence of immaterial substances). This potency is referred to as subjective potency and is found only in created things, as you pointed out. In a less proper sense, however, we may apply the term “potency” to the potency of possible beings toward existence, which St. Thomas has also done. But since this potency is not found in an actual subject, but in things that are mere objects of God’s Power or God’s Mind, we call it by a special term: “objective potency.”

If we can call a being of reason a “being” even if it is not a real being, then why can’t I call the potency (toward existence) of a possible being a “potency” even if it is not in an existing created being? St. Thomas did not hesitate to call it that, did he?

This manner of handling terms is really not uncommon in philosophy and the other sciences. In human language we use terms sometimes in a broad (or wide) sense, sometimes in a restricted (or narrow) sense. We use terms sometimes strictly, sometimes loosely. We use terms sometimes properly, and sometimes less properly. I don’t find any problem with this, as long as we clarify in what sense we are using a term. Consider, for example, the term “change.” Strictly speaking, the only kind of transition that we can properly call a “change” is one in which there is something that changes; that means, one where there is a subject or substratum of change. But in this thread we have used the term “change” loosely to refer to any kind of transition whatever from one state or thing to another. If this loose sense is adopted, then creation may be referred to as a “change” from non-being to being. But if we use the term “change” in its strict philosophical meaning, then creation is not a change at all because there is no subject that changes. Rather, there is a production of the entire being of a thing from nothing.
 
I see that you are still struggling with the idea of calling possible beings as “potencies.” Yet I pointed to you a text from the Summa which shows that even St. Thomas referred to possible beings as “in potentiality” toward existence. He said, “Those things that are not actual that means, possible beings] are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God” (ST, Part 1, Q.14, Art. 9, Reply to Obj. 1. [The phrase in parenthesis is mine, inserted for clarity.]

Maybe the following will help to clarify this further. Consider the term “being.” Strictly speaking, the only thing that we can properly call a being is something that exists; that means, a real being. Yet, we also apply the term “being” even to non-real or fictional beings, such as a mermaid or a centaur. Since these are not real beings, and exist only in our minds, we call them by a special term: “beings of reason” (or entia rationis).

In like manner, the only thing that we can properly call a potency is the potency that we find in actual subjects (such as the prime matter of existing bodily substances, or the essence of immaterial substances). This potency is referred to as subjective potency and is found only in created things, as you pointed out. In a less proper sense, however, we may apply the term “potency” to the potency of possible beings toward existence, which St. Thomas has also done. But since this potency is not found in an actual subject, but in things that are mere objects of God’s Power or God’s Mind, we call it by a special term: “objective potency.”

If we can call a being of reason a “being” even if it is not a real being, then why can’t I call the potency (toward existence) of a possible being a “potency” even if it is not in an existing created being? St. Thomas did not hesitate to call it that, did he?

This manner of handling terms is really not uncommon in philosophy and the other sciences. In human language we use terms sometimes in a broad (or wide) sense, sometimes in a restricted (or narrow) sense. We use terms sometimes strictly, sometimes loosely. We use terms sometimes properly, and sometimes less properly. I don’t find any problem with this, as long as we clarify in what sense we are using a term. Consider, for example, the term “change.” Strictly speaking, the only kind of transition that we can properly call a “change” is one in which there is something that changes; that means, one where there is a subject or substratum of change. But in this thread we have used the term “change” loosely to refer to any kind of transition whatever from one state or thing to another. If this loose sense is adopted, then creation may be referred to as a “change” from non-being to being. But if we use the term “change” in its strict philosophical meaning, then creation is not a change at all because there is no subject that changes. Rather, there is a production of the entire being of a thing from nothing.
Yes, I understand what you are saying. I just disagree, I think those who do not accept the existence of God will use this application as an excuse to say either that God does not exist or that He is not distinct from the other beings of the universe. They may say, " look here, there is a potency in God, so he is nothing other than a part of the material universe, subject to change like everything else. " But as I said, that is just my opinion.

Linus2nd
 
God freely chose to create the universe, but not with what we generally call “free will.”

Free will is something a creature with an immortal soul has, for deciding to love and serve God or reject and hate Him, as the final decision. That is why two of the “last things” are heaven and hell, not purgatory and not earth.

So free will is that with which we decide to either conform ourselves to God’s Will or defy God’s Will. Since it is incoherent to think God could ever defy His own Will, consequently the idea of free will doesn’t apply to God.

God’s Will is sovereign, and God’s Will is free, but it isn’t “free will” per se.
I think that free will is basically the freedom to make choices that are in keeping with the nature of each individual without force, threats, or pressures. I believe that God has free-will choices in that He is freely able to choose to do the things that are in keeping with His perfect character. Since God is perfect, His standard of free-will choices are always perfectly made. God, not man, is the standard by which mankind is to define such things as free-will choices, love, and justice. To use mankind as the standard of anything on which to base a free-will choice of right and wrong and good and evil is to start off on the wrong foot.
 
Nobody is saying that the Creator must be in the same category as everything else.
Your entire argument is based on that assumption. For example, you deny that God can create without mutating. Even we can do that…
 
Your entire argument is based on that assumption. For example, you deny that God can create without mutating. Even we can do that…
No, my argument is not based on that assumption at all, and it isn’t even true that we can do that.
I have said everything I wanted to say in this thread, so I won’t be responding anymore, especially not to someone like you who has only half read the argument.
 
I think that free will is basically the freedom to make choices that are in keeping with the nature of each individual without force, threats, or pressures. I believe that God has free-will choices in that He is freely able to choose to do the things that are in keeping with His perfect character. Since God is perfect, His standard of free-will choices are always perfectly made. God, not man, is the standard by which mankind is to define such things as free-will choices, love, and justice. To use mankind as the standard of anything on which to base a free-will choice of right and wrong and good and evil is to start off on the wrong foot.
In Heaven, no one has free will.
 
No, my argument is not based on that assumption at all, and it isn’t even true that we can do that.
I have said everything I wanted to say in this thread, so I won’t be responding anymore, especially not to someone like you who has only half read the argument.
And to someone like me, who has read your whole argument, actually expressed it formally, and shown how it fails, you will dismiss me with,
  1. You don’t understand my argument, and
  2. I’m not willing to explain it to you.
You sure are insulated against anything except your own ideas! Keeps you safe, I guess.
 
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