St. Thomas on "If a tree falls in a forest..."

[well2661]

It would seem that this is a metaphysical/epistemological question, rather then a play on language of the subject and object in regards to the word sound, regarding whether there are objects outside the human mind or not or rather if there is a being outside of the physical universe (ie God) that could substantiate that there indeed was a tree that made a sound and that fell. So I it would look that St. Thomas would say that there was a sound.

 

[Katholish]

Providing arguements both “for” and “against” isn’t the same as saying (without any further explaination) “Yes & no.” at the same time as answer to a question. Saying “Yes, when ___ means…” and “No, when ____ means…” isn’t the same as providing arguements both “for” or “against” nor is it the same as a “yes/no” answer (as if it is both “true and false” simutaneously.)

I am not referring to Thomas’s objection sections.

No where was “yes and no” even unqualified. My original post which you took issue carefully explained under which aspect it is yes and under which aspect it is no.

 

[itinerant1]

What would St. Thomas say about this one:

If a man says something in the woods, and there’s no woman around to hear him, is he still wrong?

DaveBj

 

[GreggAlvarez]

I am of the least intellect at trying to figure out what great minds such as St. Thomas Aquinas would say but considering his influence by the logic of Aristotle, he might say something along the lines of sound being an observation but only because we can observe it. He may not even negate it but give examples that would argue the “no” answer. For instance, If nobody is there to see the other side of the moon, does it exist visually (or is it visually observable)? I am probably way off in his thinking because he was unique (as are all the other saints). I hope this feeds your Thomistic interest!

 

[GreggAlvarez]

He may not even negate it but give examples that would argue the “no” answer.

I meant “…but give examples that would argue AGAINST the “no” answer.”

 

[Leela]

How would St. Thomas resolve the classical philosophical question “If a tree falls in a forest, and no one is around, does it make a sound?” Thanks

It seems to me that such hypothetical trees can do whatever you want them to do. It is like asking, if pigs could fly, how high would they go?

 

[HumbledCatholic]

It seems to me that such hypothetical trees can do whatever you want them to do. It is like asking, if pigs could fly, how high would they go?

Are you suggesting that a tree cannot fall in the forest whilst no-one is about, or that a tree could only fall unobserved “when pigs fly”?

Or are you suggesting instead that our “hypothetical trees” can do anything that we wish them to because, in your opinion, we cannot reason validly about the behaviour of falling trees in general on the basis of the few specific fallings of trees which we have witnessed and perhaps studied for ourselves?

In which case, wouldn’t you be contradicting the very inductive principle on which you have built your worldview?

Taking a second to comment by aside on your blog in general based on the premise which you have placed on the header:

Pragmatism, like materialism, really only usefully confronts those believers who have taken their eyes off the prize, so to speak. Materialist arguments convince those who have ceased looking for any ideal or purpose, and in their hearts wish only to have as much material happiness in this life as possible. Pragmatist arguments convince those who have ceased fixing their eyes on the Eternal, the Unmoveable, and whose highest purpose at heart is simply to live a “good life” for its own sake. Neither line of argument has any real hope of convincing that believer away who has his eyes firmly fixed upon God as his source and his ending, and the source of whose joy in this life is hope for the next.

Both lines of argument really depend upon the one being argued at having already supplanted God with something else as his highest good, and then on showing him with rational argument how it is possible to attain to this highest good (freedom from hunger, an ethical code, family values, &c.) in the absence of a personal God.

Both lines of argument convert no believers to unbelief, but only help those who had long since ceased being believers to discover their unbelief.

 

[GaryTaylor]

Aquinas follows Aristotle in regard to sensible qualities, that is, green leaves are actually green, sounds exists independently of any creature with the sense of hearing, and so on.

Yes, and its related back to following in Blind Faith. What is, truely is, regardless of your opinion, belief, and understanding.

The Lord Loves you everyday, always. And untill the Blessed Mother gets up and says her work is through, you know exactly what to do. Untill the day when you are me and I am you. Is that not loving you? Untill we pray and dream of God then God become the dream.

 

[Leela]

Are you suggesting that a tree cannot fall in the forest whilst no-one is about, or that a tree could only fall unobserved “when pigs fly”?

Or are you suggesting instead that our “hypothetical trees” can do anything that we wish them to because, in your opinion, we cannot reason validly about the behaviour of falling trees in general on the basis of the few specific fallings of trees which we have witnessed and perhaps studied for ourselves?

In which case, wouldn’t you be contradicting the very inductive principle on which you have built your worldview?

??? I’m just saying that if you ask “If a tree falls…” My response is, okay, you’ve asked me to imagine a tree falling with no one around. Well, yes, the tree that I am imagining is indeed making a sound.

Taking a second to comment by aside on your blog in general based on the premise which you have placed on the header:

Pragmatism, like materialism, really only usefully confronts those believers who have taken their eyes off the prize, so to speak. Materialist arguments convince those who have ceased looking for any ideal or purpose, and in their hearts wish only to have as much material happiness in this life as possible. Pragmatist arguments convince those who have ceased fixing their eyes on the Eternal, the Unmoveable, and whose highest purpose at heart is simply to live a “good life” for its own sake. Neither line of argument has any real hope of convincing that believer away who has his eyes firmly fixed upon God as his source and his ending, and the source of whose joy in this life is hope for the next.

Both lines of argument really depend upon the one being argued at having already supplanted God with something else as his highest good, and then on showing him with rational argument how it is possible to attain to this highest good (freedom from hunger, an ethical code, family values, &c.) in the absence of a personal God.

Both lines of argument convert no believers to unbelief, but only help those who had long since ceased being believers to discover their unbelief.

I’m not trying to convince believers not to believe.

 

[HumbledCatholic]

??? I’m just saying that if you ask “If a tree falls…” My response is, okay, you’ve asked me to imagine a tree falling with no one around. Well, yes, the tree that I am imagining is indeed making a sound.

But trees do fall when no-one is around! What is unknown is whether or no they make a sound when they do so. I am not imagining the circumstance, but rather am making an inquiry as to one of its particulars.

But really the question is not about trees falling; it is about the nature of sound itself. Is the sound the vibrations themselves, or is the sound our brains’ interpretation of these vibrations as detected by the ears?

I would say that this question and the question of colour resolve themselves in this way: some quality of refraction of light or vibration of air columns by material objects are indeed the things themselves, colour and sound. Let me explain:

The appearance of each colour is predicated upon the sensory faculties of each observer. Nevertheless, since sensation is generally uniform, blue will appear one way to me; colour X which I call “blue” may appear to you such that, were I to see it through your eyes, I should call it colour Y, which I call “yellow”; colour X, furthermore, looks, as interpreted by your senses, as colour X does to mine. Nevertheless, as you have no innate knowledge of the colours themselves, but rather have learnt to name them through sense experience and communication with others, you will certainly refer to colour X as “blue” and to colour Y as “yellow”, even though, were I unexpectedly to experience your sense life, I would call colour X “yellow”, as you saw it.

Nevertheless, to any one observer, each blue object appears one way, each green object, another. Colour, as sound, is a property of material objects, and this is demonstrated by our ability to discourse rationally about it; it is not, in short, an attribute arbitrarily assigned by our minds at random to material objects, but is interpreted consistently as a response to real characteristics of those objects.

Therefore, sound as such is produced by the falling of the tree, although it remain unheard.

I’m not trying to convince believers not to believe.

OK. I’m not really sure what you’re about.

 

[Leela]

But trees do fall when no-one is around! What is unknown is whether or no they make a sound when they do so. I am not imagining the circumstance, but rather am making an inquiry as to one of its particulars.

But really the question is not about trees falling; it is about the nature of sound itself. Is the sound the vibrations themselves, or is the sound our brains’ interpretation of these vibrations as detected by the ears?

I gave you the way that an idealist dissolves the question. The above suggests another way, which I think is how James would answer. If sound is defined as vibrations, then yes. If sound is defined as an interpretation of sense data, then no. I think the Jamesian answer is the best one; however, it gives an answer in terms of semantics that was probably asked in terns of metaphysics (which I have no use for). That’s why I gave a cheeky idealist response to paint the question as no better than asking “if pig’s cold fly, how high would they go?” Well hypothetical pigs and trees can do pretty much anything, can’t they?

I would say that this question and the question of colour resolve themselves in this way: some quality of refraction of light or vibration of air columns by material objects are indeed the things themselves, colour and sound. Let me explain:

The appearance of each colour is predicated upon the sensory faculties of each observer. Nevertheless, since sensation is generally uniform, blue will appear one way to me; colour X which I call “blue” may appear to you such that, were I to see it through your eyes, I should call it colour Y, which I call “yellow”; colour X, furthermore, looks, as interpreted by your senses, as colour X does to mine. Nevertheless, as you have no innate knowledge of the colours themselves, but rather have learnt to name them through sense experience and communication with others, you will certainly refer to colour X as “blue” and to colour Y as “yellow”, even though, were I unexpectedly to experience your sense life, I would call colour X “yellow”, as you saw it.

Nevertheless, to any one observer, each blue object appears one way, each green object, another. Colour, as sound, is a property of material objects, and this is demonstrated by our ability to discourse rationally about it; it is not, in short, an attribute arbitrarily assigned by our minds at random to material objects, but is interpreted consistently as a response to real characteristics of those objects.

Therefore, sound as such is produced by the falling of the tree, although it remain unheard.

As I said I have no use for metaphysics. I see all this talk above about what is and is not interpretation as itself an interpretation.

OK. I’m not really sure what you’re about.

I like to discuss philosophy, and I am also concerned about bigotry toward nonbelievers.

 

[Moonstruck888]

Therefore, sound as such is produced by the falling of the tree, although it remain unheard.

I can assure you as someone who works in psychoacoustics that sound is an observation.

A compression wave will propagate as a function of time that disipates as a function of the square of the radius if a tree falls over, but it does not become a sound until it is observed.

Evidence for this is in that fact that the propagation of a compression wave bears no mathematical resemblence to the subjective experience of hearing a sound. Compression waves propagate as a function of the square of the radius while the subjective experience is logarithmic.

 

[HumbledCatholic]

Moonstruck,

The variability of subjective experience, if you will notice, is accounted for in my logic.

Consistency to one’s own ears, not to everyone else’s, is all that is necessary for the syllogisms to work.

If anything, you’ve given evidence for my assertions, unless you care to explain in something other than English Greek how this works in any way which differs from colours X & Y.

 

[Moonstruck888]

Moonstruck,

The variability of subjective experience, if you will notice, is accounted for in my logic.

Consistency to one’s own ears, not to everyone else’s, is all that is necessary for the syllogisms to work.

If anything, you’ve given evidence for my assertions, unless you care to explain in something other than English Greek how this works in any way which differs from colours X & Y.

I’m not a philosopher so you’d need to eliminate some of the Star Trek terms like Syllogism and English Greek for me. I don’t see what compression waves propogating in air have to do with colours X & Y either, you’d need to be talking about propogating light waves for that to make sense, and how the optical systems in humans work is outside my field.

What I can tell you for certain is that the question on whether sound is an observation or not has been settled. It is an observation. The tree has to be observed for the propogating compression waves to become a sound. Sound is an interpretation of shock fronts of compressed and rarified air that is created by the ear and brain.

We know through experiment that sound is created by computational analysis performed by the brain. For example, if you play someone a series of harmonics over a set of loudspeakers or headphones, we know that the brain will interpolate the fundamental and you’ll hear the fundamental as if it was there.

 

[HumbledCatholic]

Syllogism is a word you ought to have learnt in a philosophy survey course as a first year student at University. If you do not know that word, what in the world are you doing in the philosophy forum?

Now, I understand well enough what your point is. Nevertheless, consider it a little more deeply. Data settle nothing; interpretation of data is what counts.

1. Although the fundamental itself is not played in these experiments, it is consistently added by the healthy listener’s brain.
2. That is to say, although perhaps no one’s interpretation of the compression waves accurately accounts for the wavelengths represented, nevertheless such a consistent and universal error means that our interpretation of sound is objective. Any two healthy listeners hearing those wavelengths will hear the same sound, even if that hearing inaccurately reflects the wavelengths present.
3. This means that our interpretation of sound is actually more objective than the completely hypothetical interpretation of colour which I posited earlier. My reasoning was to prove that as long as each person interprets colours self-consistently within his own mind, this is enough to demonstrate that colour is a objective quality of objects, not just an invention of our mind.
4. What you have demonstrated, however, is that certain waves are consistently interpreted in specific ways by the human mind, and to my mind this settles the matter: sound is primarily objective, not subjective.

 

[Moonstruck888]

Syllogism is a word you ought to have learnt in a philosophy survey course as a first year student at University. If you do not know that word, what in the world are you doing in the philosophy forum?

It never said the forum was for Philosophy Graduates only.

Now, I understand well enough what your point is. Nevertheless, consider it a little more deeply. Data settle nothing; interpretation of data is what counts.

No sir. Compression waves propagating in time settle nothing, interpretation is what counts.

1. Although the fundamental itself is not played in these experiments, it is consistently added by the healthy listener’s brain.

According to current theory. I have heard dissenting opinions on this…

1. That is to say, although perhaps no one’s interpretation of the compression waves accurately accounts for the wavelengths represented, nevertheless such a consistent and universal error means that our interpretation of sound is objective. Any two healthy listeners hearing those wavelengths will hear the same sound, even if that hearing inaccurately reflects the wavelengths present.

Until we learn how to connect two or more people’s thoughts, I don’t see how that can be proven.

1. This means that our interpretation of sound is actually more objective than the completely hypothetical interpretation of colour which I posited earlier. My reasoning was to prove that as long as each person interprets colours self-consistently within his own mind, this is enough to demonstrate that colour is a objective quality of objects, not just an invention of our mind.

Like I said, I’m not an expert on optical and visual processing in humans.

1. What you have demonstrated, however, is that certain waves are consistently interpreted in specific ways by the human mind, and to my mind this settles the matter: sound is primarily objective, not subjective.

It really doesn’t matter whether it is subjective or not. What matters is that a sound is created between the ear and the audio centres of the brain and not in the outside world. Evidence of this is that it is common for people as they age to experience sounds that no one else can hear. Tinitus and musical hallucinations are examples of this.

 

[HumbledCatholic]

It never said the forum was for Philosophy Graduates only.

How can I expect you to communicate meaningfully on a subject whose most fundamental vocabulary you seem to have no interest in learning?

No sir. Compression waves propagating in time settle nothing, interpretation is what counts.

That wasn’t about sound. That was about knowledge.

According to current theory. I have heard dissenting opinions on this…

I’d assumed you’d cited it in such an assured manner because it struck you as truth. I’ve heard dissenting opinions on a lot of things; there’s one in every resolved lawsuit.

Until we learn how to connect two or more people’s thoughts, I don’t see how that can be proven.

The possibility of communication. Notice I never said each individuals phenomenological experience was the same; that is unknowable. Yet, we know that there is most like something constant which our minds are consistently interpreting such that the distinctions we make are communicable to others, even as we do not know how they experience these phenomena.

Like I said, I’m not an expert on optical and visual processing in humans.

The logic doesn’t depend on anything of the kind.

It really doesn’t matter whether it is subjective or not. What matters is that a sound is created between the ear and the audio centres of the brain and not in the outside world. Evidence of this is that it is common for people as they age to experience sounds that no one else can hear. Tinitus and musical hallucinations are examples of this.

Communication is the key to all of this. That is how we connect two minds. What is purely subjective is that which cannot be communicated, for lack of any possible common experience between two minds regarding the phenomenon (such as a hallucination).

 

[Moonstruck888]

I’d assumed you’d cited it in such an assured manner because it struck you as truth. I’ve heard dissenting opinions on a lot of things; there’s one in every resolved lawsuit.

The evidence for it seems pretty compelling. I just thought it would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge that there are other points of view.

The logic doesn’t depend on anything of the kind.

I can only be certain whether your logic is sound (no pun intended) or not if you’re talking about a field that is within my sphere of knowledge.

Communication is the key to all of this. That is how we connect two minds. What is purely subjective is that which cannot be communicated, for lack of any possible common experience between two minds regarding the phenomenon (such as a hallucination).

And we know that it is common for people who’s hearing degenerates to hallucinate sounds that are indistinguishable from those originating when a compression wave strikes the timpanic membrane.

It seems to me that the problem here is simply that you and I don’t agree on what the definition of sound is.