St. Thomas: "Prime Mover"

[JDaniel]

All:

Having put out a challenge to Perplexity, this thread is opened for the purpose of perusing counter-arguments to Aquinas’ First Way for subtleties. I will ask for respect from all of you who wish to participate herein. Since I am the OP, I will be the sub-ultimate judge of what is potentially disastrous to the thread. Of course, our Administrator will always be the ultimate judge. Therefore, (please) do not post posts that are not relevant to the topic.

Below is a pretty good translation of the Prime Mover argument. But, as everyone has ever noticed, it is not fully explanatory in and of itself. (That requires reading a great deal more of the Summa, which I understand many people don’t want to do.) To the best of my ability, I will attempt to explain those things which typically give readers trouble. Of course, you can always challenge my explanation. If you do, I will then show an authoritative source for my explanation. You are invited to do the same.

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” - Summa Theologica, basillica.org

God bless,
jd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

All:

Having put out a challenge to Perplexity, this thread is opened for the purpose of perusing counter-arguments to Aquinas’ First Way for subtleties. I will ask for respect from all of you who wish to participate herein. Since I am the OP, I will be the sub-ultimate judge of what is potentially disastrous to the thread. Of course, our Administrator will always be the ultimate judge. Therefore, (please) do not post posts that are not relevant to the topic.

Two questions. What do you mean by " Perplexity " and by " subtleties? " Any thing in specifically or are you just asking for any type of objection one might have against any part of the proof? There is another thread out there on the First Way. I suppose it is still current but I haven’t looked at it for awhile and there were all kinds of objections raised there. So what are you looking for that would be different than the objections raised there?

 

[JDaniel]

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.”

The above sentence always seems to mystify people unfamiliar with Aquinas’ use of the words, “act” and “potency,” or, “potentiality.” This is largely due to the fact that we are bringing those words out of Latin and into English. I will attempt an explanation here.

“Potency, from the Latin posse (to be able), has the meaning of possibility; and act, from the Latin agere (to act), has as its first meaning to operate. Act, however, is extended to mean any fulfillment or realization in being as well as in action.” - codified from the Summa Theologica, Part I, q. 77, 1, reply 2 (and elsewhere);.

“Act,” then, means in being, i.e. actually existing, and possessing all of the essential stuff needed for a fully formed thing in existence, or, performing an activity.

“Potentiality” has two meanings, which are related and which can be determined by their usage in a sentence. The first one is, "lacking a quality that makes a being to be in act, i.e., complete and fully in being. The second is related to the definition of “motion,” and means the term of a motion. For example, I am in potency to be in my kitchen, in front of my refrigerator. Upon walking to that spot, my motion will achieve “act,” but, until I do that, my motion is in potency.

“Potentiality” has nothing to do with the storage of electrical “potential,” which is a specialized use of the word. This is generally the biggest confusion people run into regarding the word “potential.” “Potency” means that something is lacking, i.e., missing in order that a thing be fully in act, as a child is in potency to be an adult, or an young adult bird is in potency to acquire a mate and build a nest.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Two questions. What do you mean by " Perplexity " and by " subtleties? " Any thing in specifically or are you just asking for any type of objection one might have against any part of the proof? There is another thread out there on the First Way. I suppose it is still current but I haven’t looked at it for awhile and there were all kinds of objections raised there. So what are you looking for that would be different than the objections raised there?

Linus:

Sorry, I should have better explained that. In another thread Perplexity countered my statement “that most objections that I’ve read were either intentional, or unintentional, straw men.” He replied back that perhaps I missed the subtleties in those counter-arguments. And, in all fairness, he could be right. So, this thread is a chance for Perplexity, and anyone else, to pose objections and, of course, subtleties.

I count on your help.

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

I want to argue that the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism, but that the first way provides no reason to accept an unmoved mover rather than an infinite regress of moved movers.

So, a ‘mover’ is just a thing that actualizes something’s potency. It’s called a moved mover if it was caused to actualize something’s potency and an unmoved mover if it wasn’t caused to actualize something’s potency.

But, if a mover wasn’t caused to actualize a potency, why did it do it? There are only two options: (i) for no reason whatsoever, it was just a brute fact, or (ii) because it had to out of necessity. These are the only ways a mover could actualize a potency without being caused to.

I feel I don’t need to explain why the first option isn’t really an option at all, but will do so if prompted. This means that in order for a mover to be ‘unmoved’, it must actualize the potency it does out of necessity: it cannot choose not to actualize the potency.

This raises the interesting question of whether a mover can be moved with respect to one action, but unmoved with respect to another.

Since Aquinas isn’t concerned with just any ol’ mover, but the ‘first’ one, we needn’t dwell on this question. Thomists often emphasize that this first mover shouldn’t be thought of as the first member in a linear series, but rather as simultaneously grounding all the events or causes in a series: causing vertically rather than horizontally.

Since, therefore, we’re not talking about one action in a series of actions after which the mover could be moved, but a simultaneous action, this means the unmoved mover would actualize the potencies it does out of necessity, having no freedom to restrain itself.

For me (and all incompatibilists), this entails that the unmoved mover would have no free-will, and thus couldn’t be a person. Whatever else it would be, it wouldn’t have rationality, beliefs or desires etc. It’d just be some kind of automaton, mechanistically grounding the laws of nature etc.

I don’t see how such a thing could be regarded as a God (who is defined as a person with free-will), and thus its existence would seem to provide atheism with a very good account of the workings of nature. It would undermine theism however since God couldn’t be said to have (i) created anything, nor (ii) intervene in the world, two prominent tenets of Theism. He couldn’t have done these without moving the unmoved mover, which is contradictory.

It would therefore seem that this is not an argument theists should be advocating.

But, is there an unmoved mover?

Well, the argument essentially depends on the claim that the chain of moved movers cannot regress infinitely, a claim I hope to now undermine.

It’s well known that Aquinas didn’t think all infinite regresses were impossible, but rather that a regression of essentially ordered causes was impossible. It is therefore on the Thomist’s shoulders to show that the series of moved movers in our world is an essentially ordered one. This seems effectively undermined by causal overdetermination though, and thus the argument doesn’t seem to provide any reason to think an unmoved mover exists, rather than an infinite regression of moved movers. If I’m wrong about this, the argument undermines theism. Either way.

 

[prodigalson2011]

I want to argue that the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism, but that the first way provides no reason to accept an unmoved mover rather than an infinite regress of moved movers.

Hiya Perp… long time no see. I’m intrigued by this somewhat counterintuitive proposition of yours…

So, a ‘mover’ is just a thing that actualizes something’s potency. It’s called a moved mover if it was caused to actualize something’s potency and an unmoved mover if it wasn’t caused to actualize something’s potency.

I’m with you so far.

But, if a mover wasn’t caused to actualize a potency, why did it do it? There are only two options: (i) for no reason whatsoever, it was just a brute fact, or (ii) because it had to out of necessity. These are the only ways a mover could actualize a potency without being caused to.

The obvious third option is that the unmoved mover possesses free will and did so out of desire. This becomes clearer as we move through the five ways, all of which should be considered together.

I feel I don’t need to explain why the first option isn’t really an option at all, but will do so if prompted. This means that in order for a mover to be ‘unmoved’, it must actualize the potency it does out of necessity: it cannot choose not to actualize the potency.

Again, I think this is false. The first way is inextricable from the other 4 of the popular “5 Ways”, which ultimately culminate in the prime mover’s possession of all perfections, including consciousness and will, which can act on its own without necessity.

This raises the interesting question of whether a mover can be moved with respect to one action, but unmoved with respect to another.

Since Aquinas isn’t concerned with just any ol’ mover, but the ‘first’ one, we needn’t dwell on this question. Thomists often emphasize that this first mover shouldn’t be thought of as the first member in a linear series, but rather as simultaneously grounding all the events or causes in a series: causing vertically rather than horizontally.

Since, therefore, we’re not talking about one action in a series of actions after which the mover could be moved, but a simultaneous action, this means the unmoved mover would actualize the potencies it does out of necessity, having no freedom to restrain itself.

So, I think all I could do at this point is repeat myself, since if my first point is correct, the rest of your argument is derailed along with it.

For me (and all incompatibilists), this entails that the unmoved mover would have no free-will, and thus couldn’t be a person. Whatever else it would be, it wouldn’t have rationality, beliefs or desires etc. It’d just be some kind of automaton, mechanistically grounding the laws of nature etc.

It seems to me that this was an assumption in the premise of your argument, not a conclusion that could be derived from it.

I don’t see how such a thing could be regarded as a God (who is defined as a person with free-will), and thus its existence would seem to provide atheism with a very good account of the workings of nature. It would undermine theism however since God couldn’t be said to have (i) created anything, nor (ii) intervene in the world, two prominent tenets of Theism. He couldn’t have done these without moving the unmoved mover, which is contradictory.

Since God is the unmoved mover, I am utterly baffled by the last sentence here. The whole point of an unmoved mover is that its will is perfectly free, unlike ours, which is conditioned and limited by biology, environment, etc. Please explain how you go from the premise of the unmoved mover to a God who acts on necessity. Why should we not think that the unmoved mover could have refrained from moving anything?

It would therefore seem that this is not an argument theists should be advocating.

Clearly, I disagree

But, is there an unmoved mover?

Well, the argument essentially depends on the claim that the chain of moved movers cannot regress infinitely, a claim I hope to now undermine.

It’s well known that Aquinas didn’t think all infinite regresses were impossible, but rather that a regression of essentially ordered causes was impossible. It is therefore on the Thomist’s shoulders to show that the series of moved movers in our world is an essentially ordered one. This seems effectively undermined by causal overdetermination though, and thus the argument doesn’t seem to provide any reason to think an unmoved mover exists, rather than an infinite regression of moved movers. If I’m wrong about this, the argument undermines theism. Either way.

I think this is a false dilemma. You are dismissing out of hand the idea of secondary causes. As things acquire their own potency, I see no reason to expect that, in a system with a certain amount of freedom, there would not be a collision of causation from time to time. Not only this, but the idea of overdetermination seems sketchy to me at best. It seems to be more of a useful idea than a metaphysical reality. Just because we cannot determine the exact causal order of certain events does not mean that there is not one to be determined.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think if everyone will just read " Aquinas " and " The Last Superstition " by Edward Feser most of the problems can be solved. He especially addresses the question about the possibility of the Prime Mover having " hidden " potentialities. I think it needs a little tweeking. I may contribute more later.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I want to argue that the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism, but that the first way provides no reason to accept an unmoved mover rather than an infinite regress of moved movers.

So, a ‘mover’ is just a thing that actualizes something’s potency. It’s called a moved mover if it was caused to actualize something’s potency and an unmoved mover if it wasn’t caused to actualize something’s potency.

But, if a mover wasn’t caused to actualize a potency, why did it do it? There are only two options: (i) for no reason whatsoever, it was just a brute fact, or (ii) because it had to out of necessity. These are the only ways a mover could actualize a potency without being caused to.

I feel I don’t need to explain why the first option isn’t really an option at all, but will do so if prompted. This means that in order for a mover to be ‘unmoved’, it must actualize the potency it does out of necessity: it cannot choose not to actualize the potency.

This raises the interesting question of whether a mover can be moved with respect to one action, but unmoved with respect to another.

Since Aquinas isn’t concerned with just any ol’ mover, but the ‘first’ one, we needn’t dwell on this question. Thomists often emphasize that this first mover shouldn’t be thought of as the first member in a linear series, but rather as simultaneously grounding all the events or causes in a series: causing vertically rather than horizontally.

Since, therefore, we’re not talking about one action in a series of actions after which the mover could be moved, but a simultaneous action, this means the unmoved mover would actualize the potencies it does out of necessity, having no freedom to restrain itself.

For me (and all incompatibilists), this entails that the unmoved mover would have no free-will, and thus couldn’t be a person. Whatever else it would be, it wouldn’t have rationality, beliefs or desires etc. It’d just be some kind of automaton, mechanistically grounding the laws of nature etc.

I don’t see how such a thing could be regarded as a God (who is defined as a person with free-will), and thus its existence would seem to provide atheism with a very good account of the workings of nature. It would undermine theism however since God couldn’t be said to have (i) created anything, nor (ii) intervene in the world, two prominent tenets of Theism. He couldn’t have done these without moving the unmoved mover, which is contradictory.

It would therefore seem that this is not an argument theists should be advocating.

But, is there an unmoved mover?

Well, the argument essentially depends on the claim that the chain of moved movers cannot regress infinitely, a claim I hope to now undermine.

It’s well known that Aquinas didn’t think all infinite regresses were impossible, but rather that a regression of essentially ordered causes was impossible. It is therefore on the Thomist’s shoulders to show that the series of moved movers in our world is an essentially ordered one. This seems effectively undermined by causal overdetermination though, and thus the argument doesn’t seem to provide any reason to think an unmoved mover exists, rather than an infinite regression of moved movers. If I’m wrong about this, the argument undermines theism. Either way.

I think you should take a look at Question 3 of the S.T.

 

[John_Martin]

For me (and all incompatibilists), this entails that the unmoved mover would have no free-will, and thus couldn’t be a person. Whatever else it would be, it wouldn’t have rationality, beliefs or desires etc. It’d just be some kind of automaton, mechanistically grounding the laws of nature etc.

In Thomas, Will is not the same as Free Will - Free will has to do with the choice of means to an end. It is the Reason that thinks about options to achieve what is Willed and then chooses (freely) one of the options. The Will is concerned, however with what is known and desired (or loved), and is not a matter of choice. If it is known as good, beautiful, or true, it is desired / Willed.
Since God is fully in ACT, he knows already, without need of reason,
and what he knows he “speaks”, and what he “speaks” IS, and all simultaneously. He is the first cause or first mover, not because he temporally pushes something until at a later time it is fully in motion, but because he is the “source” of the object that is “moved”. The object was created “in motion”, if I might say it that way.
God knows now, loves now, so he is “speaking” now, and Willing now.

John Martin

 

[JDaniel]

I want to argue that the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism, but that the first way provides no reason to accept an unmoved mover rather than an infinite regress of moved movers.

Perplexity:

Now, you do realize that no aggregation of finite entities can ever equal an infinity. David Hilbert, the mathematician, has a proof for this. So, there is no such thing as an actual physical infinity. It’s impossible – except in your imagination. And, you do realize why, right? So, go on with your proof of an actual infinity.

So, a ‘mover’ is just a thing that actualizes something’s potency.

What does this mean? To put it into local motion terms, take a cue ball on a pool table. While it is sitting in one spot, say, against the left-hand rail, it is in act as a billiard ball against the left rail, but, it is in potency to be somewhere (anywhere) else on the table, or on the floor, or in my hand, or in my pocket, or in one of the pockets of the pool table – if I scratch. But, a cue ball is a “mover.” It is known as the mover of the other balls on the table. And, in turn, any of those other balls can become a sub-mover if I were to make a combination shot. IOW, any mobile being is in potency to become a mover of some sort.

It’s called a moved mover if it was caused to actualize something’s potency

That is true, although it might find itself in a carton that never gets sold. So, a billiard ball may never move anything else. Now, only the parts (particles) of the ball can corrupt such that, in a thousand years, it may crumble into dust. These are parts inside of parts. Also, as we know, all pool balls are spinning around the earth with their proximate surface, once every 24 hours and hurtling through space. In each case, the pool ball is being moved by another mover that is *in act]/I].

and an unmoved

mover if it wasn’t caused to actualize something’s potency.

That exception is precisely that: an exception. It is probably inordinately rare, but, I suppose a mobile being that never moves any other mobile being could, by extending the definition, be called an “unmoved” mover. But, as you can see from my example immediately above, I can’t even imagine what that might be. Except God.

A “moved mover” is like you or me, for example: we move and, in turn, we move other mobile beings. A true unmoved mover can only be God. He cannot move, but can move all else by his Will, or perhaps an algorithm.

But, if a mover wasn’t caused to actualize a potency, why

did it do it?

There is no rule or law that requires a mobile being to move any other mobile being. It will simply always have that potentiality – at least until it corrupts into dust. But, of course, then its parts are moving each other and the whole.

There are only two options: (i) for no reason whatsoever, it was just a brute fact, or (ii) because it had to out of necessity. These are the only ways a mover could actualize a potency without being caused to.

(It would be helpful if you would not draw your own conclusions before I’ve had a chance to respond, and you’ve had a chance to read and digest my responses. Conclusions like this would perhaps be best handled in question form. You see, your conclusions are about to become actualized into irrelevancy!)

Rule No. 1 (derived from St. Thomas’ First Way) No mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so. Unless you can think of one? Which one would it be? Oh, that’s right, “God” – unless we regress backward infinitely, which we can’t do.

I feel I don’t need to explain why the first option isn’t really an option at all, but will do so if prompted. This means that in order for a mover to be ‘unmoved’, it must actualize the potency it does out of necessity: it cannot choose not to actualize the potency.

(Again, you have drawn a conclusion prior to my response which would allow you a better grasp of reality.)

As I mentioned, the only Unmoved Mover is God. Why? Because He has no parts, nor any parts inside of parts. How, then, can He move mobile beings? He moves mobile beings through his Will. Hence, he is NOT participating in anything akin to an “act of the potential precisely as potential.” (This happens to be the best definition of “motion” I have ever come across – unless you have a better one.)

This raises the interesting question of whether a mover can be moved with respect to one action, but unmoved with respect to another.

Yes, that is an interesting question. And the answer is: “of course.” A priori we notice that billiard balls move other billiard balls and, if thrown real hard, knock men out. But, they do NOT reproduce themselves.

Since Aquinas isn’t concerned with just any ol’ mover, but the ‘first’ one, we needn’t dwell on this question.

Actually, St. Thomas was concerned with all movers. That is the only way he could ever have come to the conclusion that there cannot be an infinite regress of essentially subordinated movers.

continued . . .*

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

Thomists often emphasize that this first mover shouldn’t be thought of as the first member in a linear series, but rather as simultaneously grounding all the events or causes in a series: causing vertically rather than horizontally.

It’s from the start Heaven down. Then it may be linear, as subordinate movers move mobile beings.

Since, therefore, we’re not talking about one action in a series of actions after which the mover could be moved, but a simultaneous action, this means the unmoved mover would actualize the potencies it does out of necessity, having no freedom to restrain itself.

Well, I’m not good with your premise, but, your conclusion is fine. God instantaneously and simultaneously moves all mobile being – instantaneously and simultaneously. Those are the important concepts.

For me (and all incompatibilists), this entails that the unmoved mover would have no free-will

I can’t imagine why. Of course he can! You are anthropomorphizing God. You are saying that he must be a compatibilist or an incompatibilist… We are one or the other precise because of our view of God’s causation. But, that doesn’t mean he is constrained in that way. Remember, we only have complete authority over our intentions. Our physical actions contain no morality. All that may be is that they are accompanied by immoral intentions.

and thus couldn’t be a person. /

God is NOT a person.

QUOTE] Whatever else it would be, it wouldn’t have rationality, beliefs or desires etc. It’d just be some kind of automaton, mechanistically grounding the laws of nature etc.

This is not correct. It is my opinion, and that of the Church’s, that God causes EVERYTHING physical. The absolute exception is sin, which exists only in the internationalities of man.

I don’t see how such a thing could be regarded as a God (who is defined as a person with free-will),

I’m sorry, Who defines God as a “person?” Perhaps you could point out a referent?

and thus its existence would seem to provide atheism with a very good account of the workings of nature.

That’s a huge leap, and also a sign of muddied thinking.

It would undermine theism however since God couldn’t be said to have (i) created anything, nor (ii) intervene in the world, two prominent tenets of Theism. He couldn’t have done these without moving the unmoved mover, which is contradictory.

You are confused: He is the Unmoved Mover. His act(s) of efficient causality proceed directly from his Will. That requires no parts, or parts inside of parts.

It would therefore seem that this is not an argument theists should be advocating.

I hate to tell you this, but, they can and do!

But, is there an unmoved mover?

Yes.

Well, the argument essentially depends on the claim that the chain of moved movers cannot regress infinitely, a claim I hope to now undermine.

I will wait and breathe.

It’s well known that Aquinas didn’t think all infinite regresses were impossible,

Please provide a source for this assertion. One will suffice.

but rather that a regression of essentially ordered causes was impossible.

(More signs of muddied thinking.) You do realize you are now crossing over into the 2nd Way?

You are missing an important word. It is NOT, “‘essentially [ordered] causes’. It is “essentially subordinated causes.” Can you see that there is a huge difference?

It is therefore on the Thomist’s shoulders to show that the series of moved movers in our world is an essentially ordered one. This seems effectively undermined by causal overdetermination though, and thus the argument doesn’t seem to provide any reason to think an unmoved mover exists, rather than an infinite regression of moved movers.

So, someone was able to prove an actual physical infinity, I take it?

If I’m wrong about this, the argument undermines theism. Either way.

Not so, as you should now be better able to see.

God bless,
jd

 

[Perplexity]

Hiya Perp… long time no see. I’m intrigued by this somewhat counterintuitive proposition of yours…

I try to keep you guys entertained

The obvious third option is that the unmoved mover possesses free will and did so out of desire. This becomes clearer as we move through the five ways, all of which should be considered together.

You agreed that an unmoved mover is a thing that actualizes something’s potency without being caused to do so. Accordingly, as Aquinas says, this mover couldn’t have moved itself, nor could anything else have moved it. So, why then did it act? Nothing caused it to, not itself nor anything else. I’m not sure how free-will would be a third option unless it involved self-movement or a combination of self-movement with external causation which Aquinas discounts.

However, suppose I’m wrong and free-will is a legitimate third option that deserves to be explored. Then at this point in the dialectic we have no more reason to think this unmoved mover has free-will than that it’s a mechanistic automaton. While the other four ways might change this, we haven’t gotten to those yet. So, your appealing to the four ways to show that the unmoved mover has free-will would be like me appealing to atheistic arguments to show that this first mover isn’t God, since the latter doesn’t exist.

Since God is the unmoved mover, I am utterly baffled by the last sentence here. The whole point of an unmoved mover is that its will is perfectly free, unlike ours, which is conditioned and limited by biology, environment, etc. Please explain how you go from the premise of the unmoved mover to a God who acts on necessity. Why should we not think that the unmoved mover could have refrained from moving anything?

At this point in the argument, I’ve assumed that I succeeded in showing that God couldn’t be the unmoved mover, precisely because God would have free-will whereas this thing wouldn’t. The reason this unmoved mover couldn’t restrain itself from acting is because the only way it could actualize a potency without being caused to do so is if it had to out of necessity. Process of elimination (a.k.a. disjunctive syllogism): it either actualizes the potency completely randomly, or it necessarily has to. Any other option involves it being caused to actualize the potency (thus being a moved-mover), or self-motion (an impossibility).

I think this is a false dilemma. You are dismissing out of hand the idea of secondary causes. As things acquire their own potency, I see no reason to expect that, in a system with a certain amount of freedom, there would not be a collision of causation from time to time. Not only this, but the idea of overdetermination seems sketchy to me at best. It seems to be more of a useful idea than a metaphysical reality. Just because we cannot determine the exact causal order of certain events does not mean that there is not one to be determined.

I’m not sure how I’ve dismissed secondary causation. The reason why the existence of an unmoved mover that wasn’t God would undermine theism is that theism involves at least two claims that would be false if God wasn’t the unmoved mover:

1. God freely created the world.
2. God has freely periodically intervened in the world.

Given my argument, if the unmoved mover grounded the reduction of God’s active potency to create or to intervene in the world, it did so out of necessity. Therefore, God couldn’t have chosen not to create, or to refrain from intervening, thus neither of these actions would be free.

As far as overdetermination goes, the link I provided described firing-squads as examples of overdetermination: that doesn’t sound unrealistic to me. But, suppose there is no good reason to endorse causal overdetermination. It would still be the case that the Thomist has to show that the series of moved movers in our world is essentially ordered, otherwise, we’ve been given no reason to think the series of moved movers in our world cannot regress infinitely.

 

[Perplexity]

Perplexity:

Now, you do realize that no aggregation of finite entities can ever equal an infinity. David Hilbert, the mathematician, has a proof for this. So, there is no such thing as an actual physical infinity. It’s impossible – except in your imagination. And, you do realize why, right? So, go on with your proof of an actual infinity.

My claim was that the First Way provides no reason to think an unmoved mover exists rather than an infinite regression of moved movers. So, even if Hilbert managed to prove that actual infinites couldn’t exist, this wouldn’t effect my claim.

Having said that, Hilbert did not convince the mathematical or philosophical communities of the impossibility of actual infinites. Like all philosophical subjects, this one is highly controversial with heavy weights on either side.

(It would be helpful if you would not draw your own conclusions before I’ve had a chance to respond, and you’ve had a chance to read and digest my responses. Conclusions like this would perhaps be best handled in question form. You see, your conclusions are about to become actualized into irrelevancy!)

Sorry, generally when you present an argument you show all the premises and the conclusions that would follow from them. It’s then the opponent’s job to show why the premises are false or unjustified.

Rule No. 1 (derived from St. Thomas’ First Way) No mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so. Unless you can think of one? Which one would it be? Oh, that’s right, “God” – unless we regress backward infinitely, which we can’t do.

The claims that ‘no mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so’ and ‘some mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so’ are logically contradictory: they cannot both be true.

As I mentioned, the only Unmoved Mover is God. Why? Because He has no parts, nor any parts inside of parts. How, then, can He move mobile beings? He moves mobile beings through his Will. Hence, he is NOT participating in anything akin to an “act of the potential precisely as potential.” (This happens to be the best definition of “motion” I have ever come across – unless you have a better one.)

I’ve argued that God couldn’t be the unmoved mover because the former would have free-will whereas the latter wouldn’t. Thus, God’s being utterly simple doesn’t mean he’s the unmoved mover. It still needs to be shown that the unmoved mover would have free-will.

Actually, St. Thomas was concerned with all movers. That is the only way he could ever have come to the conclusion that there cannot be an infinite regress of essentially subordinated movers.

This is fair, I should revise and say we’re concerned with what actions the first mover would do.

I can’t imagine why. Of course he can! You are anthropomorphizing God. You are saying that he must be a compatibilist or an incompatibilist… We are one or the other precise because of our view of God’s causation. But, that doesn’t mean he is constrained in that way. Remember, we only have complete authority over our intentions. Our physical actions contain no morality. All that may be is that they are accompanied by immoral intentions.

Incompatibilism is a metaphysical thesis about free-will per se. It’s not about free-will in human creatures etc. (and thus cannot be an anthropomorphism). Thus, an incompatibilist would extend her belief even to God. Incompatibilism says that free-will is incompatible with determinism. Since, I’ve argued that the unmoved mover’s actions would be determined by necessity, it would follow that incompatibilists would deny that this thing had free-will.

I’m sorry, Who defines God as a “person?” Perhaps you could point out a referent?

Sure, here’s one: “I take the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equivalent to ‘there exists necessarily a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and the creator of all things’.” - Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. p. 7.

As far as Aquinas on infinite regressions, he didn’t think it could be shown by reason that the world began, he thought it was possible (by reason) that the world regressed infinitely.

Finally, as far as whether I was crossing over into the second way: Aquinas’ argument against infinite regression is the same in both. An essentially ordered series cannot regress infinitely. That’s well and good, but is the series of moved movers ordered essentially?

 

[prodigalson2011]

You agreed that an unmoved mover is a thing that actualizes something’s potency without being caused to do so. Accordingly, as Aquinas says, this mover couldn’t have moved itself, nor could anything else have moved it. So, why then did it act? Nothing caused it to, not itself nor anything else. I’m not sure how free-will would be a third option unless it involved self-movement or a combination of self-movement with external causation which Aquinas discounts.

I think you are mistaken in this conclusion. Aquinas does not say that the unmoved mover does not cause itself to act. His exact words (well… the English translation thereof) are: “seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover,*** put in motion by no other***; and this everyone understands to be God.”

So it seems to me the entire gist of the argument is that the prime mover is immune, so to speak, to outside influence, whereas all subsequent movers are contingent upon it. The causal chain cannot extend infinitely, or nothing would ever be moved.

However, suppose I’m wrong and free-will is a legitimate third option that deserves to be explored. Then at this point in the dialectic we have no more reason to think this unmoved mover has free-will than that it’s a mechanistic automaton. While the other four ways might change this, we haven’t gotten to those yet. So, your appealing to the four ways to show that the unmoved mover has free-will would be like me appealing to atheistic arguments to show that this first mover isn’t God, since the latter doesn’t exist.

Fair enough. I was only pointing out that, just as the 5 Ways are not a complete argument for the Judeo-Christian God, neither is each individual way a complete argument for the theistic God. The 5 Ways are really, in essence, one.

At this point in the argument, I’ve assumed that I succeeded in showing that God couldn’t be the unmoved mover, precisely because God would have free-will whereas this thing wouldn’t. The reason this unmoved mover couldn’t restrain itself from acting is because the only way it could actualize a potency without being caused to do so is if it had to out of necessity. Process of elimination (a.k.a. disjunctive syllogism): it either actualizes the potency completely randomly, or it necessarily has to. Any other option involves it being caused to actualize the potency (thus being a moved-mover), or self-motion (an impossibility).

I think you’re misinterpreting the basic premise of the argument. Again, Aquinas only argues that the prime mover is immune to external causation, and I don’t see any reason to think that self-motion would be an impossibility for the prime mover.

I’m not sure how I’ve dismissed secondary causation.

By expecting the causal chain to appear “orderly” back to the prime mover. In terms of pure cosmology, I would argue that it increasingly does appear just as such. However, taking human beings as the ultimate example, secondary causation creates an intricate and seemingly chaotic web of events. In that respect, the only way we would expect to see a chain such as you posit is on the basis of determinism. The introduction of life, and especially human wills, into this system necessarily muddles that chain. So, if anything, I think you’ve provided a better basis for refuting determinism than Thomism.

The reason why the existence of an unmoved mover that wasn’t God would undermine theism is that theism involves at least two claims that would be false if God wasn’t the unmoved mover:

1. God freely created the world.

1. God has freely periodically intervened in the world.

Given my argument, if the unmoved mover grounded the reduction of God’s active potency to create or to intervene in the world, it did so out of necessity. Therefore, God couldn’t have chosen not to create, or to refrain from intervening, thus neither of these actions would be free.

Right. Only I think your argument is wrong.

As far as overdetermination goes, the link I provided described firing-squads as examples of overdetermination: that doesn’t sound unrealistic to me. But, suppose there is no good reason to endorse causal overdetermination. It would still be the case that the Thomist has to show that the series of moved movers in our world is essentially ordered, otherwise, we’ve been given no reason to think the series of moved movers in our world cannot regress infinitely.

That example illustrates my point even better. Though we might not be able to determine which bullet was ultimately responsible for the death of the executed (the final straw or fatal shot, so to speak), it does not follow that one did not deliver the “final blow.” In fact, I think it’s almost entirely certain that one of them did, whether by piercing just the right nerve or stopping just the right organ or what have you, ultimately end his life.

As I argued above, I think the complexity of secondary causes in our universe, and especially that of human beings, undermines your claim for a necessity of essential order.

 

[Perplexity]

I think you are mistaken in this conclusion. Aquinas does not say that the unmoved mover does not cause itself to act. His exact words (well… the English translation thereof) are: “seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover,*** put in motion by no other***; and this everyone understands to be God.”

You’re right, he did argue for a prime mover that was immune from external causation. But, this doesn’t mean it put itself in motion, since self-motion is in Aquinas’ own words “impossible.” The only viable option left, therefore, is that this thing is in motion by necessity: not by self or external movement.

Aquinas says in the first way:

“Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.”

This is what you’re saying the unmoved mover could do: without external stimuli to initiate the actualization of its potency to choose, the unmoved mover would need to actualize that potency itself. Since “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality”, it would need to be actually choosing when it actualizes its potency to choose. That is, while it’s in the state of potentially choosing, it would be actually choosing. This is precisely what Aquinas labels ‘impossible’.

By expecting the causal chain to appear “orderly” back to the prime mover. In terms of pure cosmology, I would argue that it increasingly does appear just as such. However, taking human beings as the ultimate example, secondary causation creates an intricate and seemingly chaotic web of events. In that respect, the only way we would expect to see a chain such as you posit is on the basis of determinism. The introduction of life, and especially human wills, into this system necessarily muddles that chain. So, if anything, I think you’ve provided a better basis for refuting determinism than Thomism.

That example illustrates my point even better. Though we might not be able to determine which bullet was ultimately responsible for the death of the executed (the final straw or fatal shot, so to speak), it does not follow that one did not deliver the “final blow.” In fact, I think it’s almost entirely certain that one of them did, whether by piercing just the right nerve or stopping just the right organ or what have you, ultimately end his life.

As I argued above, I think the complexity of secondary causes in our universe, and especially that of human beings, undermines your claim for a necessity of essential order.

Are you arguing that if this unmoved mover behaved purely out of necessity, we wouldn’t expect to see the ‘muddiness’ of the secondary causes generated by human wills etc.?

I’m just trying to figure out which claim of mine you’re addressing, because I’ve never advocated an essential order. Rather, I said the only way Aquinas’ objection to an infinite regression of moved movers can succeed is if the series of moved movers is essentially ordered. If it’s not (which you seem to be suggesting), then Aquinas’ objection fails, and my sub-thesis stands: the first way provides no better reason to believe in an unmoved mover than an infinite regression of moved movers.

 

[JDaniel]

My claim was that the First Way provides no reason to think an unmoved mover exists rather than an infinite regression of moved movers. So, even if Hilbert managed to prove that actual infinites couldn’t exist, this wouldn’t effect my claim.

Yes it certainly would. It would require that either Aquinas’ proof stands or there is another viable alternative to replace the charade of an infinite regress. You will read below, one of St. Thomas’ statements concerning “infinity.” His referent to infinite regression was his entire philosophical concept and physics concept of “infinity.” Anti-Aquinas straw men are abundant, as I said.

Having said that, Hilbert did not convince the mathematical or philosophical communities of the impossibility of actual infinites.

Actually, yes he did, and he wasn’t the first. That’s why you see mathematicians asserting “sets” as though they are somehow not unadulterated reifications. A reasonable person asks to be shown an actual infinity and what we are shown is a pair of brackets, 3 real number-line numbers, 3 commas, and the alpha letter “n”. That’s not an actual infinity! There’s nothing ontological about it at all. It’s nothing more than a sign for an uncountable and unachievable mathematical abstraction.

Like all philosophical subjects, this one is highly controversial with heavy weights on either side.

I have an inkling that you are now resorting to unsubstantiatable assertions. Point me to one of these “heavy weights.” (I told you I would do my best to substantiate all of my assertions. Now, I’m not expecting you to do likewise, but, it would be nice if you would do so on rather material assertions.)

The claims that ‘no mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so’ and ‘some mover actualizes a potency without itself being moved to do so’ are logically contradictory: they cannot both be true.

They are contradictory in the same way as the US Tax Code is based upon “voluntary compliance.” (If you call the IRS and ask them what it means, they’ll tell you it is like stopping at a red light. But, that is such a stupid answer!)) My subtlety is, we are left with no other ontological alternative. And, just because we’ve taken the liberty to permit this one apparent contradiction, does not mean that all other contradictions are now admissible. We permit this one because we can’t see past its surface of last scattering.

I’ve argued that God couldn’t be the unmoved mover because the former would have free-will whereas the latter wouldn’t.

Unsuccessfully, I might add. So, your point is without merit.

And, you still need to show where and how you supposedly successfully argued that point. Merely stating it repetitively, does not equal success.

Here, you keep referring to a “former” and a “latter.” Who or what are they supposed to be? They have no referents, that I have seen - and neither have others. What are their referents?

Thus, God’s being utterly simple doesn’t mean he’s the unmoved mover. It still needs to be shown that the unmoved mover would have free-will.

You are again, very confused. That which is without parts cannot move itself. That’s not a naked assertion. That’s a brute fact.

As far as the unmoved mover having free will, simple logic gets you there, and you know the logic.

This is fair, I should revise and say we’re concerned with what actions the first mover would do.

Incompatibilism is a metaphysical thesis about free-will per se. It’s not about free-will in human creatures etc. (and thus cannot be an anthropomorphism). Thus, an incompatibilist would extend her belief even to God. Incompatibilism says that free-will is incompatible with determinism. Since, I’ve argued that the unmoved mover’s actions would be determined by necessity, it would follow that incompatibilists would deny that this thing had free-will.

I never cease to be amazed at how recklessly the word “metaphysical” is bandied about. “Incompatibilism” is simply the antithesis of “compatibilism.” In your use it is an anthropomorphism precisely because it is all about the wills of men – not dogs, or cats, or dinosaurs.

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

Sure, here’s one: “I take the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equivalent to ‘there exists necessarily a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and the creator of all things’.” - Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. p. 7.

God: “(in Christianity and other monotheistic religions) the creator and ruler of the universe and source of all moral authority; the supreme being.” – Oxford English Dictionary – online

Person: “a human being regarded as an individual.” – Ibid.

As I initially pointed out: “straw men” all over the place, plus now, “equivocation!”

As far as Aquinas on infinite regressions, he didn’t think it could be shown by reason that the world began, he thought it was possible (by reason) that the world regressed infinitely.

ONLY because he was not sure he could show that the world was absolutely not infinite. But this is his total stance:
“I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.” – Summa Theologica, I, q. 7, a. 2.
You need to understand that by “relative infinity,” St. Thomas is talking about “potential infinity,” i.e., “possible infinity.” Possible infinity is an indeterminate number that could, if continuously added to, or subtracted from, reach to “infinity.” That’s the most he would commit himself to, because he thought that all matter had a determined form, Anything with a determined form could not be infinite. Perplexity, you should to read St. Thomas rather than making baseless assertions based on hearsay.

Finally, as far as whether I was crossing over into the second way: Aquinas’ argument against infinite regression is the same in both. An essentially ordered series cannot regress infinitely. That’s well and good, but is the series of moved movers ordered essentially?

Again, he has never said “essentially ‘ordered.’” He said, “essentially subordinated.” Straw men are all around us.

Furthermore, even though both arguments “sound” the same, because their “subjects” are different, they are not. “Causes” are inferable and more akin to forms while “motion” is countable and is more akin to “number.” And, we are not concerned with an infinity of causes, as the First Way only deals with motion and, hence, mobile beings. Ours is a problem not of so-called transcendental or metaphysical multitude but of predicamental, or countable, multitude and magnitude, i.e., the quantitative infinite. Such a predicamental or quantitative infinite, as Aquinas and I have argued, can only be potential in character. Arguments against the actual infinity of predicamental multitude and magnitude are convincingly clear, e.g., the finite character of any quantity, and determinate goal of any motion, and the system we can discover in any part of our universe

God bless,
jd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I try to keep you guys entertained

You agreed that an unmoved mover is a thing that actualizes something’s potency without being caused to do so. Accordingly, as Aquinas says, this mover couldn’t have moved itself, nor could anything else have moved it. So, why then did it act? Nothing caused it to, not itself nor anything else. I’m not sure how free-will would be a third option unless it involved self-movement or a combination of self-movement with external causation which Aquinas discounts.

However, suppose I’m wrong and free-will is a legitimate third option that deserves to be explored. Then at this point in the dialectic we have no more reason to think this unmoved mover has free-will than that it’s a mechanistic automaton. While the other four ways might change this, we haven’t gotten to those yet. So, your appealing to the four ways to show that the unmoved mover has free-will would be like me appealing to atheistic arguments to show that this first mover isn’t God, since the latter doesn’t exist.

At this point in the argument, I’ve assumed that I succeeded in showing that God couldn’t be the unmoved mover, precisely because God would have free-will whereas this thing wouldn’t. The reason this unmoved mover couldn’t restrain itself from acting is because the only way it could actualize a potency without being caused to do so is if it had to out of necessity. Process of elimination (a.k.a. disjunctive syllogism): it either actualizes the potency completely randomly, or it necessarily has to. Any other option involves it being caused to actualize the potency (thus being a moved-mover), or self-motion (an impossibility).

I’m not sure how I’ve dismissed secondary causation. The reason why the existence of an unmoved mover that wasn’t God would undermine theism is that theism involves at least two claims that would be false if God wasn’t the unmoved mover:

1. God freely created the world.
2. God has freely periodically intervened in the world.

Given my argument, if the unmoved mover grounded the reduction of God’s active potency to create or to intervene in the world, it did so out of necessity. Therefore, God couldn’t have chosen not to create, or to refrain from intervening, thus neither of these actions would be free.

As far as overdetermination goes, the link I provided described firing-squads as examples of overdetermination: that doesn’t sound unrealistic to me. But, suppose there is no good reason to endorse causal overdetermination. It would still be the case that the Thomist has to show that the series of moved movers in our world is essentially ordered, otherwise, we’ve been given no reason to think the series of moved movers in our world cannot regress infinitely.

I hate to disabuse your conclusions but you haven’t proved a single point yet except that you don’t understand much about Thomistic Philosophy except what you have perhaps picked up from some " antognist " and we all know how objective they are.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

May I intrude? The key to understanding the First way is to realize that the Unmoved mover by that fact is Actus Purus, It is a Being, and it is pure Actuality, having no potentiality whatsoever, either " internally " nor ontologically. If everone would just do as I suggested you would see that. Or you could actually read futher on into Question 3 in the S.T. where Thomas is explaining the Nature of God. He shows that God is absolutly simple ( i.e. Actus Purus,), whose essence is identical with his existence, who is One ( i.e. there is only One God), then you can read futher into all the following Questions and you will find that God acts Freely, under no necessity, out of His Divine Goodness, that He is a Person ( the godhead resides in the Father not by nature but logically), that He has a Will and an Intellect, is Love, Good, Just, Merciful, is the effecient, final, and ordering cause of all creation and the final end of all of creation. But you have to read!!! You have to study!!!

Anyway, the Unmoved Mover is Pure Actuality because there is no potential in It. There is no potential because It is Unmoved. Think about it. For eternity in the past It was Unmoved, It is Unmoved now, It will be Unmoved for eternity into the future. And all this eternity It was, is, and will be the Unmoved Mover for every conceivable kind of motion, change, impulse, including chemical reactions, thoughts etc. If it has been, is now, and will be so Unmoved it is because it has never had, does not have, and never will have any potency whatsoever. Period!!!. And that is why it is Pure Actuality. And all Christians recognize a Being with this attribute as God. And as I said, Thomas will go on from there to discuss in detail all the things I said above. And while you are reading you can just replace the word " God " with " Unmoved Mover , " " First Cause , " First Being, " " Necessary Being, " or " Orderer and Final End of Creation just as you please and the result, while not very spiritual or religious will be just as True.

 

[norain]

Perplexity,

I think you brought up a good question, but the answer is not in the moved/mover continuum, but the question of will and the will that is so-called free.

Rational creatures are not really free to do things on their own. I can have a choice between paper or plastic, but the choice I make is constrained to what paper or plastic means in the grand scheme of things. A truly “free” will is one that is not constrained, and a will that is not constrained is a random act, which is not a willful act!

God cannot sin because He is constrained to do the right thing. Fortunately, the right thing to do is precisely his nature. He cannot contradict himself.

When we have “will”, this will goes only so far as to try to imitate the perfection that is God. To act precisely like God is to be, well, God.

I have pondered myself if God has cognitive ability. Cognition necessitates the capacity to learn new things, which is impossible for an omniscient. He’s not exactly a robot either, for He does not follow someone else’s order, just his own.

The path to enlightenment is riddled with bad choices. To fully be able to separate good from bad is the perfection that is God.

We do not really have free will. We are simply constrained to try to choose rightly every time. The perfection of sentience is God.

“Not my will, but your will be done, on earth as it is in Heaven.”

So in short, you’re asking the wrong question.