St. Thomas: "Prime Mover"

[Perplexity]

Yes it certainly would. It would require that either Aquinas’ proof stands or there is another viable alternative to replace the charade of an infinite regress. You will read below, one of St. Thomas’ statements concerning “infinity.” His referent to infinite regression was his entire philosophical concept and physics concept of “infinity.” Anti-Aquinas straw men are abundant, as I said.

Recall that the claim you’re disagreeing with is that the First Way itself provides no more reason to believe in an unmoved mover than an infinite regression of moved movers. How do you refute this claim? By waving in Hilbert’s direction. Even if Hilbert’s arguments saved Aquinas’ claims it would still be the case that his argument wasn’t good enough by itself, and required help. I think Michael Tooley has given good arguments for the existence of actual infinites btw.

Actually, yes he did, and he wasn’t the first. That’s why you see mathematicians asserting “sets” as though they are somehow not unadulterated reifications. A reasonable person asks to be shown an actual infinity and what we are shown is a pair of brackets, 3 real number-line numbers, 3 commas, and the alpha letter “n”. That’s not an actual infinity! There’s nothing ontological about it at all. It’s nothing more than a sign for an uncountable and unachievable mathematical abstraction.

You later say you have an inkling that I’m resorting to unsubstantiated assertions and I must say your claim above gives me that same inkling. Could you really demonstrate that Hilbert convinced the mathematical and philosophical communities of the impossibility of actual infinites?

As far as heavy weights that haven’t been convinced by Hilbert: Michael Tooley, Alexander Pruss, Richard Gale, Colin Howson, Graham Oppy and J.L. Mackie. May as well throw Richard Swinburne in there as well.

They are contradictory in the same way as the US Tax Code is based upon “voluntary compliance.” (If you call the IRS and ask them what it means, they’ll tell you it is like stopping at a red light. But, that is such a stupid answer!)) My subtlety is, we are left with no other ontological alternative. And, just because we’ve taken the liberty to permit this one apparent contradiction, does not mean that all other contradictions are now admissible. We permit this one because we can’t see past its surface of last scattering.

There are very, very few knock down arguments in philosophy, but if your argument contains or entails a logical contradiction, we thereby have a knock down case against it.

And, you still need to show where and how you supposedly successfully argued that point. Merely stating it repetitively, does not equal success.

As I explained, we deduce that the unmoved mover would be a mechanistic automaton by process of elimination: because an unmoved mover, by definition, cannot be caused (by itself or by anything else) to actualize the potency it does, its actualization of the potency is either a completely random event, or necessitated by its own nature (I’ve explained why these are the only two options in my posts to prodigalson). But, it couldn’t be a completely random event. Therefore, the unmoved mover actualizes the potency it does out of necessity. Since the actions of the unmoved mover would be simultaneous, anything it does is out of necessity. It therefore would have no free-will, and couldn’t be God.

You are again, very confused. That which is without parts cannot move itself. That’s not a naked assertion. That’s a brute fact.

As I’ve shown, the unmoved mover cannot be identified with God, whether or not God is utterly simple.

I never cease to be amazed at how recklessly the word “metaphysical” is bandied about. “Incompatibilism” is simply the antithesis of “compatibilism.” In your use it is an anthropomorphism precisely because it is all about the wills of men – not dogs, or cats, or dinosaurs.

Incompatibilism is a thesis about free-will per se, regardless of whether that’s in God, a human or a cat. You say it’s just about the wills of men. I don’t know what else to say to this except that it’s contradicted by every definition and usage of incompatibilism out there.

You say that my definitions of God and person are straw-men and equivocations.

This is like me saying Aquinas’ definitions of act, potency and motion are straw-manned equivocations since they contradict the dictionarie’s definitions of them (which they do). The field of philosophy, like any academic field, gets to assign technical meanings to words, and that’s what the philosophy of religion has done with God and metaphysics has done with person. Biology did this with ‘life’, cosmology did this with ‘universe’, etc.

Also, we’re saying God would be a person analogically, not literally.

You seem to agree with me on Aquinas: if he thought all actual infinites were impossible, he wouldn’t have said we couldn’t prove whether the world began to exist, he would’ve said the world had to begin since actual infinities are impossible.

The phrase ‘essentially ordered’ is commonly used by Thomists. It’s not something I made up or got from critiques of the argument. Google Feser’s Oerter on motion and the First Mover for an example of a Thomist explaining what an essentially ordered series is, and its relevance to the First Way.

It’s important to note that you haven’t given a reason for thinking the unmoved mover isn’t a mechanistic automaton. You’ve tried to cast doubt on whether I’ve justified that claim, but assuming I haven’t, the claim could still be true. You seem to be attacking peripheral issues, and only addressing my sub-thesis.

My major thesis: the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism and provide atheists with a solid explanation of natural phenomena.

 

[norain]

No response to my post from Perplexity, with insistence on this ‘automaton’ deal.

I’ll attempt to answer it again:

An automaton is an automaton if it follows a directive other than its own. God follows no other directive. He is the catch-all of all possible directives. The source, the prime of all. Even if he is an automaton, he is logically an automaton of himself. Otherwise, the directive-giver would be God, not him.

We have free will only in the sense that we are driven to emulate God, the source of all right choices.

Bad choices denote evil, irrationality, hypocrisy, everything not-God. Our “will” is driven only to emulate God as closely as humanly possible. Its “free” nature is an illusion.

 

[JDaniel]

Recall that the claim you’re disagreeing with is that the First Way itself provides no more reason to believe in an unmoved mover than an infinite regression of moved movers. How do you refute this claim?

Simply by showing that it is an essential part of the argument. You may think it to be a mere, take-it-or-leave-it codicil, but it is not. It is part and parcel or the whole argument.

By waving in Hilbert’s direction. Even if Hilbert’s arguments saved Aquinas’ claims it would still be the case that his argument wasn’t good enough by itself, and required help. I think Michael Tooley has given good arguments for the existence of actual infinites btw.

That’s idiotic. Pull a material part away from the argument then make the accusation that the “argument is not strong enough without that part?” That’s almost infinitely beyond ridiculous. And, it is another “straw man!”

You later say you have an inkling that I’m resorting to unsubstantiated assertions and I must say your claim above gives me that same inkling.

It was better that you didn’t.

Could you really demonstrate that Hilbert convinced the mathematical and philosophical communities of the impossibility of actual infinites?

Anybody can sue anybody for anything. Does that mean such law suits aren’t frivolous? If you believe that there are good mathematicians who don’t get Hilbert, just show me. You made the claim that there are “heavy-weights on both sides” of the argument. If that’s the case, showing me one should be a piece of cake for you.

As far as heavy weights that haven’t been convinced by Hilbert: Michael Tooley, Alexander Pruss, Richard Gale, Colin Howson, Graham Oppy and J.L. Mackie. May as well throw Richard Swinburne in there as well.

Good grief! Show the argument or statement. I can flush names down a toilet too.

There are very, very few knock down arguments in philosophy, but if your argument contains or entails a logical contradiction, we thereby have a knock down case against it.

The logic re. “infinity” is simple: in the real number line, when you think you have achieved “infinity,” why can’t you add (or subtract) another real number to it? If you can, then you haven’t achieved “infinity.” Pure logic; purely simple. Show me an argument against it. Second argument: why can’t you show it to us? I.e., why is it not ontological? Is the following an actual infinity : **1,2,3,n]**?

As I explained, we deduce that the unmoved mover would be a mechanistic automaton by process of elimination: because an unmoved mover, by definition, cannot be caused (by itself or by anything else) to actualize the potency it does, its actualization of the potency is either a completely random event, or necessitated by its own nature.

I completely disagree with your completely arbitrary limitation to only two possibilities. And so does the Catholic Church. And so does the rest of Christianity. And, so do most real thinkers who are not over-trying to win a debate. It is clearly obvious that human beings often act in ways that defy logic for onlookers. This happens millions of times per day. Why would God NOT have that same propensity? Where is is said that Perplexity alone is to be the judge and jury of the actions of God? What are your qualifications? What school of highest learning did you attend? What credentials did you receive when you graduated? Are you really serious that you think you can get away with this by positing some very weak argument that only you believe in? Perplexity; come on.

But, it couldn’t be a completely random event.

Of course not, as then it would be completely homogeneous. Do you even know what “random” means?

Therefore, the unmoved mover actualizes the potency it does out of necessity.

You are getting way ahead of yourself. You have not undergirded such a conclusion at all.

Since the actions of the unmoved mover would be simultaneous, anything it does is out of necessity.

Show me a syllogism for that piece of absurdity.

It therefore would have no free-will, and couldn’t be God.

This is called, in many circles, very muddied thinking and very wishful.

As I’ve shown, the unmoved mover cannot be identified with God, whether or not God is utterly simple.

Are you nutz? Do you actually believe you’ve shown that? I mean, really? Not in any way, shape, or form have you shown that.

Incompatibilism is a thesis about free-will per se, regardless of whether that’s in God, a human or a cat.

We are so far away from any consideration of “cats” it would take an unsighted person to not concur. And neither you nor I have any real idea of how the Mind of Gos handles free will. Thus, it can only be an anthropomorphism!

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

You say it’s just about the wills of men. I don’t know what else to say to this except that it’s contradicted by every definition and usage of incompatibilism out there.

“The compatibilists’ main adversaries are incompatibilists, who deny the compatibility of free will and determinism. Some incompatibilists remain agnostic as to whether persons have free will. But most take a further stand regarding the reality or unreality of free will. Some of these incompatibilists, libertarians, hold that at least some persons have free will and that, therefore, determinism is false. Other incompatibilists, hard determinists, have a less optimistic view, holding that determinism is true and that no persons have free will. In recent times, hard determinism has fallen out of fashion, largely because our best sciences suggest that determinism is false. But the spirit of the hard determinist position is sustained by hard incompatibilists, who hold that there is no free will if determinism is true, but also, that there is no free will if determinism is false. A salient element of the hard incompatibilist view is that the manner in which indeterminism is true (for instance, due to quantum indeterminacies) poses just as much of a threat to the presumption of free will as determinism would.” – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Thus you are refuted. Again.

You say that my definitions of God and person are straw-men and equivocations.

This is like me saying Aquinas’ definitions of act, potency and motion are straw-manned equivocations since they contradict the dictionarie’s definitions of them (which they do).

(1) Act: Origin: late Middle English: from Latin actus ‘event, thing done’, act- ‘done’, from the verb agere, reinforced by the French noun acte – The Oxford English Dictionary, online

(2) Potency: from the Latin posse (to be able), has the meaning of possibility – The General Science of Nature, online

(3) Motion: [mass noun] the action or process of moving or being moved –
The Oxford English Dictionary, online

Now, (1) is essentially identical with the definition I provided. (2) is from an authority that actually supplies the origin of the word (as the other two do for the other words, but the Oxford Dictionary seems afraid to do for this one.) and, (3) is just a wonderful tautology. What is a “car?” Why, it’s a “car.” Or, “What is water?” “Why, it’s water.” Anyway, the definition: “the “act of the potential precisely as potential,” is from the Latin as used by St. Thomas, and has a plethora of backup.

The field of philosophy, like any academic field, gets to assign technical meanings to words, and that’s what the philosophy of religion has done with God and metaphysics has done with person.

It’s not that they could have pre-dated the modern definitions by centuries, or that they were the closest literal translations of the words to their original language definitions. Of course not. It’s not like we don’t have dictionaries that really and actually show the original words and meanings. Only our current definitions are true and correct. Period. (Sorry for being so sarcastic, but you gave me little choice.)

Also, we’re saying God would be a person analogically, not literally.

No we’re not. Christianity is say that God is a “personal” entity. Let’s go to real definitions, shall we?

Person : noun (plural people or persons) a human being regarded as an individual.

Personal : adjective
[attributive] belonging to or affecting a particular person rather than anyone else. – The Oxford English Dictionary, online.
(This is too easy!)

You seem to agree with me on Aquinas: if he thought all actual infinites were impossible, he wouldn’t have said we couldn’t prove whether the world began to exist, he would’ve said the world had to begin since actual infinities are impossible.

Please use your brain for once. He also knew that anything was possible for God. So, if God had made the world from the beginning – from before the start of time – then God could have made it infinite. Your logic is absurd. If God wanted the World from eternity, He could make it so. It might have helped him had he been able to see other planets and stars for comparables. But, we had to wait another few hundred years for telescopes. Not rocket science, Perplexity.

The phrase ‘essentially ordered’ is commonly used by Thomists.

That’s too bad; they’re dead wrong.

It’s not something I made up or got from critiques of the argument. Google Feser’s Oerter on motion and the First Mover for an example of a Thomist explaining what an essentially ordered series is, and its relevance to the First Way.

Not necessary. If that’s what was said, then that is wrong and I will tell them so to their faces. Unfortunately, it may have affected yours, and the thinking of many others. Look, St. Thomas uses an illustration. In the illustration he depicts an essential subordination of agents: the hand, the stick, the stone. The stone is nor only geometrically lower than the stick, it is also moved by the stick. The stick is not only geometrically lower than the hand, but the hand moves the stick. That is a terrific illustration of none other than “subordination.”

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continued . . .

It’s important to note that you haven’t given a reason for thinking the unmoved mover isn’t a mechanistic automaton.

Hmmm? Really? So, a mechanistic automaton always existed: from ALL ETERNITY? To, ALL ETERNITY? And, this merely mechanistic automaton created. First the Universe, then each and every life form, and supplied life to them – even though it didn’t have life, and couldn’t have known what life was? The automaton self-altered its programming to accomplish those things (and many, many others) – I guess it wasn’t truly an “automaton?”

Let’s see, “automaton” : “noun a moving mechanical device made in imitation of a human being.” – The Oxford English Dictionary, online

You’ve tried to cast doubt on whether I’ve justified that claim, but assuming I haven’t, the claim could still be true. You seem to be attacking peripheral issues, and only addressing my sub-thesis.

I am attacking only your premises and the juvenile thinking behind them.

My major thesis: the existence of the unmoved mover would undermine theism and provide atheists with a solid explanation of natural phenomena.

Yes. It would. And, my major thesis that my wife is really from Venus and I am really from Mars is a rock-solid explanation as to why we’re different.

 

[JDaniel]

No response to my post from Perplexity, with insistence on this ‘automaton’ deal.

I’ll attempt to answer it again:

Norain:

May I?

An automaton is an automaton if it follows a directive other than its own.

No. Wait, that can’t be! No. An automaton has perfect thinking powers, given to it by it. Prove that it doesn’t. (Just a little sarcasm. Obviously not aimed at you.)

God follows no other directive. He is the catch-all of all possible directives. The source, the prime of all. Even if he is an automaton, he is logically an automaton of himself. Otherwise, the directive-giver would be God, not him.

He is The Directive of directives.)

We have free will only in the sense that we are driven to emulate God, the source of all right choices.

We can physically choose this or that, but at the complete direction of God. We can mentally choose the intention to this or that bad or good ourselves. When “free will” is so constrained that it MUST follow only a certain course, that is, of itself, not free. But, we can choose to subscribe to it or not. How strange.

Bad choices denote evil, irrationality, hypocrisy, everything not-God. Our “will” is driven only to emulate God as closely as humanly possible. Its “free” nature is an illusion.

Perfectly said.

God bless,
jd

 

[Hokomai]

Everything is in motion. All the time. There is no first mover, because there is no first movement.

 

[norain]

We can physically choose this or that, but at the complete direction of God. We can mentally choose the intention to this or that bad or good ourselves. When “free will” is so constrained that it MUST follow only a certain course, that is, of itself, not free. But, we can choose to subscribe to it or not. How strange.

JDaniel,

There is a TED talk on philosophy and science that questioned bad intent. It said, and I believe it now, that every person’s intent is always for something ultimately good. No one seeks evil for evil’s sake. What happens is that the evil act leads either to an unintended result, or the result itself was perceived by the actor to be of ultimate good, but is not.

Evil results from a lack of understanding or clouded judgement. Learning from mistakes then leads to enlightenment.

 

[Perplexity]

JDaniel, I think if we just cleared up a few things you’re misunderstanding about Thomism and actual infinites (etc.) you’d be prepared to accept my objection, unfortunately, the tone has gotten far too bitter for my taste. Thanks for taking a swing anyways.

 

[levinas12]

All:

Having put out a challenge to Perplexity, this thread is opened for the purpose of perusing counter-arguments to Aquinas’ First Way for subtleties. I will ask for respect from all of you who wish to participate herein. Since I am the OP, I will be the sub-ultimate judge of what is potentially disastrous to the thread. Of course, our Administrator will always be the ultimate judge. Therefore, (please) do not post posts that are not relevant to the topic.

Below is a pretty good translation of the Prime Mover argument. But, as everyone has ever noticed, it is not fully explanatory in and of itself. (That requires reading a great deal more of the Summa, which I understand many people don’t want to do.) To the best of my ability, I will attempt to explain those things which typically give readers trouble. Of course, you can always challenge my explanation. If you do, I will then show an authoritative source for my explanation. You are invited to do the same.

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” - Summa Theologica, basillica.org

God bless,
jd

 

[levinas12]

JD,

I remember reading somewhere an article that asked whether Aquinas’ first unmoved mover argument was linked to the celestial spheres in Aristotelian astronomy. As you may recall, the spheres are embedded in the cosmos, one sphere turning another. in a subordinated series. The spheres themselves are moved by intelligences. In Aquinas, the intelligences are moved by love for the first unmoved mover (God) who acts as a final cause.

What I’m driving at is whether Aquinas’ first unmoved mover argument stands or falls with Aristotelian astronomy.

Because, without the spheres, where else can we find a vertical series of simultanenous movers? And how would these movers be moved by the first unmoved mover? Final cause? But now could this happen if there are no longer cosmic non-human intelligences.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

May I offer a few comments? Some are forgetting the key to the first way. It is precisely this. Thomas says "…whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that toward which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves in as much as it is in act.

This means that " …a certain potentiallity is actualized by something whose potentiality is itself actualized by something whose potentiality is itself actualized by ( something whose potentiality is actualized by, etc ) and so on…such a series can only possibly terminate in something which is not reduced to act or actualized by anything else, but which just isin act or actual and thus " unmoving "…Eventually this regress must terminate in something which here and now actualizes potentialities without itself being actualized, an unmoved mover. " ( Edward Feser, in Aquinas, pg 73)

So the Unmoved Mover ( Aristotle’s Prime Mover as interpreted by Aquinas) is Actus Purus or pure actuality having no potentiality whatsoever. Such a being, a Pure Actuality is immediately recognized by Christians as God.

Several things must be seen about such an Acutality. First, it must be outside the ontological members of the series since it is a pure actuality having no potentiality whereas the members of the series are all beings composed of actuality and potentiality.

Secondly such a series could actually be eternal since the Unmoved Mover itself is outside the series ontologically. One of our posters objected that an Unmoved Mover would not be required if the series was eternal. This answers that objection. It must be remembered that Thomas designed the proof to account for the possibility of an eternal universe. His proof shows that even if the universe is eternal an Unmoved Mover is required. What most people forget is that the Unmoved Mover is ontologically outside the series. Thomas could have made this more clear but he does explain himself in other places. However it is clear from the argument he gave if you think about it thoroughly.

Now it can be shown that all the proofs conclude in a First Something which can indeed be reduced to a Pure Actuality and thus can be identified easily as the Christian God. Thomas will go on in Book 1, Question 3 and following to analyize the nature of the Unmoved Mover, etc. or God. He will show that the First Being, God, has all the characteristics of the Christian God, including Intelligence, Will, Justice, Love, Goodness, Mercy, Personhood, etc. is Omnipotent, Omnescient, Omnipresent and, the creator, maintainer, and orderer of all that exists.

 

[JDaniel]

JDaniel, I think if we just cleared up a few things you’re misunderstanding about Thomism and actual infinites (etc.) you’d be prepared to accept my objection, unfortunately, the tone has gotten far too bitter for my taste. Thanks for taking a swing anyways.

Perplexed:

That’s fine. But, just to set the record straight, all of the misunderstanding concerning Thomism and infinities is on your part. So, if you can overcome St. Thomas’ truths concerning those two things, you might even open your mind.

BTW, no bitterness here - just total sweetness.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

JD,

I remember reading somewhere an article that asked whether Aquinas’ first unmoved mover argument was linked to the celestial spheres in Aristotelian astronomy. As you may recall, the spheres are embedded in the cosmos, one sphere turning another. in a subordinated series. The spheres themselves are moved by intelligences. In Aquinas, the intelligences are moved by love for the first unmoved mover (God) who acts as a final cause.

What I’m driving at is whether Aquinas’ first unmoved mover argument stands or falls with Aristotelian astronomy.

Because, without the spheres, where else can we find a vertical series of simultanenous movers? And how would these movers be moved by the first unmoved mover? Final cause? But now could this happen if there are no longer cosmic non-human intelligences.

Levinas:

I’ve not seen anything along those lines. Nor, would I think it possible, having read more than a mere smattering of Aquinas and Aristotle. Also, you might want to go to a site where such a question could be answered. Here

But, actually, all we have to do is think it through:

Change or motion is a transition from potency to act. In everything we see, whatever is moved or changed is moved or changed by something that already is in act. The subject of the change or motion is in potency in that it does not have the perfection that it will possess upon conclusion of the transition - that it receives from the agent which is in act with respect to the perfection imparted. Now, everything that moves is moved by more than one antecedent (except in the case of ensoulment). Let’s say that the thing we see that moves Mobile Being # 5, is moved by another mover up the chain, MB # 4, which is moved by another up the chain, MB # 3, which is then moved by another, MB # 2, etc.(We can lay out example after example in a dialectic that could involve everything in the universe.) But, it cannot regress to infinity. If it did, then there would be no first mover, all there would be would be an infinite stream of intermediate movers and the motion here and now would be unintelligible. (This conclusion, as you are aware, takes some intelligence to discern. Some people just never seem to get it.)

Any assertion that states that something can change itself is a violation of the principle of contradiction, since nothing gives what does not have. Nothing can be the cause of its own change. If it is changed, it is changed by another. Now, let’s take an example from the book Being and God, by Frs. Klubertanz and Holloway. A book that, by the way, has not been outdated by anything newer. It is still current and unassailable.

Take the example of a chisel, a chisel is moved by a hand, the hand by the nerves that serve the hand, the nerves by the will, the will by the soul, the soul by that from which it has received its nature, and which is keeping that nature in existence. Here we can see a decent among the moved movers, from God, down to the soul, down to the will, down to the nerves, down to the hand, down to the chisel. Despite that some of these are level, the entire action can be seen as a downward trend. This is part of the reason for calling it a chain of subordinated moved movers.

To call the series “vertical” is to assign an attribute that only someone who does not understand Aquinas argument would give it. That would be an assignment that no one has the perspicacity to make, except by chicanery. Anyway, that’s my opinion and I give it Free of charge!

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

May I offer a few comments? Some are forgetting the key to the first way. It is precisely this. Thomas says "…whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that toward which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves in as much as it is in act.

This means that " …a certain potentiallity is actualized by something whose potentiality is itself actualized by something whose potentiality is itself actualized by ( something whose potentiality is actualized by, etc ) and so on…such a series can only possibly terminate in something which is not reduced to act or actualized by anything else, but which just isin act or actual and thus " unmoving "…Eventually this regress must terminate in something which here and now actualizes potentialities without itself being actualized, an unmoved mover. " ( Edward Feser, in Aquinas, pg 73)

So the Unmoved Mover ( Aristotle’s Prime Mover as interpreted by Aquinas) is Actus Purus or pure actuality having no potentiality whatsoever. Such a being, a Pure Actuality is immediately recognized by Christians as God.

Several things must be seen about such an Acutality. First, it must be outside the ontological members of the series since it is a pure actuality having no potentiality whereas the members of the series are all beings composed of actuality and potentiality.

Secondly such a series could actually be eternal since the Unmoved Mover itself is outside the series ontologically. One of our posters objected that an Unmoved Mover would not be required if the series was eternal. This answers that objection. It must be remembered that Thomas designed the proof to account for the possibility of an eternal universe. His proof shows that even if the universe is eternal an Unmoved Mover is required. What most people forget is that the Unmoved Mover is ontologically outside the series. Thomas could have made this more clear but he does explain himself in other places. However it is clear from the argument he gave if you think about it thoroughly.

Now it can be shown that all the proofs conclude in a First Something which can indeed be reduced to a Pure Actuality and thus can be identified easily as the Christian God. Thomas will go on in Book 1, Question 3 and following to analyize the nature of the Unmoved Mover, etc. or God. He will show that the First Being, God, has all the characteristics of the Christian God, including Intelligence, Will, Justice, Love, Goodness, Mercy, Personhood, etc. is Omnipotent, Omnescient, Omnipresent and, the creator, maintainer, and orderer of all that exists.

Linus:

Thank you. Great explanation!

God bless,
jd

 

[norain]

Sometimes I wonder why this “first mover” concept seems so basic to some and to others no amount of explanation seems sufficient.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Sometimes I wonder why this “first mover” concept seems so basic to some and to others no amount of explanation seems sufficient.

Some are incapable - it is difficult. No one can truely understand it, because who can understand God? That is who the Prime Mover is as Thomas said. Just because we call him the Prime Mover does not make him any less ineffable.

Some do not want to understand because they have a vested interest in God’s non-existence.

Some are not motivated to study philosophy.

Some are just lazy and could care less.

 

[JDaniel]

Sometimes I wonder why this “first mover” concept seems so basic to some and to others no amount of explanation seems sufficient.

Norain:

Actually, I think they do understand it, but are desperately attempting to undermine it any way they can.

God bless,
jd