St. Thomas: "The First Way"

[JDaniel]

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. - (from New Advent - Summa

, Q 2, A 3, ans)

The above is the text taken from the New Advent - Summa, and is a translation of St. Thomas First Way, or first proof, for the existence of God. St. Thomas begins by stating the obvious, “we all observe motion throughout our lives.” Motion is defined elsewhere in the Summa, as the “act of the potential precisely as potential.”

Motion is the relative change from one coordinate to another, but is neither only just started or not yet finished. It is that which is in between Potential and Act. Matter, in potency, has either not begun to move nor is yet in Act. These last two sentences illustrate the problem of trying to adequately define motion, because they all question beg. You can’t define it without using the word, or a hard synonym in the definition.

All that said, it is important to understand that motion involves the passing across of anything, to another local, but from the proper point of origin. When you speak of such things as mind events, while it may well be possible to trace them back to their proper starting points, that is usually not what St. Thomas had in mind. Certainly the motion of neurons could handle that scenario, but, it not specifically what we mean by motion.

The second thing we must keep in mind is that we’re not speaking of minor local motion, per se, but, rather more substantial motion, such as coming-to-be, in some form or other. When we speak of such motion we are speaking of a simultaneous event that has an obvious, or not so obvious, beginning and an obvious end.

Typically, we tend to conceive of this motion thing as the moving of a couple of billiard balls on a billiard table. But, that is incorrect. It is only correct if you correctly describe the instant of contact between the cue ball and a numbered ball. The cue ball makes initial contact, which instantly sends potential energy into the numbered ball, and that begins the numbered ball’s rotation. Subsequently, other forces are moving the numbered ball each step of the way, thus, each mm is a separate event - separate beginning and separate ending, separate potential and separate act. Does that make sense?

More to follow as requested . . .

jd

 

[awatkins69]

Hi JD. I understand all of this. However, Newton’s second law of motion states that “Every body remains in a state of rest or uniform motion (constant velocity) unless it is acted upon by an external unbalanced force.” Let me note that this applies only in a vacuum. If there is air obviously the air will cause friction, or if there is gravity then obviously it will pull on the object.

Again, I’m not sure why local motion is not motion in the true sense. A body is potentially at point A and then actually at point A. Yet the body remains in motion without being directly moved, except having been previously imparted initial motion by something else.

Saint Thomas believed in Aristotle’s physics which, however advanced they were for their time, ultimately proved incorrect. Aristotle believed there was no such thing as a vacuum, and that the air around an object made it move.

With all this said, I’m just reiterating my objection from my other post. If you could, could you reply there? Thanks.

 

[JohnDamian]

Taking into consideration Aquinas “Commentary on the Physics”; “Heavy things are moved more with themselves than by themselves” we can have two simple replies;

If an entity is intentionally distinct in it’s parts; then one part may compel the other or the whole; and thus no motivator outside the individual is necessary.

If an entity is formally distinct in it’s parts; then one part may compel the other or the whole; and thus no motivator outside the individual is necessary.

If we take God for an example; the will is distinct (in formal or intentional terms; not real terms) from the potency; but the will may motivate the potency.

From this (and against Aquinas); there is no reason to posit that there is any God; or for that matter a first cause in the singular; for it is plausible that a multiplicity of agents elicited the motion; or that the potency or intellect of the agents is null or by degree; sub infinite. Now; these can be argued against; but it is clear that the argument does not stand alone.

 

[JDaniel]

Hi JD. I understand all of this. However, Newton’s second law of motion states that “Every body remains in a state of rest or uniform motion (constant velocity) unless it is acted upon by an external unbalanced force.” Let me note that this applies only in a vacuum. If there is air obviously the air will cause friction, or if there is gravity then obviously it will pull on the object.

I am aware of this small problem for Newton. His theory cannot be tested. We can’t find a perfect vacuum. Nonetheless, you begin to see something in the description of Newton’s Law that strikes one as odd. Once set in motion, every body remains in motion unless acted upon, etc. The description is telling us that there exists other exigencies that begin the movement and keep it rolling. So, what are efficient causes?

Again, I’m not sure why local motion is not motion in the true sense. A body is potentially at point A and then actually at point A. Yet the body remains in motion without being directly moved, except having been previously imparted initial motion by something else.

Therein is the problem. Usually, when we view local motion, we are viewing a series of small, relative, independent motions, then trying to describe motion by blaming the universal on the particular. In the example you gave, you are not thinking through all of the micro-movements present when a cue ball, e.g., moves across a table. IOW, we have a series of movers at each point where friction attempts to stop the motion. At each of those points, inertia resumes to continue the forward motion of the ball.

Now, motion, as we must needs talk of it is like a television set. Going back to just the point where the electricity plugs into the wall, the electricity moves almost instantaneously through each of the resisters, capacitors, IC’s, etc., mounted on circuit boards within the set. As soon as electricity is applied, it moves directly to through the circuits to the LED or LCD display and the speaker system. This is an imperfect analogy, but, only in the sense that there are solid state exigencies therein whose purpose is to reduce the larger flow and retard the effect slightly.

St. Thomas was a little less lazy than we moderns are. Thus, he knew that motion was more than what it appeared to be. He knew it had to consist of a simultaneous stream, so to speak, of subordinated efficient causes. The example he gives is the person pushing a rock along the ground with a stick. The man moves his shoulder, which moves his arm, which moves his hand, which moves the stick, which moves the rock. All the while, everything moves simultaneously. This is a correct example of motion.

Saint Thomas believed in Aristotle’s physics which, however advanced they were for their time, ultimately proved incorrect. Aristotle believed there was no such thing as a vacuum, and that the air around an object made it move.

I disagree. For the most part, Aristotle’s Physics proved out to be far more correct than falsified. Atomic and quantum levels were unknown, at his time, but, that didn’t matter. Most of the time, he got it right.

With all this said, I’m just reiterating my objection from my other post. If you could, could you reply there? Thanks.

Sorry, but, no. Your question there is too large and cumbersome. I don’t want to tackle it there. I’d rather state your objections correctly, then reply to them, one at a time, in separate threads.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Taking into consideration Aquinas “Commentary on the Physics”; “Heavy things are moved more with themselves than by themselves” we can have two simple replies;

If an entity is intentionally distinct in it’s parts; then one part may compel the other or the whole; and thus no motivator outside the individual is necessary.

OK. I see. We’re talking apples and oranges. On the one hand, Aquinas is talking about the mover or agent. What you are talking about is really a second definition, that which talks about the mobile being itself. Aquinas is talking about motion, you are talking about the mobile, i.e., mobile being. As an example, we can discuss me throwing a bowling ball down a lane, or, we can talk about the bowling ball itself. You are talking about the bowling ball. St. Thomas and I are talking about me throwing it down the alley.

If an entity is formally distinct in it’s parts; then one part may compel the other or the whole; and thus no motivator outside the individual is necessary.

Again, you are clearly talking about mobile being again, not motion, per se. When a thing can move itself, it consists of parts. But again, we are talking, in this case, about a being that possesses mobility, rather than motion. It is important not to confuse the two words and views with each other, or, the argument becomes confusing. The subject, motion, is not the same as the subject, mobile being.

I push a rock down the sidewalk with a stick. It is not the same as a lizard hoping down the sidewalk as I tap the ground behind him with the stick. The complete stream of me pushing the rock is the fundamental called, “motion,” that results in the types of movement of the heavenly bodies away from each other, as the universe expands. That God was the First Mover of all the heavenly bodies, is in this sense. The heavenly bodies did not initially move themselves.

If we take God for an example; the will is distinct (in formal or intentional terms; not real terms) from the potency; but the will may motivate the potency.

That is irrelevant to our discussion. Good for another topic, though!

From this (and against Aquinas); there is no reason to posit that there is any God; or for that matter a first cause in the singular; for it is plausible that a multiplicity of agents elicited the motion; or that the potency or intellect of the agents is null or by degree; sub infinite. Now; these can be argued against; but it is clear that the argument does not stand alone.

As you can now plainly see, once understood correctly – the way Aquinas meant it – there IS reason to posit God. (All the more reason to seek help, from time to time, in order to understand things better. That’s why I like CAF.)

God bless,
jd

 

[JohnDamian]

OK. I see. We’re talking apples and oranges. On the one hand, Aquinas is talking about the mover or agent. What you are talking about is really a second definition, that which talks about the mobile being itself. Aquinas is talking about motion, you are talking about the mobile, i.e., mobile being. As an example, we can discuss me throwing a bowling ball down a lane, or, we can talk about the bowling ball itself. You are talking about the bowling ball. St. Thomas and I are talking about me throwing it down the alley.

I am honestly trying to avoid issues of plurivocity; I am talking about a mobile being; and using it insofar as it is necessary to show Aquinas first way does not stand alone. There is no reason to posit unicity in a first mover; as it is entirely plausible that motion could originate through a multiplicity rather than in a singular. I am stating that it is entirely plausible that an accidental order of motion terminates in multiplicty; and am not alone in that opinion; Occham soundly elaborates on the flaws of an accidental order argument in the Quodlibeta I.

Again, you are clearly talking about mobile being again, not motion, per se. When a thing can move itself, it consists of parts. But again, we are talking, in this case, about a being that possesses mobility, rather than motion. It is important not to confuse the two words and views with each other, or, the argument becomes confusing. The subject, motion, is not the same as the subject, mobile being.

Motion per se is the praxis of mobility. This is precisely why Aquinas first way is unable to stand on it’s own; by arguing an accidental order there can be no argument for termination in the singular. The subject of motion lends accidentally upon the praxis of mobility in an agent.

I push a rock down the sidewalk with a stick. It is not the same as a lizard hoping down the sidewalk as I tap the ground behind him with the stick. The complete stream of me pushing the rock is the fundamental called, “motion,” that results in the types of movement of the heavenly bodies away from each other, as the universe expands. That God was the First Mover of all the heavenly bodies, is in this sense. The heavenly bodies did not initially move themselves.

We could easily say that a multiplicity is the first mover; insofar as to say that really distinct entities created the first movement; rather than the formally distinct entitiy that is God. Aquinas first way does not demonstrate unicity; and is therefore utterly useless for an argument for the Catholic God.

It is only by arguing through an essential order that we can have a sensible starting point in an argument; this is only present in the third way of Aquinas; the first and second do not terminate in the singular. (I shall ignore for this the fourth and fifth as they arn’t cosmological).

 

[JDaniel]

I am honestly trying to avoid issues of plurivocity; I am talking about a mobile being; and using it insofar as it is necessary to show Aquinas first way does not stand alone.

John:

An old friend of mine once suggested to me, that “jargon was no substitute for gravitas.” Now I get to aim it at someone else!

If a creature observed a man, a dog, and a rock, resting on a distant porch, and though they are of different shapes and sizes, they would all be that same matter, to that creature. That is, until they moved. Moreover, the more intricate the motions, the more a creature might be able to determine which one of the three was the more significant. It is motion that first gets the creature’s attention, then the beings that are the praxes of motion.

There is no reason to posit unicity in a first mover; as it is entirely plausible that motion could originate through a multiplicity rather than in a singular.

Not true. However, it is quite true that every natural agent is in potency to be a mover. But, in this respect it must be moved by an outside mover, not itself. A hammer is moved by an arm. An arm may move, but it is decidedly different. It is a being, or a part of a being. And, as we know, there can’t be an actual infinity, and to the best of science’s knowledge, there was only one Big Bang.

Now, in order for there to be a multiplicity of movers, as you know, the universe would have to be infinite. You have already proved that there is no such possibility as an actual infinity. You made reference to there being parts. If there are parts, then the parts of that which is infinite would never get here. If we were part of a potential infinity, that might be different, but, then the entirety of the multiplicity would have to be present at the same moment.

I am stating that it is entirely plausible that an accidental order of motion terminates in multiplicty; and am not alone in that opinion; Occham soundly elaborates on the flaws of an accidental order argument in the Quodlibeta I.

But, St. Thomas was not talking about an accidental order of motion.

Motion per se is the praxis of mobility.

I disagree. Motion stands on its own.

This is precisely why Aquinas first way is unable to stand on it’s own; by arguing an accidental order there can be no argument for termination in the singular. The subject of motion lends accidentally upon the praxis of mobility in an agent.

No. It leans upon an efficient cause, or, first mover, outside of a mobile being. A rock is not considered a mobile being, and the larger the rock, the truer that is. Motion is a property of essentially mobile being, but, it may also be the property of beings that are immobile, in certain ways.

We could easily say that a multiplicity is the first mover; insofar as to say that really distinct entities created the first movement; rather than the formally distinct entitiy that is God. Aquinas first way does not demonstrate unicity; and is therefore utterly useless for an argument for the Catholic God.

Yes, we can nakedly assert anything. I have just shown that it does.

It is only by arguing through an essential order that we can have a sensible starting point in an argument; this is only present in the third way of Aquinas; the first and second do not terminate in the singular. (I shall ignore for this the fourth and fifth as they arn’t cosmological).

Whatever; however, this is my thread, si’l vous plait.

God bless,
jd

 

[awatkins69]

Hi JD. I’m sorry, but I’m simply not going to accept Aristotle’s physics for this proof. They don’t work at all when it comes to anything serious scientists have to deal with. I think his philosophy of science works (e.g. substantial forms, natures, final causality, teleology, etc.), but not the science itself.

I’ll just ask a simple question: Do you think that the First Way works with Newtonian mechanics or not? If so, how? I’m not asking whether Newtonian mechanics is correct. Take care.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Hi JD. I’m sorry, but I’m simply not going to accept Aristotle’s physics for this proof. .

Can you please not confuse Aristotle physics with Aristotle "“metaphysics”. Its annoying.

Thanks.

 

[awatkins69]

Can you please not confuse Aristotle physics with Aristotle "“metaphysics”. Its annoying.

Thanks.

I’m not trying to be annoying. I’m also not confusing the two. I said specifically that I think Aristotle’s metaphysics of science is good. JD specifically said these words: “For the most part, Aristotle’s Physics proved out to be far more correct than falsified” and “Most of the time, he got it right.” Hopefully I’m not misunderstanding and taking these words out of context. I have the best of intentions here, and I think we should always be charitable and assume the best.

Aristotle’s physics said that air around an object moved the object. He believed there was no such thing as a vacuum, and no object could move unless moved directly by some other object or element. Newton’s physics say that an object will continue to move even if nothing is directly moving it, so long as no outside force impedes that local motion. Newtonian physics is much closer to reality than Aristotelian physics. Best.

 

[awatkins69]

PS My rejection of the First Way is not equivalent to atheism, or equivalent to a rejection of all Thomism.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

I’m not trying to be annoying. I’m also not confusing the two. I said specifically that I think Aristotle’s metaphysics of science is good.

Aristotle’s physics said that air around an object moved the object. He believed there was no such thing as a vacuum, and no object could move unless moved directly by some other object or element. Newton’s physics say that an object will continue to move even if nothing is directly moving it, so long as no outside force impedes that local motion. Newtonian physics is much closer to reality than Aristotelian physics. Best.

Obviously Aristotle’s “physics” is outdated. And i agree that Thomists, if they are in fact using an outdated view of physics when making examples, they should update Aquinas’ arguments in manner that takes in to account other forms of physical motion which is evident to us to day. But i think that JD does point out the difference between the description of moving things in terms of what we attribute to a things nature (that a thing moves in a particular manner), and the concept of motion in general.

I agree that given certain conditions a thing will move without an object directly moving it. But notice that “sufficient conditions” must be present in-order for this to take place. Thus nothing in physical reality moves purely in accord of itself; rather it moves in relation to and relative to other events, natures, and conditions. Thus everything physical has a kind of cause as long as an object exists in space relative to other objects.

If a thing moves randomly, this does not explain where the potentiality came from. Out of nothing comes nothing, and thus all effects are proportionate to its cause. An effect is never going to have more power then what it already has in its actuality. What a thing will potentially become, in terms of power and act, cannot be more than what it possesses in the first instance of its actuality. Thus if a thing does become qualitatively and quantitatively more than what it was in its first instance of being, one must conclude that it does not do so by its own power or nature. A thing moving from a state of rest into a state of motion is to add something to a thing that was not present in its original state. One can say that it is in a things nature to move as such, but one cannot say that it moves by itself, as this would involve getting more from that which is existentially less. Thus to say that it is in a things nature to move this way or that way can only serve as a description of events when a sufficient physical cause absent, and even a sufficient physical cause requires an explanation of its potentiality since all physical causes are secondary causes in virtue of its motion.

 

[JohnDamian]

Not true. However, it is quite true that every natural agent is in potency to be a mover. But, in this respect it must be moved by an outside mover, not itself. A hammer is moved by an arm. An arm may move, but it is decidedly different. It is a being, or a part of a being. And, as we know, there can’t be an actual infinity, and to the best of science’s knowledge, there was only one Big Bang.

Why; from a first movement do we have to presuppose a singular rather than a mulitple?

Why; from the argument from motion must we believe “God is some thing more noble and more perfect than anything else besides him”; rather than believing “God is that than which nothing is more noble and more perfect”.

From where I am standing a numerically finite sequence like motion does not have to terminate in one God; there is no reason to believe from this that only one God exists.

Now, in order for there to be a multiplicity of movers, as you know, the universe would have to be infinite. You have already proved that there is no such possibility as an actual infinity. You made reference to there being parts. If there are parts, then the parts of that which is infinite would never get here. If we were part of a potential infinity, that might be different, but, then the entirety of the multiplicity would have to be present at the same moment.

Two objections; a multiplicity of causes can exist in a finite regress; and a multiplicity need not be essentially ordered as the first mover; merely accidentally ordered - to demonstrate the first way does not stand alone.

I disagree. Motion stands on its own.

Motion is contingent; ergo motion is a praxis. If you argue that motion is not contingent; you totally undermine the argument…

No. It leans upon an efficient cause, or, first mover, outside of a mobile being. A rock is not considered a mobile being, and the larger the rock, the truer that is. Motion is a property of essentially mobile being, but, it may also be the property of beings that are immobile, in certain ways.

Mobility is merely the capacity to be motivated; it is the praxis which elicits motion that is the efficient cause; and there is no reason to believe that there cannot be a multiplicity of efficient causes in a finite sequence.

 

[JDaniel]

Hi JD. I understand all of this.

Sorry, but, I don’t think you do.

However, Newton’s second law of motion states that “Every body remains in a state of rest or uniform motion (constant velocity) unless it is acted upon by an external unbalanced force.” Let me note that this applies only in a vacuum. If there is air obviously the air will cause friction, or if there is gravity then obviously it will pull on the object.

Can you point me in the direction of a place, or a space like this? Any where in the universe? A place where there exists force-free motion?

Again, I’m not sure why local motion is not motion in the true sense. A body is potentially at point A and then actually at point A. Yet the body remains in motion without being directly moved, except having been previously imparted initial motion by something else.

Because, typical local motion is not a singular motion, rather it is an amalgamation of smaller, pure motions that we, as macro beings, don’t seem to see, unless we take a really close look.

As to your second sentence: so you believe that initial force is only present at the start of a motion, and that it is not responsible for the miraculous continuance of the object?

Saint Thomas believed in Aristotle’s physics which, however advanced they were for their time, ultimately proved incorrect.

For example?

Aristotle believed there was no such thing as a vacuum, and that the air around an object made it move.

Aristotle was right. Show me a real vacuum anywhere in the universe. Moreover, The air around some object does, in fact, make numerous objects move. Have you ever watched leaves on a windy day? Or, have you watched feathers flying for a pillow fight? And, the friction from air can certainly slow a heavier object down.

AW. I’d like to teach you physics and logic, but, I just don’t have the time. If you have some real questions, go ahead and ask. Otherwise, no offense but I really don’t have time to teach you. I used to be a teacher, but, it exacerbates me now.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Hi JD. I’m sorry, but I’m simply not going to accept Aristotle’s physics for this proof.

I would suggest that you are far more arrogant than you ought to be for a self-avowed Catholic. Tell me why I should care, after reading your opening sentence?

They don’t work at all when it comes to anything serious scientists have to deal with.

Give me an example; don’t simply make unfounded assertions.

I think his philosophy of science works (e.g. substantial forms, natures, final causality, teleology, etc.), but not the science itself.

Sounds to me as though you don’t have much background in Aristotle’s sciences.

I’ll just ask a simple question: Do you think that the First Way works with Newtonian mechanics or not?

I’m not sure what you want me to say. From my POV, there’s no such thing as force-free motion in the physical world. If one understands precisely what Newton is saying, the universe does not have the isolation his axiom requires. I’m at a loss here. Really. Can you be more specific?

I am only going to ask you this one last time.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I’m not trying to be annoying. I’m also not confusing the two. I said specifically that I think Aristotle’s metaphysics of science is good. JD specifically said these words: “For the most part, Aristotle’s Physics proved out to be far more correct than falsified” and “Most of the time, he got it right.” Hopefully I’m not misunderstanding and taking these words out of context. I have the best of intentions here, and I think we should always be charitable and assume the best.

Aristotle’s physics said that air around an object moved the object.

Where?

He believed there was no such thing as a vacuum,

True.

and no object could move unless moved directly by some other object or element.

True.

Newton’s physics say that an object will continue to move even if nothing is directly moving it, so long as no outside force impedes that local motion. Newtonian physics is much closer to reality than Aristotelian physics. Best.

For an exigency to be considered a Law, the principle in question must be certain. It must be truly physical? And, it must be universal. If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, then we must look elsewhere for an axiom that meets said requirements. Newton’s Law meets none of them.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Why; from a first movement do we have to presuppose a singular rather than a mulitple?

Either there are actual infinities or there aren’t. If there aren’t, then, all of the multiple movers must be present at the same time else we will be looking at a chaos of motion out there. Even then, there might not be any guaranty of uniformity of motions from a plethora of first movers.

Why; from the argument from motion must we believe “God is some thing more noble and more perfect than anything else besides him”; rather than believing “God is that than which nothing is more noble and more perfect”

Because, if in fact He is the Prime Mover, my question to you is why wouldn’t he be?

From where I am standing a numerically finite sequence like motion does not have to terminate in one God; there is no reason to believe from this that only one God exists.

You’re understanding it quite wrongly, then.

Two objections; a multiplicity of causes can exist in a finite regress; and a multiplicity need not be essentially ordered as the first mover; merely accidentally ordered - to demonstrate the first way does not stand alone.

Then, as you might expect, I’d like to know an example.

God bless,
jd

 

[awatkins69]

Where?

For an exigency to be considered a Law, the principle in question must be certain. It must be truly physical? And, it must be universal. If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, then we must look elsewhere for an axiom that meets said requirements. Newton’s Law meets none of them.

God bless,
jd

Aristotle’s description of what I said is in the *Physica *IV, 8, 215a 14-17.

As for Newton’s laws: You’re right. They only work universally at larger scales (and there can, of course, be exceptions by God). However, Aristotle’s theories don’t work at any scale. So either way, we know that Aristotle’s theory is wrong, and that’s the main point. You can take the falsification to have been done by Newton or Einstein. You get the point.

I’m not going to argue about reconsidering Aristotle’s motion. I think there are a couple of real physicists here.

My question is simply this: Do you think Saint Thomas’ proof works, *given *Newton’s laws? I don’t mean to ask whether you think the laws are in fact laws. Best.

 

[JDaniel]

Aristotle’s description of what I said is in the *Physica *IV, 8, 215a 14-17.

I think you’re not being honest. What exactly is the problem here. He is talking about place and void. Nothing too complex at all.

As for Newton’s laws: You’re right. They only work universally at larger scales (and there can, of course, be exceptions by God).

No. Newton’s Axiom only works in an idealized situation. (But, it may be useful nonetheless.)

However, Aristotle’s theories don’t work at any scale.

How? Where? This is becoming very tiresome.

So either way, we know that Aristotle’s theory is wrong, and that’s the main point. You can take the falsification to have been done by Newton or Einstein. You get the point.

Actually, I think you’re not knowledgeable and are attempting to puff up.

I’m not going to argue about reconsidering Aristotle’s motion. I think there are a couple of real physicists here.

Well, then ask them.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

To continue:

In this thread, there has been much talk of infinities with regard to motion. We have already shown that there are no such things as actual infinities. Now, there are no doubt such things as potential infinities, such as a transfinite whole number, or the number of atoms in the universe (which is a closed transfinite number). But, regardless of them, Aquinas says that essential (as opposed to accidental) motion cannot go back back to infinity, So what do they have to do with infinities anyway.

Essential motion, as I have defined from St. Thomas, is the act of the potential precisely as potential. It is broad in that it includes coming-to-be as motion. The problem of defining motion, as I have shown, inevitably has it become circular. One must use terms that are motions in the definition, which is OK providing everyone agrees to permit them. So, to define motion as the passage of a thing from point A to point B, is to use the word “passage.” Motion = passage and passage = motion. We don’t learn much, but, in our own sloppy ways, it often seems good enough. IMHO, man has left behind all precision except perhaps the measuring of things.

Moreover, there are two basic kinds of motion, essential and accidental. Essential motion is the motion of the thing in a primary way. It is, IOW, that which is the commensurate universal of a thing. Accidental motion is that motion that we see that occurs not due to the mobile being but due to something else. E.g., when an apple falls to the ground it has nothing to due with its redness. It has essentially to due with the mass of the apple and gravity. For the red to undergo local motion is accidental to its nature. The local motion, or change, of the red takes place not because of the red, per se, but because it just happens to be associated with a locally moving body.

Further, on the part of a mover or agent, the same twofold distinction must be made. And, the essential must be divided into two parts just as above. It must be divided into what is primary and what is a part. Accidental as relating to the motion of an agent can be illustrated by the example of a house built by a musician. The build constructs the house as a builder, not as a musician. That he is also a musician is accidental to his being a builder. As I mentioned, agent also can be divided into its whole or merely a part.

Any questions?

More to follow as requested . . . .

God bless,
jd