Statements about God- analytic or synthetic?

[Qoeleth]

Are statements about God analytic (in the sense of being true ‘necessarily’) or synthetic (in the sense that they happen to be true, but are not so necessarily)? It seems like a rather trivial question, but actually it is quite important.

Let’s take a statement:
“God is X”
X could be: good, eternal, just, merciful, etc.

Now, is God X by definition, i.e. is God necessarily eternal?

Or, does it happen that God is X, but is not so necessarily?

There are problems either way. If statements about God are considered to be analytical (cf. Anselm’s Proslogion)- it could be that any theological statement is then really nothing more than a definition of theological terms. For example, if the statement “God is merciful” is held to be true analytically, it will be simply a statement of something which was true be definition anyway- in other words, it won’t really say anything that wasn’t held to be true already.

On the other hand, if statements about God are held to be synthetically true, it is then possible that subsequent actions or events could cause them to be re-appraised. For example, it could happen that someone might say: “We thought that God was totally merciful, but, in fact, subsequent events revealed that is He only somewhat merciful.” (I ask God’s mercy for giving this example…but it is only an example).

I pose this question, not in order to discuss the nature of God, but rather, to discuss the nature of theological statements.

When we do theology, are we making real observations about God (synthetic judgments) or, are we simply stating in different ways things that are necessarily true by definition (i.e. making analytical statements)? Do we ‘observe’ God to do theology, or do we just look at texts, definition and distinctions?

Of course, it is obvious to reply that our theological statements are only anagogic anyway, so such a distinction doesn’t matter. But, let’s put the anagogicity in epoche for a moment…

 

[tonyrey]

I think it is a false dilemma because our statements about God fall into both categories!

 

[Qoeleth]

I think it is a false dilemma because our statements about God fall into both categories!

Agreed. For example “God told Noah to build an ark” is clearly a synthetic statement about God. I perhaps should have specified ‘theological statements’, if such a category may be proposed.

 

[tonyrey]

Agreed. For example “God told Noah to build an ark” is clearly a synthetic statement about God. I perhaps should have specified ‘theological statements’, if such a category may be proposed.

I think even theological statements fall into both categories because they apply to both the nature and the existence of God - although the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic has been questioned.

 

[Starrsmother]

I read this several times trying to absorb it and decide what the point was. I finally decided that either I am a complete moron (always a possibility even though I’m a college grad believe me–and I never exclude such a possibility ) OR this is over analytical and an exercise in semantics. Nobody can really define God. Even when God showed himself in the Old Testament, He veiled his image so the people could bare to look. Remember the awe that Jesus inspired in the 3 apostles at his transfiguration? I don’t think we can define God because whatever our human senses attribute to him–He is ultimately greater than that! So for me, I will just say, like a little child, that I cannot comprehend God. I cannot list His attributes because God is far greater than myself or any human being and He loves and forgives more than I can wrap my mind around! But good luck figuring your hypothesis out! Maybe if you wrote ex-Pope Benedict he could answer you–he wrote a lot like this–and I never was able to really wrap my mind around his treatises either!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The question, as you pose it, is confused about its terminology. “Analytic” does not mean “necessarily true,” and “synthetic” does not mean “true but not necessarily true”.

“Analytic” is a property of a statement whose truth or falsity is a mere matter of the meanings of the words involved. For example, you can know that “The bachelor is male”, without looking at anything in the world.

“Synthetic” is a property of a statement whose truth and falsity involved something other than the meanings of words. For example, you cannot know whether “the cat is on the mat” without checking something other than the meanings of the words.

Now consider the statement “God is good.” If this statement is analytic, it means that the definition of God includes goodness, so the statement imports nothing outside of the meanings of words, and is analytic. It would seem.

But now consider the possibility that there is an omnipotent, omniscient creator who is BAD. In this case, since “God is good” is analytic, the creator would not be God. In other words, God would not exist.

So really, all our language analysis does is narrow down what WE mean by words. God could be necessarily, or contingently, good, but we can be sure that language itself won’t help us figure this out.

 

[Qoeleth]

The question, as you pose it, is confused about its terminology. “Analytic” does not mean “necessarily true,” and “synthetic” does not mean “true but not necessarily true”.

It is not less an authority than Quine who proposes ‘necessarily’ as an indicative marker of analyticity (e.g. “Bachelors are ‘necessarily’ unmarried”).

So would YOU say, “God is good” is a synthetic or an analytic judgement, within the context of the mainstream Christian theological tradition?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It is not less an authority than Quine who proposes ‘necessarily’ as an indicative marker of analyticity (e.g. “Bachelors are ‘necessarily’ unmarried”).

So would YOU say, “God is good” is a synthetic or an analytic judgement, within the context of the mainstream Christian theological tradition?

Quine is saying that “necessary implies analytic”. He is not saying that the two terms mean the same thing.

Kant disagrees, and says that some truths are necessary without being analytic: for example, “all equilateral triangles are equiangular.” I side with Kant.

But neither Quine or Kant agree with your definition of analytic and synthetic.

As for what I would say about “God is good”…

Suppose we assume that an omnipotent creator exists. If we allow ourselves the liberty to call the creator “God”, then we can ask the question whether God is good or bad. This is an open question – not determined by the meanings of words – so it is synthetic.

(But we can “load the dice” by saying that God is good “by definition”. Then if we find some godlike thing that is bad, God just wouldn’t exist.)

In other words, the whole question is mixed up, because it assumes that the way we use language has anything to do with the properties of objects that actually exist.

 

[Qoeleth]

In other words, the whole question is mixed up, because it assumes that the way we use language has anything to do with the properties of objects that actually exist.

Well, possibly, I did not explain things to well. Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa…

And, as I mentioned, my question does not pertain to anything about God Himself, but rather about the nature of theological discourse.

Are we manipulating definitions and ‘givens’, or are we discovering new things when we ‘do’ theology?

 

[inocente]

"By Hume’s fork, relations among ideas are strictly divided from states of actuality. Thus, among the necessary versus contingent (concerning reality), the a priori versus a posteriori (concerning knowledge), and the analytic versus synthetic (concerning statement), relations among ideas or the abstract are necessary, a priori, and analytic, whereas actualities or the concrete are contingent, a posteriori, and synthetic.

…]

Hume’s fork is often stated in such a way that statements are divided up into two types:

• Statements about ideas. These are analytic, necessary statements that are knowable a priori.
• Statements about the world. These are synthetic, contingent, and knowable a posteriori.

…]

If accepted, Hume’s Fork makes it pointless to try to prove the existence of God (for example) as a matter of fact. If God is not literally made up of physical matter, and does not have an observable effect on the world, making a statement about God is not a matter of fact. Therefore, a statement about God must be a relation of ideas. In this case if we prove the statement “God exists,” it doesn’t really tell us anything about the world; it is just playing with words. It is easy to see how Hume’s Fork voids the causal argument and the ontological argument for the existence of a non-observable (non-material) God. However, this does not mean that the validity of Hume’s Fork would imply that God definitely does not exist, only that it would imply that the existence of God cannot be proven as a matter of fact without worldly evidence."

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hume%27s_fork

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, possibly, I did not explain things to well. Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa…

And, as I mentioned, my question does not pertain to anything about God Himself, but rather about the nature of theological discourse.

Are we manipulating definitions and ‘givens’, or are we discovering new things when we ‘do’ theology?

Sorry, I mostly looked at the beginning of your original post, so I missed this part. Now my turn to mea culpa!

I believe in naturalized theology, that we look at the world to discover what God is like – including events like the Incarnation, of course. And we look to Scripture. Anything beyond that is speculation.

I think Christianity would be a lot better off without most theologians.

But some of them do a great job!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

"By Hume’s fork, relations among ideas are strictly divided from states of actuality. Thus, among the necessary versus contingent (concerning reality), the a priori versus a posteriori (concerning knowledge), and the analytic versus synthetic (concerning statement), relations among ideas or the abstract are necessary, a priori, and analytic, whereas actualities or the concrete are contingent, a posteriori, and synthetic.

…]

Hume’s fork is often stated in such a way that statements are divided up into two types:

• Statements about ideas. These are analytic, necessary statements that are knowable a priori.
• Statements about the world. These are synthetic, contingent, and knowable a posteriori.

…]

If accepted, Hume’s Fork makes it pointless to try to prove the existence of God (for example) as a matter of fact. If God is not literally made up of physical matter, and does not have an observable effect on the world, making a statement about God is not a matter of fact. Therefore, a statement about God must be a relation of ideas. In this case if we prove the statement “God exists,” it doesn’t really tell us anything about the world; it is just playing with words. It is easy to see how Hume’s Fork voids the causal argument and the ontological argument for the existence of a non-observable (non-material) God. However, this does not mean that the validity of Hume’s Fork would imply that God definitely does not exist, only that it would imply that the existence of God cannot be proven as a matter of fact without worldly evidence.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hume%27s_fork

Good thing Hume’s fork is flawed.