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Guest
One of the seriously problematic points in the recent “Fernandez Document” is the suggestion that the commission of what is “objectively adultery” but might be somehow be justified. Here is the text:
The answer is: NO. The self-defense which results in death is not itself a “killing” but a “defending” which happens to kill and incapacitates the assailant prior to and causally distinct from his death. (I am prepared to defend this point at a nauseating length - beginning with Thomas, then going through the whole modern debate from Avanzini to Eschbach to Penachini to Waffelaert to Grisez et al. to Long). But “killing” is not even intrinsically evil… The Scriptural sense of the actual word used in the 5th Commandment IS intrinsically evil, namely, “ratsach” - roughly, “to slay.” It is an inherently unjust kind of killing… Of course, there are many commandments in the Mosaic Law to kill, and yet this commandment is even normative for governments: nobody is exempt from the Decalogue. One must ask: what is wrong with “slaying”? It is the usurpation of the role of God (and those to whom he has delegated the authority to end life in his place, namely, government) which is necessarily manifested as a will contrary to the good of the individual. It is never good for a private individual - or for a government agent acting out of private animosity - to end a person’s life, because the order of nature insists on the preservation of the individual’s life except by the lawful execution of the State (or by God). (Anyone looking for a systematic defense of the death penalty from the Catholic perspective may find Dr. Feser’s new book on the topic quite helpful.)
Theft is only possible when property is not actually one’s own. The perennial understanding of property rights is that they only extend so far… When one has grave enough a reason to use some object which is not his according to civil law, it may be his according to moral law. It is impossible to steal what is morally one’s own. The civil law does not exist to provide for every situation… Even though a hardware store lawfully owns a sledgehammer, the person who breaks in and takes it to free a man trapped in his car has not stolen a sledgehammer. Why then, is stealing wrong? Because it ruins the order of ownership and therefore undermines civil life. But the order of ownership allows for these exceptional cases, where all things are owned by all inasmuch as they are truly, manifestly, immediately, and directly ordered to the good of the commonwealth.
This brings us to adultery… Even though the Archbishop says “fornication” (it is a translation), we are speaking of adultery. (There is no c. 915 prohibition on cohabitors, unless they are notorious, have been warned, and persist in the state.) There exists no case where a person may knowingly choose to have relations with a person other than his or her wife for any reason. Adultery, unlike “killing” or “taking what is not one’s own according to civil law,” is always wrong. There is no “uncertainty” on this point…
The absolute norm in itself does not admit exceptions, but that does not imply that its succinct formulation must be applied in every sense and without nuances in all situations. “Thou shalt not kill” does not admit exceptions. However, it raises this question: should taking life in self-defense be included within the term “killing” prohibited by the norm? Should taking food from others to feed a hungry child be included within the term “stealing” prohibited by the norm? No one would doubt that it is legitimate to ask whether these concrete cases are actually included within the narrow formulations of the negative precepts “Thou shalt not kill” or “Thou shalt not steal.”
The first paragraph suggests that “killing” and “stealing” are not the absolute moral norms they seem to be. After all, can one not “kill in self-defense,” or “steal in urgent need”?For this reason, it is also licit to ask if the acts of a more uxorio cohabitation should always fall, in its integral meaning, within the negative precept of “fornication”. I say, “in its integral meaning,” because it is not possible to hold that those acts in each and every case are gravely immoral in a subjective sense. In the complexity of particular situations is where, according to St. Thomas, ‘uncertainty increases.’ Indeed, it is not easy to describe as an ‘adulteress’ a woman who has been beaten and treated with contempt by her Catholic husband, and who received shelter, economic and psychological help from another man who helped her raise the children of the previous union, and with whom she had new children and cohabitates for many years.
The answer is: NO. The self-defense which results in death is not itself a “killing” but a “defending” which happens to kill and incapacitates the assailant prior to and causally distinct from his death. (I am prepared to defend this point at a nauseating length - beginning with Thomas, then going through the whole modern debate from Avanzini to Eschbach to Penachini to Waffelaert to Grisez et al. to Long). But “killing” is not even intrinsically evil… The Scriptural sense of the actual word used in the 5th Commandment IS intrinsically evil, namely, “ratsach” - roughly, “to slay.” It is an inherently unjust kind of killing… Of course, there are many commandments in the Mosaic Law to kill, and yet this commandment is even normative for governments: nobody is exempt from the Decalogue. One must ask: what is wrong with “slaying”? It is the usurpation of the role of God (and those to whom he has delegated the authority to end life in his place, namely, government) which is necessarily manifested as a will contrary to the good of the individual. It is never good for a private individual - or for a government agent acting out of private animosity - to end a person’s life, because the order of nature insists on the preservation of the individual’s life except by the lawful execution of the State (or by God). (Anyone looking for a systematic defense of the death penalty from the Catholic perspective may find Dr. Feser’s new book on the topic quite helpful.)
Theft is only possible when property is not actually one’s own. The perennial understanding of property rights is that they only extend so far… When one has grave enough a reason to use some object which is not his according to civil law, it may be his according to moral law. It is impossible to steal what is morally one’s own. The civil law does not exist to provide for every situation… Even though a hardware store lawfully owns a sledgehammer, the person who breaks in and takes it to free a man trapped in his car has not stolen a sledgehammer. Why then, is stealing wrong? Because it ruins the order of ownership and therefore undermines civil life. But the order of ownership allows for these exceptional cases, where all things are owned by all inasmuch as they are truly, manifestly, immediately, and directly ordered to the good of the commonwealth.
This brings us to adultery… Even though the Archbishop says “fornication” (it is a translation), we are speaking of adultery. (There is no c. 915 prohibition on cohabitors, unless they are notorious, have been warned, and persist in the state.) There exists no case where a person may knowingly choose to have relations with a person other than his or her wife for any reason. Adultery, unlike “killing” or “taking what is not one’s own according to civil law,” is always wrong. There is no “uncertainty” on this point…