Subsistence vs. hypostasis

[mardukm]

Is there a difference between the Latin understanding of “subsistence” and the Greek understanding of “hypostasis”?

According to this excerpt from St. Aquinas, there seems to be, but perhaps I am misinterpreting it: op.org/summa/letter/summa-Iq29a2.pdf

If you have any (other) sources you can quote on the matter, please do so. Thanks

Blessings

 

[Areopagite]

Is there a difference between the Latin understanding of “subsistence” and the Greek understanding of “hypostasis”?

According to this excerpt from St. Aquinas, there seems to be, but perhaps I am misinterpreting it: op.org/summa/letter/summa-Iq29a2.pdf

If you have any (other) sources you can quote on the matter, please do so. Thanks

Blessings

I really am not an expert on this. But I found this quote here (that may have nothing to do with what you’re talking about):

Henri Renard, S.J., The Philosophy of Being (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1943, 1946), p. 230.

Moreover, since the “to be” is the highest actuality in the order of being, and supposit (or hypostasis) demands the most perfect completeness in that order, it follows that the substantial “to be” by which a being subsists is of the very essence of the supposit. It is not the supposit itself, for the supposit includes the whole being; but we may say that it is its most important factor: for it is that because of which and by which a being attains its highest completion in the order of being, and by which it exists of its own right (it subsists).

So, unless I’m wrong, subsistence is a kind of actual existence, only applicable to complete substances … and when such a substance gains subsistence, it becomes a hypostasis (i.e. an individual substance). In this usage of these terms (which would be the Latin one … apparently), a “subsistence” would always be a “hypostasis” (for all subsisting things would be concrete, individual substances … i.e. hypostases). There is of course a conceptual distinction nonetheless here between the two, because subsistence is talking more about how it exists, whereas hypostasis conceptually includes its essence (and it’s existence? I’m not sure) … but this is minor.

Of course, as Thomas said, the Greeks said that hypostases were only defined as individual substances of a rational nature (i.e. persons). In which case, subsistence and hypostasis would not always coincide, but only when the substance in question was of a rational nature.

Does that make sense? Once again, I’m horridly unread in this topic. It’s quite confusing. I may have stated nothing but lies here for all I know.

 

[Ghosty]

Hypostasis literally translated is substance, and that’s what Aquinas is referring to in this passage. For example, when he distinguishes hypostasis from subsistence he says:

For, as it exists in itself and not in another,
it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist
which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies
some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as,
for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it
underlies the accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.”

Literally speaking, the hypostasis is simply the underlying substance that is covered by accidents. In a red car, for example, the car would be the substance, and the red would be the accident (think of nouns and adjectives).

In Byzantine theological usage, hypostasis doesn’t mean “substance”, but rather means “this existing substance of a rational nature”. It came to have this meaning because “ousia” was already used to mean the general, underlying nature even though it technically just means the definition of a thing and not necessarily a really existing substance (so it would normally refer to “car” rather than “this car”). In theological developments of language, hypostasis (which, in the car example, would be the car which underlies the color red) came to represent what we call in English “person”, because a person is the highest and most perfect example of hypostasis.

Subsistence refers specifically to that which exists of itself, and can refer to anything from a rock to a Divine Person. In terms of Divine Persons, subsistence and hypostasis have the same meaning, in Latin and Greek respectively. In both cases the terms mean “this individual thing with this particular nature”. The reason that the equivalent of hypostasis (substance) isn’t used in Latin is simply because it came to refer to the general nature in Latin theological tradition (and, linguistically speaking that is a more precise usage), while the term subsistence carries the actual intended meaning of “hypostasis”, even though it’s not the literal translation.

Hope that helps!