Substance dualism

[CatholicSoxFan]

If you’ve seen some of my other threads, you know that I’ve been looking into idealism, the view that mind is fundamental and that matter ultimately reduces to it. Along the way, I’ve discovered some serious problems with dualism, the view that both matter and mind are fundamental and don’t reduce to one another, not the least of which is the problem of interaction. Basically, if matter and mind can interact in any meaningful way, they must do so via s hared property. So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other. You also have some apologetics problems with materialists, because there is no example we have of any mind existing without a material brain, which is a real problem if we assume that there is such a thing as a material brain that isn’t itself reducible to mind. Now, I’ve heard from many here that Catholics can’t be idealists, and although a lot of the reasons given seem to be attacking something that I am not actually considering, and I haven’t actually been told everything Catholics have to believe on these matters and/or any dogmatic statements on idealism in particular, I am still very careful about just accepting it outright. But if I do discover that Catholics have to be dualists, I’m going to need an answer for these problems with it.

 

[Partinobodycula]

So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other.

I’m not sure that I completely understand where you’re coming from, but I’m trying to. However I absolutely love the above quoted line. For a solipsist the most fundamental question is, has all of this “stuff” created my mind, or has my mind created all of this “stuff”? To a solipsist it is impossible to know which of these scenarios is true. Or indeed, if either of them is true.

But the joy comes in considering the implications of both.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If you’ve seen some of my other threads, you know that I’ve been looking into idealism, the view that mind is fundamental and that matter ultimately reduces to it. Along the way, I’ve discovered some serious problems with dualism, the view that both matter and mind are fundamental and don’t reduce to one another, not the least of which is the problem of interaction. Basically, if matter and mind can interact in any meaningful way, they must do so via s hared property. So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other. You also have some apologetics problems with materialists, because there is no example we have of any mind existing without a material brain, which is a real problem if we assume that there is such a thing as a material brain that isn’t itself reducible to mind. Now, I’ve heard from many here that Catholics can’t be idealists, and although a lot of the reasons given seem to be attacking something that I am not actually considering, and I haven’t actually been told everything Catholics have to believe on these matters and/or any dogmatic statements on idealism in particular, I am still very careful about just accepting it outright. But if I do discover that Catholics have to be dualists, I’m going to need an answer for these problems with it.

You have a lot of confusion here. First, you never sacrifice a teaching of the Church in order to satisfy the objections of an opponent. Secondly, I’m not sure whether or not a Catholic can be an " idealist. " I think that would depend on exactly what you mean by " idealism, " which you have not defined. Thirdly, the fact that the mind operates through a material brain and that no one can explain how this can be does not require that you sacrifice the nature of the spiritual soul, nor does it mean that you sacrifice the material brain. It simply means that no one, absolutely no one, can explain how this can be.

But we do know that the Church teaches that God created man out of the physical material of the universe and gave man a spiritual soul. The Church has ratified this Biblical teaching through its Doctrine. The Chruch goes so far as to describe the human soul as the life force of man, the source of his intellect and will ( spritual, immaterial powers ), and calling the soul the " form " of man ( In Aristotelian/Thomistic terms this means the substantial form of man). So it would be a violation of Biblical and Catholic teaching to disagree with either of these, the material body or the spiritual, intellectual, life giving form she calls the soul.

This is not dualism. It is a serious error to label it so. The body of man and the soul of man are the Principles ( causes ) of his very being. Each works in tandem with the other. However, it is the soul which governs and directs all of man’s activities, even down to all his natural functions such as digestion. Without the soul man would do nothing, he would not be a man.

Just how the soul does this is a mystery, it just is. If your friends cannot accept that, all you can do is pray that they will eventually accept what the Church teaches and also much of what Thomas Aquinas says about these things - since these naturally follow.

But please refrain from calling this material, spiritual relationship dualism. The Church does not refer to it that way and neither did Thomas Aquinas. And it too easily recalls the " dualism " of Descartes which is to be rejected all together.

Linus2nd

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

You have a lot of confusion here. First, you never sacrifice a teaching of the Church in order to satisfy the objections of an opponent. Secondly, I’m not sure whether or not a Catholic can be an " idealist. " I think that would depend on exactly what you mean by " idealism, " which you have not defined. Thirdly, the fact that the mind operates through a material brain and that no one can explain how this can be does not require that you sacrifice the nature of the spiritual soul, nor does it mean that you sacrifice the material brain. It simply means that no one, absolutely no one, can explain how this can be.

But we do know that the Church teaches that God created man out of the physical material of the universe and gave man a spiritual soul. The Church has ratified this Biblical teaching through its Doctrine. The Chruch goes so far as to describe the human soul as the life force of man, the source of his intellect and will ( spritual, immaterial powers ), and calling the soul the " form " of man ( In Aristotelian/Thomistic terms this means the substantial form of man). So it would be a violation of Biblical and Catholic teaching to disagree with either of these, the material body or the spiritual, intellectual, life giving form she calls the soul.

This is not dualism. It is a serious error to label it so. The body of man and the soul of man are the Principles ( causes ) of his very being. Each works in tandem with the other. However, it is the soul which governs and directs all of man’s activities, even down to all his natural functions such as digestion. Without the soul man would do nothing, he would not be a man.

Just how the soul does this is a mystery, it just is. If your friends cannot accept that, all you can do is pray that they will eventually accept what the Church teaches and also much of what Thomas Aquinas says about these things - since these naturally follow.

But please refrain from calling this material, spiritual relationship dualism. The Church does not refer to it that way and neither did Thomas Aquinas. And it too easily recalls the " dualism " of Descartes which is to be rejected all together.

Linus2nd

I don’t know that much about the difference between the mind and the soul (I’ll have to look more into that), but I don’t deny that our bodies exist, or that they are made of what the universe is. And of course I wasn’t suggesting that you should deny that matter is fundamental if the Church says so because of that, just that it is a serious objection that I will have to learn the answer to if I find out that the Church really does teach that idealism is false. Thanks for the reply, I’ll keep searching.

Btw, Craig gave what I think is a good illustration of how mind-body interaction works. He compares the mind to a musician using an instrument, the body. If the body/instrument is damaged, nothing about the musician himself is damaged, but his ability to make music with that instrument is.

 

[GEddie]

It would not seem that mind is fundamental; at least in human life, it depends wholly on physical processes; and when those fail, the mind disappears (“death”).

Yet at the same time, it makes no sense that either matter or mind would reduce to the other.

ICXC NIKA

 

[Counterpoint]

If you’ve seen some of my other threads, you know that I’ve been looking into idealism, the view that mind is fundamental and that matter ultimately reduces to it. Along the way, I’ve discovered some serious problems with dualism, the view that both matter and mind are fundamental and don’t reduce to one another, not the least of which is the problem of interaction. Basically, if matter and mind can interact in any meaningful way, they must do so via s hared property. So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other. You also have some apologetics problems with materialists, because there is no example we have of any mind existing without a material brain, which is a real problem if we assume that there is such a thing as a material brain that isn’t itself reducible to mind. Now, I’ve heard from many here that Catholics can’t be idealists, and although a lot of the reasons given seem to be attacking something that I am not actually considering, and I haven’t actually been told everything Catholics have to believe on these matters and/or any dogmatic statements on idealism in particular, I am still very careful about just accepting it outright. But if I do discover that Catholics have to be dualists, I’m going to need an answer for these problems with it.

Several points:

1. I believe that Thomistic metaphysics is the de facto metaphysics of Catholicism.
2. Thomistic metaphysics is based on hylomorphism (the dualism of form and matter), not substance dualism. (The term “information” is the contemporary term for “form.” Information is what “in-forms” matter. In fact, digital physics is based on the duality of information and matter; digital physics (e.g. Wheeler’s “participatory universe”) is compatible with idealism.

"“Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being.”

Barrow and Tipler believe that this is a valid conclusion from quantum mechanics, as John Archibald Wheeler has suggested, especially via his idea that information is the fundamental reality, see It from bit, and his Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP) which is an interpretation of quantum mechanics associated with the ideas of John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner." (source: Wikipedia: Anthropic principle)

1. I believe that Thomistic metaphysics is compatible with Bishop Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

“Hence the fundamental idea of this philosophical system (as represented by Berkeley or Mach) is that things are complexes of ideas or sensations, and only subjects and objects of perceptions exist. Berkeley summarized his theory with the motto “esse est percipi” (“To be is to be perceived”), but went on to elaborate it with God as the source of consensus reality and other particulars.” (source: Wikipedia: Subjective idealism)

 

[polytropos]

Idealism is an incredibly broad term. There is a very technical sense in which even Thomism is considered to be a form of idealism, since the forms instantiated by concrete entities pre-exist in the mind of God, who sustains substances/form-instances in being constantly. (Though, in effect, it does not come close to Platonism or the later idealisms, ie. Kant, Hegel, etc.) That isn’t to say that matter is reducible to mind, though.

The Church does not have any official pronouncements regarding substance dualism or idealism, though its general Thomist bent might produce some tension. The tendencies in substance dualism and idealism to divorce the mind from the person are incompatible with Catholicism; that’s not to say that varieties cannot be formulated which do not do so, but they are tendencies that have marked those traditions historically.

Pope John Paul II was a leading proponent of “Lublin Thomism” which synthesized some idealist insights with Thomism to create a sort of “phenomenological Thomism.” But he maintained the Thomist tradition’s philosophy of mind.

I think both substance dualism and idealism are weak positions these days anyway. Neither of them seem to handle embodied mind objections or Wittgenstein’s private language argument, whereas hylemorphic dualism, in my view, can. I think hylemorphic dualism is also correct to locate the specifically human in the intellect, rather than the possession of qualia.

The issue, really, is materialism. Substance dualism is basically materialism that realizes that qualia and intentionality cannot be accommodated by materialism, so it makes something of an ad hoc exception. Hylemorphism as a metaphysics is not properly a monism, and has a number of desirable resources to face contemporary mind-body issues. Forms permit a better solution to the problem of other minds. The fact that souls are a special case of more general forms (and that human souls are a special case of animal forms) makes the theory far less ad hoc than substance dualism, in my view. Thomist metaphysics in general can accommodate intentionality better than can materialism, so it is not as perplexing that animals share so many features with us. Et cetera.

 

[polytropos]

It’s also worth mentioning some advantages that hylemorphic dualism has vis-a-vis the interaction problem. Substance dualism, property dualism, and emergentism sometimes face issues (depending on how they are formulated) in positing forces caused mentally but which influence the physical. Hylemorphic metaphysics, though, endorse causal pluralism, so hylemorphists can make sense of mental events without recourse to any forces which could be charged with violating the laws of physics. Such an analysis can also have implications for the understanding of free will as well as (speaking theologically) the nature of grace (ie. what role do we play in our salvation if God saves us through grace, which is offered to everyone?).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It would not seem that mind is fundamental; at least in human life, it depends wholly on physical processes; and when those fail, the mind disappears (“death”).

Yet at the same time, it makes no sense that either matter or mind would reduce to the other.

ICXC NIKA

It is the brain that depends on physical process. The mind or intellect thinks, wills, and has some powers of memory without dependence on the brain. But the mind does depend on the senses and the brain to process its access to the singular perceptions of reality. Don’t confuse the mind with the soul. The mind represents the intellectual powers of the soul. The mind, like the intellect which is identified with it is a purely spiritual power. The soul, as the substantial form of man, directs and controls all his non-intellectual activities as well.

And you are right, matter cannot be reduced to the immaterial. Mind cannot be reduced to matter, nor can matter be reduced to the spiritual and immaterial.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Idealism is an incredibly broad term. There is a very technical sense in which even Thomism is considered to be a form of idealism, since the forms instantiated by concrete entities pre-exist in the mind of God, who sustains substances/form-instances in being constantly. (Though, in effect, it does not come close to Platonism or the later idealisms, ie. Kant, Hegel, etc.) That isn’t to say that matter is reducible to mind, though.

I think it would be incorrect to say the " forms " pre-existed in the mind of God. This would be what Plato taught ( though I’m no expert on that ). It would be better to say that God had knowledge of the " forms " He would create in the beings He created. He instantiated the " forms " he knew.

Linus2nd.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Several points:

1. I believe that Thomistic metaphysics is the de facto metaphysics of Catholicism.

Though I would love to agree with this, it is not true. Catholicism has no " official " metaphysics. It borrows and uses whatever is true from many philosophies.

1. Thomistic metaphysics is based on hylomorphism (the dualism of form and matter), not substance dualism. (The term “information” is the contemporary term for “form.” Information is what “in-forms” matter. In fact, digital physics is based on the duality of information and matter; digital physics (e.g. Wheeler’s “participatory universe”) is compatible with idealism.

Though I understand what you are saying, it is an affliction of modern philosophers that they feel compelled to speak of " dualism. " Neither Aristotle nor Thomas Aquinas employed this term when speaking of the realtionship between matter and form, potency and act, etc as principles of material reality. Ever since Decartes the philosophical discussion has been clouded by this term. It would be much better if it were avoided when speaking of hylomorphism.

1. I believe that Thomistic metaphysics is compatible with Bishop Berkeley’s subjective idealism.

Never. Berkeley was one of the principle actors leading to the present confusion in philosophy. He and Hume and Decartes caused a three hundred year decline in Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics.

Linus2nd

 

[GEddie]

It is the brain that depends on physical process. The mind or intellect thinks, wills, and has some powers of memory without dependence on the brain. But the mind does depend on the senses and the brain to process its access to the singular perceptions of reality. Don’t confuse the mind with the soul. The mind represents the intellectual powers of the soul. The mind, like the intellect which is identified with it is a purely spiritual power. The soul, as the substantial form of man, directs and controls all his non-intellectual activities as well.

And you are right, matter cannot be reduced to the immaterial. Mind cannot be reduced to matter, nor can matter be reduced to the spiritual and immaterial.

Linus2nd

I didn’t conflate the mind with the soul. To my understanding, soul = life and mind is a function of that life (in a human soma).

But intellect would seem to go into abeyance without the services of the neuroanatomy, in that after general anesthesia, a chokehold on the neck, or an old-fashioned knock on the head, no intellectual processes take place.

ICXC NIKA

 

[polytropos]

I think it would be incorrect to say the " forms " pre-existed in the mind of God. This would be what Plato taught ( though I’m no expert on that ). It would be better to say that God had knowledge of the " forms " He would create in the beings He created. He instantiated the " forms " he knew.

Linus2nd.

Well, there are two sorts of forms in Thomistic ontology: those that are concrete and particular (like your soul and my soul), and abstract and universal (like your concept of “cat”). The latter “exist” only mentally. But they do preexist in God’s mind; God has knowledge of universals. Further, the principle of proportionate causality suggests that for God to sustain created substances in existence (and to direct them toward their ends), he must in some sense cognize their forms, which he possesses qua universals.

This isn’t quite what Plato taught, since it does not undermine the physical world, nor does it repudiate the existence of concrete, individual forms.

I think you’re right to say that God has knowledge of the forms. But in the Thomistic account of knowledge, that implies that the forms in some sense preexist in God qua universals. (That preexistence is, of course, understood in terms of analogy and divine simplicity.)

 

[Counterpoint]

Though I would love to agree with this, it is not true. Catholicism has no " official " metaphysics. It borrows and uses whatever is true from many philosophies.

I said it was the “de facto” metaphysics, not the “official” metaphysics of Catholicism.

Though I understand what you are saying, it is an affliction of modern philosophers that they feel compelled to speak of " dualism. " Neither Aristotle nor Thomas Aquinas employed this term when speaking of the realtionship between matter and form, potency and act, etc as principles of material reality. Ever since Decartes the philosophical discussion has been clouded by this term. It would be much better if it were avoided when speaking of hylomorphism.

It doesn’t matter if neither Aristotle nor Aquinas employed the term. Hylemorphism qualifies as a form of dualism - the duality of form and matter. The form is the soul of the body. In fact, Aristotelianism qualifies as a form of animism because all matter is ensouled.

Never. Berkeley was one of the principle actors leading to the present confusion in philosophy. He and Hume and Decartes caused a three hundred year decline in Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics.

Perhaps, I should qualify my previous comment. I believe there is compatibility with the basic premise of idealism as expressed by the motto “esse est percipi” (“to be is to be perceived”).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well, there are two sorts of forms in Thomistic ontology: those that are concrete and particular (like your soul and my soul), and abstract and universal (like your concept of “cat”). The latter “exist” only mentally. But they do preexist in God’s mind; God has knowledge of universals. Further, the principle of proportionate causality suggests that for God to sustain created substances in existence (and to direct them toward their ends), he must in some sense cognize their forms, which he possesses qua universals.

This isn’t quite what Plato taught, since it does not undermine the physical world, nor does it repudiate the existence of concrete, individual forms.

I think you’re right to say that God has knowledge of the forms. But in the Thomistic account of knowledge, that implies that the forms in some sense preexist in God qua universals. (That preexistence is, of course, understood in terms of analogy and divine simplicity.)

Yes, I agree with that. The qualifier is " universal, " since a universal is an idea and God clearly has " ideas. "

Linus2nd

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

If you’ve seen some of my other threads, you know that I’ve been looking into idealism, the view that mind is fundamental and that matter ultimately reduces to it. Along the way, I’ve discovered some serious problems with dualism, the view that both matter and mind are fundamental and don’t reduce to one another, not the least of which is the problem of interaction. Basically, if matter and mind can interact in any meaningful way, they must do so via s hared property. So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other. You also have some apologetics problems with materialists, because there is no example we have of any mind existing without a material brain, which is a real problem if we assume that there is such a thing as a material brain that isn’t itself reducible to mind. Now, I’ve heard from many here that Catholics can’t be idealists, and although a lot of the reasons given seem to be attacking something that I am not actually considering, and I haven’t actually been told everything Catholics have to believe on these matters and/or any dogmatic statements on idealism in particular, I am still very careful about just accepting it outright. But if I do discover that Catholics have to be dualists, I’m going to need an answer for these problems with it.

It is important to remember that the moniker “dualist” was applied to thinkers in the western theistic tradition like Aristotle and Aquinas (among others) by those who were already committed physicalists. Given their commitment to materialistic monism and the conviction that everything supervenes on the physical, theists or Aristotelians would then appear to be dualists.

Aristotle and Aquinas would not see themselves as dualists, since it is perfectly normal for being to include simple and composed substances and to range from stones to God. There is a continuum in being.

Descartes is another story. He truly works out of an unbridgeable (almost unbridgeable) split be res cogitans (thinking thing) and res extensa (extended/corporal thing).

 

[yppop]

If you’ve seen some of my other threads, you know that I’ve been looking into idealism, the view that mind is fundamental and that matter ultimately reduces to it. Along the way, I’ve discovered some serious problems with dualism, the view that both matter and mind are fundamental and don’t reduce to one another, not the least of which is the problem of interaction. Basically, if matter and mind can interact in any meaningful way, they must do so via s hared property. So, either matter shares a mental property with mind or mind shares a physical property with matter. But this would mean that both matter and mind aren’t fundamental after all, and one ultimately reduces to the other. You also have some apologetics problems with materialists, because there is no example we have of any mind existing without a material brain, which is a real problem if we assume that there is such a thing as a material brain that isn’t itself reducible to mind. Now, I’ve heard from many here that Catholics can’t be idealists, and although a lot of the reasons given seem to be attacking something that I am not actually considering, and I haven’t actually been told everything Catholics have to believe on these matters and/or any dogmatic statements on idealism in particular, I am still very careful about just accepting it outright. But if I do discover that Catholics have to be dualists, I’m going to need an answer for these problems with it.

Hello Boston
I read your OP with great interest. You introduced a subject close to my heart (and mind). I believe that a plausible explanation of how the material and the spiritual interact (the mind/body problem) depends on the acceptance of idealism as you define it in your first sentence. Dualism as you describe it in your second sentence (Cartesian or substance dualism) is not accepted Catholic teaching.

I have worked out a way to explain how the mind is fundamental to the material, i.e., idealism. The thesis that I developed is based on the idea that the spiritual substance can be modeled as “continuous space”, which can be described by the real numbers. Matter is modeled as discrete space, which can be described by the rational numbers. The real numbers contain the rational numbers, hence continuous space permeates discrete space, and the spiritual permeates the material. Since by “physical” I mean anything associated with the four basic elements of reality, namely, space, matter, energy, and time, the “physical” (discrete space) is of the same substance but different modality than the “spiritual” (continuous space). Using this foundation of two modalities of space to describe objective reality is what I believe is meant by “hylomorphism”.

This subject and my thesis was discussed at great lengths on two other threads: “Space” introduced by JDaniel, now on page 69 and my thread, “How God Exists” now on page 83. IMO the “Space” thread presents my thesis better because it contains a more coherent discussion. In both threads I make the mistake of using the word “duality” indiscriminately. If you do read either thread just substitute “hylomorphism” for “dualism” and “duality”.

Yppop

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hello Boston
I read your OP with great interest. You introduced a subject close to my heart (and mind). I believe that a plausible explanation of how the material and the spiritual interact (the mind/body problem) depends on the acceptance of idealism as you define it in your first sentence. Dualism as you describe it in your second sentence (Cartesian or substance dualism) is not accepted Catholic teaching.

I have worked out a way to explain how the mind is fundamental to the material, i.e., idealism. The thesis that I developed is based on the idea that the spiritual substance can be modeled as “continuous space”, which can be described by the real numbers. Matter is modeled as discrete space, which can be described by the rational numbers. The real numbers contain the rational numbers, hence continuous space permeates discrete space, and the spiritual permeates the material. Since by “physical” I mean anything associated with the four basic elements of reality, namely, space, matter, energy, and time, the “physical” (discrete space) is of the same substance but different modality than the “spiritual” (continuous space). Using this foundation of two modalities of space to describe objective reality is what I believe is meant by “hylomorphism”.

This subject and my thesis was discussed at great lengths on two other threads: “Space” introduced by JDaniel, now on page 69 and my thread, “How God Exists” now on page 83. IMO the “Space” thread presents my thesis better because it contains a more coherent discussion. In both threads I make the mistake of using the word “duality” indiscriminately. If you do read either thread just substitute “hylomorphism” for “dualism” and “duality”.

Yppop

I have addressed your " ideas " on your thread as follows " Re: God exists; but how?

---

I think the ideas being presented by this O.P. are dangerous beyond belief. I’m very surprised how many gullible Catholics are giving it serious consideration. I urge everyone on this thread to stop being amature theologians and stick to what is true and safe. How many of you have taken up a serious study of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas? Yet you discuss things which have been rebuted by Aristotle and Thomas.

Experimental theology is a very dangerous topic.

A public forum, open to children, adults, the educated and the uneducated is not the proper place to do expermental theology. Write your papers if you wish but submit them for Peer review in the proper periodicals and in the proper venues.

Linus2nd

 

[yppop]

I have addressed your " ideas " on your thread as follows " Re: God exists; but how?

---

I think the ideas being presented by this O.P. are dangerous beyond belief. I’m very surprised how many gullible Catholics are giving it serious consideration. I urge everyone on this thread to stop being amature theologians and stick to what is true and safe. How many of you have taken up a serious study of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas? Yet you discuss things which have been rebuted by Aristotle and Thomas.

Experimental theology is a very dangerous topic.

A public forum, open to children, adults, the educated and the uneducated is not the proper place to do expermental theology. Write your papers if you wish but submit them for Peer review in the proper periodicals and in the proper venues.

Linus2nd

Linus,
Whoa there cowboy! Back up a bit! Am I to understand that you are accusing me of heretical thoughts? Are you issuing a monitum? Or is this merely a puritanical rant of a mind that hasn’t advanced beyond the 13th century?

Why don’t you tell me which of my ideas are “dangerous”? A clearly articulated example should do. If you can do that, I promise to withdraw from this forum, because it has been a waste of my time for the following reason:
In spite of your observation that “I’m surprised how many gullible Catholics are giving it serious consideration”, I have found only a scant few that briefly skimmed the surface of my thesis and they soon lose interest. So, you see, Linus my dear, you don’t have to worry your sweet little mind about all the respondents that you condescendingly consider to be gullible, the church is safe from this amateur theologian.

However on second thought, you may be right about the danger of my influence. Although I have yet to find many who seem to understand my ideas, I do generate an inordinate amount of interest with my posts. Interest can be surmised by dividing the number of visits to one’s page by the number of that person’s posts. My interest quotient presently is: 3216 / 532 = 6.04 visits per post. Yours is: 4533/4907 = .92. visits per post.

Yppop

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Linus,
Whoa there cowboy! Back up a bit! Am I to understand that you are accusing me of heretical thoughts? Are you issuing a monitum? Or is this merely a puritanical rant of a mind that hasn’t advanced beyond the 13th century?

Why don’t you tell me which of my ideas are “dangerous”? A clearly articulated example should do. If you can do that, I promise to withdraw from this forum, because it has been a waste of my time for the following reason:
In spite of your observation that “I’m surprised how many gullible Catholics are giving it serious consideration”, I have found only a scant few that briefly skimmed the surface of my thesis and they soon lose interest. So, you see, Linus my dear, you don’t have to worry your sweet little mind about all the respondents that you condescendingly consider to be gullible, the church is safe from this amateur theologian.

However on second thought, you may be right about the danger of my influence. Although I have yet to find many who seem to understand my ideas, I do generate an inordinate amount of interest with my posts. Interest can be surmised by dividing the number of visits to one’s page by the number of that person’s posts. My interest quotient presently is: 3216 / 532 = 6.04 visits per post. Yours is: 4533/4907 = .92. visits per post.

Yppop

Be careful, there, let’s not turn this into a mud-slinging contest.