Summa Theologica - God is simple

[Gorgias]

Consider this, I am physically - sticking to the physicality of my body - made, on the subatomic level, entirely of the same substance, yet I am also physically composed of specific parts. What is the difference?

You’re going to hate to read this, but… you’re using ‘substance’ in a way that’s different from its use in a philosophical context. (See… told ya you’d hate to hear it!)

So, you can’t just say “God is spirit but made up of particular substance-parts, just as I’m human but made up of particular substance-parts”, as a way to conclude “so, since I’m composite, so must be God.”

Understanding the nature of the Godhead isn’t easy, and there have been many ideas floated to explain it that aren’t correct. Have you ever seen the “Lutheran Satire” series of cartoons on YouTube? There’s one – St Patrick’s Bad Analogies – which is pretty spot-on in identifying and (briefly) discussing a number of the ways that we might misunderstand “persons” in the Godhead.

 

[SeekerOfTruth7]

God cannot be a composite of parts, for as has been said above, then something would have to put those parts together, then that puts us into an infinite regress, which then leads to no first mover so then no second mover and so on so then nothing. God must be simple, that is, not made up of parts.
@aitapyh gave me a couple good laughs when he went on to ask if an entity composed of a single part can be considered to be without parts in the plural. Asking if an entity is composed of a single part is like asking if a circle can be square. It doesn’t make sense and is illogical. The very fact that God is simple means that he is not composed of any parts. He is his essence and existence. If He were composed of parts, then He would not be His existence, leading Him to not be immutable. God being simple is foundational for God being God. If he is the creator, the First Mover, the First Efficient Cause, then He must be absolutely simple.
Any argument against leads to blunders like we see above, claiming an entity that is a single part is composed. Doesn’t make sense.
Aquinas response defeats @aitapyh argument against divine simplicity:

 

[SeekerOfTruth7]

" First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in [God], since He is not a body; nor composition of [matter] and [form]; nor does His [nature]differ from His “suppositum”; nor His [essence] from His [existence]; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and [accident]. Therefore, it is clear that [God]is nowise composite, but is altogether simple.

Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but [God] is the first being, as shown above ([I:2:3]).

Thirdly, because every composite has a [cause], for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something [causes] them to unite. But [God]is uncaused, as shown above ([I:2:3]), since He is the first efficient [cause].

Fourthly, because in every composite there must be [potentiality] and [actuality]; but this does not apply to [God]; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.

Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a [form], viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the [essence] of white; nevertheless in the [form]itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since [God] is absolute [form], or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. [Hilary] implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "[God]), Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."

 

[FChichizola]

Aquiana’s reply to its Artiche 5, second objection may help here:

“The statement that composites are better than simplicity is true only for created beings because they cannot be altogether simple. Therefore we must look for perfection in many things. However, perfection of a divine goodness is found in one simple thing (God).”

 

[Vico]

Now here you have posted and he has stated something only wisdom could have provided. By Gods grace I am thankful I can recognize this. I appreciate your sharing this.

The de fide dogma on divine simplicity was given many years before St. Thomas Aquinas was born (1225).

The Lateran Council IV 1215
Ecumenical XII (against the Albigensians, Joachim, Waldensians etc.
The Trinity, Sacraments, Canonical Mission, etc.*
Chap. 1. The Catholic Faith

(Definition directed against the Albigensians and other heretics]

428 Firmly we believe and we confess simply that the true God is one alone, eternal, immense, and unchangeable, incomprehensible, omnipotent and ineffable, Father and Son and Holy Spirit: indeed three Persons but one essence, substance, or nature entirely simple. The Father from no one, the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Spirit equally from both; without beginning, always, and without end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the Holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal and omnipotent and coeternal; one beginning of all, creator of all visible and invisible things, of the spiritual and of the corporal; who by His own omnipotent power at once from the beginning of time created each creature from nothing, spiritual, and corporal, namely, angelic and mundane, and finally the human, constituted as it were, alike of the spirit and the body. For the devil and other demons were created by God good in nature, but they themselves through themselves have become wicked. But man sinned at the suggestion of the devil. This Holy Trinity according to common essence undivided, and according to personal properties distinct, granted the doctrine of salvation to the human race, first through Moses and the holy prophets and his other servants according to the most methodical disposition of the time.

Reference: Denzinger, Sources of Catholic Dogma: Denzinger - English translation, older numbering

 

[Dimmesdale]

A while back this was a hard nut for me to crack myself. How can that which is without form, lead to something formful? Looking at it again, it doesn’t seem to be the non-sequitur it was at one time for me. God if he is omnipotent could apparently create the world out of nothing. There doesn’t appear to be a contradiction. Of course if you think of it in terms of a seed and a tree, and DNA, etc, then of course with such an interpretation you may not see how it can occur. But God is independent of any reality external to Himself. He is “Other”, set apart, holy.

 

[Vico]

…
Composition MAY imply parts but it certainly doesn’t have to eliminate the simplistic nature of what those “parts” may be made of. …

Divine simplicity only rules out distinctions that require composition, not other distinctions.

 

[Gorgias]

Composition MAY imply parts but it certainly doesn’t have to eliminate the simplistic nature of what those “parts” may be made of.

Composition does imply parts. What those parts are made up of, themselves, is irrelevant.

Take a tea pot consisting of three parts; the pot, the handle, the spout.

That’s not necessarily what we’re talking about in terms of “parts”, in the context of composition. What you’ve done here is defined “parts” in a way that ignores that these have the same physical makeup, and then you’re using that identical makeup to attempt to deny that these are all composites of given materials. You could ignore “pot”, “handle”, and “spout”, and you’d still have a teapot that’s a composite of particular materials, and not anything that’s “simple”.

So tell me what is the substance of a tea pot,

In Thomistic terms, it’s what makes a teapot a “teapot” (and not something else).

Can you possibly impart any meaningful phrase to describe this substance in distinction from any other substance apart from accidents which underlies the subject of its existence?

Teapots are containers in which tea is brewed. There ya go! Nothing about ‘accidents’ there!

In set theory the fundamental difference between the null set and a set composed of one element is that the null set comprises no corresponding elements with the set consisting of one element.

Precisely! So, the “empty set” has no elements, whereas sets that are not the empty set have elements (even if only one element).

So, the empty set has cardinality 0, whereas a set with only one element has cardinality 1.

What’s being attempted to be claimed here is that the empty set is equivalent to the set with one element, merely because the set with one element does not have two or more elements. Fundamentally, that’s a mistaken notion. The empty set and any other set are distinct; sets with one or more than one element have more in common than any of them with the empty set.

My example does not deal with the empty set comprised of no applicable elements, it deals with sets whose minimum qualifications are existent elements of substantial equality no matter how few or many.

And that’s the whole point. “Simple” entities are more akin to the empty set, and “composite” entities are more akin to sets with one or more elements. There’s a distinct qualitative differences (which, both in terms of entities and sets, we can perceive through quantitative measures).

 

[Gorgias]

So the question is, if the same substance underlies each element, what is the difference between the sets apart from quantity?

We might consider a projection of these sets, then. We might take the set that has many members with substance commonality, and project it onto a set using a function that maps based on substance. That set would have at least one member (a member that speaks to the specific substance), and that would distinguish it from a set that has no members. Recall that God has no physical substance, and you’ll see the point.

Do you honestly believe these statements impart any meaningful information about the entity whose nature is considered simple?

Umm… yes!

It says absolutely nothing about the function, capability, or distinction let alone anything else comprehensive about the entity.

Sure. Yet, “function”, “capability”, and “distinction” are not “substance”, which is really at the heart of the discussion, no?

Are you saying that nothing metaphysically simple can ever be a “part” of something else in that it effects that something else’s existence somehow?

You’re moving the goalposts.
“Effects something else’s existence” isn’t the question – substance is, no?

Since reality is comprised of God

Not physically. Not in substance.

These constructs are nothing but word games

Ahh… that’s the claim of someone who’s about to abandon the project of attempting to substantiate his assertions, no…?

 

[Vico]

Distinction by definition when combined in a whole implies a part of that whole. Why are we stuck on the word composition? The word is being mistaken in this context for
Composition
noun

1the act of combining parts or elements to form a whole.

2the resulting state or product.

3manner of being composed; structure:
This painting has an orderly composition.

4makeup; constitution:
His moral composition was impeccable.

5an aggregate material formed from two or more substances:
a composition of silver and tin.

6a short essay written as a school exercise.

The word MAY imply parts: 1, 2, 5, but it is also used to indicate a state of being…4. In my earlier posts I defined my use. I presume God is in some sort of state of being? I think the problem is trying to conceive of what is meant by stating God is simple. What do you gather the simplicity of God means? How can you have distinction within the same entity without referencing that distinction as a part of the whole?

Vico:

Divine simplicity only rules out distinctions that require composition, not other distinctions.

Wonderful, but how does this simplicity rule out composition requiring distinction and then how can other distinctions arise without being composed?

You asked: “I presume God is in some sort of state of being?”
Philosophically being is the real, and corresponds to essence (what is).

Well, the question is incorrect, it should be this:

… how does this simplicity rule out distinction requiring composition and then how can other distinctions arise without being composed?

Distinction with composition: different ingredients.

Distinction without composition:

• Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (~ 475 – 524 CE) states that relations are predicated relatively, and thus do not import composition in that of which they are predicated.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

You asked: “I presume God is in some sort of state of being?”
Philosophically being is the real, and corresponds to essence (what is).

I’m sorry I don’t understand what your trying to convey here in correction of my statement. Are you saying that Gods essence is real being? The essence of God is being real? The essence of God is what is his being? What added meaning or clarification are you presenting?

Well, the question is incorrect, it should be this:

How do you have an incorrect question? Do you mean the question is misapplied to our discussion? If it is misapplied then what can it be applied to?

… how does this simplicity rule out distinction requiring composition and then how can other distinctions arise without being composed?

You’ve left out the important relation of each distinction within the whole as related to the whole

Distinction without composition:

• Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (~ 475 – 524 CE) states that relations are predicated relatively, and thus do not import composition in that of which they are predicated.

It is self evident that any distinct thing is predicated relative to the relation it has with other things distinct from itself. Consider, the composition is not imported relative to themselves in their distinction but this says nothing about importing composition to that which each is predicated in relation to in common other than between themselves.
Consider also that any relation between two things relative to their distinction is predicated on those things being composed differently. While the relation itself may be simple in its predicating; two things either are distinct or are the same, the predicating of distinction is not. If we have exact composition in each entity then we have no distinction. We may include other distinctive features such at time displacement or relative locality etc. but here again is a comparison of composed distinction. One is composed of something lacking in the other in its distinction. Even in consideration of two absolutely simple things, if their simplicity is not identical in which case you have one thing then their distinctive simplicities must be composed of those things which make them distinct. Location in space, time, self identity etc. Composition does not have to be relegated solely to the physical realm. You cannot comprehensively talk about distinction within a whole without importing composition to that whole if that distinction is of a necessity in defining that whole.

I am pointing out that composition and distinction were reversed in your sentence from that I posted.

Father, Son, Holy Spirit indicates the distinction, but is does not imply three separate gods. Their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the other, all in the essence.

 

[Gorgias]

I’ve defined my term. It is aptly applied as defined.

Umm… I’m happy for you?

God must be in a state of being, therefore this state is what he is composed of.

No. Aquinas asserts that God’s existence is His essence, not that God is comprised of anything. So, you’re falling into the trap of presuming “composition” where none exists. It kinda bends your mind a little bit, since it’s different from what we see with composite beings… but that’s the whole point! He isn’t a composite being!

No, your mind is naturally doing what it was designed to do…apply your experience of the natural world to the case at hand.

Funny, that… this is my precise criticism of your approach!

I am talking here about the idea of a tea cup, not any particular tea cups actual physical existence.

You’re actually not, since you’re appealing to a particular design with particular composite parts.

How is it that an idea can be composed of different materials?

How is it that an idea has “'pot”, “handle”, and “spout”? See the problem with your assertion?

I’d be as justified to say that purple goo allows all things to exist simply because we cant understand what purple goo is.

Well… at least that wouldn’t propose that God is composite, and so that would be an improvement!

You misunderstand what an accident is. The pot could just as well have been created for another purpose and it is by accident that the pot brews tea.

“By accident”? No, sir… you understand what an ‘accident’ is, in philosophical terms.

So what causes us to recognize a pot as a tea pot? Its accompanying accidents of course.

Nope. Accidents don’t make a teapot.

One [accident] of which is its use in brewing tea.

Oh, boy. You’re horribly misunderstanding the (Aristotelian) description of ‘cause’. Let’s review some basics:

• The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g., the bronze of a statue.
• The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
• The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice, the father of the child.
• The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools.

So, in talking about “accidents”, you’re either talking about material or form, but not the ‘final cause’, which is what a teapot is, qua teapot.

 

[Gorgias]

I can only say again that I’m not dealing with empty sets.

You should be, since that’s what analogous to simple entities: no composition of other elements (even of a single element).

I don’t use the empty set in this case because the empty set is by definition empty. In other words no existent entity is represented in the empty set.

Close. No cigar, though. The empty set exists.

 

[Vico]

… If the persons are equally God in themselves there is no relationship unless you relate themselves to themselves which adds no meaning to the term relationship. …

The relations are essential, so no, they are not God in themselves – there is no independence, rather penetration. See the teaching of perchoresis which means the penetration and indwelling of the three divine persons reciprocally in one another. There are four internal divine relations in the Holy Trinity, of which only three are really distinct relations. The four are paternity, filiation, active spiration (not really distinct), and passive spiration.

St. Gregory of Nyssa wrote: “Though we hold that the nature is not different, we do not deny the difference arising in regard of the source and that which proceeds from the source; but in this alone do we admit that one Person differs from another.”

 

[Vico]

Consider you still must define these substances by their accompanying “accidents” in order to render real existence to the substances. …

God is only substance, since by definition divinity is that true being that can admit no accidents.

 

[EndTimes]

Im reading Suma Theologica and it keeps saying that God is simple. Im a little over 300 pages in but Im having a hard time trying to understand God as simple considering He is the creator of everything. Any help understanding this concept?

Summa… Is very very long … and unfinished

and you’re very far from finishing the remainder

What is your purpose in reading it?

 

[JimG]

God is ontologically simple; but this thread can get pretty verbose.
God is pure spirit. Spirit is simple, having no extension in space or time. No parts to extend in space. No parts which can come apart. No temporality, as He possesses all his existence not as a series of events but as eternally now.

 

[JimG]

Yes, angels are spirit. They are non-material, spititual entities. So is the human soul a spiritual entity. God is infinite uncreated all powerful spirit. Angels are spiritual beings created by God, each angel unique, but not infinite, not omnipotent. Human beings are a composite of body and spirit.

Spirit does not occupy space or time. Human beings exist in space and time by reason of our bodies but our spiritual soul is eternal–it has a beginning but no end. It would be incorrect to think of the human soul as “spread out” over the body, since spirit does not take up space. A spirit can be said to be in the place where it acts; and our soul is so intimately united with our body that we are not two beings but one, our soul the life principle of the body. The soul can only be separated from the body by death.

Mortimer Adler wrote that angels can be thought of as “minds without bodies,” They obtain knowledge not through the senses, as do humans, but by immediate intuition.

Just because a being is a spirit, does not mean that all spiritual beings are the same. Spiritual beings are as varied and more so than human beings.

 

[JimG]

What do you think this means? What does it mean to experience an “eternal now”? How is it you can experience an eternal now in the absence of a temporal framework since eternity is defined in temporality.

It means that for God, what we perceive as past, present, or future, are to Him all immediately present.

Think of a television image, which is formed pixel by pixel and line by line over a defined temporal span, yet we perceive the whole picture at once. God sees all of time at once.

 

[EndTimes]

God is ontologically simple; but this thread can get pretty verbose.
God is pure spirit. Spirit is simple, having no extension in space or time. No parts to extend in space. No parts which can come apart. No temporality, as He possesses all his existence not as a series of events but as eternally now

Simple?

That’s immensely simplistic compared with God’s ongoing unfurling Revelation to Man, Yes?